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Preface 
 
Dear Readers, 
 
You are holding in your hands a publication, which is a collective work of the 
lecturers and participants of the 9th Batthyány Summer School, which was held 
from 13th to 19th July 2014, in Győr, Hungary, organised by the Batthyány Lajos 
College. 
 
The Batthyány Summer School is open for university students, doctoral students 
and young researchers, who seek an opportunity to spend a week in a Visegrád 
country in an inspiring international environment. This program is a mixture of 
academic, social, cultural and free-time activities. Such a platform for scientific 
debate beyond the boundaries of one country contributes to the global view on 
social sciences, which is so important in current days. 
 
The participants of the 9th Batthyány Summer School could listen to lectures given 
by famous experts of the legal, political, economic science, and sociology also. 
This year the lectures focused on the global and local issues of the 21st century, 
from the point of view of law, economy and other social sciences. The topics 
included the sustainable development, the challenges of the international relations, 
the challenges of the European Union and the challenges of the state in the 21st 
century. 
 
Besides the academic program, the participants had the chance to learn about the 
rich cultural heritage of the city of Győr, Hungary and the Central-European 
region. The program included sightseeing trips, cultural events as well. The visit 
to the thousand-year-old Abbey of Pannonhalma, is always one of the most popular 
activity of the Summer School. 
 
On the so-called Cultural Evenings, participants from each country showed the 
others the cultural, historical, natural beauties of their country, possibly the 
musical, singing and dancing traditions as well. These events help the participants 
understand other cultures, find the endless richness of diversity in each other, and 
thus develop tolerance, and a better dialogue of cultures. 
 
Honour and obeisance behoves to the organisers of the 9th Batthyány Summer 
School: Laura Hegedűs, Csilla Gömbös, Georgina Sarlós and Petra Ujvári. 
 
Contributions contained in this collection reflect all those features.  
 
dr. János Kálmán 
Head of Batthyány Lajos College 
Széchenyi István University 
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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership  
– The Revival of Bilateralism? 
 
HORVÁTHY, Balázs 
Széchenyi István University 
Faculty of Law and Political Sciences 
Department for Public and Private International Law 
Győr, Hungary 
HAS CSS Institute for Legal Studies 
Budapest, Hungary 
horvb@ga.sze.hu 
Abstract 
The trade negotiations between the EU and the US on the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (T-TIP) are obviously showing that the regulation of international 
economic and trade relations is tending to go off the track of multilateralism and switch to 
the bilateral regulation of international trade between the two major economic blocs of the 
world. Moreover, the T-TIP might overstep the borders of the multilateral framework of the 
trade liberalization, doing far more than merely to eliminate the already low average tariffs 
and targets the non-tariff barriers that are typical trade obstacles for the relations between 
the well-developed industrial nations. The main aim of the present paper is to analyze the 
characteristics of this bilateral segment of world trade, provide a general examination of 
the trade relations between the EU and US in the light of the EU negotiation mandate. 
 
Keywords: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Bilateral trade agreements, 
Trade and Environment, Foreign direct investments 
 
JEL classification: K33; F21, Q56 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The trade negotiations between the EU and the US on the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (T-TIP) has been launched last year, aiming the most 
ambitious – ‘comprehensive’ (Barroso)1 and ‘high-standard’ (Obama)2 – trade 
                                                 
1 “A future deal will give a strong boost to our economies on both sides of the Atlantic. It 
will be a comprehensive agreement going beyond tariffs, by integrating markets and 
removing barriers. It is estimated that, when this agreement is up and running, the European 
economy will get a stimulus of half a per cent of our GDP – which translates into tens of 
billions of euros every year and tens of thousands of new jobs.” Speech of José Manuel 
Durão Barroso, former President of the European Commission. See BARROSO, JOSÉ 
MANUEL DURÃO: Statement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Joint 
press conference, Brussels (13 February 2013), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-121_en.htm [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
2 “Promoting growth, creating jobs, strengthening the middle class-these are the principles 
that animate President Obama's economic policies, including this Administration's trade 
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agreement ever attempted, due to both its scale and its significance for the 
transatlantic relationship between the European Union and the United States. 
Moreover, this time the chances of success of the agreement seem more feasible 
than ever. From an economic point of view, the growth is weak equally in the EU 
and the US, however, the monetary and fiscal policy instruments are largely 
exhausted.3 The trade growth has been slow-moving because of the effects of the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 and subsidy and regulatory policies that impede 
commercial activity.4 Structural reforms are demanded in both regions, from which 
the prospect of economic growth is expected. Moreover, both EU and US have 
widely lost market shares in the last two decades. Therefore, the liberalization of 
bilateral trade relations could increase their ability to compete with the emerging 
economies.  
On the other hand, from the perspective of the international economic law, the 
negotiations on the T-TIP are showing that the regulation of international economic 
and trade relations is tending to go off the track of multilateralism and switch 
obviously to the bilateral regulation of international trade between the two major 
economic blocs of the world. Moreover, the T-TIP could overstep the borders of 
the multilateral framework of the trade liberalization, doing far more than merely 
to eliminate the already low average tariffs and targets the non-tariff barriers as 
well, which are typical trade obstacles for the relations between the well-developed 
industrial nations.5  
The main aim of the present paper is to analyze the characteristics of this 
bilateral segment of world trade from the perspective of the international economic 
law. The paper starts with a general examination of the bilateral trade relations 
between the EU and US, then, it goes over the EU negotiation mandate, 
highlighting two specific and disputed fields, the trade and environment, and the 
investment provisions.  
                                                 
policy. As President Obama said […], T-TIP can be a success if »we can achieve the kind 
of high-standard, comprehensive agreement that the global trading system is looking to us 
to develop.«” Michael Froman, the U. S. Trade Representative cited president Obama in 
his speech, see FROMAN, MICHAEL: Remarks at the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership First Round Opening Plenary (July 8, 2013), in Law and Business Review of 
the Americas, Vol. 19. (2013), 135-136.  
3 See FELBERMAYR, GABRIEL J. – LARCH, MARIO: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP): Potentials, Problems and Perspectives, in CESifo Forum, Vol. 14. No. 
2. (2013), 49-60.  
4 SCHOTT, JEFFREY J. – CIMINO, CATHLEEN: Keys to negotiating the transatlantic trade and 
investment partnership, in Intereconomics, Vol. 48. No. 4. (2013), 263-264. 
5 According to the EU Commission’s document, it is actually an average of 4 %, see: 
Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on a 
comprehensive trade and investment agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, between the European Union and the United States of America. 
COM(12.3.2013) 136 final. There are some tariffs peaks for sensitive products on both 
sides of the Atlantic, e.g. tobacco, textiles and clothing, sugar, footwear, dairy products and 
some vegetables.  
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2. THE RISE OF BILATERALISM AND THE EU-US TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
“We are living in a trading environment of bilateralism” – Abbott has admitted 
already in 2007, and made attempts to examine the possible consequences of the 
rising bilateral trends in the EU trade policy.6 The current EU–US negotiations can 
be regarded also a part of this tendency, which is now suggesting that the 
significant trading countries or trade blocs, like the European Union are seeking 
more frequently the opportunities in the bilateral trade negotiations, instead of 
bringing the even extending trade agenda to multilateral level. In more concrete 
terms, it means that the postponement of the Doha Round has somewhat weakened 
the desire for multilateral trade agreements,7 and bilateral agreements, or regional 
integrations seem to be back in favor.8 The advantages of the revival of bilateralism 
are quite palpable: while multilateral negotiations are more comprehensive and 
beneficial at global level, bilateral agreements are faster, and the countries 
involved can focus purely on their requirements without having to build common 
negotiating objectives among blocs of countries.9 Moreover, achievements from 
bilateral negotiations can be accomplished gradually, and bilateral negotiations 
also enable countries to give more reflections on the regional and socio-political 
conditions of the negotiating parties, which can pave the way to reach 
compromises on ‘tailor-made’ agreements. This feature is hardly feasible in 
multilateral negotiations.  
In terms of the trade statistics, the EU, and the US have already the largest 
bilateral trade relationship in the world. Each is the other’s largest export market, 
and the investment relations between the two trade blocs are also significant. The 
US–EU bilateral trade in goods and services totals approximately 1000 billion US 
dollars annually, and the US and the EU are also heavily investing in each other’s 
market (almost 3000-4000 billion US dollars a year).10 In other terms, the US 
invests considerably more in the EU than in all of Asia – three times more 
according to the European Commission – while the EU invests considerably more 
in the US than in China and India combined – eight times more.11  
                                                 
6 ABBOTT, FREDERICK M.: A new dominant trade species emerges: Is bilateralism a threat? 
in Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 10. No. 3. (2007), 571-583. 
7 BARUA, AKRUR – BANDYOPADHYAY, SUNANDAN: Revival in international trade and the 
resurgence of bilateralism, in Global Economic Outlook, No. 2. (2014), 60. Available at: 
http://dupress.com/articles/global-economic-outlook-q2-2014-revival-in-international-
trade-and-the-resurgence-of-bilateralism/ [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
8 Cf. PARDAVI LÁSZLÓ: A globális gazdaság vámjogának alapkérdései (különös tekintettel 
a preferenciális szerződésekre) [Main questions of the global economy’s customs law (with 
specific regard to the preferential agreements)], Dissertation (manuscript), 2014, Széchenyi 
István University, Győr, 55. 
9 BARUA – BANDYOPADHYAY: op. cit. 60-61. 
10 SCHOTT – CIMINO: op. cit. 263.  
11 See trade policy website of the European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/ [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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The T-TIP is not the first attempt to conclude an EU-US bilateral trade 
agreement. Between 1994 and 1996, a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) was 
under discussion, but formal negotiations were never started,12 because the priority 
at that time was to ensure the stability of the newly formed World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The current negotiations are rooted in a summit meeting held 
on 28 November 2011, when Commission President José Manuel Barroso, EU 
President Herman Van Rompuy and US President Barack Obama established the 
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG). The task of the Group 
was to identify policy measures, which are capable of increasing trade and 
investment between the two major economic areas, the United States, and the 
European Union.13 The HLWG has issued an interim report in 2012, which referred 
to the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement as the best policy option. The final 
report has been adopted on 13 February 2013,14 which recommended to open 
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the EU with the United States. The 
opening of the negotiations was cordially announced by US President Obama and 
EU Commission President Barroso. According to the report, the subject of the 
negotiations shall be the liberalization of agricultural products, industrial goods, 
services, of public procurement and investments as well as a regulation of 
intellectual property rights.  
3. THE EU’S MANDATE AND THE ’RED-HOT’ ISSUES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 
3.1. Obscurity over the EU negotiation mandate and the main objectives of the 
T-TIP 
The European Commission has elaborated the framework of the mandate for the 
negotiation in March 2013, however only its summary has been published.15 
According to the frequently criticized EU practice, in the field of external trade, 
                                                 
12 WRÓBEL, ANNA: Multilateralism or bilateralism: The EU trade policy in an age of the 
WTO crisis, in Ekonomika, Vol. 92. No. 3. (2013), 20. 
13 The bilateral trade relationship is extremely important for both partners. The EU is first 
trading partner of the US (17.6% in trade in goods), and the US is the EU's second largest 
trading partner with 13.9% in trade in goods. Together the EU and the US account for 
approx. 50% of global GDP, 1/3 of total world trade. Bilateral trade volume of goods and 
services amounted to 702.6bn euro (2011), bilateral investment stock was 2.394 trillion 
euro (2011). See Commission Staff Working Document – Executive Summary of the 
Impact Assessment on the Future of the EU-US Trade Relations, SWD(12.3.2013) 69 final, 
2.  
14 Final Report High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (February 11, 2013), 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf [cit. 
2014-12-19]. 
15 Member States endorse EU-US trade and investment negotiations, DG Trade News 
Archive (14 June 2013), available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index. 
cfm?id=918 [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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the whole text of the negotiating mandate is never published, as it is always 
submitted to the Council and the Parliament as restricted – i.e. confidential – 
document. As a result, officially we shouldn’t know further information than the 
above-mentioned summary and some other clarifications made public by the 
European Commission. Not surprisingly, however, the negotiation mandate 
classified as ‘restricted document’ has been leaked quickly, and it is accessible on 
the Internet even today. In late November 2014, the Commission has changed its 
policy regarding the ‘secrecy’ of international trade negotiation and made 
commitments to conduct a more transparent trade policy and provide more space 
for public participation.16 
However, some ‘hints’ can help to cover up the objectives of the negotiations. 
As the name of the preparatory body of the negotiations suggests (‘High Level 
Working Group on Jobs and Growth’), the overriding policy objectives of the T-
TIP is to create more jobs and boosting economic growth. The expected impacts 
were analyzed in a commissioned study published in 2013,17 which have estimated 
the overall economic impacts,18 as well as the sectorial impacts19 of the eventual 
conclusion of an ambitious T-TIP between EU and US. However, from legal and 
regulatory point of view the most important question is that how these economic 
gains arise? According to the 2013 study of CEPR, the key part of the liberalization 
within the prospective T-TIP will be the reduction of non-tariff barriers, it will be 
a key part of the transatlantic liberalization. The study has concluded that the 
majority – as much as 80% – of the total potential gains might come from cutting 
costs imposed by trade bureaucracy and regulations, as well as from liberalizing 
trade in services and public procurement.20 
In addition to that, according to the short texts, and other summarizing 
documents brought out by the Commission, at least the directions of the 
                                                 
16 To be more precise, the Commission was pressurized by the Ombudsman and the CJEU 
in order to involve the public into the decisions on international trade issues. See especially, 
C-350/12 P. Council versus in’t Veld, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039.0. 
17 Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) for European Commission – Reducing 
Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic Assessment (March 2013; 
hereinafter: CEPR assessment paper), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf [cit. 2014-12-19]. The study suggested, that an ambitious 
agreement could bring significant economic gains as a whole for the EU (€119 billion a 
year) and US (€95 billion a year).This translates to an extra €545 in disposable income 
each year for a family of 4 in the EU, on average, and €655 per family in the US. 
18 It is also interesting the benefits for the EU and US would not be at the expense of the 
rest of the world. On the contrary, liberalizing trade between the EU and the US would 
have a positive impact on worldwide trade and incomes, increasing global income by 
almost €100 billion. 
19 Income gains are a result of increased trade. EU exports to the US would go up by 28%, 
equivalent to an additional €187 billion worth of exports of EU goods and services. Overall, 
total exports would increase 6% in the EU and 8% in the US.  
20 See Independent study outlines benefits of EU-US trade agreement, European 
Commission, MEMO/13/211 (12 March 2013), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-211_en.htm [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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negotiations can be already seen. In terms of that, the objectives of the negotiations 
cover two big areas and other miscellaneous issues.  
Firstly, the EU is trying to put the questions of the market access on the 
agenda. The market access encompasses the following main topics:  
 removing tariffs on transatlantic trade in industrial and agricultural 
products; 
 reconciling the EU and the US approaches to rules of origin, which are 
used to determine the origin of a product for the purpose of trade rules;  
 discussing the question of the Trade Defence Measures, namely, the EU 
wants to establish a regular dialog with the US on anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy measures; 
 opening up more access for transatlantic trade in services, at both federal 
and sub-federal level, and ensuring that European professional 
qualifications can be recognized in the US;  
 securing investment liberalization at both federal and sub-federal level 
and potentially, to establish investment protection provisions;  
 providing access to government procurement markets at all levels of US 
government.  
The second big issue is the elimination of the regulatory trade barriers. This 
term refers to a variety of trade obstacles, which can take different forms. In 
general, two main categories are covered with the term ‘non-tariff-barriers.’ Firstly, 
it includes the whole range of quantitative restrictions that directly restrict market 
access (e.g. import quotas), and secondly, it covers regulations, which add to the 
cost of export into that market, e.g. domestic regulations requiring expensive 
reconfiguration of products, or adapting the technical parameters (environmental 
standards of cars, standards and product requirements of foods, administrative 
measures, e.g. price controls etc.). From the perspective of their effects, this 
category might cover, e.g. the need to have to allow products separately for both 
markets, often on the basis of different procedures and conditions for admission; 
different environmental, health or consumer protection policy standards: different 
industrial standards, packaging requirements and information or labelling 
obligations; regulation of access to public procurement procedures or economic 
development programs, such as the state export credit insurance, etc.21 Therefore 
the terms refers typically to the so-called ‘behind-the-border’ barriers to trade.22  
These differences in domestic regulations, technically, can be addressed by 
                                                 
21 Expressive examples are examined by Lester and Barbee, illustrating how fruit and 
vegetable product can sizes, or car headlights standards can operate as regulatory trade 
barriers, see LESTER, SIMON – BARBEE. INU: The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory 
Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol. 16. No. 4. (2013), 848. 
22 See SADIKOV, AZIM: Border and Behind-the-Border Trade Barriers and Country Exports, 
in IMF Working Paper (WP/07/292), December 2007. Available at: https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07292.pdf [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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three major approaches.23 The first method is the unification, which provides a tool 
for establishing the same requirements in all contracting countries. However, the 
unification has its limitations; namely, if strong industrial actors are competing in 
the market at stake, setting common standards is much more than difficult. 
However, it is not impossible, even today unified standards are working in several 
areas, like telecommunication, IT technologies, automotive industry, or 
international aviation and maritime transport. Secondly, the harmonization implies 
the alignment of regulations to a single best practice. Usually a voluntary 
agreement, harmonization can be based on a reference to international standards 
from a standard-setting body, or simply involve coordination among nations. 
Countries agree, in general to converge on a single standard or regulation. This is 
usually the most difficult way to achieve regulatory cooperation, in part because 
countries are reluctant to adjust their standards, and also because the harmonization 
of standards requires complete consensus. Thirdly, the principle of mutual 
recognition can also help to eliminate the regulatory trade barriers; it is especially 
useful in eliminating duplicative testing and certification processes.24 
All of these approaches would facilitate trade by reducing the regulatory 
hurdles faced by prospective exporters both sides, in that they would save them the 
trouble of complying and/or demonstrating that they have complied with, a 
different regulatory regime. The question arises, however, how the EU and US can 
find a compromise on these issues. Probably, the solution should simply be to 
remove regulatory divergences that are accidental or serve no purpose. However, 
it is inevitable that both negotiating parties must accept some inefficiency and 
higher costs.25  
In addition to the market access, and the regulatory trade barriers, the 
objectives of the EU encompass other particular and colorful issues, such as the 
intellectual property rights,26 customs and trade facilitation, trade in energy and 
raw materials, trade-related aspects of small and medium-sized enterprises, state-
owned enterprises, or trade and environment, and the inclusion of investment 
arbitration clauses.  
                                                 
23 LESTER, SIMON: Tackling Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, in CARDOSO, DANIEL (et. al., ed.): Transatlantic Colossus – Global 
Contributions to Broaden the Debate on the EU-US Free Trade Agreement, 2013, Berlin 
Forum on Global Politics, Berlin, 84. 
24 Both the EU and the US have already concluded Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(MRAs), and even the EU and the US has common agreement on specific issues. The 
MRAs have the objective of promoting trade in goods between the contracting parties by 
facilitating market access. They are, in general, bilateral agreements, and aim to benefit 
industry by providing easier access to conformity assessment. The EU has currently MRA 
with USA, and Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland.  
25 See Lester’s example: if a car producer wants to sell vehicles in the United Kingdom, it 
must account for the UK’s use of left-hand drive traffic. LESTER – BARBEE: op. cit. 856. 
26 The main objective here is to reconcile different US and EU approaches to specific 
issues, such as protection for Geographical Indications, which is vital in several EU made 
products, e.g. Tokaji vine, or parma ham.  
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It would not be feasible to extend the analysis to the whole range of the 
covered topics, however, we refer to specific examples, which shed light on the 
particularity of the European perspective and can give illustration of issues – ‘red-
hot issues’ –, over which the negotiating parties have considerably divergent 
visions. The first example focuses on the trade and environment issues, the second 
will examine the debate on the investment arbitration.  
3.2. Example 1: Trade and environment on the agenda of the transatlantic 
negotiations 
The role and stance of the European Union to the ‘Trade and Environment’ 
debate,27 comparing with the US position, represents a very strong commitment to 
the real inclusion of environmental concerns into the legal framework of the world 
trade. From the perspective of the ongoing negotiation on a transatlantic free trade 
and investment partnership agreement, it means that a successful compromise can 
be reached only if the striking divergence between the positions of the parties can 
be reconciled. However, it is hard to pave the way to a mutually acceptable 
agreement not only because of the big differences in the positions of the parties, 
but also because of their specific interest. At the current stage of the negotiations 
it is hardly possible to foresee, which compromise could be found regarding the 
disputed issues, in which the EU has expressed crucial interest in the last two 
decades (from the past e.g. GMOs, hormone treated-beef and pork, chlorine-
sterilized chicken, or quite recent disagreements on the so-called ‘fracking’ shale 
gas reserves).  
However, is the reconciliation of these positions really required? On the one 
hand, technically, it is not, in other terms an agreement could be concluded without 
real inclusion of ‘bridges’ between the trade and environmental concerns. On the 
other hand, the chance of the ratification of such a treaty would be precious little. 
The specificity of the EU’s position to the ‘Trade and Environment’ issues has its 
roots not only in the EU law, but also in a kind of European sensitivity to 
environmental concerns. Therefore an agreement without the real inclusions would 
                                                 
27 See for ‘Trade and Environment’ debate, ARAYA, MONICA – FIGUERES, JOSE MARIA – 
SALAZAR-XIRINACHS, JOSE M.: Trade and Environment in the World Trade Organization: 
The Need for a Constructive Dialogue, in SAMPSON, GARY (ed.): The Role of the WTO in 
Global Governance, 2001, United Nations University Press, New York, 156; SANTARIUS, 
TILMAN (et al.): Balancing Trade and Environment: An Ecological Reform of the WTO as 
a Challenge in Sustainable Global Governance, 2004, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, 
Environment and Energy, Wuppertal, 18; KESERŰ, BARNA ARNOLD: A fenntartható 
fejlődés a GATT-WTO normarendszer tükrében [The sustainable development in the light 
of the GATT-WTO law], Diskurzus, Special Edition (2013), 34-41; KESERŰ, BARNA 
ARNOLD: Review on the Role of Green Technologies in Hungarian Policies Concerning 
Sustainability, in KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS (ed.): Legal Studies on the Contemporary Hungarian 
Legal System, 2014, Universitas-Győr Nonprofit Kft., Győr, 190-223; VÍG, ZOLTÁN: 
Szabadkereskedelem és környezetvédelem: a WTO Vitarendezési Testületének gyakorlata 
[Free trade and environment: the case law of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body], in CSEHI, 
ZOLTÁN – RAFFAI, KATALIN (ed.): Állam és magánjog [State and private law], 2014, 
Pázmány Press, Budapest, 427-438. 
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be politically unacceptable in Europe. Over this, the question can be raised finally, 
what kind of compromise would mean a real solution, which can bring the 
concerns of trade as well as of the environment together. Essentially, four basic 
concerns could be highlighted, which are pivotal elements of an ‘environmentally 
conscious’ trade agreement.  
First an ‘environmentally conscious’ trade agreement sets down the most 
important, environmentally relevant principles and objectives and makes clear the 
relationship between these principles and the principles of the free trade. It is 
important to ensure that these principles and objectives have legal effects as well 
(e.g. as tools of the interpretation in the dispute settlements etc.), and that the 
principles of the free trade should not overrule the environmental principles and 
objectives. The principle structure of the EU funding treaties furnishes a good 
instance of that solution, when introducing a clear stucture between the 
environmental concerns, as the general principle of the EU’s external activities, 
and the free trade and liberalization, as principles of the Common Commercial 
Policy. The negation mandate of the European Union is a good base towards this 
compromise, but at this time, the details in this regard are not clear. According to 
the public summary of the mandate, this part of the agreement (e.g. its preamble) 
should express the commitment to sustainable development and the contribution 
of international trade to sustainable development “[…] in its economic, social and 
environmental dimensions, including economic development, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all as well as the protection and preservation of 
the environment and natural resources […].”28 Questionable is, however, the 
notion of ‘sustainable development’. If we interpret this reference in context with 
the EU law, the proposition of the EU is that the agreement should recognize the 
sustainable development as an overarching objective, as well as the aim of the 
parties at promoting high levels of protection for the environment. In this regard, 
the mandate emphasizes a specific objective as well. In terms of that the 
Agreement should also recognize that the Parties will not encourage trade or 
foreign direct investment by lowering domestic environmental standards. In other 
words, the agreement should prevent the ‘race to the bottom’ effect, which could 
lead to sinking the level of protection in the contracting parties. 
Second, the agreement should also cover substantive provisions, which 
enables the parties to introduce measures with the intention to achive 
environmental objectives. However, the real question is whether also the 
guarantees should be established, which can prevent the parties from introducing 
illicit discriminatory measures in this way. In this regard the mandate is not clear 
enough, it refers only general statements which are in line with the proposed 
principles and objectives, but the material content of this chapter is questionable. 
The mandate stresses only that the separate chapter of ‘Trade and sustainable 
development’ will include commitments by both parties in terms of the trade and 
                                                 
28 See Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on 
a comprehensive trade and investment agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, between the European Union and the United States of America. 
COM (12.3.2013) 136, paragraph 6.  
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sustainable development. Consideration will be given to measures to facilitate and 
promote trade in environmentally friendly and resource-efficient goods, services 
and technologies, including through green public procurement and to support 
informed purchasing choices by consumers. Besides the Agreement will also 
include provisions to promote adherence to and effective implementation of 
internationally agreed standards and agreements in the labor and environmental 
domain as a necessary condition for sustainable development,29 end the importance 
of implementation and enforcement of domestic legislation on labor and 
environment should be stressed as well. It should also include provisions in support 
of internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility, as well 
as of the conservation, sustainable management and promotion of trade in legally 
obtained and sustainable natural resources, such as timber, wildlife or fisheries’ 
resources. The future Agreement will foresee the monitoring of the 
implementation of these provisions through a mechanism including civil society 
participation, as well as one to address any disputes.  
It should be also noted that the mandate refers, among the market access rules, 
to the general exceptions under the WTO law, noting that the agreement should 
have a general exception clause based on Articles XX and XXI GATT and Articles 
XIV and XIVbis GATS. In the context with the non-tariff barriers, the agreement 
should also reflect on the specificity of Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS). 
According to the mandate, on SPS measures, the negotiations shall follow the 
former negotiating directives of the EU.30 In terms of that, the parties shall 
establish provisions that build upon the WTO SPS Agreement and on the 
provisions of the existing veterinary agreement, introduce disciplines as regards 
plant health and set up a bilateral forum for improved dialogue and cooperation on 
SPS issues. Moreover the chapter on the SPS measures should be based on “[…] 
the key principles of the WTO SPS Agreement, including the requirement that each 
side's SPS measures be based on science and on international standards or 
scientific risk assessments, applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health, and developed in a transparent manner, without 
undue delay […].”31 In addition to that the proposed agreement should also touch 
upon the technical regulations, which is also an important regulatory area from an 
environmental perspective. In line with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT), the EU’s mandate foresees also provision. The objectives of these 
provisions would be to generate greater openness, transparency and convergence 
in regulatory approaches and requirements and related standards-development 
processes, as well as, inter alia, to reduce burdensome testing and certification 
requirements, promote confidence in our respective conformity assessment bodies, 
and enhance cooperation on conformity assessment and standardization issues 
globally. 
Third, the essential element of such an agreement is also a dispute resolution 
system, which can effectively reconcile the disagreements of the contracting 
                                                 
29 Recommendation for a Council Decision… COM (12.3.2013) 136, paragraph 25. 
30 Adopted by the Council on 20 February 1995, see Council Doc. 4976/95.  
31 See Recommendation for a Council Decision… COM (12.3.2013) 136, paragraph 18. 
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parties. In this regard the main point is that the proposed the dispute resolution 
procedure should be applied to the ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ chapter. 
In other terms, the agreement has to express clearly that the same implementation 
requirements are to be applied to this chapter as for all other content of the 
agreement. The EU mandate touches upon the question of the dispute resolution 
but it is silent on its possible extent. Therefore, it is still unknown, how these 
requirements will be applied to the trade and environmental matters.  
Finally, the fourth requirement is that a trade agreement which takes into 
consideration the environmental interest should make clear its relationship to the 
multilateral environmental agreements. One option could be that the most 
important relevant agreements previously concluded by the EU32 are to be listed 
explicitly in the text agreement. This concern is totally in compliance with the EU 
commitments to these issues, as it was mentioned before, the EU has intended to 
make provision regarding the multilateral environmental agreements already in the 
course of the Uruguay round. However, the current and publicly accessible 
information on the EU mandate is silent on this issue.  
3.2. Example 2: Investor-State Dispute Resolution in the T-TIP 
As the title of the T-TIP suggests, it will contain provisions regarding the 
investment activities as well. A typical feature of the investment treaties is the set 
of rules providing mutual protection for investors, including specialized 
mechanism of dispute resolution (Investor-State Dispute Resolution – ISDS). The 
ISDS can be regarded as a general ‘guarantee’ of the agreement that entitles the 
investors to initiate procedures directly against the host state, if it is deemed to 
breach the obligations arising from the agreement. The main reason of the ISDS 
clauses in the investment treaties is to provide an investor-friendly environment 
and encourage the foreign investments in the participating countries. However, the 
ISDS is recently in center of debates, specifically in the European Union. 
Problematic is not only the ongoing negotiation on T-TIP, but we can currently also 
observe a competence struggle between the European Union and its Member 
States. It is because the Treaty of Lisbon established the framework of the 
exclusive competence in the field of the foreign direct investments, however, the 
more than 1000 bilateral treaties previously concluded by the Member States could 
not yet replaced by new Treaties negotiated by the European Union, therefore the 
Member States are allowed to maintain their old investment treaties and 
relationships for a transitory period.33 The European Commission is wholly 
                                                 
32 The most significant agreements are as follows: Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting 
Substances, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticide. 
33 See 1219/2012/EU European Parliament and Council Regulation (12th December 2012) 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between 
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concerned over the application of the new Union competence and it clearly wants 
to uphold this issue on the agenda of the T-TIP negotiations in spite of the weighty 
public opposition. Consequently, the T-TIP seems to be a ‘pilot project’ of the 
Commission, which might indicate the particularity of the competence division 
between the Union and the Members States and have a long-term effect on the EU 
investment policy, hoping, that the T-TIP would serve as a model agreement for 
the future negotiations, thus the T-TIP would have precedent value in this respect.  
However, neither all Member States nor the academia are convinced about the 
necessity of the investment provisions. Among the EU Member States, Germany 
has expressed the harshest criticisms on the necessity of the investment chapter 
and of ISDS provisions within the T-TIP, highlighting a several concerns about the 
inclusion of investment protection provisions. It was argued, that these provisions 
might lead to litigious activity against EU member states by US investors, which 
observation was based on the empiric experiences, which are showing, that that 
US had launched by far the largest number of ISDS claims and were supported by 
“equally litigious” US law firms, who “dominate the global arbitration business.34 
In addition, the academia has publicly criticized the proposed ISDS clause in 
T-TIP as well. The worldwide known international law professor, Martti 
Koskenniemi has highlighted a number of concerns that are to be considered, if the 
EU would decide to put the question on the negotiation agenda.35 Firstly, he 
remarked, that the ISDS clause is not adequate in the USA-EU relationship. It is 
because corporations investing in unstable, typically non-democratic economies 
demand investment protection regulations, however the EU and the EU member 
states are based on the principle of democracy and rule of law. Secondly, he 
criticized the method of investment arbitration as well, underlining the weaknesses 
of the current models of dispute settlements, specifically the World Bank’s 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Koskenniemi 
highlighted, that over a half of the disputes brought to the ICSID have been 
resolved by 15 lawyers, who has the possibility to represent also parties in the 
procedures, and since the body has no permanent composition, its rulings lack 
cohesion and coherency. Koskenniemi also referred to the assumption, which 
                                                 
Member States and third countries. It is worth noting, that eight member states have own 
bilateral investment treaty also with the United States, therefore the T-TIP would replace 
all these existing individual Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between the US and the 
Member States concerned.  
34 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, of the 247 
concluded cases known by the end of 2013, around 43% were decided in the state’s favor 
and 31% in favor of the investor. The rest (26%) were settled. TTIP and the Arbitration 
Clause, in Euractiv Special Report (8–12 December 2014), 1. Available at: http://www.eur 
activ.com/files/euractiv_special_report_-_ttip_and_the_arbitration_clause.pdf [cit. 2014-
12-19]. 
35 See Professor: Finland's legislative power may be in jeopardy, in Helsinki Times (15 Dec 
2013), available at: http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/8717-
professor-finland-s-legislative-power-may-be-in-jeopardy.html [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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governs this judicial body, namely that all investors act in good faith (bona fide), 
therefore, investors acting in mala fide are not accounted for. If the T-TIP will 
establish a similar body similar, law firms will wrangle on every possible clause 
of international legislation. Thirdly, he noted, that such disputes generally arise in 
the fields, which are strictly regulated by the state. For example a foreign mining 
company could, initiate legal action against an EU Member State for restricting its 
operations. He refers to the case of Tobacco company Philip Morris, in turn, 
initiated legal action against Australia after it decreed that cancerous lungs be 
imprinted on cigarette packs.  
Besides it is notable, that also a formal ‘academic opposition’ has been 
launched in July 2014.36 A group of 120 academic experts37 in trade and investment 
law, EU law, international law and human rights, constitutional law, private law, 
political economy and other fields has spoken out against planned provisions on 
ISDS in T-TIP. The action coordinated by the University of Kent, has been a 
contribution to the public consultation announced by the European Commission.38 
The expert group criticized the Commission for failing to make a plausible case 
for the need for investment protection provisions in T-TIP in the first place, and for 
excluding views on their desirability from the consultation exercise. Based on the 
consultation document published by the Commission, the expert group found that 
the proposed text, amongst other shortcomings, specifically  
 allows for unwarranted discretion for arbitration tribunals in the 
application of various ‘necessity’ tests; 
 fails to exclude acquisitions of sovereign debt instruments from the scope 
of the Treaty; 
 allows anyone with a substantial business activity in the home state who 
holds any ‘interest’ in an enterprise in the host state to bring a claim;  
 fails to spell out legal duties of investors in host states; 
 fails to control the expansion of investment arbitration to purely 
contractual claims;  
                                                 
36 Statement of Concern about Planned Provisions on Investment Protection and Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), available at: https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/isds_treaty_consultation.html [cit. 2014-
12-19]. The submission was written by Peter Muchlinski (SOAS School of Law), Horatia 
Muir Watt (Sciences Po Law School), Harm Schepel (Kent Law School), and Gus van 
Harten (Osgoode Hall Law School).  
37 Public consultation on investor-state arbitration in TTIP – Comment, available at: 
https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/downloads/ttip_isds_public_consultation_final.pdf [cit. 2014-
12-19]. 
38 See Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
(TTIP), European Commission, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/ 
index.cfm?consul_id=179 [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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 fails to protect the ‘right to regulate’ as a general right and as a component 
of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and Expropriation standards of 
protection of investors; 
 fails to further the stated principle of favoring domestic court proceedings, 
and 
 fails to regulate conflicts of interest in the arbitration process.  
Although the scholars emphasized that the proposed text has been rather better 
than many investment treaties, they added that “the nature of the problems 
associated with investor-state arbitration is not quite as straightforward as the 
Commission presents it. In a strange cat-and-mouse game, the Commission’s 
objective seems to be to ‘outwit’ arbitrators by closing down ‘loopholes’, 
eradicating discretion, and putting in place firm ‘rules’ on transparency of 
proceedings and impartiality of arbitrators.”39 Proponents of ISDS have suggested 
that the proposed provisions in T-TIP may serve as a ‘Gold standard’ for the 
European Union’s use of its new competences regarding foreign direct investment 
under the Common Commercial Policy. The scholars show this claim to be 
misleading at best, and expressed the hope that the current controversy over ISDS 
in T-TIP will prompt broad and serious debate about a sensible EU policy on 
existing and new investment Treaties in accordance with the values of Articles 2 
and 3 of the Treaty on European Union that the Union is to promote in its relations 
with the wider world.  
The Commission completed the public consultation40 and is preparing an 
imminent report on the use of ISDS in T-TIP, which will supposedly re-ignite the 
debate between the EU negotiators who favor pushing ahead with an arbitration 
clause in the future agreement, and the broad coalition of opponents. The whole 
report is expected to be published in December 2014 or January 2015, therefore, 
the explosive debate is still not over. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As the above analysis has shown, the negotiation on the T-TIP is based on strong 
economic arguments, namely, since both the EU and the US are facing decreasing 
world market shares and ability to compete with the emerging economies, the 
biggest motivation and perspective for the future agreement is the enhancement of 
                                                 
39 Statement of Concern about Planned Provisions on Investment Protection and Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), available at: https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/isds_treaty_consultation.html [cit. 2014-
12-19]. 
40 The Commission, surprisingly, has received approx. 150.000 contributions. See 
Preliminary report (statistical overview) – Online public consultation on investment 
protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), European Commission, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152693.pdf [cit. 2014-12-19]. 
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the bilateral trade relations. Consequently, the T-TIP as free trade agreement will 
form an exemption pursuant to GATT Article XXIV, in other terms, the agreement 
will apply ‘legal discrimination’ against the outside world. From this point of view, 
it seems to be not an exaggeration to regard the T-TIP as a potential ‘economic 
NATO.’41  
Therefore, the first concluding question is whether the T-TIP would mean 
really a threat for the third countries, specifically for the emerging markets. It is 
important that the customs duties towards the majority of the third countries, first 
of all, all WTO members, are low as the same way as it is insignificant in the EU-
US relation. The second component is the likely effects of standards and regulatory 
barriers, if the T-TIP will pay the way for harmonization and mutual recognition. 
However, if also the third countries will introduce and apply these standards, they 
will not face discriminatory effects.  
The second question is how the T-TIP would affect the multilateral 
negotiations within the WTO. It is interesting not only from the perspective of the 
T-TIP, because both the EU and the US have recently opened and concluded 
negotiations on a number of bilateral trade agreements. Presumably, the bilateral 
trade negotiations and the ‘revival of bilateralism’, as the title of this paper 
suggests, is not itself the hindrance of the future multilateral talks within the WTO. 
It is rather a consequence of several changes that occurred in the international 
economic law and world trade in the last few decades. It means that the GATT-
WTO system lifted international trade barriers of various kinds in eight successful 
negotiation rounds effectively, which covered predominantly the traditional trade 
measures, like customs tariffs. Due to the successful liberalization agenda, the 
customs tariffs are fallen to a current historically low level. Though, it is relatively 
easy to lower the tariff barriers, which are generating low welfare gains, in 
comparison to the high level non-tariff barriers, which are very difficult to address 
among the 160 members of the WTO and find a mutually acceptable agreement on 
these issues. Probably, it is because the Doha Round is still not closed. However, 
it is expected the T-TIP should not weaken neither the EU’s nor the US’ 
commitment to the WTO and a strong multilateral global agreement, and the T-TIP 
may indeed offer considerable template for future multilateral trade negotiations.42 
As a consequence, the regulatory models and methods of the T-TIP would 
important not only for their impact on the EU and US alone, but also for the 
multilateral trade negotiations.  
                                                 
41 It is not known who introduced this term first time, but even the policy papers of the 
Atlantic Council characterized the future agreement with using this language, see GRAY, C. 
BOYDEN: An Economic NATO: A New Alliance for a New Global Order, in Atlantic 
Council Issue Brief (February 2013) 1. 
42 Not mention here the potential for the future bilateral agreements in terms of Baldwin’s 
domino effect theory. See BALDWIN, RICHARD: A domino theory of regionalism, in 
BHAGWATI, JAGDISH – KRISHNA, PRAVIN – PANAGARIYA, ARVIND: Trading blocs: 
Alternative approaches to analyzing preferential trade agreements, 1999, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 479-502. 
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Thirdly, it is also obvious that the major benefits from T-TIP will come from 
the regulatory field and from the elimination of non-tariff barriers. Even if the 
chance of removal of regulatory trade barriers is every so often underestimated, 
mostly because of the strong ‘self-confidence’ of the EU and US legislators, it is 
worth noting, that even today converging tendencies are palpable in the relation of 
the US and EU legal order. The literature is analyzing the so-called Brussels effect 
and demonstrates how the EU regulations are occupying e.g. the US environmental 
law.43 The EU seems to be a powerful actor in regulating the global markets, 
therefore, it is likely that the negotiation on regulatory trade barriers will not hinder 
both parties to find a compromise.  
Finally, as the two case-studies from the negotiation agenda – the environment 
and the investment – have illustrated, some topics can raise significant public 
concern on both sides of the Atlantic. It is essential that the negotiating parties, 
especially the European Commission from the EU side, address the public interest 
and conduct a transparent dialog on these issues. Public participation and more 
transparency could play an important role in facilitating these debated issues. It is 
the only way to lay the foundation of democratic legitimacy of the future 
agreement.  
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Abstract 
Today, the objective of sustainable development is acclaimed by almost all international 
organizations, national governments, and also private enterprises. This general consensus 
seems mainly to rest upon the vague substance of the terms ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘sustainability’ themselves, which leave much room for interpretation. 
Different definitions of ‘sustainable development’ or ’sustainability’, often general and 
vague, lead one to question how these terms can be of any practical value. In this article, 
I do not attempt to provide a single definition or single acceptable approach to sustainable 
development or sustainability. My intention is to point out that sustainable development 
(sustainability) is not a (key) principle, especially not a principle of environmental law. It 
is rather a fundamental and overarching objective, aiming to continuously improve the 
quality of life and well-being for present and future generations, by linking economic 
development, social justice and environmental protection. It is not a principle, but is has 
its own principles, and I am convinced that the real solutions of our current problems are 
embedded in the principles of sustainable development.  
 
Keywords: Sustainable development, sustainability, principles. 
1. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ROOTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
The basic idea behind sustainable development is not new, especially among 
traditional or indigenous societies. Since the industrial revolution, human actions 
have gradually become the main driver of global environmental change. In earlier 
centuries when physical survival was often the highest imperative, human 
population and densities were lower, technologies were simpler and their 
byproducts more benign. The use of steam power facilitated the concentration of 
factories in cities; environmental pollution was the inevitable by-product of 
industrial activities, experienced on a greater scale and in a more complex and 
concentrated form, than ever before. The spread of industrialization, followed by 
the development of science and technology, and the exponential growth of the 
population have put unprecedented stress on the environmental systems on which 
life depends. 
Pollution due to human activities on a local scale has been around for a very 
long time. Degradation and deterioration of the environment started from the 
prehistoric times when man created the first fires. As early as the first quarter of 
the 19th century the environmental effects of intense economic growth became 
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apparent. The industrial revolution, the emergence of great factories and 
consumption of fossil fuels gave rise to unprecedented air pollution, a large volume 
of chemical discharges, and a growing load of untreated human waste. 
Environmental pollution became a popular issue after World War II, due to 
radioactive fallout from atomic warfare and testing sometimes near inhabited 
areas, especially in the earlier stages of their development. What is relatively new 
and what has been giving rise to much current environmental concern since the 
end of the 1950s is the existence of human activities which lead to pollution on the 
global scale. Unprecedented growth in human numbers and accompanying 
increase in usage of natural resources is linked to threats to the global ecosystem.1 
In the United States, pollution began to draw major public attention between 
the mid-1950s and early 1970s. The theory of sustainability has it roots in the 
1960s environmental movement when global environmental problems came into 
focus. 
In 1962, an American biologist, Rachel Carson published a famous book titled 
“Silent Spring”. The book's legacy was to produce a far greater awareness of 
environmental issues. The book suggested that the indiscriminate use of DDT and 
other pesticides without fully understanding their effects on the environment was 
a threat to wildlife, particularly birds. The agricultural use of DDT2 questioned the 
logic of releasing large amounts of chemicals into the environment. The resulting 
public concern led to the creation of the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) in 1970.  
In the 1970s the environmental movement gained rapid speed around the 
world. Environmentalists have seen a false trade-off between environmental 
protection and economic growth. To protect the environment from the adverse 
effects of pollution, many countries worldwide have enacted national legislation 
to regulate various types of environmental pollution. Public policies were problem 
specific: air, water and land pollution were examined as distinct subjects. 
Nowadays there’s a growing consensus in national governments and 
international organisations that it is impossible to separate economic issues from 
environment issues. Many forms of development erode the environmental 
resources upon which they must be based, and environmental degradation can 
undermine economic development.  
The general ‘environmental’ element of sustainable development is the most 
fundamental aspect of the concept. The protection of the environment is a long-
term activity, providing the basis for developing environment policy across all 
                                                 
1 The term ecosystem was coined in 1930 by Roy Clapham, to denote the physical and 
biological components of an environment considered in relation to each other as a unit. 
British ecologist Arthur Tansley later refined the term, describing it as the interactive 
system established between biocoenosis (a group of living creatures) and their biotope (the 
environment in which they live).  
2 The abbreviation DDT stands for dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane. During and after 
World War II, DDT became an extremely popular insecticide. By the early 1970s, however, 
serious questions were being raised about its environmental effects. DDT was first banned 
in Hungary in 1968. 
 
35 
 
environmental topics, including inter alia accelerating climate change, 
deterioration of our eco-systems and increasing overuse of natural resources. 
Environmental policies are designed to have positive impacts on the state of the 
environment in the future, but the timeframes are always too short to cover policy 
formulation, adoption and implementation in several areas because of the need for 
more information or because of other obstacles.  
2. THE EMERGENCE OF SUSTAINABILITY 
While numerous governments and other domestic actors have pressed the 
sustainable development goal in many countries, the impetus toward governmental 
adoption of the concept in all countries has been a direct result of international 
discussion, debate and pressure. The origins of sustainable development are 
usually identified in the Stockholm conference of 1972, which sought to emphasise 
links between human development and environmental protection. 42 years ago, the 
participants of the United Nations Conference on Man and Environment agreed on 
the urgent need to respond to the problem of environmental degradation and 
deterioration. This was the first of a series of world environmental conferences 
under the auspices of the United Nations, and a turning point in the development 
of international environmental policy and law.3  
The Stockholm Conference focused the world’s attention on actions to protect 
the ecosystems. It bought together the world: thousands of participants, including 
heads of State and Government, national delegates and leaders from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses and other stakeholders. The 
Stockholm Conference also had a real impact on the development of EU 
environment policy: the Environmental and Consumer Protection Directorate was 
set up, and the first Environmental Action Program was adopted in 1973 by the 
European Community (that later became the European Union).  
The rest of the 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the accumulation of many 
environmental instruments. Some of these instruments have played an important 
role in defining environmental problems in a global or a regional setting. Little, 
however, was done in the succeeding years to integrate environmental concerns 
into national economic planning and decision-making. Overall, the environment 
continued to deteriorate, and such problems as ozone depletion, global warming 
and water pollution grew more serious, while the destruction of natural resources 
accelerated at an alarming rate. 
Since at least the early 1980s, sustainable development has been a fashionable 
                                                 
3 The next summits took place in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1992, in Johannesburg (South 
Africa) in 2002, and in Rio again, in 2012. Unfortunately, the international community 
could not embrace the priority of strengthening global environmental governance at the 
Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development. One of the most important outcomes 
of Rio+20 is the new aim of creating a framework for global goals and indicators – 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – which build on the current Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). 
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concept in environmental discourse, and an important element of international 
cooperation. By 1983, when the UN set up the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED), environmental degradation, which had been seen as a 
side effect of industrial wealth with only a limited impact, was understood to be a 
matter of survival for developing nations. Led by Gro Harlem Brundtland of 
Norway, the Commission put forward the concept of sustainable development as 
an alternative approach to one simply based on economic growth. The member of 
the Commission explored the possibility of reconciling demands for development 
from developing countries with demands for environmental protection, primarily 
from rich industrialised countries. 
The Commission was an independent body, linked to but outside the control 
of governments and the UN system. The Commission’s mandate gave it three 
objectives:  
 to re-examine the critical environment and development issues and to 
formulate realistic proposals for dealing with them;  
 to propose new forms of international cooperation on these issues that 
will influence policies and events in the direction of needed changes; and  
 to raise the levels of understanding and commitment to action of 
individuals, voluntary organizations, businesses, institutes, and 
governments.4 
The World Commission on Environment and Development first met in 
October 1984, and published its seminal work on sustainable development, ‘Our 
Common Future’5 (the ‘Brundtland Report’) 900 days later, in April 1987. The 
Brundtland Report was an extraordinarily optimistic piece of work: it brought 
many formerly opposing positions, particularly growth and environmental 
protection, into agreement around the same ideas.6 In the wake of the Report and 
the UN General Assembly Resolution adopting the report, the UN General 
Assembly called for the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED).  
In the case of sustainable development the history of the UNCED programme 
transpired largely outside of the realm of normal domestic politics. The number of 
actors involved was both very small and very professional, consisting 
predominantly of representatives of one or two governmental ministries and NGOs 
for environment and development. The specification of the programme took place 
over a period of five years (1987–92), mostly within closed committee sessions or 
working conferences for specially invited and certified representatives. The key 
issues of negotiation and the specifics of the draft documents were known to 
relatively few people, and the vast majority of sub-policies were formulated as 
                                                 
4 AN OVERVIEW BY THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 
available at: http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm#I.3 [cit. 2014-07-20]. 
5 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED): Our Common Future, 
1987, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
6 HOLDER, JANE – LEE, MARIA: Environmental Protection, Law and Policy – Text and 
Materials, Second Edition, 2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 220. 
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relatively abstract goals. Representatives from political parties were hardly ever 
represented as such, and the key issues being discussed and negotiated at the 
international level were generally not introduced into elections.7 
The primary goals of the next UN Summit were to come to an understanding 
of “development” that would support socio-economic development and prevent 
the continued deterioration of the environment, and to lay a foundation for a global 
partnership between the developing and the more industrialized countries, based 
on mutual needs and common interests, that would ensure a healthy future for the 
planet. Consequently, a high level world conference was held in 1992 (the Rio 
‘Earth Summit’), where – in view of the fact that global economic, social and 
environmental processes that are in close interaction with one another, are 
threatening societies’ development in a longer run – national governments adopted 
three major agreements aimed at changing the traditional approach to 
development: 
 Agenda 21 (a comprehensive programme of action for global action in 
all areas of sustainable development); 
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (a series of 
principles defining the rights and responsibilities of States); 
 The Statement of Forest Principles (a set of principles to underlie the 
sustainable management of forests worldwide). 
In addition, two legally binding Conventions aimed at preventing global 
climate change and the eradication of the diversity of biological species were 
opened for signature at the Summit, giving high profile to these efforts: 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
UNCED was heralded as a ‘paradigm shift’ from international environmental 
law to the international law of sustainable development. Although references to 
„sustainable development” and international law abound in Agenda 21, none of 
the formulations apparently follows that of Principle 27 (“international law in the 
field of sustainable development”),8 and there remain occasional references to 
“international environmental law”.9 Whether the variable terminology arises by 
accident or design is unclear. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the head of the 
Brazilian delegation persuaded Working Group III of UNCED’s Preparatory 
Committee to replace every reference in Agenda 21 to “international 
environmental law” to “international law in the field of sustainable 
development”.10 
                                                 
7 LAFFERTY, WILLIAM M. (ed.): Governance for Sustainable Development – The Challenge 
of Adapting Form to Function, 2004, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 17-18. 
8 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 27; Report of the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (“UNCED Report”), A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l 
(vol. II), 3; 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). 
9 Agenda 21, para. 39.2 
10 The diplomat, Pedro Motta Pinto Coelho, apparently remarked that this change would 
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It can also be observed that in the recent decades the concept of sustainable 
development featured both in agreements on economic cooperation and 
conventions adopted for the protection of the environment. We may discern an 
interesting tendency, according to which the concept of sustainable development 
opens the door to the enforcement of environmental considerations in economic 
agreements, while in the case of environmental treaties, the legal institution of 
sustainable development guarantees not only the protection of the environment, 
but also the satisfaction of the basic human needs, the fight against poverty and 
safeguarding the possibilities for development.11 
Nevertheless, the 1992 Earth Summit was a landmark achievement in 
integrating environmental, economic and social concerns into a single policy 
framework. After the Rio Conference, concepts such as sustainable development 
sounded initially like principles deprived of concrete content. The concept of 
sustainable development and the proposals set out in Agenda 21 have since been 
expanded and strengthened at several major UN conferences. 
3. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OR SUSTAINABILITY?  
The interaction between economy and the environment that supports it lies at the 
core of sustainable development. In its essence, sustainable development is about 
reducing the overall (global) pressures on life-support systems and natural 
resources resulting from the ‘drivers’ of development. Such drivers are principally 
related to economic activity. 
The relationship between economic development and environmental 
degradation was first placed on the international agenda in 1972, at the UN 
Conference on the Human environment, held in Stockholm. After the Conference, 
Governments set up the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which 
today continues to act as a global catalyst for action to protect the global 
environment. 
The term “sustainable development” has been included in the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development (1992) to denote the need to balance 
environmental and development considerations. The original articulation and the 
most widely quoted ‘definition’ of sustainable development comes from the 
Brundtland Report, according to which sustainable development means 
development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs’.12 The definition contains within it 
two key concepts: 
                                                 
“keep you lawyers busy well into the 21st century”); see SAND, PETER: UNCED and the 
Development of International Environmental Law, in Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 3 (1992), 17. 
11 SZABÓ, MARCEL: A fenntartható fejlődés koncepciója a nemzetközi jogban [The Concept 
of Sustainable Development in International Law], in SZABÓ, MARCEL (ed.): Ünnepi kötet 
Gál Gyula tiszteletére [Liber Amicorum Gál Gyula], 2011, Európa Nostra, 171. 
12 WCED: op. cit. 43. 
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 the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s 
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and 
 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future 
needs. 
From the late 1980s until the second half of the 1990s the formulation of 
environmental policy plans and strategies was the dominant approach to 
implementing sustainable development domestically. Sustainable development 
was mainly understood by policymakers in the sense of ’environmentally’ or 
‘ecologically’ sustainable development. This understanding of sustainable 
development gradually changed in the late 1990s and the early 2000s to include 
economic and social goals on an equal footing. As a result, comprehensive 
sustainable development strategies increasingly replaced the more 
environmentally focused plans and strategies. 
In 2002, sustainable development was further articulated as having three 
pillars, namely: economic development, social development, and environmental 
protection. This means that the concept of sustainable development aims to 
continuously improve the quality of life and well-being for present and future 
generations, by linking economic development, protection of the environment and 
social justice. The social and economic pillars are as important as the 
environmental pillar. 
The desired future state conjured by a policy of sustainable development is 
long term and dynamically changing. Rather than seeking a stable equilibrium, 
sustainable development is a dynamic concept, recognising that changes are 
inherent to human societies.13 The term “sustainable development” has been 
decried by some as devoid of content, as a concept used to express different and 
often disparate worldviews.14 
Despite these misgivings, however, the expression has assisted in reconciling 
in one phrase what before seemed irreconcilable – namely, environmental 
protection and development. Sustainable development has put on the negotiating 
table issues of economic and social development that are prerequisites for the 
quality of life and environmental protection. It is interesting to see how sustainable 
development has been used in local communities to articulate goals and indicators 
for future development, such as the goals of equity, economic vitality, strong 
community, quality of education, good government, decent housing, healthy 
people, efficient transport and land-use, protected natural resources, and minimal 
pollution and waste.  
The concept of sustainable development should be distinguished from that of 
sustainability, despite of the fact that the main problem regarding the evaluation of 
sustainable development is that neither the real meaning of sustainable 
                                                 
13 Measuring progress towards a more sustainable Europe, 2007 monitoring report of the 
EU sustainable development strategy, 2007, European Communities, 7. 
14 And this is true, to some extent, as developed countries have used the concept to 
underline the importance of environmental values, whereas developing countries have used 
it to support their right to development. 
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development has been come to stay. ‘Sustainability’ is a property of a system, 
whereby it is maintained in a particular state through time. The concept of 
sustainable development refers to a long-term process involving change or 
development. Sustainable development aims to ‘achieve continuous improvement 
of quality of life’, and the focus is therefore on sustaining the process of improving 
human well-being.15 
Another famous definition of sustainability was adopted by the World’s 
Scientific Academies in Tokyo, May 2000: “Sustainability implies meeting current 
human needs while preserving the environment and natural resources needed by 
future generations.”16 To preserve human well-being over the long term, people 
need to move toward new ways of meeting human needs, adopting consumption 
and production patterns that maintain the Earth’s life support systems and 
safeguard the resources needed by future generations.  
Similarly, the Hungarian National Council for Sustainable Development 
emphasizes that “the essence of sustainability is to establish a system of relations 
– a culture – in which people, in their relations established with each other and the 
environment, do not deplete but preserve resources for the future. Sustainability is 
in search for this proper system of relations, to allow for the next generations to 
also be able to meet their needs.”17 
Over the past decades innumerable definitions of sustainable development 
have been proposed. It is obvious that the integration of environmental protection 
into the concept of sustainable development tends to make environmental 
objectives (more or less) easily attainable. But the usage of the concept of 
sustainable development remains somewhat vague. From the beginning, a 
disagreement has existed as to the precise meaning of the concept. There are 
numerous mentions of the adjective ‘sustainable’ (sustainable growth, sustainable 
business solutions, sustainable mobility, sustainable tourism, etc.). Moreover, 
sustainable development’ and ‘sustainability’ are often misused terms. They are 
popularly used to describe a wide variety of activities which may not necessarily 
be “sustainable” in the long term.  
It is not necessary here to go into the issue of ‘weak’ vs ‘strong’ sustainability. 
I just mention that proponents of the weak sustainability view argue that there is 
essentially no inherent difference between natural and other forms of capital. 
Maintaining and enhancing the total stock of all capital (physical, human, etc.) 
alone is sufficient to attain sustainable development. In contrast, according to the 
strong sustainability view, there is inherent difference between natural and other 
forms of capital, physical or human capital cannot substitute for all the 
environmental resources comprising the natural capital stock, or all of the 
                                                 
15 Sustainable development in the European Union, 2011 monitoring report of the EU 
sustainable development strategy, 2011, European Union, 11. 
16 IAP Statement on Transition to Sustainability, available at: http://www.interacade 
mies.net/10878/13933.aspx [cit. 2014-08-11]. 
17 In search for the future. Summary report of the National Council for Sustainable 
Development for Hungarian Society, 9-10. 
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ecological services performed by nature.18 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that sustainability itself is not an endpoint. It 
is rather an ideal toward which we strive. It has many interrelated dimensions (e.g., 
ecological, economic, social, political, and epistemological) and calls for a holistic, 
interdisciplinary and participatory approach.  
Official documents often emphasize three types of sustainability: 
 environmental sustainability means the conservation of our natural 
values, so that also our children can enjoy them; 
 economic sustainability in turn means that we do not have to pay more 
taxes to ensure the successful operation of the results of development; 
 social sustainability means that we have to assist more and more people 
to care for themselves and take responsibility for the country as a whole. 
To put the issue in the context of an integrated approach to sustainable 
development, the challenge is how the environmental objective of reduced 
pollution can best be integrated with economic policy objectives of maintaining 
levels of output and employment which will enable the needs of the population to 
be met, consistent with the goal of social sustainability.  
Nevertheless, achieving sustainable development is no easy task. ‘Sustainable 
development’ is like ‘democracy’, ’freedom’ and other high-minded terms: it is 
universally desired, diversely understood, and extremely difficult to achieve, 
because the interactions among economic, social and environmental concerns are 
extremely complex and unpredictable. Sustainability poses the challenge of 
determining whether we can hope to see the current level of well-being at least 
maintained for future generations, or whether the most likely scenario is that it will 
decline. It is no longer a question of measuring the present, but of predicting the 
future.19 
4. THE PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
Environmental policies traditionally cover a wide range of issues related to 
sustainable development, and contribute to raising awareness of the opportunities 
and challenges lying ahead. The basic principles of the horizontal strategies on 
sustainable development (SDSs) make it possible to harmonise the various sectoral 
and development strategies with SDSs, and they also provide a general type of 
guidance for determining the SDSs’ priorities, more specifically defined goals and 
tasks, the frameworks and means of implementation, in a coordinated and 
harmonised way.  
In my opinion, sustainable development is not a principle, but it has several 
                                                 
18 BAKER, SUSAN: Sustainable Development, 2006, Routledge, London and New York, 29-
35. 
19 STIGLITZ, JOSEPH E. – SEN, AMARTYA – FITOUSSI, JEAN-PAUL (eds.): Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 61. 
Available at: http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf [cit. 2014-
08-11]. 
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principles. This may sound trivial, but most of the existing approaches fail to adopt 
this approach, leading to potentially confusing messages. For instance, confusion 
may arise when one tries to define sustainable development as a principle of 
environmental policy and/or environmental law. 
The principles of sustainable development have been formulated, clarified, 
and adopted at the highest levels by the relevant bodies of both the UN and the EU. 
On account of their national relevance the following should be highlighted from 
the complete set of principles: 
4.1. The principle of holistic approach 
Things must be viewed as a system of inter-related elements, the elements 
themselves also being systems interacting with one another. Any intervention may 
trigger ripple effects even in remote systems. So local challenges can be adequately 
addressed relying on the knowledge of the wider environment and global trends 
alike. 
4.2. Principle of intra-generation and inter-generation solidarity 
The interests of sustainable development are focused on people. Sustainable 
development is not about maintaining a good quality of life for just one generation, 
but rather about passing the ability to realize a good quality of life from generation 
to generation. 
4.3. The principle of sustainable management of resources 
Sustainable management of resources with a view to the limitations of the carrying 
capacity of the environment; by using natural resources in a prudent and thrifty 
way it preserves resources required for future development. Biodiversity is also a 
natural resource and we attach high priority to its conservation. 
4.4. The principle of social justice 
The right to adequate conditions for living must be recognised and fundamental 
human rights must be guaranteed for all. All people should have equal 
opportunities for acquiring knowledge and skills required to become a worthy 
member of society. 
4.5. The principle of integration 
In the course of elaborating, evaluating, and implementing sectoral policies, plans, 
and programmes, economic, social, and environmental considerations and their 
relationships must also be taken into account to ensure that they can mutually 
reinforce each other. Local, regional, and national activities must be coordinated. 
4.6. The principle of precaution and prevention 
The precautionary approach means that wherever the possibility of severe or 
irreversible damage is perceived, lack of complete scientific certainty may not be 
used as an excuse for delaying effective action to prevent damage to the 
environment or endangering human health; i.e. action must be taken in view of the 
gravity of the perceived threat. Human activities must be planned and carried out 
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in line with this precautionary principle and activities damaging or polluting the 
environment endangering natural systems and human health must be prevented and 
– where it is not possible – reduced, and finally, damages must be restored to their 
original state as far as possible. 
4.7. The polluter pays principle 
Prices must reflect the real costs paid by society for activities involved in 
consumption and production as well as for their impacts, including the costs of 
using natural resources. Those engaged in activities damaging/polluting the 
environment must pay for damage caused to human health or the environment. 
4.8. The principle of utilising local resources 
Efforts should be made to supply the needs of communities on a local level, from 
local resources. Local features and diversity should be preserved. Preservation and 
sustainable utilisation of the man-made environment and the cultural heritage are 
also very important tasks. 
4.9. The principle of public participation 
Adequate access to information affecting social/economic life and the 
environment, to information on decision-making processes must be provided for 
all. People’s knowledge about sustainable development, its social/economic and 
environmental implications, and about sustainable solutions and approaches must 
be clarified and enhanced. Public participation in decision making should be 
strengthened. 
4.10. The principle of social responsibility 
To enable sustainable development and to make higher quality of life possible, 
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed. 
Businesses’ social responsibility must be strengthened, along with cooperation 
between the private and the public sector.20 
I agree with the doyen of European environmental law, Professor Ludwig 
Krämer who claims positively that sustainable development is rather a guideline 
to political action than an actual legal concept.21 In my opinion, the principles of 
integration, prevention and precaution, or public participation are the principles of 
environmental policy and law, such as the famous polluter pays principle, the 
principle of rectification at source or the need for international cooperation and 
partnership.22  
In the past couple of years a number of general principles of environmental 
law have also emerged, or are emerging. Basically they are general guidelines that 
have some indirect legal significance. Instead of repeating these legal principles, 
we can mention three other principles of sustainable development:  
                                                 
20 National Sustainable Development Strategy of Hungary, June 2007, 3-4. 
21 KRÄMER, LUDWIG: Az Európai Unió környezeti joga [EU Environmental Law], 2011, 
Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 36. 
22 Most of them are included in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. 
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4.11. Respect for all other forms of life 
Every form of life on earth is an important part of this living entity. Human beings 
are members of a global community of life and they share a common mission and 
responsibility for the future of our planet. 
4.12. Satisfaction of basic physical needs (water, food, shelter and other 
requirements for life and dignity) for everyone 
Limits and enoughness are the two most widely ignored components of 
sustainability. We have to separate need from want, and thereby learn when enough 
is, in fact, enough. 
4.13. Access to knowledge 
Knowledge has always been crucial to human development. Knowledge is 
essential for so many human activities and values, including freedom, the exercise 
of political power, and economic, social and personal development. The 
knowledge gap can be narrowed by education, awareness raising, and share of 
innovations, exchange of best practices and other measures.  
5. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU  
In Europe, the current rate of progress observed over the past few decades in 
addressing environmental issues is insufficient, too. We can identify successes and 
improvements (recycling, bathing water quality, reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, etc.), but also register old legacies that need further effort such as, in 
particular, air pollution, water issues and contaminated sites. New threats call for 
coherent strategies and integrated measures at all levels, such as persistent 
chemicals in the environment, biodiversity loss and climate change. 
Many individual improvements could be identified in different regions for 
different issues, but the overall picture is not one of progress.23 Some local and 
global thresholds are being crossed; negative environmental trends could lead to 
dramatic and irreversible damage to some ecosystems and services, and contribute 
to the degradation of the environment up to the point of no return. Public concern 
continues to be high, and urgent action is needed to protect the environment, 
particularly halting loss of biodiversity, preserving natural resources that are under 
pressure and protecting public health. 
The EU is a leading force in the world in taking action on environmental 
sustainability in order to move towards a sustainable development path. The EU 
always repeats its commitment to addressing climate change internally and on an 
international scale, to promoting environmental sustainability, to reducing 
dependence on external resources and to ensuring the competitiveness of European 
economies.  
                                                 
23 The European Environment – State and Outlook 2010, European Environment Agency, 
2010. 
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Sustainable development is a fundamental goal of the European Union, 
enshrined in the EU Treaties since 1997. The European Union was a strong 
supporter of the Declaration at the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro. At the ‘Rio + 5’ follow up conference, the European Union and its 
Member States committed themselves to adopt SDSs. As a result of this, the 
Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997, introduced sustainable development as a core 
objective of the European Union as set out in Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the EC Treaty. 
In 2001, the European Union adopted its sustainable development strategy (EU 
SDS) in Gothenburg that was renewed in June 2006 and July 2009.24 In 2002, the 
external dimension of the Strategy was added by the European Council in 
Barcelona and the EU was active in supporting the conclusions of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.25 
The EU SDS defines objectives and targets intended to put the European 
Union on a path towards sustainable development. The EU SDS aims for the 
continuous improvement of quality of life for current and future generations, by 
linking economic development, protection of the environment and social justice, 
and bringing together the many strands of economic, social and environmental 
policy under one overarching objective. 
Measuring progress towards sustainable development is an integral part of the 
EU SDS. Regularly adopted monitoring reports of the EU are based on a set of 
sustainable development indicators (EU SDIs).  
The EU examines the following SDI themes: 
1) Socioeconomic development, 
2) Sustainable consumption and production,  
3) Social inclusion, 
4) Demographic changes, 
5) Public health, 
6) Climate change and energy, 
7) Sustainable transport, 
8) Natural resources, 
9) Global partnership,  
10) Good governance. 
There are several indicators within the individual themes of the EU SDI set, 
but the European Union has identified 12 of them as headline indicators: 
1) Real GDP per capita, 
2) Resource productivity, 
3) People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
4) Employment rate of older workers, 
5) Life expectancy at birth, 
                                                 
24 See the website of the European Commission on Sustainable Development, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/ [cit. 2014-07-01]. 
25 See HORVÁTH, ZSUZSANNA: Greening Production and Consumption: Towards 
Sustainability in the EU Integrated Product Policy, in REBREANU, VERONICA (ed.): 
Sustainable Development: Utopia or Reality? 2010, SC Editura Sfrea SRL, Cluj-Napoca, 
146-156.  
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6) Greenhouse gas emissions, 
7) Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, 
8) Primary energy consumption, 
9) Energy consumption of transport relative to GDP, 
10) Common bird index (Abundance of common birds), 
11) Fish catches from stocks outside safe biological limits, 
12) Official Development Assistance.26 
It is very complicated to measure to what extent the EU is on track to 
achieving the concrete goals for sustainability. We need to look at the whole 
picture, and see the parts holistically. These headline indicators are intended to 
give an overall picture of whether the EU has achieved progress towards 
sustainable development in terms of the objectives and targets defined in the EU 
SDS. The evaluation of progress since 2000 based on these headline indicators 
shows a rather mixed picture.27 Detailed assessments show that the EU is moving 
in a moderately unfavourable direction.  
Within the context of the European Union, there’s a real contradiction 
between the EU’s primary market-oriented function and the demands of 
sustainable development. There’s a traditional hierarchy of policy objectives, 
where environmental interests historically have tended to be ranked below issues 
of economics and finance. Furthermore the principal connotation of the term when 
used is usually with a reference to ’sustainable growth’ in this context.28 In 
accordance with sustainable growth, three priorities have been identified by the 
EU to contribute to objectives and targets of the Europe 202029 Strategy:  
 a low-carbon economy (focus on investments in energy efficiency, 
buildings, renewables and clean transport); 
 ecosystem services and biodiversity (focus on preserving and 
maximising the potential of the natural environment); 
 ecoinnovation (focus on mobilising innovation partnerships and 
information technology). 
                                                 
26 Good governance contains no headline indicator as no indicator is considered to be 
sufficiently robust and policy relevant to provide a comprehensive overview. 
27 Sustainable development in the European Union, 2013 monitoring report of the EU 
sustainable development strategy, 2013, European Union, 8. 
28 In 1992, when the term ‘environment’ was included into the key Articles 2 and 3 of the 
EC Treaty for the first time, which set out the objectives and activities of the Community, 
Article 2 referred to ‘the promotion (…) of a harmonious and balanced development of 
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment’. The 
incorporation of an environmental objective was certainly of great political significance, 
but the formulation ‘sustainable growth’ was criticized as being marginally weaker than 
that of ‘sustainable development’. See JANS, JAN H. – VEDDER, HANS H. B.: European 
Environmental Law, Third edition, 2008, Europa Law Publishing, 7.  
29 The Europe 2020 Strategy, adopted by the European Council in June 2010, builds on 
lessons learned from the earlier Lisbon Strategy of the EU, recognising its strengths but 
addressing its weaknesses. The objective of Europe 2020 is to turn the EU into a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economy, delivering high levels of employment, productivity and 
social cohesion. 
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We can only hope that current policy making and future trends will make EU 
environment policy more effective in protecting the environment and in the pursuit 
of sustainable development. The European integration – a regional economic 
integration organisation which has its roots in hard industrial cooperation – has to 
realize that sustainable development is not only a necessity, but also an exceptional 
opportunity for the European economy. Air, water, land, species, soil and seas are 
amongst the natural resources that are crucial to our well-being and also to our 
economic prospects. Natural capital is a major source of economic development; 
preserving ecosystems leads to jobs and socio-economic development. 
6. A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE 
We should not delude ourselves into believing that we live in a sustainable world. 
Today we are living through a period of rapid change and deep disturbance. Many 
ecological processes are not sustained: a broad range of species is threatened by 
extinction, whole ecosystems are at risk, and furthermore, climate change is 
becoming the most challenging threat to human life. We still do not recognize the 
great value of many environmental systems as we are not conscious of the 
importance of natural ecosystems to modern societies. Moreover, we place too 
little value on the future, and many of the benefits from environmental protection, 
from sustainable economic and social organization, are far into the future. 
Over the past decades, the escalating economic and ecological damage costs 
of not investing in environmental protection and improvement have been 
repeatedly demonstrated. At this point in time, when the world does not yet show 
clear signs of recovery from the economic and financial crisis and is facing food 
and energy crises, climate change and threats to social cohesion and security, it is 
more than ever important to have a coherent and long-term vision for our future 
development.  
While there are considerable differences of opinion as to what an effective 
implementation of achieving sustainability entails, there can be little doubt that the 
ambitions enunciated in Rio – prefigured by the Brundtland Report (WCED) in 
1987 – involve significant changes in current patterns of development, production, 
consumption and behaviour. Sustainable development is necessary because ‘over-
development’ in the richest countries and ‘under-development’ in the poorest 
countries is causing harm to local, regional and global life-support systems. A 
global population even of the current size cannot adopt “Western” lifestyles 
without destroying the ecosystems of the planet.  
Countries vary greatly in their demonstrated willingness and ability to address 
the sustainable development challenge. It seems that the likelihood of achieving a 
common understanding of ‘sustainable development’ or ’sustainability’ is even 
more remote than ever. The present system of international relations and law can 
hardly be expected to master the complex challenges which will have to be 
balanced in the quest to attain sustainability. But they are now being addressed 
holistically for the first time as a result of the emergence of the concept of 
sustainable development. Sustainable development should, therefore, be seen as a 
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continuous learning process, where appropriate answers and solutions may change 
as our experience increases. 
Unfortunately, there is no sane alternative. As Simon Dresner argues: “the 
alternative to the pursuit of sustainability is to continue along the present path of 
unsustainability, leading to disaster.” 30 This challenge calls for nothing less than a 
shift in our collective worldview from the narrowness and linearity of techno-
optimism and political-economic short-termism to embrace a much more systemic 
and future-oriented perspective. 
It is increasingly clear that in the next decades the pressure for change will 
unavoidably grow; life on Earth will collapse if current patterns of production and 
consumption continue. An environmental disaster may be looming within the 
lifetime of the present, and certainly within the lifetime of the next generation. We 
have to survive in a hostile environment – destroyed by ourselves –, and to improve 
living conditions for future generations. Traditional expert-driven, top-down 
approaches to problem solving are not flexible enough to address complex, non-
linear changes in the Earth System effectively. 
In order to stop self-destruction, a U-turn in human behaviour and the way of 
our use of planet Earth should be implemented immediately.31 The changes in 
human attitudes depend on both appropriate legislation and non-legal measures 
(education, debate, campaigns, etc.). A real paradigm shift would be crucial to the 
future of mankind.32 Individuals who accept personal responsibility for the 
consequences of their thoughts, choices, and actions form the basis of 
sustainability.33 Peoples of the Earth have to find ways to work together to raise 
the level of our collective consciousness to the point where we can move steadily 
toward sustainability, to sustain the dignity of being human. To achieve the needed 
changes, the next few years are going to be crucial.  
Last but not least, environmental deterioration can lead to conflict between 
states and instability in the international order.34 Although the “Cold War” came to 
an end during preparations for UNCED, other conflicts emerged, largely between 
developed and developing countries. These conflicts have revolved around the 
interplay between environmental measures, economic competition, and 
international trade and investment flows; the developing countries’ insistence on 
their right to develop economically; and disagreements about how the burden of 
taking action to deal with common environmental concerns should be borne. As 
environmental obligations increasingly address fundamental economic interests 
                                                 
30 DRESNER, SIMON: The principles of sustainability, 2002, Earthscan Publications, 
London, 173. 
31 See for example, EHRLICH, PAUL R. – EHRLICH, ANNE H.: The betrayal of science and 
reason: how anti-environmental rhetoric threatens our future, 1996, Island Press, 
Washington DC. 
32 Just how fundamental a paradigm shift is, of course, another highly contentious topic. 
33 Sustainable development requires us to manage the only thing we can manage – 
ourselves. 
34 See SZABÓ, JÁNOS: Fenntarthatóság, kockázatok, biztonság [Sustainability, Risks, 
Security], 2007, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest. 
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and needs, actors which do not comply with their environmental obligations are 
perceived to gain unfair and perhaps unlawful, economic advantage from their 
environmentally harmful activities in relation to those actors which are complying 
with their obligations. 
The growing demands of states and those subject to their jurisdiction for 
access to natural resources, coupled with a finite available resource base, provide 
the conditions for increasing conflict over access to natural resources. It seems 
unlikely that the quest for ever-increasing growth can continue unchecked without 
causing serious negative effects – and those effects might come sooner than we 
think… 
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Abstract 
The appreciation of ecological footprint has been increasing since the study of ‘Stiglitz – 
Sen – Fitoussi’.1 At the same time, due to the methodological and standardized problems 
and the shortcomings of data collection, its accuracy can be questioned. In our study we 
were looking for countries with structurally different from the average ecological 
footprints, with the help of cluster analysis, in a database used by calculating the 
ecological footprint index of Global Footprint Network. Comparing the data of two certain 
years, we are trying to find an answer for the question if outlier data could be traced back 
to professional reasons of data collecting problems. The consequences of faulty and 
unreliable data can not lead to the expected results; it can make the situation even worse. 
The most essential result of our study can be the correction of failures of the database and 
establishing a reasoned statistical background for better decisions. 
 
Keywords: ecological footprint, fishing ground footprint, Gambia, grazing land footprint, 
hierarchical cluster 
 
JEL classification: Q01 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant economic and economic-policy tasks of recent years is 
                                                 
1 STIGLITZ, JOSEPH E. – SEN, AMARTYA – FITOUSSI, JEAN-PAUL (eds.): Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress., 
Available at: http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf [cit. 2014-
06-11]. 
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the reform, the correction and the completion of the GDP, which is a macro-
economic production index. Some researchers even consider the malfunction of 
GDP as a sign of the total failure the current mainstream economic theory and call 
for a new economic paradigm,2 because less comprehensive, operative tools does 
not seem to improve the situation significantly.3 The researchers tried to replace 
the GDP, but so far none of them were successful,4 GDP and the other SNA 
indicators are still in the center of the dialogue.5 The development of national 
accounts was set in many ways due to the concerns related to environmental 
problems caused by the increasing economy from the 1970s.6 It should also be 
noted that this approach of development had a powerful impact on land use. This 
case stimulates scientific study of urban structures7 and scientific debates on the 
sustainability of these areas.8 Researchers have developed several indicators in the 
past decades as a result of the improvement of additional GDP-based or 
substituting alternative indicators. One of the most completed overview of the 
findings of recent years can be found in the article of Bleys.9 The author is not 
willing to determine the exact number of alternative indicators however, Brent 
Bleys presents almost 200 indicators and various opportunities for their use in 
clustering methods. The study of Vackár10 is outstanding; preparing examinations 
                                                 
2 TÓTH, GERGELY: A fenntarthatóság gazdasági paradigmája felé, in RÓBERT, PÉTER (ed): 
Gazdaság és morál: tisztatársadalom, tisztagazdaság, Kautz Gyula Emlékkonferencia, 
June 12, 2012. Széchenyi István Egyetem, Győr. Available at: http://kgk.sze.hu/images/do 
kumentumok/kautzkiadvany2012/vallalkozas/tothg.pdf [cit. 2014-06-11]. 
3 TÓTH, GERGELY: Környezeti teljesítményértékelés, 2001, KÖVET, Budapest. 
4 CSISZÁRIK-KOCSIR, ÁGNES: Mit hozott a válság Keleten és Nyugaton? – avagy a 
makroadatok alakulása Magyarországon és Németországban a válság előtt és után. A 
világgazdaság és világpolitika – A „Nyugat” és a „Kelet” változó geopolitikai erőterében, 
Széchenyi István Egyetem és az MTA VEAB közös konferenciája, Győr, 2014. május 15., 
(under press) 
5 CSISZÁRIK-KOCSIR, ÁGNES – FODOR, MÓNIKA: Mennyire befolyásolták a 
makrogazdasági mutatószámok a költségvetési helyzetképet a válság előtt és után? – 
eredmények a Visegrádi négyek országcsoport adatai alapján. Vállalkozásfejlesztés a XXI. 
században III. – Tanulmánykötet, 2013, Óbudai Egyetem, Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, 
91-101. Available at: http://kgk.uni-obuda.hu/sites/default/files/05_Csiszarik-Fodor.pdf 
[cit. 2014-06-11]. 
6 LAWN, PHILIP: A stock-take of green national accounting initiatives, in Social Indicators 
Research, Vol. 80. Issue 2. (2007), 427-460. 
7 GDP can also be used for revealing spatial economic concentrations and examining urban 
structures. See SZABÓ, DÁNIEL RÓBERT: Policentrikus Magyarország: Problémák és 
lehetséges stratégiák, in KARLOVITZ, JÁNOS TIBOR (ed.): Kulturális és társadalmi 
sokszínűség a változó gazdasági környezetben, 2014, International Research Institute, 
Komárno, 18-25. 
8 PINTÉR, TIBOR: Policentrizmus, nagyvárosi terek Magyarországon és világszerte, in Acta 
Scientiarum Socialum, Vol. 2. (2011), 23-32. 
9 BLEYS, BRENT: Beyond GDP: Classifying Alternative Measures for Progress, in Social 
Indicators Research, Vol. 109. Issue 3. (2012), 355-376. 
10 VACKÁR, DAVID: Ecological Footprint, environmental performance and biodiversity: A 
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aiming at exploring the connections among indicators in a correlation matrix of 27 
alternative indicators. Detailed analysis about the relation among GDP, ecological 
footprint and happiness can be read in the article of Kocsis,11 in which the 
influences and consequences of various developmental ways for Hungary are 
outlined. The environmental sustainability would often requires the decrease of the 
GDP per capita in the so-called developed countries among the possible and 
positive future prospects. Various indicators are important on a global level, but 
we think that it could be also on a macro regional level too, for example the 
interpretation of the indicators could be also important in the cohesion policy of 
the EU. Also the local actors (civil organisations, firms, etc.) can contribute to the 
success of the cohesion policy,12 so they can also contribute to the utilizations of 
the indicators by a wide range of the actors. 
Researchers have been applying and developing one of the most well-known 
alternative indicator, eco-footprint for 20 years. The appreciation of the footprint 
has been increasing since the study of Stiglitz – Sen – Fitoussi. At the same time, 
due to the methodological and standardized problems and the shortcomings of data 
collection, its accuracy can be questioned. In recent years, several assessments and 
criticisms have been published about the research of Stiglitz, mainly as a result of 
social studies.13 
Ecological footprint (EF) 
The Ecological Footprint means that how much productive field is needed for 
a human society to maintain itself and to process the manufactured waste beside a 
given technological development. The measurement unit of the Ecological 
Footprint is the global hectare/person (gha). Footprint tendencies show the 
impossibility of sustaining long term economic growth. We have long been aware 
of the overconsumption of developed countries, but the ‘under-consumption’ of 
lesser developed countries used to compensate for this. Even in 1960, bio-capacity 
– the output from biologically valuable land – was 2-3 times greater than that is 
consumed per person globally. According to the opinion of the European 
Commission, ecological footprint and carbon-dioxide footprint are together those 
environmental indexes, which can fill the role of an overall environmental index, 
however, the circle of their application is restricted. We can download the 
ecological footprint data of 142 countries from the homepage of the Global 
Footprint Network and estimations for further 9 countries can be found in the 
database, including the calculation of the Happy Planet Index. The most 
widespread criticism against Ecological Footprint Index is that it does not contain 
                                                 
cross-national comparison, in Ecological Indicators, Vol. 16. (2012), 40-46. 
11 KOCSIS, TAMÁS: „Hajózni muszáj” A GDP, az ökológiai lábnyom és a szubjektív jóllét 
stratégiai összefüggései, in Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 57. Issue 6. (2010), 536-554. 
12 REISINGER, ADRIENN: Civil/non-profit szervezetek a kohéziós politikában – elméleti 
alapok, in Tér és Társadalom, Vol. 26. Issue 1. (2012), 41-66. 
13 TSAI, MING-CHANG: If GDP is not the answer, what is the question? The juncture of 
capabilities, institutions and measurement in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, in Social 
Indicators Research, Vol. 102. Issue 3. (2011), 363-372. 
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neither social factors nor people’s satisfaction. This index is not suitable for 
catching all the aspects of sustainability although it is often mentioned among the 
sustainability indicators. However, this criticism is irrelevant since the creators of 
the ecological footprint have never claimed that, for instance, it would be a 
composite indicator, such as the HDI or ESI, which include more pillars of 
sustainability. The Ecological Footprint gives information about the application of 
hypothetic area, it does not promise anything more or less.14 The Ecological 
Footprint is applied on more levels from the beginning of measurement by its 
creators.15 Besides global evaluation in order to compare the spatial demands of 
the consumption with the disposable biological capacity they also use national, 
regional, settling and individual EF indicators. The general recognition of this 
index differs considerably in different application areas while the global EF is 
considered to be the best index of the „sustainability”16 its spatial application is 
criticised from more sides. For this reason, the national use of Ecological Footprint 
must be treated with increased caution. The values of this indicator are more than 
0, although it does not have a top limit. The smaller the value of the index is, the 
more favourable the case is. 
The Global Footprint Network17 (GFN) applies the ecological footprint (EF) 
for countries and the whole world. The national results as well as global trends can 
be downloaded by land-use categories from the website of the institution. The GFN 
prepares guidelines and information for the calculation.18;19 We are able to establish 
homogeneous groups based on the components of ecological footprint as well as 
on the relationship between the ecological footprint and bio-capacity. The footprint 
structure is fundamentally determined by the characteristics of living style as well 
as the geographical and financial situation of the country, so certain groups of 
countries are well-defined regarding geographical and income perspectives. 
One of the most significant critics of the territorial application of the index is 
                                                 
14 CSUTORA, MÁRIA: Az ökológiai lábnyom számításának módszertani alapjai, in 
CSUTORA, MÁRIA (ed): Az ökológiai lábnyom ökonómiája, 2011, Aula Kiadó, Budapest, 
12. 
15 REES, WILLIAM – WACKERNAGEL, MATHIS: Urban ecological footprints: why cities 
cannot be sustainable and why they are a key to sustainability, in Environ Impact Assess, 
Rev. 16. (1996), 223-248. 
16 STIGLITZ – SEN – FITOUSSI: op. cit. 70-72. 
17 You can find detailed information about the institution and co-operation possibilities as 
well as about the publications related to GFN: www.footprintnetwork.org. 
18 KITZES, JUSTIN – GALLI, ALESSANDRO – RIZK, SARAH – REED, ANDERS – 
WACKERNAGEL, MATHIS: Guidebook to the National Footprint Accounts. 2008, Global 
Footprint Network, Oakland, available at: http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php 
/GFN/page/methodology [cit. 2014-06-11]. 
19 EWING, BRAD – REED, ANDERS – GALLI, ALESSANDRO – KITZES, JUSTIN – 
WACKERNAGEL, MATHIS: Calculation methodology for the National Footprint Accounts, 
2010, Global Footprint Network, Oakland, available at: http://www.footprintnetwork 
.org/images/uploads/National_Footprint_Accounts_Method_Paper_2010.pdf [cit. 2014-
06-11]. 
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that the borders of the countries were established based on geo-political and 
cultural aspects. For this reason, these do not or not by all means have 
environmental meaning; that is why they usually divide connecting ecosystems. In 
this aspect, the EF calculation within the natural borders is applicable for straighter 
conclusion. At the same time, nations are the largest decision-making body, so 
environmental intervention can be done in the first place in this frame. For this 
reason, one of the suggestions of the spatial calculation’s critics is that the index 
should not be used in spatial instead of temporal analyses: ‘The per capita EF is 
neither very informative about the spatial distribution of the impacts nor the causes 
of environmental pressure’.20 
In our study we are examining the extreme outlier data included in the GFN 
database for 2010 and 2011. We are looking for those countries whose ecological 
footprint structure differs significantly from the average value. Comparing the data 
of two years, we are trying to find answers for the question if the outlier data can 
be traced back to professional reasons or data collecting problems. 
2. MATERIAL AND METHOD  
The GFN database gives the ecological footprint of certain countries between 1961 
and 2008 (Table 1). The increase of EF has gone with the transformation of the 
structure, which means that the carbon footprint has increased fivefold and the 
carbon-dioxide emission is responsible for more than half of the EF presently. 
Behind the seemed unambiguous global tendency, significant individual national 
differences can be realized. 
We conducted our analyses with the application of IBM SPSS20 programme 
package and we relied on the database analyses manual of Sajtos and Mitev21 by 
selecting the methods and assessment of the results. The ranking was performed 
with the help of cluster analyses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 VAN DER BERGH, JEROEN C. J. M. – VERBRUGGEN, HARMEN: Spatial sustainability, trade 
and indicators: an evaluation of the ‘ecological footprint’, in Ecological Economics, Vol. 
29. Issue 1. (1999), 61-72. 
21 SAJTOS, LÁSZLÓ – MITEV, ARIEL: SPSS kutatási és adatelemzési kézikönyv, 2007, Alinea 
Kiadó, Budapest. 
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Table 1: The structure and size of global ecological footprint between 1961 and 
2008 (global hectare (gha) / person).22 
According to our hypothesis, the failures in the database of the ecological 
footprint indicator can be discovered with statistical methods (in the first place, 
with the help of hierarchical and non-hierarchical cluster examination). We are 
able to establish homogeneous groups based on the components of ecological 
footprint, as well as on the relationship between the ecological footprint and bio-
capacity. The footprint structure is fundamentally determined by the characteristics 
of living style as well as the geographical and financial situation of the country, so 
certain country groups are well-defined regarding geographical and income 
perspectives. We apply vectors inclinations to compare the structures of ecological 
footprint of the countries within the relevant groups. With this examination, we are 
able to determine if the structures of the ecological footprint of the countries ranked 
in the given group resemble more the groups or the average. 
We applied GFN database for 2010 and 2011 for our research. We used 
graphic method, boxplot diagram for mapping the outliers. Then in the second part 
of our research we discovered that a linear relationship can be realized among the 
six ingredients of EF in pairs. We indicated the values of Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient in correlation matrix (Table 2). Since cluster-analysis is very sensitive 
to the appearance of outliers, we checked the outstanding data with the nearest 
neighbour method before every examination and excluded these values further on. 
From the perspective of assessment of the results, it is important that we did not 
exclude the outstanding values of certain data although those, which would have 
created single group. The data applied in the study are measured on same metrical 
scale for this reason we used non-standardized data. In co-operation with two 
independent variables trio, as well as five variables-we excluded the cropland 
footprint because of the strong multi-collinear method-, we conducted hierarchical 
cluster analyses with analyses of variance: with the ‘Nearest neighbour’ and 
Ward’s methods. Clustering was performed, in cases when it was necessary, with 
K-means cluster, and not with hierarchical method, which was followed by 
summarizing the results with analysis of contingency tables. 
                                                 
22 In the following we are going to refer to the abbreviation in brackets in the table as 
territorial categories. Source: Database of GFN in the 2011 edition. 
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The aim of conducting cluster-analyses in the first place was not to limit the 
country teams with similar characteristics, however, to identify the outstanding 
values as well as the outlier ones. 
3. FINDINGS 
Based on the statistical data of 150 countries, Table 2 shows the formation of linear 
correlation coefficient of the components of the ecological footprint. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients marked in the cells show significant relationship between 
certain components of ecological footprint while others are independent. Since 
strong relationship cannot be noticed anywhere, in principle, there is nothing to 
prevent us from withdrawing all of the variables from the cluster-analyses. Table 
2 shows the examination of the 2010 edition database, however, the investigation 
of the 2011 edition shows similar results. 
Table 2: The matrix of correlation coefficient from Pearson.23 
We conducted our first cluster analysis in our research with five variables, 
however we did it with three variables in our second study. 
In our first examination, due to the stronger than mid-range relationship 
between cr and ca, as well as the cr and bu variables, we conducted the examination 
with 5 variables excluding cr. The outliers – revealed with nearest neighbour 
method – are: regarding the data of 2010 edition year, Mongolia; Uruguay; 
Australia; Qatar and United Arab Emirates, we received similar results with the 
use of database in 2011 edition,the results made with similar methods are also 
similar however, Kuwait presents among the outliers instead of Australia. We 
examined the cluster-analyses of three-four, and five cluster solutions without 
outlier values, nevertheless none of them provided appropriate result, the grouping 
of countries cannot be performed clearly based on the examined variables.  
Based on independent variables trios (gr, fi, fo and fi, gr, bu) they canbe 
separated in pairs. Continuing our examination, in order to eliminate the deviations 
because of correlation (Table 2), we repeated the analyses with the two variables 
group as well. 
In our second study, we performed cluster-analyses with the use of gr, fi, and 
                                                 
23 Source: Own examination based on GFN 2007, 2010 edition. 
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fo variables and we excluded Mongolia and Uruguay as they proven to be outliers 
according to the nearest neighbour method. Regarding the method of Ward, used 
by the first case (the examination was done by 3-7 clusters), we did not receive 
any appreciable results. Neither the nearest neighbour method analyses, nor the K-
means hierarchical cluster-analyses brought solutions in this question. 
 
Ward’s method (gr, fi, bu) 2010 gr fi bu 
1 Mean 0.166 0.010 0.072 
N 112 112 112 
StDev 0.119 0.099 0.053 
2 Mean 0.723 0.059 0.093 
N 18 18 18 
StDev 0.188 0.073 0.096 
3 Mean 0.138 1.963 0.040 
N 3 3 3 
StDev 0.066 0.206 0.039 
4 Mean 1.639 0.081 0.045 
N 3 3 3 
StDev 1.136 0.077 0.022 
5 Mean 1.161 0.726 0.114 
N 14 14 14 
StDev 1.189 0.291 0.067 
Total Mean 0.261 0.190 0.077 
N 150 150 150 
StDev 0.300 0.338 0.061 
Table 3: Clusters (5 clusters solution).24 
We continued the examination with the other three independent trio variables 
(fi; gr; bu) after excluding the outliers (Mongolia, Uruguay), as a result of 
hierarchical cluster-analyses as well as Ward’s method, based on the database of 
2010 year, we came to similar conclusions (Table 3). The best seemed to be to list 
the countries into five clusters, according to two methods, three clusters were 
completely the same, in which a three member group was established, including 
the Gambia, Mauritius and Norway. This group, which is considered to be stable, 
has not been established in 2011. 
4. RESULTS 
Revealed during our analyses, in all three cases Mongolia and Uruguay can be 
found among the outliers in both examined years. We were looking for the reasons 
for this while examining the structure of the ecological footprint of these two 
countries. 
                                                 
24 Source: Based on the database of GFN 2007, 2010 edition. 
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Figure 1: Times series of grazing land footprint (gha/person).25 
Based on Table 1 the most significant ingredient of the average ecological 
footprint26 is the carbon footprint (and the grazing-land footprint) account for10 % 
of the whole footprint. On the contrary, the grazing-land footprint of the ecological 
footprint of Mongolia is 70% and of Uruguay is 60%, which are considered to be 
extreme outliers. Their grazing-land footprint means 10 times of the world average 
and this also means to be extreme outlier (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 2: Time series of fishing ground footprint (gha/person).27 
 
Based on the cluster-analyses conducted on the data of 2011 year, the group 
                                                 
25 Source: Based on the database of GFN of 2011 year of own edition. 
26 There are some small differences between the arithmetic average of the national data 
shown here – in other words the “average ecological footprint” and the structure and the 
size of the global ecological footprint outlined in Table 1 – due to methodological reasons. 
27 Source: Based on the database of GFN of 2011 year of own edition. 
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with invariant and homogenous characteristics are proven to be interesting due to 
the differences of its members. The reason for this lays in the structure of 
ecological footprint since we can realize that Gambia, Mauritius and Norway with 
remarkably different geographical, cultural and economical characteristics have 
one common feature (Figure 2); their fishing-ground footprint includes 38-58% of 
their own footprint. 
This prominently high fishing-ground footprint value is 9-11 times more than 
the world average. Examining the database of 2011year, Gambia cannot be 
discovered among the extreme outliers, even its fishing-ground footprint is the 
same as the world average – 0.1 gha/person – according to the database. 
 
 average Gambia Mauritius Norway 
average x 1.155 x x 
Gambia 1.155 x x x 
Mauritius 0.705 0.540 x x 
Norway 0.755 0.454 0.266 x 
  Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Norway x x x x 
Denmark 0.684 x x x 
Sweden 0.781 0.466 x x 
Finland 0.884 0.415 0.468 x 
Table 4: Angle of vectors (Radian).28 
The smaller the angle of the vector, the closer they are to each other’s structure 
(pairwise is calculated). Therefore, the Norwegian EF structure closely resembles 
the structure of Gambia, such as Sweden. This fact might indicate serious 
inconsistencies in the database (Table 4). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
While it is said to be the best indicator of „unsustainability”29 on global level,30 the 
appreciation of the ecological footprint indicator considerably varies in different 
application areas, its spatial application is criticized from many angles.31;32 
                                                 
28 Source: Database of GFN in 2011 edition. 
29 TÓTH GERGELY – SZIGETI CECÍLIA: Az emberiség ökolábnyoma Kr.e. 10.000-től 
napjainkig. LV. Georgikon Napok, Pannon Egyetem, Georgikon Kar, September 26-27, 
2013. Keszthely, available at: http://napok.georgikon.hu/cikkadatbazis-2012-2013/ 
doc_view/121-toth-gergely-szigeti-cecilia-az-emberiseg-okolabnyoma-kr-e-10-000-tol-
napjainkig [cit. 2014-06-11]. 
30 STIGLITZ – SEN – FITOUSSI: op. cit. 70-72. 
31 VAN DER BERGH – VERBRUGGEN: op. cit. 61-72. 
32 MCDONALD, GARRY W. – PATTERSON, MURRAY G.: Ecological Footprints and 
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However, the connecting studies have not examined the whole database of the 
developing Global Footprint Network indicator, so the critical statements as well 
as the applications have been conducted without screening the outliers. According 
to our study, the majority of the countries (112 out of 150) can be described with 
an average EF structure, in other words, we can come to appropriate conclusion 
about the ecological footprint structure of certain countries from the average 
ecological footprint structure. However, there are some well-limited small groups, 
which have EF structure that significantly differs from the average. Since the 
consumption system of a given country is reflected in the ecological footprint, 
according to our anticipation, the structure of the ecological footprint of countries, 
which are close to each other geographically and culturally, will also resemble each 
other. Mongolia and Uruguay form stable and separated group because of their 
essential grazing land footprint, independently from the year of the study or the 
method. With the economic reforms and the dramatic change in the external 
environment for Mongolia, the dualistic economic system, that had been dominant 
over the past decades of central planning, is being severely undermined. In part, 
this is not negative as the large traditional livestock sector was 'drained' for 
resources, which were transferred to the modern sector.33 For this reason we 
consider it reasonable to examine their consumption structure and characteristics 
in detail later.In case of the other three members group, the outstanding values can 
traced back to other reasons. Presumably, the consumption structure of Mauritius, 
the African Gambia and the north-European Norway differs from each other 
considerably. The common feature is considered to be the fishing-ground 
ecological footprint of the 2010 edition, which exceeds remarkably the average in 
all three countries, however by examining the database of 2011 edition, the fishing-
ground ecological footprint of Gambia is corresponding to the world average. The 
reason for establishing cluster in 2010 edition can be found in the deviations of the 
methods of calculating the fishing-ground ecological footprint, which can strongly 
query the commensurability and reliability of the database. 
In the NFA 2011, a source data cleaning algorithm was implemented different 
to the algorithm used in NFA 2010. The new algorithm is used to reduce spikes 
and troughs and inconsistencies in the reported time series of source data sets. The 
new algorithm excludes data points that are beyond a fixed distance from the 
median value of the reference time series data. Table 5 contain an ordinal ranking 
of countries by Footprint respectively, as well as a comparison with values from 
the previous NFA 2010 Edition. Methodological differences between editions can 
be demonstrated by looking at the change in absolute EFand biocapacity, and by 
looking at changes in country rankings for these two indicators. For the year 2007 
– the most recent year covered by both NFA 2011 and NFA 2010 Editions – there 
were seven countries whose rank in EF per capita changed more than 15 places 
(one of them: Gambia). 
                                                 
interdependencies of New Zealand regions (analysis), in Ecological Economics, Vol. 50. 
Issue 1-2. (2004), 49-67. 
33 SPOOR, MAX: Mongolia: Agrarian Crisis in the Transition to a Market Economy, in 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48. No. 4. (1996), 615-628. 
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Table 5: NFA 2010 and NFA 2011 Editions comparison: Ecological Footprint 
data table.34 
Our suggestion is that the statistical examination of the database (filtering the 
extreme outliers) should be followed by professional control and the final data 
chart should be conducted as a result of this. Consequences and political decisions 
based on faulty and unreliable data can not lead to the expected results; it can make 
the situation even worse. The most essential result of our study can be the 
correction of failures of the database the establishment of the statistical background 
for more established consequences. 
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Abstract  
In this study, basic challenges of the EU’s enlargement will be discussed. It will be argued 
that there are mainly three challenges. The first challenge, that is, building peace 
throughout Europe, is also one of the greatest visions of the founding fathers of the then 
EU. The second challenge is related to the lack of good performance related to the 
principles of “good” governance. Finally, the third challenge includes economic 
governance and the weak competitive power of the candidate and potentially candidate 
countries. All in all, in this study, the EU’s current motto will be presented as a key 
challenge of the EU’s future enlargement: “United in diversity.” 
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governance, competitiveness  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this article is to explain the basic challenges of the EU’s future 
enlargement.1 The focus will be on the three challenges: 1. Peace, 2. “good” 
governance, and 3. economic governance including competitiveness. It will be 
argued that there is a great difference not only for the countries expected to join 
the EU in the future, but also for those who are already in the EU. That is why, the 
EU’s motto explains both the vision and the greatest challenge of the EU: “United 
in diversity”.  
At this point, it should be underlined that these challenges and problems are 
not only specific to the current and future enlargement process, that is to say, they 
have been more or less present since the EU’s first enlargement. The current and 
future widening process can only make these challenges more intense, complicated 
and hard to manage. Nevertheless thanks to the lessons drawn from the past 
experience embodied in conditionality and accession criteria (such as the 
Copenhagen Criteria, administrative capacity, absorption capacity etc.), the EU can 
handle and overcome this complex enlargement process.  
                                                 
1 By future enlargement of the EU, the study means both candidate countries (Albania, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) and potential 
candidate countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) as of October 2013. 
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2. PEACE AS MISSION, VISION AND CHALLENGE 
It is possible to argue that the first and foremost challenge of the EU enlargement 
is to keep peace alive. That is why, in this study, peace in Europe will also be 
presented as both mission and vision of the EU. It is considered a mission because 
one of the reasons for the existence or raison d’être of the foundation of The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and/or the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was to establish peace. The reason why the founding fathers 
preferred to use an economic medium can be explained with reference to 
neofunctionalism, which argues that the economy has a spillover effect into other 
areas for the sake of paving the way for the political union. Indeed, history shows 
that both military and political union efforts have failed, and that the only 
successful attempt was in the realm of economic cooperation.2 Therefore, 
considering Monnet and other founding fathers’ ideal future, it is possible to argue 
that peace in Europe was the EU’s vision.  
Having a vision is of crucial importance because only then it would be 
possible to take systematic actions to mobilize all necessary resources. Vision is a 
destination to go, and if no one knows where to go, then a person or an institution 
is bound to drift away.  
The classic novel of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson and famous Disney cartoon 
“Alice in Wonderland” contains an important message of strategic management 
regarding having an aim. Once Alice reaches a road leading to two different paths, 
she asks the Cheshire cat which way she should go. The Cheshire cat’s answer is 
the same as that of strategic management: “That depends a good deal on where 
you want to get to.”  
Alfred Chandler was one of the first people to realize the importance of 
determining long-term goals. According to Chandler, what needs to be done is to 
allocate necessary (physical, financial, intellectual, human etc.) resources for the 
sake of a common vision.3 
It is a fact that there is a gap between the current situation (or the status quo) 
and the ideal future. At this point, the current situation needs to be changed. One 
of the key questions related to the change is as follows: Should we take the current 
situation or the ideal future as a reference point? While the first option brings us to 
a realist but conservative4 vision based on current limitations, by adopting the 
second approach, it is possible to come up with a “visionary” vision without 
limitations. Taking the status quo as a reference point may bring marginal or 
incremental change, but having a visionary ideal may result in fundamental and 
radical change.  
Although there is no final answer to this question, Jean Monnet and other 
founding fathers have chosen the second option and they preferred to be a game 
                                                 
2 KJAER, ANNE METTE: Governance, 2004, Polity, UK, 99-122. 
3 BARCA, MEHMET – BALCI, ASIM: Kamu Politikalarına Nasıl Stratejik Yaklaşılabilir? in 
Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Vol. 39. Issue 2. (2006), 38. 
4 The meaning of conservative here has nothing to do with conservatism. 
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changer. They did not limit themselves and they “demanded the impossible”: Peace 
in Europe. For the founding fathers, the ideal future was not an economic union, 
but rather a political union; they thought that only a political union could bring 
peace. This was the gap expected to be fulfilled by Jean Monnet and other founding 
fathers. They dreamed of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. Jean Monnet was one 
of them: “Continue, continue, there is no future for the people of Europe other than 
in union… Peace can be founded only on equality of rights.” 
This is the key point which links vision to the challenges: Having such a 
visionary ideal can simultaneously be presented as a challenge. It is a great 
challenge not only because it is hard to achieve, it may take time or even it may 
not be realized during an average lifetime. Convincing other people to fight for 
your cause and your vision is also a challenge. European Union is not an exception. 
The “peace in Europe” idea was a “visionary” vision considering two world wars 
and others. This was a vision which could not be limited to five years or even their 
lifetime. Their dream was not a temporary peace, but a “perpetual peace,” as Kant 
would say. The founding fathers wanted to establish an eternal peace, rather than 
a truce.  
It is exactly the same with that of Kant who wanted and dreamed about 
perpetual peace as early as 1795. According to Kant, “no treaty of peace shall be 
held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war” because, 
“otherwise a treaty would be only a truce, a suspension of hostilities but not peace, 
which means the end of all hostilities – so much so that even to attach the word 
‘perpetual’ to it is a dubious pleonasm.” 
It should be noted that Kant’s liberal optimism clashed with Lenin’s socialist 
realism in 1915. Lenin was sure that perpetual peace was not possible within the 
system of capitalism. The only possible unity of those capitalist states, for Lenin, 
could be war and colonialism based on brutal force:  
“A United States of Europe under capitalism is tantamount to an 
agreement on the partition of colonies. Under capitalism, however, no other 
basis and no other principle of division are possible except force. Under 
capitalism, there are no other means of restoring the periodically disturbed 
equilibrium than crises in industry and wars in politics.” 
All in all, the founding fathers of the EU have seen two world wars, so they 
had every reason to be hesitant about the peace, but they did not choose to be 
pessimistic about the future of Europe. They were not satisfied with the then 
“warfare” status quo. There was a gap between the status quo and the ideal future, 
and they have chosen to take their ideal future as a reference point to change the 
status quo. They wanted to change it. They preferred to be a game changer as 
previously mentioned.  
El-Agraa explains the case as follows:  
“The founding fathers dreamed of the creation of a United States of 
Europe. This was because they believed that there was no other means of 
putting an end to the continent’s woeful history of conflict, bloodshed and 
suffering – that is, they saw unity as the only way to achieve eternal peace in 
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a continent with a long history of deep divisions and devastating wars.”5 
Although neither founding fathers nor their current colleagues could achieve 
the United States of Europe, the EU has been relatively successful in bringing 
peace in the EU borders.6 Despite its symbolic and political character, the Nobel 
Peace Prize should be read as a reward for the founding fathers’ visionary ideal of 
peace. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize is a symbol that the EU has been doing 
the right thing since its inception in building peace in Europe. There is more than 
one reason why the Nobel Peace Prize was given to the EU. All of them are related 
to the making of a peaceful Europe. First of all, the EU was able to transform 
hostile relations between Germany and France into a partnership. Secondly 
enlargement was seen as an important tool to widen and strengthen democratic 
transition, especially for Greece, Spain, Portugal and other ex-communist 
countries. Thirdly, the EU’s future enlargement process was also seen as 
reconciliation among those countries that have been in conflict with each other. 
Finally, Turkey’s inclusion in the membership process was also read by the 
committee as part of the advancement of democracy and human rights.  
This prize shows that enlargement has been an integral part of the peace 
project and it also shows that peace is also one of the biggest challenges of the EU. 
Currently the EU is trying to “deal with bilateral issues and overcoming the legacy 
of the past.”7 It is a hard challenge but at least a few positive steps have been taken 
so far, such as the historic agreement between Belgrade and Prisitina agreed on 19 
April 2013, or a public apology expressed by Serbia’s President Tomislav Nikolic 
“for crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The name issue between FYR 
of Macedonia and Greece is another important challenge which needs to be solved. 
The EU is aware of these problems; that is why “in the case of the countries of the 
Western Balkans additional conditions for membership, were set out in the so-
called 'Stabilisation and Association process', mostly relating to regional 
cooperation and good neighbourly relations.”8  
3. GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Another important challenge is related to governance comprehension.9 It should 
                                                 
5 EL-AGRAA, ALI M.: The European Union: Economics and Policies, 2011, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, 423. 
6 This proposition cannot be generalized to the European continent. 
7 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, 2013, 
Brussels, 12, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents /2013/pac 
kage/ strategy_paper_2013_en.pdf [cit. 2014-10-03]. 
8 For further information on enlargement and conditions for membership, see: http:// 
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm [cit. 2013-10-03] 
9 For a discussion on the term governance, see RHODES, ROD A. W: The New Governance: 
Governing without Government, in Political Studies, Vol. 44. Issue 4. (1996), 652-667, and 
KJAER: op. cit.  
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be underlined that the term governance is different from the term government. 
Governance is something broader than government, because it includes non-state 
actors, implying that government is not the only and dominant actor anymore. It is 
not the single actor because there are many other levels ranging from EU level to 
the citizens. So, as Kjaer argues “the relationship between public and private is 
blurred and government is not the single dominant actor that can unilaterally 
impose its will.”10 Multi-level governance11 comprehension can be given as an 
example. Apart from, sub-national levels, even European citizens do have a chance 
to be involved in the policy making process considering “citizen initiative.” If one 
million signatures from at least seven countries could be obtained, the European 
Commission “may” propose legislation based on the European citizen’s initiative.  
As Leftwich argues there are at least three possible components or levels of 
good governance. As is explained above, first of all, the systemic use is that it is 
wider than government and it refers to “a looser and wider distribution of” both 
political and economic power. Secondly, politically, it refers to a legitimate and 
democratic “Western” state based on democratic principles such as democratic 
polity, separation of power, checks and balance system, regular elections etc. 
Finally, from an administrative point of view, it refers to “an efficient, open, 
accountable and audited public service” including “independent judicial system to 
uphold law and resolve disputes arising in a largely free market economy.”12 
According to Leftwich, the latest use, that is, administrative use of governance is 
especially the one employed by the World Bank. 
Although the definition of these principles may differ from different 
organizations such as World Bank, OECD or the EU, the WB perspective, as an 
initiator of the term, explains the use of governance in a brief way as follows:  
“Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them.”13  
In this context, good governance can be read as a version of classical 
liberalism or “model of a liberal-democratic polity”.14 What needs to be done in 
good governance is to create a self-regulating civil society and market economy 
apart from efficient and effective governments. Originally the term good 
                                                 
10 KJAER: op. cit. 7, 14. 
11 HOOGHE, LIESBET – MARKS, GARY: Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of 
Multi-Level Governance, in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97. No. 2. (May, 
2003), 233-243. 
12 LEFTWICH, ADRIAN: Governance, democracy and development in the Third World, in 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14. Issue 3. (1993), 611. 
13 For a definition and components of governance by World Bank, see: http://info.world 
bank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home [cit. 2013-10-03]. 
14 LEFTWICH: op. cit. 605. 
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governance was proposed as a kind of solution to both democratic and 
administrative problems of Sub-Saharan African countries by the WB in 1989, but 
currently the WB indicators are not limited to them. 
There are six criteria of the WB “good” governance.  
1) Voice and Accountability; 
2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; 
3) Government Effectiveness; 
4) Regulatory Quality; 
5) Rule of Law; 
6) Control of Corruption. 
Table 1 shows that future enlargement will be even more challenging than the 
latest enlargement process considering lower average good governance points. 
Although Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania’s average performance are worse than 
the Nordic countries, potential candidate and candidates countries are even worse 
than the newcomers of the EU. Another interesting fact is that although Bulgaria 
and Romania are in the EU, except for “voice and accountability” and “political 
stability and absence of violence” criteria, their performance is worse than or 
similar to Turkey. Montenegro’s average is very close to that of Romania and 
Bulgaria. What is also clear from the table is that “political stability and absence 
of violence” criterion should be ameliorated and developed for the countries 
involved in the future enlargement process.  
4. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITIVENESS 
Governance does have an economic dimension. It is important for the EU because, 
as was explained above, considering the history of the then EU, the economic 
union was relatively a success story. It is a fact that economic governance itself is 
part of the Copenhagen Criteria: “a functioning market economy and the capacity 
to cope with competition and market forces in the EU.” The basic challenge here 
starts with this criterion because according to the European Commission, “while 
Turkey is a functioning market economy, no Western Balkan enlargement country 
enjoys this status.”15  
Another challenge can be seen in terms of the Convergence Criteria or the 
Maastricht Criteria which needs to be satisfied after membership, since an opt-out 
option will not be given to the newcomers. In the future, members of the EU who 
are not part of the Euro-zone except for Denmark and the UK, should set a target 
date. However, only Lithuania and Romania have set a target date for the adoption 
of the Euro so far.16 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: op. cit. 
16 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Sweden should also determine 
the target date, but they haven’t set it so far.  
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Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
 Selected Maastricht Criteria 
 GDP 
Growth 
Unemployment Consumer-
Price 
Index 
General 
Government 
Balance 
General 
Government 
Gross Debt 
 Macroeconomic Performance 
Indicators 
 
EU28(1) 0,1 10,8 1,5 -3,3 87,1  
EU 18(1) -0,4 12,0 1,3 -3,0 92,6  
Albania(2) 0,7 16,2 1,9 -4,9(4) 65,2(4) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina(2) 
1,2 44,5 -0,1 -2,2(4) 45,1(4) 
Macedonia(3) 3,1 29,0 2,8 -4,1 36 
Montenegro(3) 3,5 19,5 2,2 -2,6 58,0 
Serbia(3) 2,5 22,1 7,8 -5,0 63,7 
Turkey(3) 4,0 9,8 7,5 -1,6 36,3 
Kosovo(2) 2,5 30,9 1,9 -2,6(4) (5) 8,3(4) (5) 
Table 2: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2013.17 
As table 2 indicates, what is promising for the future enlargement is that GDP 
growth, government balance and government debt are relatively better than the 
EU28 average. Considering some of the selected Maastricht Criteria, it is seen that 
only Bosnia and Herzegovina could pass the criteria concerned. It should also be 
underscored that Kosovo and Montenegro have already adopted the Euro as their 
currency. Albania and Serbia are the countries lagging behind who could not pass 
all of the selected criteria. As for Macedonia, there is a need for amelioration 
regarding inflation rate and government balance. As to Turkey, only inflation rate 
seems problematic considering its better position in terms of government balance 
and debt. 
Apart from the Maastricht criteria, macroeconomic performance of the 
countries gives an alert of an immediate challenge considering the unemployment 
                                                 
17 Source:  
* Grey areas show that the Maastricht Criteria could not be achieved. 
(1) Eurostat. 
(2) IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2014. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/weo/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf [cit. 2014-10-03]. 
(3) European Commission, European Economic Forecast, Spring, 2014. Available at: http:// 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2014/ee3_en.htm [cit. 
2014-10-03]. 
 (4) European Commission, EU Candidate & Potential Candidate Countries’ Economic 
Quarterly, 2014. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/cpaceq/ 
documents/cceq_2014_q2_en.pdf [cit. 2014-10-03]. 
(5) 2013 data is NA. Instead, 2012 data are shown in the table for Kosovo in terms of general 
government balance and general government gross debt. 
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rate. When compared to the EU average, it is highly problematic for the countries 
concerned except for Turkey: “Structural reforms need to be prioritised and 
competitiveness enhanced in order to support fiscal consolidation, tackle high 
external imbalances as well as high unemployment in all countries, averaging over 
20% in the Western Balkans.”18 
 
The Global Competitiveness Index 2013–2014 rankings 
Future Enlargement 
Albania 95 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  87 
Kosovo - 
Macedonia, FYR,  73 
Montenegro  67 
Turkey  44 
Serbia  101 
Benchmarking 
Bulgaria  57 
Croatia  75 
Romania  76 
Finland  3 
Germany  4 
Sweden  6 
Table 3: The Global Competitiveness Index 2013–2014 rankings.19 
The World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness Index” 2013–2014 
rankings in table 3 show that the problem is not only related to the unemployment 
rate. There is another urgent problem regarding their competitive power. Although 
Turkey seems the most competitive country when compared to the latest 
enlargement countries and the future enlarging countries, there is a great difference 
when compared to the members of the EU especially Finland, Germany and 
Sweden, in that, these three countries are the EU’s most competitive ones. 
The difference between the countries can be seen easily in the index with 
reference to their economic development stage. For example, candidate and 
potential candidate countries, except for Turkey, are placed under the “stage two: 
efficiency-driven economies,” while countries such as Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland are placed under the “third stage: innovation-driven 
economies.” Turkey finds itself a place in-between them: the transition stage. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Considering the challenges, it is out of question not to argue that both current 
members and future members do have a significant diversity. Not only their 
                                                 
18 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: op. cit. 4. 
19 Source: World Economic Forum, available at: http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-
competitivene ss-report-2013-2014 [cit. 2014-10-03]. 
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economy, but also their governance levels are diverse. That is why the motto of the 
EU is highly suitable for the EU: “United in diversity.” The EU will be united but 
that does not mean that it will omit differences including economy, culture, 
traditions and languages etc. That is why, the motto gives us the clue of the basic 
challenge: To keep the EU united in spite of the members’ and candidates’ great 
and significant difference.  
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Abstract 
The article explores the issue of paternalism from both a definitional and justificatory 
aspect. It presents some of the problems related to the definition of the concept and then 
investigates elements that could be taken into account in the justification of paternalistic 
public policies. The author describes various failures in human reasoning identified in 
economics literature (technical inability, weakness of will, emotional decision-making, 
lack of experience). Paternalistic public policies might be justifiable with reference to these 
reasoning-failures. Finally, the issue of libertarian paternalism is discussed as a relatively 
mild, less-coercive method of state intervention. 
 
Keywords: paternalism, public policy, libertarian paternalism, autonomy, self-harm. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of paternalism permeates public relations and private life as 
well.1 Take, for instance, the case of a benevolent father who prohibits his children 
to play outdoors on a freezing winter day because he is afraid that they will catch 
a cold. The state – analogously to a benevolent father – may prescribe the 
compulsory use of seat belts or prohibit the use of dangerous narcotics to protect 
citizens from the harmful consequences of their own poor decisions. For sure, 
benevolent intentions matter, but there is a strong, commonly accepted liberal 
presumption against someone else, including the state and its agents, determining 
the right course of action for a competent individual. Thus, it seems centrally 
important to determine relevant arguments that can be used to justify legal 
paternalism in democratic societies. In what follows, I will examine various 
aspects that need to be taken into account when justifying paternalistic public 
policies. The article starts with a conceptual analysis of paternalism including the 
identification of possible definitional elements. In the second part, I proceed to 
justificatory issues. I introduce the consequentialist and the autonomy-based 
approaches to justification and examine why and under what circumstances the 
state should be seen as a better decision-maker than the individual. In the final part, 
                                                 
1 Preparation of this article has been supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, 
OTKA project K 108790 entitled ‘Changes of modern state – Historical perspectives and 
answers to contemporary challenges’ (lead researcher prof. dr. Péter Takács). 
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I explore how policy-makers can use the non-coercive methods of libertarian 
paternalism to ‘nudge’ people to make better (i.e. more beneficial and less self-
harming) decisions in their everyday lives. 
2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
There have been many attempts to define paternalism.2 Paternalism is not a ‘natural 
kind’3 and – seeing the huge amount of complex and often conflicting definitions 
– one is tempted to give a stipulative definition of the concept.4 Presumably, this 
would preclude possible debates over the definition’s correctness because 
stipulative definitions are arbitrary in the sense that they assign a meaning to a 
word for the first time.5 However, the word ‘paternalism’ has acquired a meaning 
in ordinary language use and it seems necessary to test the meaning of definitions 
against the colloquial meaning of the word – even if this is quite vague and 
uncertain. This correspondence is important but a ‘good’ definition will have to 
satisfy a number of other expectations as well; a definition will be judged 
according to e.g. its consistency, its context and the set of problems it is used to 
clarify and resolve.6 
The word ‘paternalism’ carries negative connotations and it is often 
considered to be morally wrong. People are regularly criticized for being too 
paternalistic and public policies are frequently attacked under the banner of anti-
paternalism by political opponents. The two most common explanations given for 
the concept’s negative normative content are the impermissible intentions behind 
                                                 
2 A complex definition given by Gerald Dworkin looks like the following. ‘X acts 
paternalistically towards Y by doing (or omitting) Z if and only if: (1) Z (or its omission) 
interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y; (2) X does so without the consent of Y; (3) X 
does so just because doing Z will improve the welfare of Y, or in some way promote the 
interests, values, or good of Y.’ DWORKIN, GERALD: Defining Paternalism, in COONS, 
CHRISTIAN – WEBER, MICHAEL (ed.): Paternalism – Theory and Practice, 2013, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 29. The same definition appears under the 
‘Paternalism’ entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. DWORKIN, GERALD: 
Paternalism, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2014 Edition, EDWARD 
N. ZALTA (ed.), available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/patern 
alism/ [cit. 2014-12-03]. 
3 DWORKIN (2013): op. cit. 38. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a 
‘kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a grouping or ordering that does not depend 
on humans.’ BIRD, ALEXANDER – TOBIN, EMMA: Natural Kinds, in ZALTA, EDWARD N. 
(ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), available at: 
http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/natural-kinds/ [cit. 2014-12-03]. 
4 DWORKIN (2013): op. cit. 31. 
5 HURLEY, PATRICK J.: A Concise Introduction to Logic, 2006, ninth edition, Thomson 
Wadsworth, 88.  
6 DWORKIN (2013): op. cit. 25.  
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paternalism and its coercive character.7 It seems to me that the violation of 
autonomy is implicitly associated with most paternalistic interventions8 and any 
definition that retains autonomy as a central element already implies something for 
the justification of the concept. Consequently, it is not merely a theoretical question 
how someone defines paternalism: if something qualifies as paternalism, chances 
are high that it will be subject to a more rigorous scrutiny. It might be easier to 
accept an intervention that is not labelled as ‘paternalism’ because it falls outside 
the scope of definition. 
Gerald Dworkin, in his latest contribution, gives an excellent overview of the 
different dimensions along which definitions of paternalism might vary (e.g. 
outcomes vs. motives, motives vs. reasons, acts vs. omissions, violation of 
autonomy, etc.).9 Most definitions seem to share the same fundamental concepts 
but place emphasis on different dimensions. My understanding is that paternalism 
can be conceptualized with the help of two additional concepts: autonomy and 
benevolence. Roughly, paternalism can be defined as interference with someone’s 
autonomy in order to protect this person from self-induced harm and/or to promote 
his benefit. I believe that we cannot and should not strive for a ‘perfect’ definition: 
a rough definition, such as this, might be useful to circumscribe the area of 
examination but it cannot be complete without giving a settled definition of the 
other concepts (autonomy, benevolence, harm, benefit, etc.).  
An important question that needs clarification is what the term ‘paternalism’ 
is predicated of: acts, people, institutions, motives, legal regulations, policies can 
all be paternalistic. People act paternalistically in private relations, for example a 
husband who hides the sleeping pills from his suicidal and depressed wife. Legal 
regulations that allow the sectioning of potentially self-harming mentally ill 
patients also have a paternalistic character. Yet, the two scenarios are quite 
different from each other. John Kultgen talks about public and private paternalism 
in this respect and warns us that justified forms of public paternalism might not 
exactly parallel justified cases of personal paternalism.10 Abstract legal regulations 
treat people in a standardized way and they are less responsive to individual 
circumstances. Thus, it seems that the justification of paternalistic public policies 
and legal regulations requires ‘more’ than a single act of private paternalism e.g. 
from the perspective of democratic accountability. In what follows, I try to explore 
elements that need to be taken into account when justifying paternalistic public 
policies. 
                                                 
7 CORNELL, NICOLAS: A Third Theory of Paternalism, in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 113. 
forthcoming (2015). Paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2456419 [cit. 2014-12-03]. 
8 It is a debated question whether the violation of autonomy is a necessary element of 
paternalism. DWORKIN (2013): op. cit. 27.  
9 Ibid. 26-28. 
10 KULTGEN, JOHN: Autonomy and Intervention – Parentalism in the Caring Life, 1995, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 161. 
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3. JUSTIFYING PATERNALISTIC PUBLIC POLICIES 
Due to the interference with individual autonomy, paternalism is a ‘frightening 
prospect’ for many.11 However, most people do not deny that paternalism might be 
justifiable, or even necessary in certain situations.12 The two major factors that are 
generally taken into account when it comes to the justification of paternalism are 
the beneficent consequences of the intervention and the autonomy of the person 
subjected to paternalism. Put it very simply, it seems that the more beneficent and 
the less intrusive a paternalistic intervention, the easier it is to accept it as morally 
non-problematic.  
Autonomy-based approaches are friendlier to ‘softer’ forms of paternalism 
that do not interfere with the decision-making of individuals – often because the 
given person is incapable of making fully autonomous decisions in the first place, 
either due to mental incapacity or the lack of relevant information that would be 
necessary to make a fully informed decision. A major distinction, from the 
perspective of autonomy-based justifications, is the distinction between hard and 
soft paternalism. In Joel Feinberg’s terminology, hard paternalism advocates 
coercion to protect competent adults against their voluntary self-harming choices. 
Soft paternalism, on the other hand, allows protection from self-regarding harmful 
conduct, if ‘the conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary 
intervention is necessary to establish if it is voluntary or not’.13 Feinberg’s 
proposition that soft paternalism is acceptable while hard paternalism is not seems 
to correspond to our basic moral intuitions as an ‘ethical minimum’: there is 
nothing wrong with stopping a child or a mentally ill person from harming himself 
or herself, while the same is not necessarily true for competent adults making 
voluntary self-harming decisions. Thus, Feinberg’s account of paternalism roughly 
comes down to the question what makes a choice ‘substantially’ voluntary or 
nonvoluntary. Voluntariness, however, seems to be an elusive concept, partly 
because it is tied to other complex, vague and often contested concepts as mental 
capacity and human rationality.14 For example, seemingly irrational self-harming 
                                                 
11 CONLY, SARAH: Against Autonomy – Justifying Coercive Paternalism, 2013, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 182. 
12 The approach of ‘absolute anti-paternalism’ contends that paternalism is never justified 
and imposes a blanket prohibition on all forms of paternalistic interventions. KULTGEN: op. 
cit. 132. I tend to agree with Conly that those who reject all forms of paternalistic 
constraints may have ‘a quite unrealistic picture of human ability’ (i.e. the presumption that 
people are always capable of making perfect choices) and a ‘morally unjustified sense that 
people deserve to suffer for their own mistakes’. CONLY: op cit. 182. Even John Stuart Mill, 
often considered the ‘greatest enemy’ of paternalism admits certain exceptions to the ‘harm 
principle’. See e.g. Mill’s example about crossing an unsafe bridge in Chapter V of On 
Liberty.  
13 FEINBERG, JOEL: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law – Harm to Self, 1986, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 12. 
14 The traditional view of human rationality is increasingly challenged in light of the 
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choices might be explained with the different values and personal preferences of 
people;15 they are not necessarily attributable to errors in someone’s reasoning 
capacities.  
Consequentialist justifications focus on the outcome of paternalistic 
interventions. This means that paternalism is morally justifiable if it leads to ‘good’ 
consequences for the paternalised person or – in other words – if it serves his or 
her ‘best interests’. The question is how to determine what is actually ‘good’ for 
the individual: some claim that there are objective elements of well-being that 
every human being wants to possess (e.g. health) while others claim that these 
elements are essentially subjective and it is only someone’s revealed preferences 
that should be promoted through paternalism.16  
When it comes to the justification of paternalism in practice (particularly 
state-implemented public policies), we cannot limit ourselves to merely one of the 
previously mentioned models. I will consider a few elements that seem to 
complicate the picture. (1) Consequences and respect for individual autonomy are 
usually both taken into account when evaluating the acceptability of paternalistic 
interventions. It seems to me that neither approach has a fixed priority over the 
other but priority varies on a case-by-case basis. Consequences often ‘relativize’ 
other considerations when it comes to public policies and legislation but autonomy 
can be thought of as constituting a ‘deontological side-constraint’ that reference to 
consequences cannot override.17 The question is how to strike a balance between 
the two values and through what kind of democratic process is it possible to 
persuade people about the correctness of a paternalistic state action. (2) The 
rationale behind a paternalistic action is often ‘mixed’ in the sense that the actor 
might have motives other than benevolent protection to act paternalistically. This 
is particularly true for the state that has to take into account multiple reasons when 
regulating complex social issues (e.g. protection of the individual, protection of 
others, public order, morals, etc.). Actually, it seems that there are very few 
unmixed cases of paternalism. Even in an apparently ‘pure’ case (e.g. prescribing 
motorcyclists to wear crash helmets), one can refer to the indirect harm caused to 
other members of society (e.g. by the additional social security expenses that incur 
                                                 
findings of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics (cf. the issue of libertarian 
paternalism later in this article). Mental capacity is also a contested concept: the line 
between capacity and incapacity often seems vague and arbitrary.  
15 The classical example here is the example of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Christian Scientists) 
who reject blood transfusions for religious reasons even in life-threatening emergencies. 
Their choice seems irrational from an external perspective but it is questionable whether 
blood transfusions can be forcibly administered to them. See e.g. DWORKIN, GERALD: 
Paternalism, in The Monist, Vol. 56. No. 1. (1972), 66. 
16 Dan Brock distinguishes between ‘desire’ and ‘ideal’ theories of good that roughly 
corresponds to the subjectivist-objectivist distinction. BROCK, DAN: Paternalism and 
Promoting the Good, in SARTORIUS, ROLF (ed.): Paternalism, 1983, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 250.  
17 Similarly to Ronald Dworkin’s idea that rights should be conceived as ‘trumps’ that have 
priority over non-right based social objectives.  
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in case of an accident).18 (3) The state as a paternalistic actor has different 
characteristics than an ‘ordinary person’ acting paternalistically in the private 
domain. The state, as mentioned before, is more ‘distant’ from the paternalistic 
situation and intervenes through abstract regulations that leave less space for 
appreciating the particularities of each case. On the other hand, there are certain 
factors that make the state a ‘wiser’ decision-maker than the individual. These are 
explored in the following paragraphs 
Bill New examines the justification of paternalistic public policies in 
economics terms.19 He argues that contrary to the traditional liberal theory, the state 
may sometimes be a better judge of welfare than the person himself.20 It is possible 
to identify failures in human reasoning and it seems that the state and its officials 
might be able to reason better in certain situations.21 New distinguishes four such 
failures. First, individuals might make sub-optimal choices because the amount of 
information needed is so great or because the ‘causal connections between choice 
and outcome are difficult to make’.22 Human intellect is limited and this leads to a 
‘technical inability’ to make good decisions in complex situations. Secondly, 
people neglect to act in accordance with their best interests (i.e. long term 
preferences) due to weakness of will (akrasia) – consider the example of a heroine 
addict who wants to stop using the drug but cannot do so because of his addiction. 
Thirdly, humans are often prone to emotional decision-making, for example 
‘becoming attached to making certain choices, such as following a habitual route 
to work, even if it is longer or less attractive than an alternative one’.23 Finally, 
people sometimes lack first-hand experience with respect to the consequences of 
their potentially self-harming decisions; even though most smokers have an 
‘abstract’ knowledge of the harmful consequences of cigarettes, they do not have 
experience of the pain and suffering that smoking-related illnesses will potentially 
cause to them. 
                                                 
18 This issue is closely related to the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding 
acts. 
19 NEW, BILL: Paternalism and Public Policy, in Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 15. Issue 
1. (1999), 63. The article is also included in the appendix of New’s doctoral thesis available 
at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/833/1/New_Justifying_state_interventions_the_case_of_patern 
alism.pdf [cit. 2014-12-03]. Page numbers in the footnotes refer to this version of the 
article. 
20 According to Mill’s assumption, the individual always knows best what is good for him, 
therefore any external intervention aimed at improving someone’s welfare is likely to be a 
failure.  
21 Paternalistic state policies are aimed at correcting failures in human reasoning. State 
policies can also be aimed at correcting market failures. Inadequate or imperfect 
information is a standard source of market failure, therefore New argues that state 
interventions aimed at correcting imperfect distribution of information are not paternalistic. 
This is contrary to the traditional view that considers inadequate information as a reason 
for paternalism. NEW: op.cit. 249-251. 
22 Ibid. 251.  
23 Ibid.  
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New argues that the state is less susceptible to such failures in reasoning and 
a paternalistic state policy can be justified if it is shown to produce better outcome 
than individual choice and if the increase in welfare is sufficient to compensate for 
the violation of autonomy that the intervention entails.24 The state can be 
considered to be more impartial (‘phlegmatic’) than an individual and therefore 
more resistant to temptation, weakness of will and emotional decision-making: 
choosing between a luxurious holiday in the present and saving for retirement in 
the future is obviously less difficult for the ‘impartial’ state than for the person 
concerned. New claims that the state and its employees also have a wider 
perspective when it comes to experiences related to possibly self-harming 
activities. Although public employees (e.g. doctors, nurses, etc.) do not experience 
directly the negative effects of not wearing a seat belt, they are still in a better 
position to make a judgment on the harmful consequences of accidents and the 
prudence of seat belt wearing than ordinary drivers. Finally, relating to the 
technical inability of individuals to make decisions in complex situations, the state 
has the advantage to employ experts who can devote themselves to the problem 
full-time. With the help of the experts, the state has a better knowledge of the 
situation than ordinary citizens. 
Response to New’s article further nuances the conditions of acceptable state 
paternalism.25 Authors argue that it is important to distinguish between those who 
know that they suffer from a failure of reasoning and those who do not. The 
‘sophisticated akratic’ knows that he faces weakness of will in certain situations 
and he will probably adopt some form of pre-commitment strategy to deal with the 
problem.26 State intervention is necessary only for the ‘myopic akratic’, the person 
who is unaware that weakness of will constitutes a problem for him. The same 
stands for people’s technical inability to make decisions in complex situations. 
Those who realise their technical inability will hire experts to help with unfamiliar 
or complex decisions (e.g. medical, legal or investment decisions).27 State 
paternalism is necessary for those ‘who do not know that they do not know enough’ 
– the difficult question is how to distinguish the former group from the latter in a 
‘blanket’ public policy regulation.  
A somewhat similar requirement has been articulated by Thomas and 
Buckmaster when arguing that an appropriate paternalistic policy should always 
‘discriminate between those for whom paternalism is deemed necessary and those 
for whom it is not’.28 This practically means that paternalism should be limited as 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 257.  
25 LEONARD, THOMAS C. – GOLDFARB, ROBERT S. – SURANOVIC, STEVEN M.: New on 
Paternalism and Public Policy, in Economics and Philosophy, Vol.16. No. 2. (2000), 323.  
26 E.g. entering into a Ulysses contract in advance and making sure that the self-harming 
option is not available to the person when the tempting situation develops. Ibid. 326. 
27 Ibid. 327. 
28 THOMAS, MATTHEW – BUCKMASTER, LUKE: Paternalism in social policy – when it is 
justifiable? in Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services Research 
paper, No. 8. (2010-2011), 18. 
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much as possible to those who are benefited by the restriction: instances of 
‘impure’ paternalism involving the restriction of others besides those who are 
benefited should be kept to a minimum.29 Proportionality, accountability and 
efficacy are also important principles when evaluating paternalistic policies. 
Proportionality requires that an intervention is the minimum necessary to achieve 
the intended aim of the policy. Accountability means that paternalistic 
interventions shall be transparent to the person subjected to the intervention. This 
is particularly important in cases of ‘libertarian paternalism’ that operate by 
modifying choice-architecture often in a way that is not obvious to the paternalised 
person. Efficacy implies that the paternalistic intervention is efficient in producing 
the intended outcomes. Although there seems to be a general consensus that social 
policies must be evidence-based, it is not entirely clear what evidence shall be 
considered when determining the efficacy of paternalistic policies.30 
To sum up, paternalistic public policies can be justified on a consequentialist 
basis by reference to the fact that the state is sometimes in a better position to assess 
what is good for the individual than the individual himself. The state, being more 
detached (‘phlegmatic’) and having a wider perspective than the individual, is less 
vulnerable to certain reasoning-failures. It is also necessary that the intervention 
be proportionate, efficient (evidence-based) and accountable to the state. Thus, a 
paternalistic state policy can be justified if it is shown to produce better outcome 
than individual choice and if the increase in welfare is sufficient to compensate for 
the violation of autonomy that the intervention entails.31 However, paternalistic 
interventions sometimes have unintended negative consequences that complicate 
this picture. For example, paternalism can cause people to undertake riskier 
activities because they will act under the (true or false) assumption that they are 
protected against their own self-harming actions. This is called ‘moral hazard’ in 
economics literature.32  
4. LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM  
Libertarian paternalism is a relatively ‘soft’, non-coercive form of paternalism.33 
                                                 
29 Pure and impure paternalism is also called direct and indirect paternalism. A ban on the 
sale of cigarettes is impure (indirect) paternalism because it limits cigarette manufacturers 
besides smokers whose benefit is originally intended to be promoted by the prohibition. 
Gerald Dworkin argues that indirect paternalism requires stronger justification because it 
involves third-parties ‘who are losing a portion of their liberty and they do not even have 
the solace of having it done in their own interest’. DWORKIN (1972): op. cit. 64. 
30 THOMAS – BUCKMASTER: op. cit. 22-25. 
31 NEW: op.cit. 257. 
32THOMAS – BUCKMASTER: op. cit.7-8.  
33 The adjective ‘libertarian’ refers to the non-coercive and liberty-preserving character of 
this form of paternalism. SUNSTEIN, CASS – THALER, RICHARD: Nudge – Improving 
Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness, 2009, Penguin, London, 5.  
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Advocates of the approach, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler start off from the 
premise that humans are not fully rational choosers and do not always act in their 
own best interests. Taking into account the findings of cognitive psychology and 
behavioural economics, it is possible to exploit individual cognitive biases and 
create regulations that ‘nudge’ people to make better, i.e. more beneficial and less 
self-harming decisions. Proponents of libertarian paternalism claim that it is an 
effective, relatively cheap but less intrusive method to promote people’s welfare 
than traditional forms of paternalism. The idea has received considerable public 
attention in recent years and has been endorsed by official government politics 
both in the United Kingdom and the United States.34 However, libertarian 
paternalism has also been criticised for its alleged ineffectiveness and for the 
moral, political and legal risks it may carry (e.g. slippery slope to hard paternalism, 
lack of transparency, lack of neutrality, etc.).35  
Libertarian paternalist public policies are based on the idea that instead of 
forcibly taking away self-harming options from people, it is better to present them 
available choices in a way that they will make ‘better’ choices themselves. If 
policy-makers are aware of weaknesses of human decision-making, they can 
modify ‘choice-architecture’ so that results are more beneficial to individuals. One 
such cognitive bias, the so-called status quo bias refers to people’s inertia not to 
change the current state of affairs. This means, for example, that changing the 
default position from non-enrolment to automatic enrolment will have a significant 
impact on the number of people enrolled to a savings scheme. Another approach 
focuses on changing the physical environment where choices take place: removing 
candies and soft drinks from supermarket checkouts ensures that people do not 
‘give in to temptation’ and buy sweets while waiting in the checkout line. People, 
however, remain free to choose in these cases – it is only that they are more likely 
to choose an option that is more conducive to their welfare. The efficiency of these 
interventions is not necessarily high, but the costs of implementing such policies 
tend to be low as well. 
The welfare state is often described as having a paternalistic character. It is 
true that a state which is preoccupied with the welfare of its citizens will sanction 
policies that do not only increase welfare through redistribution (i.e. increasing 
someone’s welfare at the expense of others) but also policies that ‘compel citizens 
to undertake or abstain from activities that affect that citizen alone’.36 
                                                 
34 The Behavioural Insights Team was set up in 2010 by the Cameron administration with 
the aim to ‘help Government departments think about non-regulatory means of achieving 
behaviour change’. See Report on Behaviour Change (Science and Technology Select 
Committee, House of Lords, 2011) 33. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), headed by Cass Sunstein, has similar functions in the US when reviewing draft 
regulations and overseeing the implementation of government-wide policies. 
35 For an overview of the most frequent objections, see SUNSTEIN – THALER: op. cit. 235-
252. See also WHITMAN, GLEN: The Rise of the New Paternalism, available at http://www. 
cato-unbound.org/2010/04/05/glen-whitman/rise-new-paternalism [cit. 2014-12-03]. 
36 NEW: op. cit. 244. 
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Redistributive policies are not paternalistic in the strict sense of the word, although 
some of them can be perceived as ‘insurance schemes’ that will protect a person’s 
future self from the full consequences of certain unwise or self-harming decisions 
in the present. Most public pension systems serve mixed purposes in the sense that 
they are partly based on the idea of social solidarity but also have a paternalistic 
character i.e. they compel people to take care about their own retirement in 
advance. The increasing transformation of pay-as-you-go pension schemes to 
defined contribution plans seems to place social solidarity increasingly in the 
background and paternalism in the foreground.37 As we have previously seen, such 
paternalism might be justified by reference to the ‘myopic akrasia’ of decision-
makers38 but countries that wish to avoid hard paternalism leave it for the 
individual to join a pension plan. 
In order to create sustainable pension systems, it seems crucial to identify 
methods that can non-coercively increase participation in voluntary pension 
schemes. This is extremely important for countries that do not require people to 
make mandatory pension contributions (e.g. the United States). Hybrid systems, 
like Hungary, can also make use of such methods in order to strengthen their non-
mandatory, private savings based pillar. Libertarian paternalism has come up with 
possible solutions in this respect. The first one proposes changing the default rule 
from non-enrolment to automatic enrolment. Although such regulation does not 
violate autonomy (people remain free to opt-out later), it drastically increases the 
number of participating employees, since most of them will probably not opt-out 
after being enrolled.39 Alternatively to automatic enrolment, participation can also 
be increased by making enrolment administratively easier or ‘forcing’ employees 
to actively make a choice between enrolment and non-enrolment when first hired. 
An additional issue – since most participants do not save enough – is how to get 
people increase their savings contribution. A possible solution is provided by ‘The 
Save More Tomorrow’ program, developed by Richard Thaler and Shlomo 
Benartzi, which aims to increase pension contributions by asking participants to 
commit themselves, in advance, to the raise of their pension contributions 
whenever they get a pay rise.40 Finally, offering tax deductions can also make 
                                                 
37 Pay-as-you-go pension schemes – often characteristic to welfare states following the 
Bismarckian model – are funded by compulsory contributions. The contributions are not 
capitalized but they are spent immediately to cover payments for current pensioners. In 
defined contribution schemes contributions are paid into an individual account for each 
member. On retirement, the member is eligible to receive the accumulated capital and its 
returns. See, e.g. NATALI, DAVID – RHODES, MARTIN: The New Politics of the Bismarckian 
Welfare State: Pension Reforms in Continental Europe, in EUI Working Papers SPS No. 
2004/10. 2.  
38 Cf. NEW: op. cit. 253; LEONARD – GOLDFARB – SURANOVIC: op.cit. 325. 
39 Sunstein and Thaler refer to statistics according to which participation rates in one 
pension plan under the opt-in approach were only 20 percent after three months of 
employment. After switching to automatic enrolment, enrolment of new employees jumped 
to 90 percent immediately. See SUNSTEIN – THALER: op.cit. (2009) 117-118. 
40 SUNSTEIN – THALER: op.cit. (2009) 22-125. See also THALER, RICHARD – BENARTZI, 
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pension savings more attractive to people. Financial incentives are relatively soft 
instances of paternalism but they do not fall within the ambit of libertarian 
paternalism.  
Sarah Conly criticizes ‘softer’ forms of paternalism for being too costly and 
inefficient.41 She claims that people sometimes continue to choose the ‘wrong 
thing’ despite all efforts of nudging, incentives or education. In the case of 
smoking, for example, she argues that an outright prohibition would be desirable 
instead of spending money on ‘softer’ but rather ineffective measures such as 
advertising or education. Conly identifies four criteria that acceptable forms of 
coercive paternalism must satisfy.42 (1) The activity to be prevented must be 
opposed to our long-term ends. Applying this criterion to the question of smoking, 
one can say that the harmful consequences, including the possibility of serious 
illnesses and premature death, are at odds with the fulfilment of someone’s long-
term goals. (2) Coercive measures have to be effective. Since the majority of 
people accept cigarettes as genuinely dangerous substances, Conly argues that the 
prohibition of smoking would be more effective than the prohibition of alcohol 
was in the 1920ies in the US. (3) The benefits must be greater than costs. It might 
be argued that society, overall, would be better off without cigarettes; costs would 
reduce overtime because smokers who initially suffer from the lack of cigarettes 
will feel better as their addiction fades. (4) The measure in question needs to be 
the most efficient way to prevent the activity. Conly claims that ‘softer’ methods 
against smoking (e.g. education, raising of prices) did not work sufficiently. 
Although the rate of smokers has gone down, more than 20 percent of Americans 
continue to smoke which shows the inefficiency of ‘soft’ methods. Still, the full 
prohibition of smoking seems relatively controversial. However, there are other 
cases when coercion and prohibition seems easier to accept (e.g. ban on trans-
fats).43 
5. CONCLUSION 
We can draw the following conclusions concerning the issue of paternalism in the 
public sphere. First of all, it is important to make a distinction between state 
paternalism (legal paternalism) and private paternalism. Although both seem to 
share similar basic elements (i.e. they can be understood as interventions to a 
person’s autonomy in order to prevent harm to that person or promote his or her 
benefit), the state has special characteristics that needs to be taken into account 
when justifying paternalistic public policies. For the sake of conceptual clarity, it 
should be emphasized that not all public welfare policies are paternalistic in the 
                                                 
SHLOMO: Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioural Economics to Increase Employee 
Savings, in Journal of Political Economym Vol. 112. No. 1. (2004), 164, available at http:// 
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/Richard.Thaler/research/pdf/SMarTJPE.pdf [cit. 2014-12-03]. 
41 CONLY: op.cit. 149.  
42 Ibid. 150-152. 
43 Ibid. 152-155. 
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strict sense of the word. Redistributive policies are only ‘paternalistic’ inasmuch 
as they are aimed at taking care of the weak but they do not necessarily protect 
people from self-harming or unwise decisions. 
The two major approaches to the justification of paternalism are the 
autonomy-based and the consequentialist models. In practice, both autonomy-
based and consequentialist arguments are considered; a general understanding is 
that autonomy constitutes a ‘deontological side-constraint’ to consequentialist 
considerations. Paternalistic public policies are justifiable in situations where it is 
apparent that the state knows better what is good for the individual than the 
individual himself; such situations can be the result of different failures in human 
reasoning to which the state and its agents are less vulnerable to. Libertarian 
paternalism is also built on certain ‘irrationalities’ in human behavior. It seems that 
these interventions are more easily accepted than traditional paternalistic 
interventions because they are less restrictive to individual freedom of choice. 
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Abstract 
Rights are, without a doubt, the most outstanding feature of contemporary legal systems. 
It can be argued that since the middle of the past century we are immersed in a culture of 
rights. “Neo-constitutionalism” is one among other such concepts that has been used to 
designate and study this phenomenon. The hypothesis we will attempt to address in this 
paper is that some of the central characters of our culture of rights, here termed as neo-
constitutionalism, cannot be explained consistently without an explicit reference to natural 
law. 
Is neo-constitutionalism a «third philosophy of law», beyond natural law and legal 
positivism? We will specifically examine the connection between the assertion that there 
exist natural law principles of justice and the following characteristics of our culture of 
rights: the recognition of rights; the reference of state or national legal systems to 
supranational legal systems; constitutions as a result of a network of principles and rules; 
the principle of proportionality; and the principle of reasonableness. While the first three 
characteristics constitute the structure of any neo-constitutional practice, the two latter 
ones are features of the processes of legal reception and legal allocation of rights in such 
a legal practice. 
Therefore, we will distinguish between three forms of neo-constitutionalism: as a theory of 
law; as an ideology of law; as a method of analysis of law.  
 
Keywords: Analytical legal theory of norms, balancing, constitutional argumentation and 
interpretation, defeasibility, democracy, Genoa Realism, legal reasoning analysis, neo-
constitutionalism, principles of proportionality and of reasonableness. 
 
«Description maybe description, even if it is an evaluation». 
Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law. 
«Death has dominion because it is not only the start of nothing 
but the end of everything, and how we think and talk about dying 
(the emphasis we put on dying with 'dignity') shows how 
important it is that life ends appropriately, that death keeps faith 
with the way we have lived it». 
Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013). 
 
«If men were angels, no Government would be necessary». 
James Madison, The Federalist; and then Jerome Frank, If men were angels. 
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«This is a Court of law; not a Court of justice. The rule of joy 
and the law of duty seem to me all one». 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law. 
1. INTRODUCTION: SOME REALISM ABOUT «GENOVA LEGAL REALISM » 
Neo-constitutionalism is a term recently suggested in legal and political 
philosophy to label what appears as a new perspective to look at and to discuss of 
law, of its ontological, phenomenological and epistemological dimension; i.e.: of 
its forms of identification, application and cognition. 
Namely, the term neo-constitutionalism has been proposed and first used by 
some exponents of the Genoa School of Law («Tarello Institute for Legal 
Philosophy»)1 to capture and to account for what, despite any difference in the 
arguments adopted and/or in the tenets maintained, emerges as a common 
assumption in the last two or three decades writings by legal and political 
philosophers as Ronald Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Carlos Nino, and, in Italy, Luigi 
Ferrajoli and Gustavo Zagrebelsky. 
(Separately necessary, but jointly sufficient, conditions for the existence of a 
school of thought are: some headquarters; one or more founding fathers; a lot of 
disciples; a Word to be spread. In fact, Genoa Realism satisfies all these conditions. 
The headquarters are just in Genoa, Italy, in the old «Legal Culture Department». 
The founding father was Giovanni Tarello,2 Italy’s foremost philosopher and 
                                                 
1 «Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy» is one of the world’s leading centres for legal 
research and education. The works are focused on topics in analytical legal theory and 
philosophy of positive law, constitutional democracy, human rights, bioethics, sociology 
of law and history of European legal culture. The library in Balbi Street has an outstanding 
collection of works in legal philosophy. Most of it is in English, Spanish and Italian, though 
we also have numerous publications in French and German. 
As for the present theme cf. BARBERIS, MAURO: Metaetica del costituzionalismo, in Diritto 
e questioni pubbliche, No. 11. (2011) 135-156; BARBERIS, MAURO (2000a): Filosofia del 
diritto. Un'introduzione storica, 2000, il Mulino, Bologna; BARBERIS, MAURO (2000b): 
Neocostituzionalismo, democrazia e imperialismo della morale, in Ragion Pratica, Vol. 
14. (2000), 147-162; COMANDUCCI, PAOLO: Il positivismo giuridico: un tentativo di 
bilancio, in Sudi in onore di Franca De Marini, 1999, Milano, Giuffrè, 125-134.; 
COMANDUCCI, PAOLO: Neo-constitutionalism: an attempt at classification, in Associations 
(in print). See also POZZOLO, SUSANNA (1998). Neoconstitucionalismo y especificidad de 
la interpretación constitucional, in Doxa, Vol. 2. No. 21. 355-370; POZZOLO, SUSANNA: 
Neocostituzionalismo e positivismo giuridico, 2001, Torino, Giappichelli. 
2 The founder of the School was unquestionably Giovanni Tarello (Genoa, October 4, 1934 
– April 20, 1987). He would regularly strike people since the start as a born story-teller, 
with a very personal sense of humour. Here we cannot analyze, even less interpret, his large 
and multi-faceted body of work. In it, with remarkable versatility, he managed to combine 
legal theory with history of institutions, sociology of law, and legal dogmatics, too. 
He was largely a man from a time in which specialization was not yet an inescapable 
destiny for a philosopher of law: he was, at the same time, jurist, historian, sociologist, and 
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historian of law. Disciples are by now a legion, but the more distinctive theoretical 
contributions – seen as different from historical and sociological3 ones – have been 
provided, until now,4 by the very contributors to the studies on neo-
constitutionalism: Riccardo Guastini (actually he is the Director of new «Tarello 
Institute for Legal Philosophy»);5 Paolo Comanducci (the representative of 
Genoa’s School who is better known in Latin America was elected Chancellor of 
                                                 
legal theorist as well. The results of these many research interests are documented, above 
all, by the many papers he published in the very first years of the Materiali per una storia 
della cultura giuridica – originally a scholarly yearbook, soon to become a journal with 
the Publishing House “Il Mulino” (Bologna), Tarello’s lifelong editorial partner. But also 
his posthumous essays (1988) are a telling testimony. Indeed, his work constantly 
succeeded in reaching a unitary character – a remarkable feat, given these variety of themes 
and modes of analysis. 
The paramount problem is maybe that «Genoa Realism» originated from Tarello 
pioneering inquiries, and methods on many specific themes: the history of the codification 
of law, the theory of the normative language and of its interpretation, the sociology of law 
and its methods, and so forth. 
If we really want to be able to identify one essential strand, in this body of work, we must 
think of the central role of interpretation (TARELLO, GIOVANNI: L'interpretazione della 
legge, 1980, Milano, Giuffrè). Such a central role was foreshadowed in 1972, but is 
explicitly stated in 1974. This is the very first formulation of what came to be known as 
the sceptical standpoint of the Genoa School: norms are but dependent variables of the 
interpretation of legal texts. This approach was further substantiated in 1976 – a large book 
project that did not go beyond the first volume – by showing how jurists and legal experts 
in general have traditionally taken part in the production of law. Before the codification of 
law in the 18th and 19th century (see TARELLO, GIOVANNI: Storia della cultura giuridica 
moderna. Assolutismo e codificazione del diritto, 1976, Bologna, Il Mulino), interpretation 
was achieved through interpretatio (an activity comprehensive of gap’s integration and of 
legal construction generally), in later times, through the activity of interpretation in the 
strict sense. The thesis found its conclusive articulation in 1980 (TARELLO (1980): op. cit.), 
where interpretation is integrated in a theory of legal reasoning at large. It is at this juncture 
that the disciples set in. 
I reminded the genius of Tarello during a beautiful evening spent – as usually occurs every 
year, during the night of August 10th, Saint Lawrence, the patron saint of Vignole Borbera, 
the little village in which I live –, together with my parents, Carlo Malaspina, his wife 
Franca Fossati and their family. In the end of the Sixties the last two passed the exam of 
Philosophy of Law just under the direction of Tarello). 
3 Among sociologists and social philosophers, Giorgio Rebuffa, Franco Lombardi, 
Riccardo Motta, Realino Marra, Mariangela Ripoli, Paolo Becchi, Monica Raiteri, Isabel 
Fanlo y Cortés can not be forgotten, as well as a Tarello's colleague: Silvana Castignone 
(Novara, August 14, 1931).  
4 Among younger legal theorist, we must remember Giulio Itzcovich, Nicola Muffato and 
Francesca Poggi can not be forgotten. Among the scholars who are or was nearer to the 
School, Michel Troper, Flavio Baroncelli, Letizia Gianformaggio, Tecla Mazzarese, 
Gianpaolo Parodi, Cristina Redondo, Bruno Celano, Enrico Diciotti, Giorgio Pino, Jordi 
Ferrer, Rafael Escudero can not be forgotten.  
5 See below § 3.1. in the present essay.  
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the University of Genoa on July 11, 2014);6 Mauro Barberis;7 Pierluigi Chiassoni 
                                                 
6 As for the neo-constitutionalism debate, Comanducci contributed, along with Pozzolo 
and Mauro Barberis to the proposal of the very label «neo-constitutionalism» – a label, and 
no more than this, to be applied to many and different authors (Dworkin, Alexy, maybe 
Carlos Nino, Atienza and Ruiz Manero) representing a «third» theory of law beyond 
natural law and legal positivism. Comanducci, who is an updated methodological legal 
positivist, does not share the opinion of many who, also within the school, would rather 
see neo-constitutionalism as a mere «constitutionalistic» variant of the millenary natural 
law tradition – on the contrary, it sees it as an evolution of positivist tradition too 
(COMANDUCCI (2001): op. cit.). As a third example of Comanducci’s moderate stance, I 
cite his role in the debate (both inside and outside the School) on Genoa-style interpretive 
scepticism. He sometimes embraced a by now widespread tendency to read, on a 
metatheoretic level, the School’s legal realism as a more complex theory, progressively 
distancing itself from Tarello’s hard scepticism and thus approaching the Hartian mixed or 
eclectic theory. 
7 Cf. BARBERIS, MAURO: Genoa's Realism: a Guide for Perplexed, in Revista Brasileira de 
Filosofia, 2013, RBF, 240-252. In BARBERIS (2011): op. cit., today’s metaethics faces more 
specific questions than moral objectivity debated in XX Century: e. g., the problem of 
constitutional interpretation discussed in this work. First section, on the tracks of David 
Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, tries to imagine an other metaethics: an 
evolutionary, genealogic, and legally oriented one. Second section criticizes the idea, often 
shared by moral philosophers and legal theorists, that the role of law and constitution in 
division of ethical work must be only application of morals. Third section, finally, sketches 
a constitutional metaethics: an objectivist, pluralistic and relativistic answer to 
methodological questions on constitutional interpretation. 
See also BARBERIS, MAURO: Law and Morality Today, in Revus 16, 2012, 55-93. Four 
philosophies of law are compared and discussed in this paper: natural law, legal positivism, 
legal realism, ans neo-constitutionalism. Each of them is defined upon its answers to three 
questions: one regards objectivity or subjectivity of ethical (i.e. moral, political, legal) 
value judgments, another one refers to legal interpretation, and the main one to the 
relationships between law and morality. Natural Law is thus characterized by a) ethical 
objectivism, b) interpretive formalism, and c) the idea that law and morality are necessarily 
connected. Positivism stands for 1) ethical subjectivism, 2) mixed theory of legal 
interpretation, and c) the separability thesis. Legal realism – which is, to some extent, a 
mere radicalization of positivistic views – is cauterized by a) ethical subjectivism, b) 
interpretive skepticism, and c) the separation thesis.  
Neo-constitutionalism holds 1) ethical objectivism, 2) interpretive formalism, and 3) the 
view that law and morality are anyhow connected in a constitutional state (thus making the 
debate between natural law and positivism outdated). Each of the four philosophies of law 
is then articulated into its respective theoretical, methodological and ideological aspects. 
This is how the author points to certain similarities between the opposite standpoints, and 
to some plurality of views inside of every one of them. He stresses furthermore the 
challenges for particular views on law and morality with the final analysis of three 
interpretations of the separability thesis – given by inclusive, exclusive and normative 
positivists. 
In BARBERIS, MAURO: Neo-constitutionalsm: Third Philosophy of Law, in Rivista di 
Filosofia del Diritto – Journal of Legal Philosophy, 1/2014, 153-164, there is the meaning 
of a «third philosophy of law», other than natural law and legal positivism, which Barberis 
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(the Director of the “Master in Global Rule of Law & Constitutional Democracy”, 
with Master courses can be attended, since 2011, in the Imperia Campus); Susanna 
Pozzolo;8 Giovanni Battista Ratti and Giovanni Damele. Finally, the Word-To-Be-
Spread is an interpretation – centered, but realistically – minded, theory of law, and 
a corresponding analysis of jurisprudence – in fact, a form of legal realism). 
That is to say, to put it roughly, the assumption along which the very notion 
of law together with its forms of identification, application and cognition (i.e., in 
its ontological, phenomenological, and epistemological dimension) requires to be 
radically revisited because of the prominent role and pervasive influence 
fundamental rights have been acquiring since the conclusion of the second world 
war both in the domestic law of an ever increasing number of (western) countries 
and in international law. In other words, the assumption is that fundamental rights 
have been so deeply affecting law in all its major aspects, to justify the need and 
to urge the claim for a new understanding of its notion.9 
The suggestion to name neo-constitutionalism the demand for such a new 
understanding of the notion of law is captivating. Simple and plain as it sounds, 
the term neo-constitutionalism in fact both recalls constitutionalism as the 
immediate antecedent of the demand dealt with and acknowledges what in such a 
demand can be taken to be distinguishing and innovative.10 
                                                 
labels neo-constitutionalism, and others describe as constitutionalism, nonpositivism, 
theory of law as integrity or as interpretation, inclusive positivism, postpositivism, and so 
on. This paper distinguishes neo-constitutionalism from constitutionalism, old and new; in 
the following three sections it reconstructs neo-constitutionalist stances on law-moral 
problem, theory of norms, and legal reasoning analysis. 
8 Susanna Pozzolo (born 1967) is now working also on political philosophy, but she is, 
since 1999, well-known for coining the label «neo-constitutionalism», now widely 
employed by almost the whole «Latin» scholarship in order to characterize what can be 
seen as the «mainstream» trend in contemporary legal philosophy. Pozzolo introduced this 
label in her contribution to an international conference in Argentina (POZZOLO (1998) 
(2004), op. cit.,). Interestingly enough, however, we can by now apply the label also to 
authors (such as inclusive or critical positivists or postpositivists as well), who, in particular 
in English-speaking world, would rather ignore or reject it – the names of Neil 
MacCormick, Gustavo Zagrebelsky and Luigi Ferrajoli are the first which come to mind. 
But one has to insist that the label cannot absolutely apply to its own originators (Pozzolo, 
Comanducci and Barberis), who always used it in order to criticize a variety of positions, 
which of course they took seriously, but could not in any way endorse.  
9 Though on the base of not always coincident arguments, a worried warning on the most 
recent apparent crisis of the protection of fundamental rights as a leading principle of 
domestic and international law has been raised, e.g., by ALLEGRETTI, UMBERTO: Diritti e 
stato nella mondializzazione, 2002, Troina (En), Città aperta, 127-197; BONANATE, LUIGI: 
La politica interna del mondo, in Teoria politica, Vol. 17. No. 1. (2001), 3-25; FERRAJOLI, 
LUIGI: I fondamenti dei diritti fondamentali, in Teoria Politica, Vol. 16. No. 3. (2000) 41-
113; MAZZARESE, TECLA: Is the age of rights to a turn? Paper presented at „Fundamental 
Aspects of Human Rights. A Symposium”, Helsinki, 22-23 February 2002. 
10 The standpoint by BARBERIS (2000b): op. cit., 147-162, can be taken to be paradigmatic 
of such a view, namely: „neo-constitutionalism differs from inclusive legal positivism just 
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The other way round, the quite dominant opinion on the way to perceive what 
can be referred to as an expression of neo-constitutionalism, far from being 
captivating, appears restrictive if not even misleading. Namely, what appears 
restrictive if not even misleading is the opinion according to which neo-
constitutionalism, despite any difference in the way it may happen to be phrased 
and argued for, is mainly, if not exclusively, a form of natural law; i.e., one of the 
different forms natural law has been given as the time goes by. 
Despite such a widespread dominant opinion, actually there is no reason why 
neo-constitutionalism shouldn't be conceived of as a form of positive law rather 
than as a form of natural law. To the contrary, it seems sound to maintain that, both 
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, neo-constitutionalism deserves and 
requires a legal positivist reading in order to account for its true distinguishing 
feature: the demand for a new definition of the notion of law11 because of the 
radical changes a great number of positive legal systems have been going through 
since the statement and the protection of fundamental rights have been taken to be 
their grounding constitutive components; i.e., since fundamental rights have been 
acquiring a prominent and pervasive influence in affecting them in all their major 
aspects. 
The recognition of human rights is, without a doubt, the most outstanding 
feature of contemporary legal systems. It can be argued that since the middle of 
the past century we are immersed in a culture of rights.12 Neo-constitutionalism is 
one among many concepts that has been used to designate and study this 
phenomenon.13 The hypothesis we will address in this paper is that some of the 
                                                 
because it maintains the natural law thesis of the (identificative) necessary connection 
between law and morals; it differs from the traditional natural law, getting closer to 
inclusive legal positivism, insofar as it places such a connection at the level of fundamental 
or constitutional principles”.  
11 MAZZARESE, TECLA: Towards a Positivist reading of Neo-constitutionalism, in Jura 
Gentium-Rivista di Filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale, 18, (2008) 
345-364. 
12 Though not always explicitly stated nor similarly defended, the need to think and define 
from anew the forms of identification, application and cognition of law because of the role 
fundamental rights have been acquiring in many contemporary positive legal systems is 
recurrent in the literature on neo-constitutionalism. In particular, one of its explicit and 
most determined formulation is spelt out by Ferrajoli who writes of constitutionalism 
(Ferrajoli himself does not use the term neo-constitutionalism) as a new paradigm of law 
as contrasted both with what he terms the pre-modern paradigm of law (judicial and 
doctrinal in character) and the modern paradigm of positive law (legislative in character). 
Cf., e.g., FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: Per una sfera pubblica del mondo, in Teoria politica, Vol. 17. 
No. 3. (2001) 3-21.  
13 Material criteria of identification are not ignored by legal positivists. To the contrary, 
since the 1934 edition of his Reine Rechtslehre, Kelsen writes: „the essential function of 
the constitution consists in governing the organs and process of general law creation, that 
is, of legislation. In addition, the constitution may determine the content of future statutes, 
a task not infrequently undertaken by positive-law constitutions, in that they prescribe or 
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central characters of our culture of rights,14 here referred to as “neo-
constitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently without a reference to natural 
law. 
In order to avoid any confusion that may arise in this paper I would like to 
stress the dual meanings attached to the terms ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘neo-
constitutionalism’. A primary meaning of both lexemes is one of a theory and/or 
ideology and/or method of analysis applied to law. A secondary meaning of both 
terms indicates some structural elements of a legal and political system, which are 
described and explained by (neo) constitutionalism as theory or which satisfy the 
requirements of (neo) constitutionalism as ideology. It is in this second meaning 
that ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘neo-constitutionalism’ designate a constitutional 
model, namely that collection of normative and institutional mechanisms realised 
in a historically determined legal-political system15 which limit the powers of the 
                                                 
preclude certain content. The catalogue of civil rights and liberties, a typical component of 
modern constitutions, is essentially a negative determination of this kind. Constitutional 
guarantees of equality before the law, of individual liberty, of freedom of conscience, and 
so on are nothing but proscriptions of statutes that treat citizens unequally in certain 
respects or that interfere with certain liberties”. The quotation is from the English 
translation, 64-65. KELSEN, HANS: Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die 
rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, 1934, Deuticke, Wien. [English translation by B. 
PAULSON, LITSCHEWSKI – PAULSON, STANLEY L.: Introduction to the Problems of Legal 
Theory, 1992, Clarendon Press, Oxford.] 
Nor material criteria of identification are disregarded by ROSS, ALF: On Law and Justice, 
1958, Stevens, London, 78-81, and ROSS, ALF: Directives and Norms, 1968, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 96; when taking into account material rules of competence as well 
as personal and procedural ones. Nevertheless, though far from being ignored, material 
criteria of identification have not been paid any special attention, nor acknowledged any 
peculiar import in affecting and conditioning legal systems way of functioning. 
14 Great emphasis on constitutional fundamental rights as material criteria of identification 
is devoted, e.g., by FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: Lo stato di diritto fra passato e futuro, in COSTA, 
PIETRO – ZOLO, DANILO (ed.): Lo stato di diritto. Storia, teoria, critica, 2002, Feltrinelli, 
Milano, 349-386. See also PALOMBELLA, GIANLUIGI: L'autorità dei diritti, 2002, Laterza, 
Roma-Bari, 7 and 23-29. Focusing more on the problem of the identification (and 
interpretation) of the constitutional rules than on the problem of the identification (and 
interpretation) of the statutory rules coping with the material criteria of validity, the topic 
is dealt with at length by the contributions to ALEXANDER, LARRY (ed.): Constitutionalism. 
Philosophical Foundations, 1998, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
15 With regard to domestic law, insofar as the Italian legal system is concerned, a critical 
overview of shortcomings and deficiencies concerning the judicial protection of 
fundamental rights is provided by TARUFFO, MICHELE: Diritti fondamentali, tutela 
giurisdizionale e alternative, in MAZZARESE, TELCA (ed.): Neocostituzionalismo e tutela 
(sovra)nazione dei diritti fondamentali, 2002, Giappichelli, Torino. With regard to 
international law, a rich exemplification of the limits met in securing legal implementation 
and judicial protection of fundamental rights is offered by CASSESE, ANTONIO: I diritti 
umani nel mondo contemporaneo, 1994, Laterza, Roma-Bari. 
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State and/or protect fundamental rights.16 
The foregoing introductory remarks (meant to make clear the reason why of 
the claim for a new understanding of the notion of law) lead to a preliminary 
distinction about the term neo-constitutionalism and its possible uses. Namely, 
they lead to distinguish what might either be taken to amount to three different 
notions of neo-constitutionalism, or, perhaps even more convincingly, to what 
might rather be conceived of as a threefold significance (import) of one and the 
same notion. 
Being more precise, the term neo-constitutionalism can be used, first, in the 
language of jurists to refer to legal systems where a catalogue of fundamental rights 
has been expressly laid down in the constitution and/or in constitutional 
amendments, and where such a catalogue has been supplemented with a variety of 
legal devices, different as the case may be, to further their implementation and/or 
to grant them legal protection. Such an use of the term simply refers to a 
distinguishing feature which some legal systems may happen to possess; that is to 
say, it simply refers to a (possible) component of positive law and/or to its 
corresponding notion in legal dogmatics.17 
Second, the term neo-constitutionalism can be used in the language of legal 
theorists and philosophers to refer to a new paradigm of law together with its 
modalities of (judicial) application and forms of cognition. Such an use of the term 
does not refer just to a (possible) component of positive law and/or to its 
corresponding notion in legal dogmatics. It rather refers to an explicative model 
which (positive) law can be given because of the way legal systems may happen 
                                                 
16 That is to say that the validity of a domestic provision might be challenged and/or its 
interpretation affected by making reference to fundamental rights listed in regional and/or 
international declarations, charters and covenants, though not included in domestic law. 
Further, a query not coincident with such an eventual practice is the problem as to whether 
to conceive of any catalogue might happen to be written down in a legal system, be it 
domestic, regional or international, as open or closed; that is to say, the problem as to 
whether to understand it as a mere exemplification rather than a sort of utterly definitive 
list of what rights are to be legally and judicially protected. 
Arguments in favour of the open character of any such a catalogue can be found, beside 
any natural law attitude, in positive constitutional provisions. That is so, e.g., with the IX 
amendment of the United States Constitution: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”, 
or else with art. 2 of the Italian Constitution: “The Republic recognizes and protects the 
inviolable human rights...”. Insofar as the Italian Constitution and its art. 2 are concerned, 
the query is dealt with, e.g., by PACE, ALESSANDRO: Metodi interpretativi e 
costituzionalismo, in Quaderni costituzionali, Vol. 21. No. 1. (2001), 35-61. Further, cf., 
GUASTINI, RICCARDO: Teoria e dogmatica delle fonti, 1998b, Giuffrè, Milano, 343-344. 
17 This can be taken to be the case, though his main concern is not the definition of the 
notion of constitutionalism, with GUASTINI, RICCARDO: La “costituzi-onalizzazione” 
dell’ordinamento italiano, in Ragion Pratica, Vol. 6. No. 11. (1998a), 185-206, when 
providing a list of what he terms “conditions of constitutionalization”. 
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to be figured out.18 
Third, the term neo-constitutionalism can be used in the language of legal 
and/or political and/or moral philosophers to refer to law as it should be because 
of the law as it is; that is to say because of the principles and the values which it 
explicitly states: the fundamental rights, the principles and values which are within, 
nor without it.19 Such an use of the term does not refer just to a (possible) 
component of positive law and/or to its corresponding notion in legal dogmatics. 
Nor it refers just to an explicative model of particular (positive) legal systems. 
Rather, such an use of the term refers to an axiological-normative model of law. 
Three different notions, perhaps. Or, rather, perhaps a threefold significance 
and import of one and the same notion: empirical and descriptive in its significance 
and import, when the term is used in the language of jurists and/or legal 
dogmaticians; reconstructive and explicative in its significance and import, when 
the term is used in the language of legal philosophers and theorists; axiological and 
normative in its significance and import when the term is used in the language of 
legal, political or moral philosophers.20 
                                                 
18 That is the way it is, with FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: La pragmatica della teoria del diritto, in 
COMANDUCCI, PAOLO – GUASTINI, RICARDO (ed.): Analisi e diritto 2014, 2014, 
Giappichelli, Torino (in print). Further, though not always as manifestly vindicated and 
purported as in Ferrajoli's works, that is also the case, e.g., with ZAGREBELSKY, GUSTAVO: 
Il diritto mite. Legge diritti giustizia, 1992, Einaudi, Torino; PALOMBELLA: op. cit., 136; 
Atienza, Manuel: El sentido del Derecho, 2001, Ariel, Barcelona, 309-310; ATIENZA, 
MANUEL: Legal Reasoning and Constitutional State, in Associations (in print). 
19 A similar understanding of the notion occurs in FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: I fondamenti dei diritti 
fondamentali, in Teoria Politica, Vol. 16. No. 3. (2000), 41-113, when maintaining that the 
new paradigm of constitutionalism “represents a completion not only of the rule of law but 
also of the very legal positivism [...] since the change it has led to, has provided legitimacy 
with a twofold artificial and positive character: not only of the law as it is, i.e. of its 
conditions of existence, but also of the law as it ought to be, i.e. of its conditions of validity 
made constitutionally positive them too, as law on the law, in the forms of legal limits and 
constraints on its production” (author's italics, the English translation is mine). 
Further, cf. also RAZ, JOSEPH: Legal Rights, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4. No. 
1. (1984), 1-21, when stating: “Legal rights can be legal reasons for legal change. They are 
grounds for developing the law in certain directions. Because of their dynamic aspect legal 
rights cannot be reduced, as has often been suggested, to the legal duties which they justify. 
To do so is to overlook their role as reasons for changing and developing the law” (p. 15), 
and “Legal rights [...] are legal reasons for developing the law by creating further rights 
and duties where doing so is desirable in order to protect the interests on which the 
justifying rights are based” (p. 18). 
20 Such a deficiency has been denounced from a variety of perspectives. From a theoretical 
perspective, it constitutes the main concern of those who concentrate on the difficulties of 
the identification and/or judicial implementation of fundamental rights because of the 
interpretative difficulties their formulations can give rise to: that is the case, e.g., with 
BOBBIO, NORBERTO: (1968). Presente e avvenire dei diritti dell'uomo, in La comunità 
internazionale, Vol. 23. 3-18. English translation by CAMERON, A.: Human Rights Now 
and in the Future, in BOBBIO, NORBERTO: The Age of Rights, 1996, Polity Press, 
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2. MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM  
Modern constitutionalism intended as legal ideology can be presented in the form 
of three dichotomies. The first is connected to the objectives and ambitions of 
constitutionalism. The second is related to those institutional means through which 
the realisation of the objectives of constitutionalism is sought. The third concerns 
the political means of realising the objectives of constitutionalism. 
The first dichotomy is between weak and strong constitutionalism. 
a) Weak constitutionalism is the ideology which requires a constitution only 
to limit existing powers, without necessarily foreseeing the specific defence of 
fundamental rights. Strong or liberal constitutionalism demands a constitution 
which is able to guarantee fundamental rights and liberties in face of state powers.  
b) The second dichotomy is between the constitutionalism of checks and 
balances and that of rules. I refer to and adopt the distinction made by Bernard 
Manin.21 
                                                 
Cambridge, 12-31; MAZZARESE, TECLA: (1993). Judicial Implementation of Fundamental 
Rights: Three Sorts of Problem, in KARLSSON, M. M. – JONSSON, O. P. – ERYNJARSDOTTIR, 
E. M. (ed.): Recht, Gerechtigkeit und der Staat, 1993, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 203-
214; KOSKENNIEMI, MARTTI: The Effect of Rights on Political Culture, in ALSTON, PHILIP 
(ed.): The EU and Human Rights, 1999, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 99-116. 
From a (meta)ethical perspective, it constitutes the main concern of those who doubt any 
alleged universality of fundamental rights because of the differing values of different 
cultures and/or ideologies and/or religions: that is the case, despite any distinguishing 
feature of different trends, with the advocates of multiculturalism and/or of (political) 
realism and/or of the gender theory. From a political perspective, it constitutes the main 
concern of those who maintain that their legal positivization deprives fundamental rights 
of their political innovative potentiality: that is mainly the case, e.g., with the adherents of 
the so called critical legal studies movement. Cf., e.g., MCILAWAIN, CHARLES HOWARD: 
Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, 1947, Cornell University Press, New York; 
SARTORI, GIOVANNI: Constitutionalism: a Preliminary Discussion, in American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 56. No. 4. (1962), 853-864; TROPER, MICHEL: Il concetto di 
costituzionalismo e la moderna teoria del diritto, in Materiali per una storia della cultura 
giuridica 18, (1988), 61-81; FLORIDIA, GIUSEPPE G.: La costituzione dei moderni. Profili 
tecnici di storia costituzionale. I Dal Medioevo inglese al 1791, 1991, Giappichelli, Torino; 
DOGLIANI, MARIO: Introduzione al diritto costituzionale, 1994, il Mulino, Bologna; and 
MORESO, JOSÉ JUAN: In Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism, in CHIASSONI, PIERLUIGI 
(ed.): The Legal Ought, 2001, Giappichelli, Torino, 37-63. 
21 Cf. MANIN, BERNARD: The Principles of Representative Government, 1997, Cambridge, 
University Press Cambridge; MANIN, BERNARD: On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 
in Political Theory, Vol. 15. No. 3. (1987), 338-368; MANIN, BERNARD – PREZEWORSKI, 
ADAM – STOKES, SUSAN: Elections and representation, in MANIN, BERNARD – 
PREZEWORSKI, ADAM – STOKES, SUSAN (ed.): Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, 1999, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
See SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Playing by the Rules, 2002, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 171-184; 
SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text, 
in Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 4. Issue 1. (2010), 34-45; SCHAUER, FREDERICK: 
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The constitutionalism of checks and balances is the ideology which, in order 
to limit the powers and/or guarantee fundamental rights, posits an institutional 
system in which these checks and balances are present. Clearly, Montesquieu’s 
theory is the main doctrinal source for this type of constitutionalism.22 
The constitutionalism of rules is the ideology which, in order to limit powers 
and to guarantee fundamental rights, sees a hierarchical relationship between a 
range of fundamental liberties and the power of the State in which the former has 
a chronological and an axiological priority over the latter. A collection of 
fundamental rules (a constitution or a charter of rights) must prevent the State’s 
intruding into this sphere. The constitutionalism of rules could also be called, as 
Manin proposes,23 market constitutionalism if one were to highlight the importance 
                                                 
Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text, in KLATT, MATTHIAS 
(ed.): Institutional Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, 2012, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 307-316; SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New 
Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 2013, Harvard University Press, Harvard. 
I had the pleasure to meet and to discuss with Frederick Schauer (Distinguished Professor 
of Constitutional Law at the University of Virginia – Charlottesville, U.S.A.) when he 
explained his theories during the residential courses of “Master Global Rule of Law and 
Constitutional Democracy”, taught on Genoa University’s Campus in Imperia, on February 
12, 2013. He was one of the teachers of the course “Constitutional Rights & 
Multiculturalism”. 
I visited the School of Law of the University of Virginia together with Charles Strauss, a 
former judge for the 22nd Judicial Circuit in Danville, at Pittsylvania County, Virginia. I 
was housed in his house in Chatham in March 2012, because I was a “Team Member” of 
Rotary International Group Study Exchange 2012. I had the opportunity to visit a part of 
Tennessee and almost the whole Commonwealth of Virginia, and the White House, too; I 
knew a lot of friends, Lawyers, Judges, Sheriffs Officers, Professors. 
A special “thanks” to the Italian and American Rotary Foundation for the splendid and 
unique forty days we spent together. But a very special “thank you” also to Lawyer Jeffrey 
Van Dooren and to his family for the final period in which he housed me in his house in 
Salem; can not be also forgotten the consorts Jim and Janet Johnson, as well as Attorney at 
Law Stephanie Cox (Firm “Spicer, Frank & Cox” in Blacksburg, Virginia) after my visit to 
the Campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech). Now all that people and 
places belong to me, as well as I belong to them.  
22 TARELLO: op. cit., 311-342. 
23 MANIN (1997): op. cit., 25-31. Bernard Manin (Marseille, April 19, 1951), is Professor 
of Politics at Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Paris); M.A. 1974 (political science), Paris I. 
Pantheon-Sorbonne and Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris). He reminds us that the 
Athenian Assembly, which often exemplifies direct forms of democracy, had only limited 
powers. According to Manin, the practice of selecting magistrates by lottery is what 
separates representative democracies from so-called direct democracies. Consequently, 
Manin argues that the methods of selecting public officials are crucial to understanding 
what makes representative governments democratic. He identifies four principles 
distinctive of representative government: 1) shose who govern are appointed by election at 
regular intervals; 2) the decision-making of those who govern retains a degree of 
independence from the wishes of the electorate; 3) those who are governed may give 
expression to their opinions and political wishes without these being subject of the control 
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given by liberal constitutionalism from the beginning of the 19th century to 
property rights and contractual freedom. The principal cultural source of this type 
of constitutionalism is, in my opinion, 18th century rationalist and voluntaristic 
natural law doctrine. 
c) The third dichotomy is that between reformist and revolutionary 
constitutionalism. 
Reformist constitutionalism is the ideology which demands that the existing 
power should concede to, or agree to negotiate, the drawing up of a constitution. 
Revolutionary constitutionalism proposes the destruction of the existing 
power and/or requires that the new revolutionary power should prepare a 
constitution. 
The following relationships existing between the single elements making up 
the three dichotomies can be foreseen: 
 Reformist and revolutionary constitutionalism are mutually 
incompatible; 
 there is a unidirectional relationship between strong and weak 
constitutionalism: strong constitutionalism includes weak 
constitutionalism whereas the weaker form does not necessarily imply 
the stronger form; 
 the constitutionalism of rules is incompatible with weak 
constitutionalism ; 
 the constitutionalism of checks and balances, and the constitutionalism 
of rules are instrumental with regards to strong constitutionalism.24 
It is more difficult to outline the relationship between the constitutionalism of 
                                                 
of those who govern; and 4) public decisions undergo the trial of debate. For Manin, 
historical democratic practices hold important lessons for determining whether 
representative institutions are democratic. 
While it is clear that representative institutions are vital institutional components of 
democratic institutions, much more needs to be said about the meaning of democratic 
representation. In particular, it is important not to presume that all acts of representation 
are equally democratic. After all, not all acts of representation within a representative 
democracy are necessarily instances of democratic representation. 
24 As Sartori himself points out [SARTORI, GIOVANNI: Costituzione, in SARTORI, GIOVANNI: 
Elementi di teoria politica, 1987, il Mulino, Bologna, 11-24], the following threefold 
distinction recalls the distinction drawn by LOEWENSTEIN, KARL: Political Power and the 
Governmental Process, 1957, University of Chicago, Chicago. Such a threefold distinction 
which, following Loewenstein, is adopted by Sartori, is not, clearly enough, exhaustive of 
all the possible notions of constitution which can be, and to a large extent, have already 
been distinguished. For a carefully, multidimensional overview of such a variety of notions, 
cf. FLORIDIA, GIUSEPPE G.: ‘Costituzione’: il nome e le cose, in COMANDUCCI, PAOLO – 
GUASTINI, RICCARDO (ed.): Analisi e diritto 1994, Giappichelli, Torino, 131-152. Further, 
cf. also, e.g., DOGLIANI, op. cit., 11-30; GUASTINI, RICCARDO: Lezioni di teoria 
costituzionale, 2001, Giappichelli, Torino, 307-321. Needless to be remarked that the net 
of (relationships among the) different notions of constitution provides one more reason, 
beside those ones already listed in the text, for the plurality of possible understandings of 
constitutionalism. 
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checks and balances and the constitutionalism of rules. Both appear to be either 
complementary or incompatible. I believe this surprising statement can be 
explained if one points out that the constitutionalism of rules has always been 
associated with the idea of the popular origins of sovereignty, whilst this has not 
always been the case with the constitutionalism of checks and balances. Therefore 
the two constitutionalisms are complementary if both presuppose popular 
sovereignty; they are incompatible if this is not the case. 
In the first case, the constitutionalism of checks and balances is conceived as 
an ideology which requires a complex separation of powers. State powers are 
delegated, separated and limited step-by-step in order to guarantee the basic 
individual rights of popular sovereignty. Power is here simply the function of the 
State: it is legitimate in that it represents the whole population and/or because this 
power is enacted in the name of the people. 
In the second case, the constitutionalism of checks and balances is conceived 
exactly as in Montesquieu’s doctrine related to monarchical government. The 
checks and balances are put in place between those bodies which represent the 
different interests of different groups and social classes: the court, the aristocracy, 
the clergy, the bourgeoisie, etc. Sovereignty belongs to the State in the person of 
the king: institutional equilibrium reflects social and political equilibrium and 
guarantees certain limited individual freedoms. The principal function of the 
constitution is not to assure individual and universal rights but to sanction legally 
a political compromise stipulated amongst factions fighting to maintain or obtain 
power.  
In this way it is hoped that a conceptual structure has been put in place which 
allows, on one hand, for the distinction between the constitutionalism of the 18th 
and 19th centuries and contemporary neo-constitutionalism, and, on the other, a 
detailed analysis of the differing forms of constitutionalism which developed in 
Europe up to the Second World War. 
3. THEORETICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL NEO-
CONSTITUTIONALISM  
At this stage I will turn to an analysis of contemporary neo-constitutionalism. 
Bobbio’s distinction25 of three types or meanings of legal positivism is well 
                                                 
25 Norberto Bobbio, who has died aged 94 (Turin, October 18, 1909 – Turin, January 9, 
2004 but buried in Rivalta Bormida -AL-), was Italy's leading legal and political 
philosopher, Senator for life and one of the most authoritative figures in his country's 
politics. His status was marked by the Italian president's immediate departure for Turin to 
be among the first mourners, and an extensive discussion of his writing in the media. 
Bobbio had taken degrees in jurisprudence and philosophy at Turin. His first book, The 
Phenomenological Turn In Social And Legal Philosophy (1934, Einaudi, Torino), had been 
followed by a monograph on The Use Of Analogy In Legal Logic (1938, Einaudi, Torino).  
He set himself the task of elaborating a general theory of the practice and validity of law, 
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known.26 It is convenient at this point to create a similar classification, albeit 
somewhat forced, for the three different forms of neo-constitutionalism – 
theoretical, ideological and methodological. In this way, the critical comparison 
between homogenous types of positivism and, respectively, neo-constitutionalism 
will be more useful. 
The use of this three-way division allows us also to show the differences 
                                                 
breaking with the attempts of most contemporary Italian philosophers to offer a speculative 
philosophy of the idea and morality of law. In elaborating his version of legal positivism, 
Bobbio drew on the writings of Hans Kelsen, whose work he had come across as early as 
1932. This research ultimately bore fruit in a number of books based on his Turin lectures, 
of which the most important are A Theory Of Judicial Norms (1958, Giappichelli, Torino) 
and A Theory Of The Legal Order (1960, Giappichelli, Torino), and studies of Locke, Kant 
and legal positivism. Between 1955 and 1970, he also published three collections of essays. 
These writings had a similar place in Italian academic legal circles to the work of H.L.A. 
Hart, the late Oxford professor of jurisprudence, and both men, at different times, expressed 
their mutual esteem for each other to me. 
Bobbio's legal studies fed into his political writings. Influenced again by Kelsen, he 
adopted a procedural view of democracy as consisting of certain minimal „rules of the 
game”, such as regular elections, free competition between parties, equal votes and 
majority rule. His theory was enriched by a strong, realist current, deriving partly from 
Hobbes and partly from the Italian pioneers of political science, such as Gaetano Mosca 
and Vilfredo Pareto (whose reputation he did much to resurrect). He had produced the first 
Italian edition of Hobbes's De Cive in 1948 (Giuffrè, Milano), and later dedicated numerous 
studies to the English philosopher, a collection of which were published in 1989 (and 
appeared in English a couple of years later). He drew on Hobbes to modify what he now 
saw as unsatisfactory elements of his earlier Kelsenism. 
Bobbio regarded Kelsen as caught uncomfortably between a purely formal account of law 
and a substantive position grounded in what he called the „basic norm” underlying all law. 
The missing dimension was the institutional context of law-making, and its relationship to 
the exercise of power. Unlike earlier legal positivists, such as John Austin, Bobbio did not 
thereby equate law with the commands of the sovereign; his point was rather that law and 
rights were best conceived as a historical achievement belonging to a particular form of 
state. 
Bobbio's shift from a pure theory of law to a concern with its political embodiment was 
marked by his moving to a chair in the newly created faculty of political science in Turin 
in 1972, where he remained until the then statutory retirement age of 75 in 1984. The essays 
from this period were later collected as The Future Of Democracy: A Defence Of The Rules 
Of The Game (1984, Einaudi, Torino) – to my mind, the most original of his books – State, 
Government And Society (1985, Einaudi, Torino) and The Age Of Rights (1990, 
Giappichelli, Torino), all of which appeared in English. 
He was a passionate critic of nuclear weapons, which he saw as making war intrinsically 
unjust, and a member of the Bertrand Russell Foundation. His writings on this issue were 
collected in the volumes The Problem Of War And The Roads To Peace (1979, Giappichelli, 
Torino).  
26 The threefold distinction of legal positivism as (a) an approach to (i.e., a methodology), 
(b) an ideology, and (c) a theory of law is drawn by BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Sul positivismo 
giuridico, in Rivista di filosofia, Vol. 52. (1961), 14-34. 
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which exist between constitutionalism and neo-constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism, as considered previously in this paper, is fundamentally an 
ideology which aims at limiting power and defending a sphere of natural liberties 
or fundamental rights. This ideology, on one hand, usually has as a backdrop the 
doctrine of natural law (despite there being no reason why this should be so), which 
maintains the view that there is a connection between law and morals; on the other 
hand, it is in conflict with ideological positivism. Constitutionalism is not, 
however, significant as a theory of law: the dominant theory of the 19th century and 
the first part of the 20th century was undoubtedly positivist and I do not believe 
that constitutionalism has ever attempted to contrast this situation with a competing 
theoretical proposal. 
Neo-constitutionalism does not present itself only as an ideology, with a 
related methodology but also and explicitly as a rival to positivist theory. 
3.1. Theoretical neo-constitutionalism 
Neo-constitutionalism, as a theory of law, aims at describing the results of 
‘constitutionalisation’, namely that process which has brought about a change in 
contemporary legal systems in comparison to those which existed prior to the full 
application of the process itself.  
In many European legal systems there has been a progressive 
constitutionalisation of law, especially in the second half of the 20th century. The 
process ends with the constitution’s saturation of law: constitutionalised law is 
characterised by an invasive nature which conditions legislation, legal theory and 
doctrine as well as the behaviour of political actors. This process is gradual: a legal 
system can, in fact, be constitutionalised to a greater or lesser extent. Following 
Guastini,27 the principal conditions of constitutionalisation are the following: 
                                                 
27 GUASTINI (2001): op. cit. 301. The internationally best known and most influential 
member of the Genoa School of Law (see footnote n. 1) is doubtless Riccardo Guastini 
(Genoa, January 25, 1946), a Giovanni Tarello's scholar who has already had three 
philosophical lives. In his first life, Guastini wrote on Marx’s and Marxism’s legal lexicon; 
during the second one, he was active teaching, and writing on, Italian Constitutional Law; 
and, in the third one, he developed a general theory of law which is original with respect 
to Tarello’s. It is first of all a theory in the tradition of analytic (Oxford-Cambridge) 
philosophy, but it also puts to a new use Hans Kelsen’s conception of meanings’ framework 
(Rahmenlehre) of legal dispositions. Among contemporary legal analysts, the «third» 
Guastini chooses as masters and friends the representatives of the Argentinian School – see 
the journal Analisi e diritto, founded by him with Paolo Comanducci in 1990 and now 
edited by Marcial Pons, as well as the collection of books by the same name, published by 
Giappichelli Publishing House, Italy, which put out, until now, more than one hundred 
titles. Interestingly, Guastini’s theory is as moderately sceptical as Tarello’s was radical: it 
is not the interpreter who «creates» norms, rathers he picks them out from within the 
framework of meanings provided by formulation of legal texts. Since the «second» 
Guastini, finally, such a legal theory focuses on the processes of «constitutionalization» of 
law.  
With this particular expression, Guastini understands a process currently under way in civil 
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1. the existence of a rigid constitution, which incorporates fundamental 
rights; 
2.  jurisdictional guarantees of the constitution; 
3. the binding force of the constitution (constitution as a body of preceptive 
rather than programmatic norms); 
4. the ‘over-interpretation’ of the constitution (extensive interpretation 
generates implicit principles); 
5. the direct application of constitutional norms also in order to regulate 
relations between private individuals; 
6. the interpretation of statutes makes the same adequate to the 
constitutional framework in which they are set. 
The model of legal system which emerges from the reconstruction of neo-
constitutionalism28 is characterised by, in addition to the pervasiveness of the 
constitution, the positivisation of a catalogue of fundamental rights which range 
from the inclusion within the constitution of principles and rules to certain 
peculiarities of interpretation and application of constitutional norms regarding the 
interpretation and application of statutes. As a theory, neo-constitutionalism 
represents, therefore, an alternative to the traditional theory of legal positivism: the 
transformations which the object of the analysis undergo mean that traditional legal 
positivism no longer reflects the real situation of contemporary legal systems. In 
particular, statism, legal-centrism and interpretive formalism, three key features of 
                                                 
law legal cultures, but also constantly present in European and International Law – judges 
and jurists constantly re-interpret the whole of the law in force in terms of the principles 
derived or constructed starting by rigid and warranted-by-judicial-review constitutions. In 
such a process a key role is just played by principles, which Guastini sets apart from rules 
in a more articulated way than the early Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Atienza and Ruiz Manero, 
and so on. Rules and principles are, to him, norms, i.e. meanings of legal provisions which 
can be interpreted either as rules, or as principles, or as both. Both rules directly apply to 
real cases, by a sort of specific subsumption, whereas principles are applied only in the 
sense that rules are derived from them, through a concretization process maybe analogous 
to generic subsumption (as to such a terminology, different from Guastini’s one, cfr. 
BULYGIN (2005): op. cit.). The rules/principles distinction was often criticized – the very 
reasons of such criticism, however, allow us to grasp the original import of the distinction 
itself. Such a distinction could be criticized by the point of view of such logico-structural 
theories of norms as Alchourrón and Bulygin’s. From the standpoint of a 
phenomenological-functional analysis, however, Guastini’s distinction comes out 
unscathed, as it explains constitutional interpretation much better. The same distinction 
could be criticized for its allegedly «weak», or «non-dichotomic», character, as some 
norms can be seen both as rules and as principles: and yet it still provides a working 
distinction. 
Finally, it is sometimes said that such a distinction in fact endangers the very normativity 
of principles, since it sees them as not directly applicable to concrete reality. But, one must 
reply, it is a matter of fact that constitutional principles as such are typically less normative 
– or more abstract – than the statutory rules – in fact, they would be always at risk of go 
unapplied without constitutional rigidity and judicial review.  
28 GUASTINI (2001): op. cit. 314.  
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19th century legal positivism, today no longer appear sustainable.29 
One must also observe that theoretical neo-constitutionalism – which is 
characterised also and above all by focusing its analysis on the structure and role 
which, in contemporary legal systems, the constitutional document possesses30 – 
adopts at times as its object of analysis that which elsewhere I have defined either 
as the ‘descriptive model of the constitution as a norm’ or the ‘axiological model 
of the constitution as a norm’. 
In the first model, ‘constitution’ designates a body of positive legal rules, 
expressed in the form of a document or conventionally accepted unwritten laws, 
which are, with regards to other legal rules, fundamental (and therefore 
representing the foundations of the entire legal system and/or hierarchically 
superior to other rules). 
In the second model, ‘constitution’ designates a body of positive legal rules, 
expressed in the form of a document or conventionally accepted unwritten laws, 
which are, with regards to other legal rules, fundamental (and therefore 
representing the foundations of the entire legal system and/or hierarchically 
superior to other rules) – and so far this is identical to the first model – ‘on 
condition that they have a determined content to which a specific value is 
attributed’. In this model, as Dogliani31 states, the constitution is ‘imbued with an 
intrinsic value: the constitution is a value itself’. 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of theoretical neo-constitutionalism 
(distinguishing it from traditional legal positivism) is without doubt the view 
according to which constitutional interpretation, as a result of the 
constitutionalisation of law process, today reveals some distinctive characteristics 
in comparison to the statutory interpretation. These particular characteristics 
however assume a different form according to who adopts one constitutional model 
or the other. In the light of the fact that, in my opinion, wherever the axiological 
                                                 
29 Reference to the logic of approximate reasoning (fuzzy logic) as contrasted with the 
deductive classical logic account for the distinguishing features of the neo-constitutional 
view on judicial decision-making may sound provocative, at least insofar as a natural law 
understanding of neo-constitutionalism is concerned. Namely, that is so since, despite its 
claim for the material justice of judicial decision as opposed to any alleged positivist 
formalism, the natural law understanding of neo-constitutionalism would never renounce 
to the contention for the ultimate rational objectivity of practical reasoning. On the logic 
of approximate reasoning (fuzzy logic) and judicial decision-making, cf. MAZZARESE, 
TELCA: Forme di razionalità delle decisioni giudiziali, 1996, Giappichelli, Torino, 222-
229. 
30 As SARTORI (1987): op. cit. 18, writes: “historically, constitution was an “empty” term 
which constitutionalism has taken possession of in XVIII century to account for the idea 
of the rule of law (not of men) through the limits of law. The term was defined from anew, 
adapted and appreciated not because it was meaning just “political order”, but because it 
was referring to that peculiar political order which rather than simply “shaping” was also 
limiting governmental action” (author's italics); the English translation is mine. In a similar, 
though not coincident way, cf. also SARTORI, GIOVANNI: Constitutionalism: a Preliminary 
Discussion, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 61. Issue 4. (1962) 853-864. 
31 DOGLIANI: op. cit. 122. 
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model of the constitution as a norm is adopted, neo-constitutionalism appears not 
as a theory of law rather as an ideology, I will illustrate in the following section 
dedicated to ideological neo-constitutionalism the corresponding doctrine of 
constitutional interpretation. 
Those who adopt however the descriptive model of constitution as a norm 
hold that the constitution shares at least one characteristic in common with statutes: 
both are normative documents. Who adopts such a model, therefore, usually views 
constitutional interpretation as a form of legal interpretation, the latter being 
generally defined as the attributing of meaning to a normative text. In effect, one 
can find in the recent literature a tendency to distinguish peculiarities of 
constitutional interpretation with regards to the statutory interpretation on the basis 
of degrees rather than qualitatively. Within this shared position, however, amongst 
writers there are visible differences of degree, which stems from the fact that some 
writers from a moderate external perspective take into account the interpretive 
activity of constitutional courts, the latter in turn appearing often to prefer the 
axiological rather than the descriptive model of the constitution. 
3.2. Ideological neo-constitutionalism 
Presented (also) in the form of an ideology, neo-constitutionalism tends in part to 
be distinguished from constitutional ideology in that its relegates to a secondary 
role the limitation of state power – which was absolutely central in 18th and 19th 
century constitutionalism – posing as its prime objective the guarantee of 
fundamental rights. This change in priorities can easily be explained by the fact 
that state power, in contemporary democratic systems, is no longer viewed with 
fear and suspicion by neo-constitutionalist ideology. Indeed, neo-constitutionalism 
is characterised by its support for the constitutionalised and democratic model of 
rule of law;32 a model which progressively became a benchmark in the West and 
which continues to expand its influence throughout the world.33 
Ideological neo-constitutionalism does not limit itself to describing the results 
of constitutionalisation but it evaluates them positively, proposing their defence 
and possible extension. In particular, it underlines the importance of institutional 
mechanisms which protect fundamental rights – we could at this stage talk of ‘neo-
constitutionalism of checks and balances’. What is more, it stresses the need for 
legislative and judiciary activity which primarily aims at the enactment and 
guarantee of fundamental rights foreseen in the constitution – we could at this stage 
talk of ‘neo-constitutionalism of rules’. 
Given that some of its champions (for instance, Alexy, Dworkin34 and 
                                                 
32 A similar tenet is assumed by TARELLO: op. cit. 124, when stating: “Great Britain hasn't 
had any codification: neither a constitutional one (despite, or perhaps just because of its 
precocious constitutionalization), nor of any other branch of law.”  
33 ALEXANDER, op. cit. 
34 Following DWORKIN, RONALD: Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., such a contention is often given a quite strong antipositivist import. 
That is the case, e.g., despite any difference in the arguments adopted, with ALEXY, 
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Zagrebelsky) sustain that in contemporary democratic and constitutionalised 
systems there is a necessary link between law and morals, ideological neo-
constitutionalism is inclined to believe that a moral obligation of obedience can 
today exist with regards to the constitution and constitutionally compatible 
statutes. It is in this specific sense that ideological neo-constitutionalism can be 
considered a modern-day variant of 19th century ideological positivism, which 
preached the moral obligation of obedience to the law. 
As ideological neo-constitutionalism adopts the axiological model of the 
constitution as a norm (mentioned above), it generally highlights the radically 
different nature of, firstly, the interpretation of the constitution in comparison to 
the statutory interpretation, and, secondly, the application of the constitution with 
regards to the application of statutes. These shifts in emphasis derive from the 
diversity which exists between constitution and statutes and become evident above 
all in the interpretive techniques used. A clear case in point is Ronald Dworkin35 
                                                 
ROBERT: Theorie der Grundrechte, 1985, Nomos, Baden-Baden; ZAGREBELSKY: op. cit. 
192, and ATIENZA: op. cit. 12-16. Nevertheless, nothing prevents that the same contention 
be accounted for in positivist terms. To be sure, the alleged ultimate moral character of 
fundamental rights and legal principles affecting and/or grounding judicial reasoning and 
decision-making is far from being obvious and plain. 
35 DWORKIN, RONALD: The Moral Reading of the Constitution, 1996, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge. In this book there is a particular way of reading and enforcing a political 
constitution, which Dworkin called the moral reading. Most contemporary constitutions 
declare individual rights against the government in very broad and abstract language, like 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that Congress shall 
make no law abridging “the freedom of speech.” The moral reading proposes that we all – 
judges, lawyers, citizens –interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding 
that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice. The First 
Amendment, for example, recognizes a moral principle – that it is wrong for government 
to censor or control what individual citizens say or publish – and incorporates it into 
American law. So when some novel or controversial constitutional issue arises – about 
whether, for instance, the First Amendment permits laws against pornography – people 
who form an opinion must decide how an abstract moral principle is best understood. They 
must decide whether the true ground of the moral principle that condemns censorship, in 
the form in which this principle has been incorporated into American law, extends to the 
case of pornography. 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush were both intense in their outrage at the 
Supreme Court’s “usurpation” of the people’s privileges. They said they were determined 
to appoint judges who would respect rather than defy the people’s will. In particular, they 
(and the platform on which they ran for the presidency) denounced the Court’s 1973 Roe 
v. Wade decision protecting abortion rights, and promised that their appointees would 
reverse it. But when the opportunity to do so came, three of the justice Reagan and Bush 
had appointed between them voted, surprisingly, not only to retain that decision in force, 
but to provide a legal basis for it that much more explicitly adopted and relied on a moral 
reading of the Constitution. The expectations of politicians who appoint judges are often 
defeated in that way, because the politicians fail to appreciate how thoroughly the moral 
reading, which they say they deplore, is actually embedded in constitutional practice. Its 
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and his The Moral Reading of the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
role remains hidden when a judge’s own convictions support the legislation whose 
constitutionality is in doubt – when a justice thinks it morally permissible for the majority 
to criminalize abortion, for example. But the ubiquity of the moral reading becomes evident 
when some judge’s convictions of principle – identified, tested, and perhaps altered by 
experience and argument – bend in an opposite direction, because then enforcing the 
Constitution must mean, for that judge, telling the majority that it cannot have what it 
wants. 
Senate hearings considering Supreme Court nominations tend toward the same confusion. 
These events are now thoroughly researched and widely reported by the press, and they are 
often televised. They offer a superb opportunity for the public to participate in the 
constitutional process. But the mismatch between actual practice and conventional theory 
cheats the occasion of much of its potential value. (The hearings provoked by President 
Bush’s nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, are a clear example.) 
Nominees and legislators all pretend that hard constitutional cases can be decided in a 
morally neutral way, by just keeping faith with the “text” of the document, so that it would 
be inappropriate to ask the nominee any questions about his or her own political morality. 
(It is ironic that Justice Thomas, in the years before his nomination, gave more explicit 
support to the moral reading than almost any other well-known constitutional lawyer has; 
he insisted that conservatives should embrace that interpretive strategy and harness it to a 
conservative morality.) Any endorsement of the moral reading – any sign of weakness for 
the view that constitutional clauses are moral principles that must be applied through the 
exercise of moral judgment – would be suicidal for the nominee and embarrassing for his 
questioners. In recent years, only the hearings that culminated in the defeat of Robert Bork 
seriously explored issues of constitutional principle, and they did so only because Judge 
Bork’s opinions about constitutional law were so obviously the product of a radical political 
morality that his convictions could not be ignored. In the confirmation proceedings of the 
present Justices Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and 
Stephen Breyer, however, the old fiction was once again given shameful pride of place. 
Dworkin (Worcester, Massachusetts, U.S.A., December 11, 1931 – London, February 14, 
2013), was an American philosopher and scholar of constitutional law. He was Frank Henry 
Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University and Professor of 
Jurisprudence at University College London, and had taught previously at Yale Law 
School and the University of Oxford. An influential contributor to both philosophy of law 
and political philosophy, Dworkin received the «2007 Holberg International Memorial 
Prize» in the Humanities for „his pioneering scholarly work” of „worldwide 
impact.”According to a survey in The Journal of Legal Studies, Dworkin was the second 
most-cited American legal scholar of the twentieth century. 
His theory of law as integrity, in which judges interpret the law in terms of consistent and 
communal moral principles, especially justice and fairness, is among the most influential 
contemporary theories about the nature of law. Dworkin advocated a „moral reading” of 
the United States Constitution, and an interpretivist approach to law and morality. He was 
a frequent commentator on contemporary political and legal issues, particularly those 
concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, often in the pages of The New York 
Review of Books.  
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3.3. Methodological neo-constitutionalism 
Some variants of neo-constitutionalism, particularly those which present 
themselves (also) as an ideology, presuppose a methodological position which I 
shall define ‘methodological neo-constitutionalism’. The reference is clearly to 
authors such as Alexy and Dworkin. 
Such a definition makes explicit reference to, and is in contrast with, 
methodological or conceptual positivism, which supports the position that it is 
always possible to identify and describe the law as it is and, therefore, to 
distinguish it from the law as it should be. This position has at least two corollaries: 
the hypothesis of the social sources of law, and that which sees no necessary 
connection between law and morals. In my opinion the positivist position has at 
least one condition: the acceptance of the crucial semantic distinction between is 
and ought as a way of distinguishing between describing and evaluating-
prescribing. It does not have, however, as a condition in the moral debate the non-
cognitivist meta-ethical position; or at least not necessarily, although in fact many 
positivist theorists are non-cognitivists and the majority of positivism’s critics are 
cognitivists. 
Methodological neo-constitutionalism sustains on the contrary – at least with 
regards to situations of constitutionalised law, where constitutional principles and 
fundamental rights are hypothesised as representing a bridge between law and 
morals – the position of a necessary identifying and/or justificatory connection 
between law and morals. 
4. SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS  
In part three I will attempt to identify certain weaknesses in the ideological and 
methodological approaches of neo-constitutionalism. Such criticisms will not be 
aimed at theoretical neo-constitutionalism as I believe this approach handles more 
effectively the structure and workings of contemporary legal systems in 
comparison to the solutions proposed by traditional legal positivism. On the other 
hand, theoretical neo-constitutionalism, if it accepts the view of the solely 
contingent connection between law and morals, it is no way incompatible with 
methodological positivism. Indeed, one could say that it is its legitimate offspring. 
In the light of today’s (partial) changes in the models of the State and of law 
developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the neo-constitutionalist theory of 
law is nothing other than today’s version of legal positivism.36 
                                                 
36 See PETTIT, PHILIP: Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, 1999, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Born 1945, Ballygar, County Galway, Ireland), is an 
Irish philosopher and political theorist. He is Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of 
Politics and Human Values at Princeton University. 
Republicanism is the old/new kid on the political theory block. It is as old as Aristotle, 
Cicero, Machiavelli, Milton, Harrington, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Madison and Adams, 
and yet as new as the revival spearheaded by the intellectual historian Quentin Skinner and 
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the philosopher Philip Pettit. We need to distinguish „old” and „new” republicanism partly 
because liberalism largely displaced it in the 19th and 20th centuries in Anglophone nations 
and partly because contemporary republicanism is liberal in that it accepts moral 
individualism, value pluralism, and an instrumental view of political life. There are two 
strands of old republicanism: one represented by Aristotle's concern for the good life to be 
realized in and through participation in self-governing communities, the other a neo-
Roman tradition that emphasizes freedom (or independence) from the arbitrary will of an 
„alien power” under the rule of law. If Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor represent 
contemporary neo-Athenian interpretations of republicanism, Skinner and Pettit represent 
neo-Roman contemporary interpretations. This splendid anthology of ten original essays 
concentrates solely on the latter, with special emphasis on the thought of Skinner and Pettit.  
Pettit's republicanism consists of two theses. The first, as already noted, is that there can 
be unfreedom without actual interference. The bare possibility of interference is enough. 
To this Pettit adds a second thesis: interference as such need not compromise freedom. 
Interference isn't domination when it isn't arbitrary, and it isn't arbitrary provided it tracks 
our „avowed interests”. This is typically assured by living in a political community 
governed by the rule of law. So a state can levy taxes, impose coercive laws, and even 
imprison without diminishing one's freedom. Provided that the state seeks ends and 
employs means derived from the common, recognizable interests of its citizens, the most 
that can be said is that citizens are nonfree if, say, they are imprisoned for violating just 
laws, not that they are unfree. Skinner accepts the first thesis, but not the second. Both 
theses have their critics. 
This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and 
communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The latest 
addition to the acclaimed Oxford Political Theory series, Pettit's eloquent and compelling 
account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as 
non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. 
The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of this conception, displays its many 
attractions, and makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. 
The second part of the book looks at what the implementation of the ideal would require 
with regard to substantive policy-making, constitutional and democratic design, regulatory 
control and the relation between state and civil society. Prominent in this account is a novel 
concept of democracy, under which government is exposed to systematic contestation, and 
a vision of state-societal relations founded upon civility and trust. Pettit's powerful and 
insightful new work offers not only a unified, theoretical overview of the many strands of 
republican ideas, but also a new and sophisticated perspective on studies in related fields 
including the history of ideas, jurisprudence, and criminology.  
This very interesting book is a systematic attempt to use a traditional view of liberty as the 
basis for modern, pluralistic states. Like many, Pettit begins with Berlin's famous, though 
ambiguous, distinction between positive and negative liberty. He wants a formulation of 
liberty that captures some of the intuitive attractions of liberty in its negative, non-
interference, form. He wants also to avoid some of the defects of liberty as non-interference 
in which liberty is „Freedom of the pike is death for the minnows (BERLIN, ISAIAH: Two 
Concepts of Liberty, in BERLIN, ISAIAH: Four Essays on Liberty, 1969, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford).” Pettit's solution is the concept of liberty as non-domination. This is a 
traditional view associated with the republican tradition that begins in the city states of 
Renaissance Italy, particularly with Machiavelli, is transmitted in the Anglophone world 
by 17th century republican theorists like Harrington, and reaches its importance in the 18th 
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century with the writings of dissident British Whig intellectuals, Montesquieu, and 
Americans like Paine and Madison. In this version of liberty, there is strong emphasis on 
individual rights and freedoms, but in contrast to the libertarian ideal of liberty as non-
interference, the state is authorized, indeed, encouraged to promote government and 
policies that prevent domination of individuals by others.  
The republican notion of 'domination' is similar to the Marxist notion of 'exploitation' in 
that the traditional republicans saw that slaves, servants or subjects, who felt obligated to 
ingratiate themselves with those of “power”, were well aware of the control being exercised 
by those individuals. As well, the Marxist theory that slaves were exploited because they 
were forced to work for someone without receiving full compensation for their labor and 
the products of their labor were forcibly appropriated by someone else, were equally aware 
of the exploitation. In both scenarios, although these individuals were fully aware of being 
in the control of others, they were not “free” to choose otherwise. 
According to Pettit, citizens lack political freedom as long as governmental authorities have 
the standing power to interfere with a citizen’s liberty at their unfettered discretion and 
without having to pay heed to the interests of the governed. This is conceptual. As with the 
case of the United States style judicial review, citizens are protected against such 
domination to the extent that they are empowered to force authorities to justify their 
decisions in terms of the public good and to decide in the ways that make every effort to 
pay heed to the legitimate interests of all governed. Since the ability to appeal to a court 
endowed with the power of constitutional review appears to be a potent mechanism of civic 
empowerment in the face of potentially arbitrary governmental decision making, the ideal 
of freedom as non-domination conflicts with the institution of judicial review. To achieve 
non-domination it would be necessary reject any form of legal constitutionalism 
characterized by entrenched constitutions and judicial review. Therefore, I believe, 
constitutionalism would not become inimical of liberty. 
The republicanism conception of freedom as non-domination is considered to be the basis 
for which the state will identify the architecture it should display and the agenda it should 
further. In other words, in my opinion I understand that the state should do everything 
possible to establish a social order in which individual citizens can enjoy independence and 
escape subjection to the arbitrary power of others. It should act in pursuit of its agenda 
without infringing on people’s freedom as non-domination. It will allow for the coercive 
interventions of the state (i.e., imposing laws and taxes), but will not take away from the 
people’s freedom as long as they are subject to the checks that would make them non-
arbitrary and non-dominating. This relates to the rule of law where citizens respect the law 
for its own sake and make a point of taking part in public life in order to ensure their own 
needs and concerns are heard, whereby the laws will be just, instead of serving particular 
interests and private concentrations of power. 
I agree with the republicans’ idea that freedom cannot exist with domination, but it can 
exist with interference as there is the potential that people may not actually suffer 
interference from those who dominate them. Pettit believes that we are free to the extent 
that we do not find ourselves under the domination of others, subject to their will and 
exposed to the vicissitudes of their desires. From this perspective, freedom consists in the 
absence of conditions which are thought to diminish our possibilities of action. I agree that 
this idea of freedom is substantially different to that of freedom as non-interference, 
because freedom of non-interference assumes that there is an outside control present when 
there is active interference as in the case of coercion or manipulation. The liberal notion of 
freedom cannot be reduced to the notion of non-interference, because in such instances as 
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4.1. Ideological neo-constitutionalism 
Ideological neo-constitutionalism is open to all those criticisms which Bobbio37 
and other writers such as Nino38 expressed against ideological positivism. Here I 
will limit my criticisms only to what appears to me as a dangerous consequence of 
such an ideology: the reduction of certainty of the law which derives from the 
‘balancing’ of constitutional principles and the ‘moral’ interpretation of the 
constitution. 
As is well known, Dworkin, one of the leading exponents of neo-
constitutionalist ideology, supports the view according to which a legal system 
formed both by rules and by fundamental principles, rooted in an objective set of 
moral norms, is, or can tend to be, totally determined (the famous proposal of the 
one right answer). In this way, I believe, Dworkin fails to distinguish both between 
an ex ante and ex post determinacy, and between the theoretical problem of 
knowing the legal consequences of actions and the practical problem of justifying 
legal decisions. 
From a theoretical point of view, which is the one adopted here, and leaving 
to one side the question of ex post determinacy, the sole question of interest is that 
of ex ante determinacy: what is the effect of the configuration of principles in an 
ex ante determinacy/indeterminacy? From this point of view, Dworkin’s answer is 
unacceptable, given that the configuration of principles, which are a species of the 
norms genus, cannot totally eliminate the structural, linguistic and subjective 
causes of the partial indeterminacy of law. However, we can ask whether they can 
be reduced.  
I believe that this indeterminacy could possibly be reduced if at least the 
following conditions were fixed: 1) were there to exist objective, known morals 
followed by judges (or, which is the same, there existed positive, known morals 
followed by judges); 2) were judges always to follow Dworkin’s (or Alexy’s) 
prescriptions and to construct an integrated system of law and morals, internally 
                                                 
tax codes, no matter how meritorious in other respects, they do affect people’s freedom in 
just the same way as the interference as a criminal. 
I had the pleasure to meet and to discuss with Philip Pettit during the two days long “11 th 
Pavia Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy” in the Faculty of Political Sciences of 
the University of Pavia (Italy) on September 12, 2013. 
37 BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Alcuni argomenti contro il diritto naturale, in Rivista di diritto 
civile, Vol. 4, (1958) 253-263; BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Il positivismo giuridico, 1996, (2nd 
ed.) Giappichelli, Torino, (1st ed. 1961); BOBBIO, NORBERTO: L'età dei diritti, in BOBBIO, 
NORBERTO: Il terzo assente. Saggi e discorsi sulla pace e sulla guerra, 1987, (2nd ed.) 
Edizioni Sonda, Einaudi, Torino, 112-125; BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Presentazione, in PECES-
BARBA, GREGORIO: Teoria dei diritti fondamentali, 1993, Giuffré, Milano, v-viii. 
38 NINO, CARLOS SANTIAGO: Introducción al análisis del derecho, 1983, Ariel, Barcelona, 
27-28. Such a characterization of the ultimate kernel of any form of natural law makes 
debatable the recent and widespreading attitude to speak of and delineate hybrid forms of 
„inclusive”, rather than „soft” or „critical” positivism; that is to say forms of alleged 
positivism which, as it is with natural law, take into account (the possibility of) morals as 
a source of law. 
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consistent in such a way that, with the aid of principles, they could choose for every 
case the right or correct solution, or at least the best. On these conditions the issuing 
of principles on the part of the legislator, or the configuration of principles on the 
part of judges and legal doctrine, could reduce the ex ante indeterminacy of law. 
However, in reality these conditions do not exist. The situation is as it is not 
for controversial meta-ethical reasons, which affirm the inexistence of objective 
morals, but for factual reasons. In fact: a) even supposing that they exist, objective 
morals are not known or accepted by all judges; b) positive morals accepted by all 
judges do not exist in our society (our societies are increasingly characterised by 
ethical pluralism); c) judges’ decisions are temporal inconsistent and judges do not 
construct a consistent system of law and morals to resolve cases; d) judges do not 
always reason and decide rationally (whatever meaning we wish to give this word, 
even the weakest). 
In real and non-ideal conditions, the configuration of principles can help 
judges to find always an ex post justification for their decisions; this configuration 
appears though not to reduce but increase the ex ante indeterminacy of law. In my 
opinion this is for three main reasons: 
1) one of the most common characteristics of norms which are configured as 
principles is their greater vagueness with regards to other norms and, 
therefore, this characteristic increases rather than reduces ex ante 
indeterminacy; 
2) consequently, the issuing and configuration of principles in absence of a 
common set of morals increases the discretion at the disposal of a judge, who 
can decide cases by making reference to their own subjective conceptions of 
justice and also this clearly increases ex ante indeterminacy; 
3) the peculiar way of applying norms configured as principles, namely 
balancing principles case by case, without a stable and general hierarchy 
between principles, increases the discretion of judges and the ex ante 
indeterminacy of law. 
At this stage in the discussion I do not want to suggest that there are no good 
reasons for issuing principles, or configuring them or balancing them. I believe 
there are valid reasons for doing so.  
I do not believe, however, that in the present situation, issuing or configuring 
principles, or balancing them case by case are activities which directly pursue (as 
Dworkin appears to believe) the value of certainty in law. These activities, in my 
opinion, follow other objectives which can be, according to differing points of 
view, equally or even more worthy of praise: for instance, the updating of law to 
respond to social change, ‘wholesale’ decision-making, the offering of general 
criteria to lower-level bodies, establishing goals for social reform, delegating the 
power to determine the content of law,39 that is to say, in general, the hetero- and/or 
self-attribution to judges of a part of normative power, etc.. 
                                                 
39 Mainly confined to public domestic law, such a one-sided political reading of 
constitutionalism is exemplified by MATTEUCCI, NICOLA: Positivismo giuridico e 
costituzionalismo, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, Vol. 17. (1963), 985-
1100. 
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4.2. Methodological neo-constitutionalism and constitutional methodology 
In opposition to methodological neo-constitutionalism (which considers 
constitutional principles as a bridge between law and morals), I will limit my 
comments to reiterating the validity of the justificatory non-connection between 
law and morals. 
The neo-constitutionalist thesis is that any legal decision, and in particular 
judicial decisions, is justified if it derives, in the last instance, from a moral norm. 
I interpret here this thesis as an answer to a normative problem (‘Which norm 
must found or justify judicial decision-making?’), and in any case the thesis itself 
takes on a normative nature (‘A moral norm must found or justify judicial decision-
making’). 
Clearly the argument of justificatory connection could be interpreted in 
another way: either as an answer to an empirical problem (‘Which norms in fact, 
in a determined context, found or justify judicial decision-making?’), or as an 
answer to a theoretical question (‘In an explanatory model of judiciary motivation, 
which norms found or justify judicial decision-making?’).40 I believe that, if we 
                                                 
40 See SEARLE, JOHN: Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, 2010, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. This book is useful to readers familiar with Searle's work 
in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, but unacquainted with, and 
curious to learn about, the 'philosophy of society' that he has been busy building since the 
mid-nineties. It collects a selection of some of the papers presented during the “Spring 
School and the International Conference Making the Social World” that took place on 7-9 
June 2011 at the Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy. (I attended this very 
interesting event). 
Such readers are offered a lengthy exposition (Chapters 1, 3, 5) of an updated version of 
the account of institutional facts that was the main theme of Searle's The Construction of 
Social Reality (1995), as well as shorter discussions of what Searle perceives as the 
implications of his account of institutions on issues pertaining to rational action, free will, 
political power, and human rights (Chapters 6, 7, 8). The book will also be useful to readers 
who have developed an interest in Searle's account of institutional reality while lacking 
sufficient exposure to his philosophies of mind and language, since it includes brief 
overviews (Chapters 2, 4) of his extensive work in these fields, which he presents as 
providing the foundations of his account of society. Readers already familiar with Searle's 
major works on mind, language, and society will probably be mainly interested in 
considering whether the account of institutional facts he currently adopts differs 
significantly from the one he had originally proposed, and, if so, whether it places him in 
a better position than before to attain his stated goals. 
Common to Searle's old and new accounts is a conception of institutional facts according 
to which such a fact (a) cannot exist unless a community collectively accepts it as existing; 
(b) requires the assignment to an entity of a „status function” (that is, of a function that an 
entity can only have by virtue of collective recognition, and not merely by virtue of 
whatever properties it might have prior to such recognition); and (c) characteristically 
generates, once in existence, „deontic powers” (in particular, rights and obligations) within 
the community whose behaviour brings it to existence. 
One difference between Searle's old and new accounts is that the generation of „deontic 
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interpreted the argument from a descriptivist perspective, this reply would be false 
(in contemporary legal systems, judicial decisions are motivated according to legal 
rather than moral norms). If we interpreted the question from a theoretical 
standpoint, this answer would I believe be a tautology: by definition every final 
justification, in the practical domain, is assumed to be made up by a moral norm, 
                                                 
powers” is now taken to be a universal consequence, and not merely, as was previously the 
case, a nearly universal consequence, of an institutional fact's creation. But the main 
difference between the old and new accounts has to do with the way in which Searle 
proposes to combine theses (a) and (b) above in providing an explanation of an institutional 
fact's creation. On the old account, the creation of institutional facts was invariably 
supposed to be the immediate result of the collective acceptance, within a community, of 
linguistically expressible „constitutive rules” that specify conditions under which status 
functions of various sorts are assignable to entities of various sorts. On the new account, 
the collective acceptance of such constitutive rules remains one but is not the only source 
from which institutional reality is supposed to spring; the other supposed source is the 
collective acceptance of speech acts of declaration, whereby entities come to possess status 
functions just by being represented as having those functions, even in the absence of 
antecedently available constitutive rules regulating those functions' assignment. 
Searle, however, believes that there must be a single fundamental principle underlying the 
creation of all institutional facts, and so does not rest content with these two seemingly 
disparate sources. In an attempt to theoretically unify them, he recalls his assumption that, 
in order to be institutionally effective, constitutive rules have to be linguistically 
expressible, and reinterprets linguistically expressed constitutive rules that are 
institutionally effective as themselves speech acts of declaration of a special kind, namely 
as „standing declarations” (13, 96-7). He therefore concludes that all of institutional reality 
derives from the collective acceptance of declarational speech acts (whether „standing” or 
not „standing”) that concern the assignment of status functions to entities (and he 
accordingly calls the acts in question „status function declarations”). Searle clearly regards 
his proposal to provide a unified account of institutions by tracing their origins to 
declarational speech acts as the book's most significant contribution:  
Now, the problems previously raised suggest that, even in this considerably weakened 
form, Searle's position would be unsatisfactory. But independently of that, the fact that the 
position Searle is finally led to embrace is so weakened should itself have given him pause, 
in view of his strongly voiced opinion, presented as the guiding methodological principle 
of his enterprise, that it is „implausible to suppose that we would use a series of logically 
independent mechanisms for creating institutional facts”. If that is implausible, then 
embracing the weakened position is itself implausible, since embracing it amounts to 
accepting that, apart from the declarational mechanism allegedly responsible for the 
creation of non-linguistic institutions, there must be one or more independent (and so far 
unspecified) mechanisms responsible for the creation of linguistic ones. It would seem, 
then, that anyone who takes the extent of institutional reality to be the same as Searle takes 
it be, and who is committed to discovering the „single mechanism” underlying its creation 
that Searle has been searching in this book, must begin a new search. 
See also SEARLE, JOHN: The Construction of Social Reality, 1995, Free Press, New York; 
SEARLE, JOHN: Mind, Language, and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World, 1999, 
Basic Books, New York; SEARLE, JOHN: Rationality in Action, 2001, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
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therefore also the final justification of a judicial decision is made up by a moral 
norm (despite there being intermediate justifications which could be defined as 
legal). 
If we concentrate therefore solely on the normative question, we have to ask 
which type of moral norm would be the one which should found or justify, in the 
last instance, a judicial decision (assuming the latter as a paradigmatic case of legal 
decision-making). 
I envisage at least four possible solutions: 
(1) one is dealing with a true and objective moral norm (in the sense in which 
it corresponds to moral ‘facts’); 
(2) one is dealing with a rational and objective moral norm (in the sense to 
which it would be accepted by part of a rational audience); 
(3) one is dealing with a subjectively chosen moral norm; 
(4) one is dealing with an inter-subjectively accepted moral norm. 
The first two solutions are objectivist, the last two, subjectivist. In the first 
solution, the moral norm is subject-independent, whilst in the others it is subject-
dependent, albeit in differing forms. The first two solutions make reference to 
critical morals, the third to individual morals, the fourth to positive morals. 
If we take the judge’s point of view, according to the proponents of the 
necessary and justificatory connection between law and morals, he should reach 
the solution to the question via a moral norm, on which his decision would be 
based. One is forced to ask however ‘moral’ in which sense? 
The first solution presents extremely serious ontological (duplication of the 
world) and epistemological problems. The latter above all would mean that the 
judge would choose a norm which he believes to be moral. Consequently, the first 
solution is reducible to the third.41 
The second solution does not present the same ontological problems as the 
first but does present serious epistemological ones: principally not because of the 
impossibility of a judge’s finding the moral norm on which to base his decision 
according to the procedural or substantial rules of a moral theory (despite their 
being epistemological problems within each theory: it is not a coincidence that 
procedural theories often do not offer rational ‘moral codes’), but because there 
are varying and divergent moral theories from which the judge must choose. 
Therefore, the second solution is also reducible to the third. 
An acceptance of the third solution would be equivalent to proposing the 
complete freedom for judges in the way in which they found and justify their 
decisions. Statutes and constitutional law would become, from the judge’s point of 
view, superfluous: the justificatory step which consists in founding a decision in 
the law is either useless (since the law conforms to the moral norm) or is forbidden 
(since the law is contrary to the moral norm). The certainty of the law would be 
exclusively dependant on the moral conscience of each judge: given that judges 
should base their decisions on universal moral norms, they should therefore use in 
                                                 
41 A similar contention occurs in PACE: op. cit. 41-42. 
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a consistent way these norms on which to base their future decisions.42 Temporal 
consistency in the decision-making of each judge (even accepting that it is 
possible: a judge can always review his own moral system if he believes the has 
committed errors in the past) does not appear sufficient to guarantee the necessary 
degree of predictability of both the legal consequences which stem from legal 
actions and the resolution of conflicts (which, according to conventional wisdom, 
represent two of the most important objectives of legal institutions). 
However, this solution (and the first and second solutions which are reducible 
to it) could have a smaller scope. Instead of affirming that the last instance 
justification of judicial decision-making should be based on a moral norm, it could 
be interpreted in the following, more limited manner: on every occasion in which 
a judge has to make a choice amongst competing solutions – interpretive or in fact 
– which are all valid from a legal point of view, he has to choose that option which 
is justified by a moral norm (and not by a methodological principle, personal 
interest, a norm deriving from positive morals, a criteria shared by legal culture, 
etc.), at least in the last instance. 
Even with its reduced scope, this ‘moralist’ thesis of neo-constitutionalism 
poses some problems: if a judge’s choices are justified by his moral beliefs (and 
not by a methodological principle, personal interest, a norm deriving from positive 
morals, a criteria shared by legal culture, etc.), nothing stops such beliefs from 
being morally unacceptable, or in contrast to the moral values shared by the 
community, or contrary to the criteria accepted by legal culture, etc. What then 
would be the reason which pushes judges to justify their decisions in this way? 
Since, ceteris paribus, the justification of a judicial decision based on a moral norm 
chosen by the judge signifies a heightened degree of legal indeterminacy in 
comparison to other types of justification (relative and not absolute), I can see no 
reasons for attributing a general preference to a ‘moral’ justification rather other 
possible types. 
The fourth choice (the judge as ‘sociologist’ of positive morals) also generates 
epistemological problems for the judge, albeit less serious than in the previous 
solutions. Judges, in fact, do not generally have the instruments necessary for 
identifying a country’s norms of positive morals. In addition, if the epistemological 
problems are excessively serious, here too the fourth solution would be reducible 
to the third. 
Even supposing that judges can at times overcome epistemological problems, 
                                                 
42 Cf., e.g., RAZ: op. cit. where the contention is maintained that legal rights can be 
accounted for on the base of the so-called «Sources Thesis», i.e. the thesis according to 
which: „the existence and the contents of the law can be determined without resorting to 
any moral arguments” (p. 10). To be sure, Raz appears sceptical on the very notion 
'fundamental human rights' can be taken to term. Thus, after having mentioned and 
characterized some different types of rights, in a somewhat detached way, he adds: „People 
who believe in fundamental human rights usually believe that these rights do not derive 
from social practices which recognize and implement them even where such practices exist. 
They further believe that people have such rights even in societies in which the rights are 
neither recognized nor respected” (p. 2). 
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two types of problems remain: 
(a) the first is that there is no moral homogeneity in a society in the form of 
widely shared moral norms (this is usually the case in contemporary 
societies); 
(b) the second is that such widely shared moral norms are already 
incorporated in rules or legal principles. 
In the first case, the fourth solution is reducible to the third (the judge has to 
choose the moral norm he prefers). In the second case – apparently often 
hypothesised by neo-constitutionalists – the moral justification is co-extensive to 
the legal justification and becomes totally useless. 
In cases where justification based on a moral norm is possible and not useless, 
the fourth solution implies that the judge will decide and justify his decision by 
basing it, in the last instance, on a norm derived from positive morals. Despite the 
fact that this solution in no way guarantees the moral correctness of the legal 
justification (positive morals, in fact, could well be in contrast with critical morals, 
and we are not in a position to know), it does appear wise to adopt it in many 
occasions in which those procedures which allow for the conversion of shared 
moral norms into law do not work, or do not work well (dictatorships, domination 
by small groups, manipulation of consensus, etc.). This solution would assign 
judges a ‘democratic’ role enabling them to compensate for weaknesses in the 
democratic workings and to ‘transform’ positive morals into law. 
In situations, however, in which the democratic workings related to the 
formation of law in fact work satisfactorily,43 this solution favours a particular 
version (addressed to judges and not only to legislators, as proposed mainly by the 
advocates of the enforcement of morals) of the position according to which the law 
must make positive morals binding. From my moral point of view, which in a 
certain sense could be defined as liberal, this position is open to the widely known 
objections forwarded by Hart44 in his debate with Lord Devlin and with Ronald 
Dworkin.45 
                                                 
43 Cf. FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: Diritti fondamentali, in Teoria Politica, Vol. 14. No. 2. (1998), 3-
33. [English translation: Fundamental Rights, in PINTORE, ANNA – JORI, MARIO (ed.): 
Italian Debate on Fundamental Rights. Monographic issue of International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law, Vol. 14. No. 1. (2001), 1-33, 1-106]. What Ferrajoli strongly regrets to 
KELSEN, HANS: General Theory of Law and State, 1945, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 161: „Just as everything King Midas touched turned into gold, 
everything to which the law refers becomes law, i.e., something legally existing”] and to 
his Reine Rechtslehre is the very conception of validity as the specific existence of a legal 
norm, i.e. the lack of the distinction between existence and validity which in Ferrajoli's 
view provides a distinguishing feature of what he conceives of as the new legal paradigm 
of „democratic constitutionalism”. 
44 CHAISSONI, PIERLUIGI: Utopia della ragione analitica. Origini, oggetti e metodi della 
filosofia del diritto positivo, 2009, Giappichelli, Torino, 11-33; CHAISSONI, PIERLUIGI: 
L'indirizzo analitico nella filosofia del diritto. Da Bentham a Kelsen, 2008, Giappichelli, 
Torino, 25-41; CHAISSONI, PIERLUIGI (ed.): The Legal Ought, 2001, Giappichelli, Torino.  
45 SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in 
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Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 77 (2007), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657 [cit. 2014-07-30]; SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: On Hart’s Way Out, 
in COLEMAN, JULES (ed.): Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of 
Law, 2001, Oxford University Press Oxford; SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: Law, Morality and the 
Guidance of Conduct, in Legal Theory, Vol. 6. Issue 2. (2000), 127-170; SHAPIRO, SCOTT 
J.: Legality, 2011, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. See also KRAMER, 
MATTHEW: Throwing Light on the Role that Moral Principles Play in the Law, in Legal 
Theory, Vol. 8. Issue 1. (2002), 115-143. 
But firstly, as for the epistemological debate between Hart and his rival Dworkin, as well 
known, see HART, HERBERT L. A.: The Concept of Law, 1994, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
(1961 first edition; 1994 second edition). Published posthumously, the second edition of 
The Concept of Law contains one important addition to the first edition, a substantial 
Postscript, in which Hart reflects upon some of the central concerns that have been 
expressed about the book since its publication in 1961. The Postscript is especially 
noteworthy because it contains Hart's only sustained response to the objections pressed by 
his foremost critic, Ronald Dworkin, who succeeded him to the Chair of Jurisprudence at 
Oxford in 1969. The Postscript, edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz, focuses 
on a range of issues covering both Hart's substantive view and his methodological 
commitments. In particular, Hart endorses Inclusive Legal Positivism, asserts that his is a 
methodology of descriptive jurisprudence which he contrasts with Dworkin's normative 
jurisprudence or interpretivism, while denying that his theory of law has a semantic 
underpinning. 
The Concept of Law was published in 1961; Hart long wanted to add a postscript 
responding to reactions to his work, but the postscript was unfinished when he died. The 
editors of the book published the most finished parts of the postscript but the drafts were 
not meant to be final. 
In the Postscript, Hart notes that he wants to focus in detail on the criticisms of his view 
advanced by Ronald Dworkin and in a second section addresses a number of other critics; 
the second section was too undeveloped at the time of Hart's death for the editors to include 
in the book; thus the postscript wholly focuses on Dworkin's views. The reader's purpose 
in studying the guide may not rely on the details of the Dworkin-Hart dispute; discussions 
of these debates have been reviewed in the secondary literature. 
Cf. COLEMAN: op. cit. The essays in this collection address each of these issues in a 
sustained way. The book contains discussions of Hart's semantic commitments, his 
rejection of a normative jurisprudence as well as the extent to which he can embrace 
Inclusive Legal Positivism in a way that is consistent with his other stated positions. The 
book's contributors include the leading advocates of alternative schools of Positivist 
jurisprudence, important contributors to the methodogical disputes in jurisprudence and 
noted experts on the relationship of philosophy of language to jurisprudence. 
It has been argued that Hart had redefined the domain of jurisprudence and moreover 
established it as a philosophical inquiry of the „nature” or „concept” of law. He is 
considered the „world's foremost legal philosopher in the twentieth century”. Many of 
Hart's former students became important legal, moral, and political philosophers, including 
Brian Barry, John Finnis, John Gardner, Kent Greenawalt, Neil MacCormick, William 
Twining, Chin Liew Ten, Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin. Hart also had a strong influence 
on the young John Rawls in the 1950s, when Rawls was a visiting scholar at Oxford shortly 
after finishing his PhD. 
See also DAN, PRIEL: H.L.A. Hart and the Invention of Legal Philosophy, in Problema, 
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5. THE JUSTIFICATION: PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY V. PRINCIPLE OF 
REASONABLENESS  
The «principle of proportionality» refers without a doubt to evaluative instances 
that are situated beyond the domain of both the text of the norms under 
constitutional control, and the text of the constitution itself. This reference to a 
meta-positive instance is shown, at least, in the following two items: first, in the 
grounds for justifying the principle itself. Why is proportionality or reasonableness 
a constitutional principle? How are we to justify this constitutional requirement? 
Except at the cost of circularity, this question cannot be answered from the 
perspective of the constitution in question. Second, it becomes apparent in each of 
the sub-principles that frame the principle, since all of them refer to ends – 
although from perspectives that do not entirely coincide – whose determination 
cannot be reduced to an internal analysis of the norms.46 
A second feature of the dynamics of the “culture of rights” in which we are 
immersed is the «principle of reasonableness». In the 19th century, the dominant 
trend concerning the description of legal interpretation was “legal formalism.” 
This, in a very short synthesis, could be described as a theory which attempts to 
reduce the adjudication of law to deductive logic. In the 20th century, however, it 
was soon perceived that in order to establish the facts in each of the cases a judge 
must resolve and determine the applicable norms, requiring a decision to be made 
between various alternatives that are, prima facie, formally correct.47 
In effect, legal operators are compelled, on the one hand, to reconstruct the 
facts in a case, and this implies choosing: a) the legally relevant facts within a 
framework of facts, b) the legal means of evidence, and c) the most convincing 
evidence. On the other hand, judges and lawyers48 are faced with the need to: a) 
                                                 
Vol. 7. No. 5. (2011), 301-323; MULLENDER, RICHARD: Nicola Lacey. A Life of H.L.A. 
Hart: the Nightmare and the Noble Dream – H.L.A. Hart in Anglo-American Context, in 
Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (review 2007), 2004, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; SCHAUER, FREDERICK: (Re)Taking Hart, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 119. Issue 
3. (2006), 852-883; REDONDO, MARIA CRISTINA: (ed.), Il “Postscript” di H. L. A. Hart, 
monographic issue, in Ragion pratica, Vol. 21 (2003), 347-360; LEITER, BRIAN: Beyond 
the Hart/Dworkin Debate: the Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, in LEITER, BRIAN: 
Naturalizing Jurisprudence, 2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 153-181. A very 
update and innovative contribution is FIGUEROA, RUBIO SEBASTIÁN (ed.): Hart en la teoría 
del derecho contemporánea. A 50 años de El concepto de derecho, 2014, Universidad 
Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile.  
46 CIANCIARDO, JUAN: The Principle of Proportionality: The Challenges of Human Rights, 
in Journal of Civil Law Studies, Vol. 3. Issue 1. (2010), 177-186. 
47 ALEXY, ROBERT: A theory of constitutional rights, 2002, Oxford University Press, 69, 
414; BERNAL, PULINDO CARLOS: El principio de proporcionalidad y los derechos 
fundamentales, 2003, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Bogotà. 
48 PAINTER, SUZANNE: Improving the Teaching of School Law: A Call for Dialogue, in 
Brigham Young University Education & Law Journal, Issue 2. (2001), 213. 
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choose the applicable norms, b) choose the method or methods of interpretation 
with which they will apply the norms, and c) choose the results towards which 
these methods of interpretation lead. 
These factual and normative choices raise the obvious question about the right 
criteria according to which they should be decided. While legal theories in the past 
century49 oscillated between, on the one hand, the practical conflation between 
discretion and unreasonableness, and, on the other hand, the practical negation of 
discretion or reasonableness, comparative constitutional analysis has come 
gradually to answer this question with the principle of reasonableness, as a 
counterpart to arbitrariness, expressly proscribed by some constitutions, as is the 
case, for example, of article 9.3. of the Spanish Constitution. 
The justification and content of the principle of reasonableness raises 
questions analogous to those posed by the principles of proportionality: why 
reasonableness, and not the lack of reasonableness? How does one justify the use 
of this principle? Furthermore, which are the reasons that justify the establishment 
of facts and the determination of norms, and what are the grounds for these 
reasons? They cannot originate in the norms themselves because, once again, this 
would be circular. In other words, because the problem that must be dealt with 
consists of determining that which is not already determined by the norms 
themselves, the solution cannot lie in them but in something outside them, although 
connected with them. 
5.1. Between constitutional interpretation and «textualism» 
Constitutional interpretation, or constitutional construction, the term more often 
used by the Founders, is the process by which meanings are assigned to words in 
a constitution, to enable legal decisions to be made that are justified by it. Some 
scholars distinguish between „interpretation” – assigning meanings based on the 
meanings in other usages of the terms by those the writers and their readers had 
probably read, and „construction” – inferring the meaning from a broader set of 
evidence, such as the structure of the complete document from which one can 
discern the function of various parts, discussion by the drafters or ratifiers during 
debate leading to adoption („legislative history”), the background of controversies 
in which the terms were used that indicate the concerns and expectations of the 
drafters and ratifiers, alternative wordings and their meanings accepted or rejected 
at different points in development, and indications of meanings that can be inferred 
from what is not said, among other methods of analysis. 
There is also a question of whether the meanings should be taken from the 
public meanings shared among the literate populace, the private meanings used 
among the drafters and ratifiers that might not have been widely shared, or the 
public legal meanings of terms that were best known by more advanced legal 
scholars of the time. Most of the U.S. Constitution appears to have been written to 
                                                 
49 A recognition in PECZENIK, ALEXANDER: On law and reason, 2009, Springer, London. 
See also CORTEN, OLIVER: The Notion of “Reasonable” in International Law: Legal 
Discourse, Reason and Contradictions, in The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 48. No. 3. (1999), 613-625. 
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be understood by ordinary people of that era, although people then were much 
more literate in the law than people are now. However, many of its words and 
phrases are fairly deep legal terms that were only well understood by a few of the 
legally educated Founders, even though the general population probably had a 
rudimentary understanding of them. 
«Textualism or Originalism», as defended by Justice Antonin Scalia50 of the 
                                                 
50 Antonin Gregory Scalia (Trenton, New Jersey, March 11, 1936). His father, Salvatore 
Eugene Scalia, was a Sicilian immigrant, graduate student and clerk at the time of his son's 
birth, who later became a professor of Romance languages at Brookiln College. His mother, 
Catherine Scalia (née Panaro), was born in Trenton to Italian immigrant parents, and 
worked as an elementary school teacher. 
Scalia began his legal career at Jones, Day, Cockley and Reavis in Cleveland, Ohio, where 
he worked from 1961 to 1967. He was highly regarded at Jones Day and would most likely 
have made partner, but later stated he had long intended to teach. He became a Professor 
of Law at the University of Virginia in 1967, moving his family to Charlottesville, Virginia. 
After four years in Charlottesville, in 1971, Scalia entered public service. President Richard 
Nixon appointed him as the general counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy, 
where one of his principal assignments was to formulate federal policy for the growth of 
cable television. From 1972 to 1974, he was the chairman of the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, a small indepenent agency that sought to improve the functioning of 
the federal bureaucracy. In mid-1974, Nixon nominated him as Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel. After Nixon's resignation, the nomination was 
continued by President Gerald Ford, and Scalia was confirmed by the Senate on August 
22, 1974. 
In the aftermath of Watergate, the Ford administration was engaged in a number of conflicts 
with Congress. Scalia repeatedly testified before congressional committees, defending 
Ford administration assertions of executive privilege in refusing to turn over documents. 
Within the administration, Scalia advocated a presidential veto for a bill to amend the 
Freedom of Information Act, greatly increasing its scope. Scalia's view prevailed and Ford 
vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode it. In early 1976, Scalia argued his only case before 
the Supreme Court, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. Scalia, on behalf 
of the U.S. government, argued in support of Dunhill, and that position was successful. 
Following Ford's defeat by President Jimmy Carter, Scalia worked for several months at 
the American Enterprise Institute. He then returned to academia, taking up residence at 
the University of Chicago Law School from 1977 to 1982, though he spent one year as a 
visiting professor at Stanford Law School. In 1981, he became the first faculty adviser for 
the University of Chicago's chapter of the newly founded Federalist Society.  
When Ronald Reagan was elected President in November 1980, Scalia hoped for a major 
position in the new administration. He was interviewed for the position of Solicitor General 
of the United States, but the position went to Rex E. Lee, to Scalia's great disappointment. 
Scalia was offered a seat on the Chicago-based United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in early 1982, but declined it, hoping to be appointed to the highly 
influential United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. 
Circuit). Later that year, Reagan offered Scalia a seat on the D.C. Circuit, which Scalia 
accepted. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on August 5, 1982, and was sworn 
in on August 17, 1982. 
On the D.C. Circuit, Scalia built a conservative record, while winning applause in legal 
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U.S. Supreme Court, is a normative doctrine of method according to which the 
judicial interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution should aim at establishing 
the original meaning of the text. Textualism in the strict sense is unpopular not 
only among most judges but also among philosophers and theologians. In 
philosophy, textualism was denounced as hopelessly naive by authors such as 
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and their American followers. In 
theology, textualism is not a viable option for believers who want both to accept 
as true the text of their holy book and to endorse the results of modern science and 
historical scholarship. I argue that textualism is the only valid methodology of 
interpretation both in philosophy and in theology. For the judicial interpretation 
and application of statutes and constitutions, however, textualism cannot be more 
than one methodological topos among many. We also have to accept other topoi, 
such as the topos that the system of statutes and treatises should form a consistent 
whole, and these other topoi cannot be considered as part and parcel of textualism 
in the strict sense. It follows that the difference between a tenable sophisticated 
version of textualism as a methodology of judicial interpretation and the so-called 
doctrine of the “Living Constitution” is one of degree and emphasis only. Justice 
Scalia’s simple version of textualism is a political ideology rather than a valid 
methodology of judicial interpretation.51 
Scalia and Garner contend that textual originalism was the dominant 
American method of judicial interpretation until the middle of the twentieth 
century.52 The only evidence they provide, however, consists of quotations from 
                                                 
circles for powerful, witty legal writing, which was often critical of the Supreme Court 
precedents he felt bound as a lower-court judge to follow. Justice Scalia has called himself 
in print a “faint-hearted originalist.” It seems he means the adjective at least as sincerely 
as he means the noun. 
51 In SCALIA, ANTONIN: A Matter of Interpretation, 1997, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, the Judge describes his adherence to textualism. Textualism means interpreting 
the text of written law without going beyond the intent of those legislators who made the 
law. He writes that judges have no authority to pursue „broader purposes.” He describes 
this as not „strict constructionism.” Strict constructionism, he writes, is „a degraded form 
of textualism that brings the whole philosophy [of textualism] into disrepute.” A strict 
constructionist might rule that use of a gun in a crime includes trading the gun for cocaine 
rather than as a weapon. Scalia takes a common sense approach to language rather than a 
strict interpretation. If it is said that someone uses a cane it is suggested that he walks with 
a cane rather than his having „hung his grandfather's antique cane as a decoration in the 
hallway.” In textual interpretation, writes Scalia, „context is everything”. 
52 In SCALIA, ANTONIN – BARNER, BRIAN: Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 
2012, West Publishing Company, College & School Division, the two authors say that 
judges like to say that all they do when they interpret a constitutional or statutory provision 
is apply, to the facts of the particular case, law that has been given to them. They do not 
make law: that is the job of legislators, and for the authors and ratifiers of constitutions. 
They are not Apollo; they are his oracle. They are passive interpreters. Their role is 
semantic.  
The passive view of the judicial role is aggressively defended in this new book by Justice 
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judges and jurists, such as William Blackstone, John Marshall, and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, who wrote before 1950. Yet none of those illuminati, while respectful of 
statutory and constitutional text, as any responsible lawyer would be, was a textual 
originalist. All were, famously, “loose constructionists”.53 
It is possible to glean from judges who actually are loose constructionists the 
occasional paean to textualism, but it is naïve to think that judges believe 
everything they say, especially when speaking ex cathedra (that is, in their judicial 
opinions). Judges tend to deny the creative – the legislative – dimension of judging, 
important as it is in our system, because they do not want to give the impression 
that they are competing with legislators, or engaged in anything but the politically 
unthreatening activity of objective, literal-minded interpretation, using arcane 
tools of legal analysis. The fact that loose constructionists sometimes publicly 
endorse textualism is evidence only that judges are, for strategic reasons, often not 
candid.54 
A problem that undermines their entire approach is the authors’ lack of a 
consistent commitment to textual originalism. They endorse fifty-seven “canons 
of construction,” or interpretive principles, and in their variety and frequent 
ambiguity these “canons” provide them with all the room needed to generate the 
outcome that favors Justice Scalia’s strongly felt views on such matters as abortion, 
homosexuality, illegal immigration, states’ rights, the death penalty, and guns. Yet 
in further obeisance to the dictionary Scalia and Garner commend a court for 
having ordered the acquittal of a person who had fired a gun inside a building and 
                                                 
Antonin Scalia and the legal lexicographer Bryan Garner. They advocate what is best 
described as textual originalism, because they want judges to “look for meaning in the 
governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne from its inception, and 
reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ extra-textually derived purposes and the 
desirability of the fair reading’s anticipated consequences.” This austere interpretive 
method leads to a heavy emphasis on dictionary meanings, in disregard of a wise warning 
issued by Judge Frank Easterbrook, who though himself a self-declared textualist advises 
that “the choice among meanings [of words in statutes] must have a footing more solid 
than a dictionary – which is a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means 
to decode the work of legislatures.” 
Scalia and Garner reject (before they later accept) Easterbrook’s warning. Does an 
ordinance that says that “no person may bring a vehicle into the park” apply to an 
ambulance that enters the park to save a person’s life? For Scalia and Garner, the answer is 
yes. After all, an ambulance is a vehicle – any dictionary will tell you that. If the authors 
of the ordinance wanted to make an exception for ambulances, they should have said so. 
And perverse results are a small price to pay for the objectivity that textual originalism 
offers (new dictionaries for new texts, old dictionaries for old ones). But Scalia and Garner 
later retreat in the ambulance case, and their retreat is consistent with a pattern of 
equivocation exhibited throughout their book. 
53 BISKUPIC, JOAN: American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia, 2009, Sarah Crichton Books. 
54 RING, KEVIN: Scalia Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court's Wittiest, Most Outspoken 
Justice, 2004, Regnery Publishing, Inc. 
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been charged with the crime of shooting “from any location into any occupied 
structure.” They say that the court correctly decided the case (Commonwealth v. 
McCoy) on the basis of the dictionary definition of “into.” They misread the court’s 
opinion. The opinion calls the entire expression “from any location into any 
occupied structure” ambiguous: while “into” implies that the shooter was outside, 
“from any location” implies that he could be anywhere, and therefore inside. The 
court went on to decide the case on other grounds. There is a common thread to 
the cases that Scalia and Garner discuss. Judges discuss the meanings of words and 
sometimes look for those meanings in dictionaries. But judges who consult 
dictionaries also consider the range of commonsensical but non-textual clues to 
meaning that come naturally to readers trying to solve an interpretive puzzle. How 
many readers of Scalia and Garner’s massive tome will do what I have done – read 
the opinions cited in their footnotes and discover that in discussing the opinions 
they give distorted impressions of how judges actually interpret legal texts? 
Scalia and Garner defend the canon of construction that counsels judges to 
avoid interpreting a statute in a way that will render it unconstitutional, declaring 
that this canon is good “judicial policy.” Judicial policy is the antithesis of textual 
originalism. They note that “many established principles of interpretation are less 
plausibly based on a reasonable assessment of meaning than on grounds of policy 
adopted by the courts” – and they applaud those principles, too.55 They approve 
the principle that statutes dealing with the same subject should “if possible be 
interpreted harmoniously,” a principle they deem “based upon a realistic 
assessment of what the legislature ought to have meant,” which in turn derives 
from the “sound principles…that the body of the law should make sense, and…that 
it is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible meanings of the text, to 
make it so”. In other words, judges should be realistic, should impose right reason 
on legislators, should in short clean up after the legislators.56 Another interpretive 
principle that Scalia and Garner approve is the presumption against the implied 
repeal of state statutes by federal statutes. They base this “on an assumption of 
what Congress, in our federal system, would or should normally desire.” What 
Congress would desire? What Congress should desire? Is this textualism, too? 
6. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION: «BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS» 
A few years ago, Robert Alexy57 explained that a normative system is not a legal 
                                                 
55 ROSSUM, RALPH: Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition, 2006, University 
Press of Kansas. 
56 STAAB, JAMES: The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on the 
Supreme Court, 2006, Rowman & Littlefield. See also TOOBIN, JEFFREY: The Nine: Inside 
the Secret World of the Supreme Court (revised ed.), 2008, Anchor Books; TUSHNET, 
MARK: A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 
(revised ed.), 2006, W.W. Norton & Co.  
57 Robert Alexy (September 9, 1945 in Oldenburg, Germany) is a jurist and a legal 
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system unless it formulates a “claim of correctness”.58 This occurs when 
governmental authorities act with the assumption that what they are doing is 
correct, regardless of whether it is actually entirely so. According to Alexy, when 
this assumption is not formulated, and when those who govern only take a personal 
or a class advantage with their power, practice of the law does not amount to a 
legal system. 
Yet it seems evident that not just any content allocated to that which is 
assumed as correct will attain legality for a normative system. For this reason, 
Alexy complements his thesis on correctness with a reference to ius-fundamental 
principles. The correctness of the assumption of a government’s actions is basically 
expressed through its reference to fundamental rights. 
What does this mean? When does a State recognize, identify, protect, and 
promote rights? When does it put forth its “politics of rights” as imposed by its 
constitution? Or, in other words, how can human rights be consistently 
conceptualized, indexed, justified, and interpreted? In the preceding account, each 
                                                 
philosopher. He studied law and philosophy at the University of Göttingen. He received 
his PhD in 1976 with the dissertation A Theory of Legal Argumentation, and he achieved 
his Habilitation in 1984 with a Theory of Constitutional Rights. 
Alexy is a professor at the University of Kiel and in 2002 he was appointed to the Academy 
of Sciences and Humanities at the University of Göttingen. In 2010 he was awarded the 
Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Alexy's definition of law looks like a mix of Kelsen's normativism (which was an 
influential version of legal positivism) and Radbruch's legal naturalism (Alexy, 2002), but 
Alexy's theory of argumentation (Alexy, 1983) puts him very close to legal interpretivism. 
His A Theory of Legal Argumentation presents some questions: what is to be understood 
by 'rational legal argument'? To what extent can legal reasoning be rational? Is the demand 
for rationality in legal affairs justified? And what are the criteria of rationality in legal 
reasoning? The answer to these questions is not only of interest to legal theorists and 
philosophers of law. They are pressing issues for practising lawyers, and a matter of 
concern for every citizen active in the public arena. Not only the standing of academic law 
as a scientific discipline, but also the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the 
possibility of rational legal argumentation. 
A theory of legal reasoning which tries to answer these questions pre-supposes a theory of 
general practical reasoning. This theory is the subject matter of the first two parts of the 
book. The result is a theory of general practical discourse which rests on insights of both 
Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy. It forms the basis of the theory of rational legal 
discourse, which is developed in the third part of this book.  
58 ALEXY, ROBERT: Begriff und geltung des rechts (The Concept and Validity of the Law), 
2005, Karl Alber, Freiburg und München; and ALEXY, ROBERT: On the Concept and the 
Nature of Law, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 21. Issue. 3. (2008), 281-299. See also BULYGIN, 
EUGENIO: Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality, in Ratio 
Juris, Vol. 13. Issue 2. (2000), 133-137; and ALEXY, ROBERT: On the Thesis of a Necessary 
Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 13. Issue 
2. (2000), 138-147. See also GARDNER, JOHN How Law Claims, What Law Claims, in 
KLATT, MATTHIAS (ed.): Institutionalized Reason. The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, 
2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 29-44. 
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of the problems being dealt with has directly involved these questions. The answer 
to such questions necessarily requires appealing to instances beyond the legal texts 
where rights are recognized, as I have attempted to demonstrate here in general 
terms. 
It could be thought, together with Norberto Bobbio,59 that the suggested 
element is a consensus, in which the basis of human rights could be found and the 
place where semantic indecisiveness could be resolved when interpreting them.60 
Yet there is an argument which destroys all the appeal of this alternative: human 
rights discourse has been presented historically as the limit to what is “able to be 
settled by agreement,” or to paraphrase the German Constitutional Court, the “limit 
of limits” that consensus (including democratic consensus) can legitimately 
impose upon the freedom of human actions. In other words, if the meaning of rights 
depends on consensus, these rights are devoid of meaning. The solution, thus, must 
be found elsewhere.61 
                                                 
59 BOBBIO, NORBERTO: El fundamento de los derechos humanos, in DÍAZ, RAMÓN SORIANO 
– CABRERA, CARLOS ALARCÓN – MOLINA, JUAN MORA (ed.): Diccionario crítico de los 
derechos humanos, 2000, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Sede Iberoamericana 
de la Rábida. 
60 Just an empirical collation will suffice to show the lack of coincidence among the 
catalogues of fundamental rights acknowledged in domestic law of different countries 
and/or in regional and international declarations, charters and covenants. Similarly, as, e.g., 
BOBBIO (1958): op. cit., and ROSS (1958): op. cit. 258-267 emphasize, just an inspection 
will suffice to show the lack of coincidence among the lists of which natural and/or moral 
rights different exponents of natural law maintain to deserve protection. Needless any 
exemplification of these two statements. Nevertheless, it might be worth reminding the 
complex network of political disagreements and ideological tensions standing behind the 
approval of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or, more recently, the 
political disagreements and the ideological tensions standing behind the approval of 2000 
Nizza Charter. With regard to the 1948 Declaration, cf. eg., CASSESE (1994): op. cit. 21-
49, and with regard to 2000 Nizza Charter, cf., e.g., MANZELLA, ANDREA – MELOGRANI, 
PIERO – PACIOTTI, ELENA – ROGOTÁ, STEFANO: Riscrivere i diritti in Europa, 2001, il 
Mulino, Bologna. 
61 In a rather different perspective, Bobbio's threefold distinction on legal positivism (see 
above § 3), has already been referred to when dealing with (the actual form of) 
constitutionalism by TROPER (1988): op. cit. and PRIETO SANCHÍS, LUIS: 
Constitucionalismo y positivism, 1997, Fontamara, Mèxico, and when dealing with neo-
constitutionalism by CoManducci: op. cit. (in print). Though not in a completely coincident 
way, Troper, Prieto Sanchís and Comanducci, each of them, draws a symmetrically parallel 
distinction to the one suggested by Bobbio in order to confront and to underline the terms 
of the contrast between legal positivism and (neo)constitutionalism insofar as either of 
them is conceived of, respectively, as a methodology, an ideology or a theory of law. On 
the contrary, what is suggested above in the text is that the threefold way to conceive of 
legal positivism is compatible with, and can provide a satisfactory understanding of neo-
constitutionalism; that is to say it is meant not to show that legal positivism and neo-
constitutionalism contrast with each other, but, the other way round, that neo-
constitutionalism can be given a positivist reading. 
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The question, however, is where? What has been presented here so far 
supports the proposal of a possible answer that lies in the following: all current 
legal systems formulate not one but two assumptions. On the one hand, the claim 
to correctness as postulated by Alexy, and on the other hand, a claim to moral 
objectivity, found implicitly in the defense of principles. Without one or the other, 
the discourse of rights turns into self-reference and, for this reason, becomes 
groundless and unintelligible. 
A reply could be given by an Alexis's scholar: Carlos Bernal Pulido.62 In the 
global legal world, it is becoming increasingly recognized that every modern legal 
system is made up of two basic kinds of norms:63 rules and principles. These are 
applied by means of two different procedures: subsumption and balancing. While 
                                                 
See also LUZZATI, CLAUDIO: Principi e princìpi. La genericità nel diritto, 2012, 
Giappichelli, Torino. The author, trying to criticize the Alexy's and Bernal Pulido's 
opinions, makes an effort to explain that lack of specification is a phenomenon that should 
not be confused with vagueness. Whereas vagueness is a problem of borderline cases and 
whenever it occurs we are intrinsically uncertain whether a sentence is true or not, lack of 
specificity is a quite different phenomenon. If a sentence is specific to a very low degree it 
is highly probable that it will be true; however such a sentence is unable to distinguish 
between different cases: it is like a lump of putty which hits the bull’s eye flattening out all 
over it. Legal principles deal with lack of specificity, even if not all unspecific norms can 
be defined as principles. In fact, according to the author’s view, what makes of a principle 
a principle is mainly the use of such a norm to justify other standards. Cf. LUZZATI, 
CLAUDIO: Vagueness (of Legal Language), in The Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics, 1993, Pergamon Press, Oxford – New York – Seul –Tokio, Vol. 4. 2086-2091; 
LUZZATI, CLAUDIO: Il formalismo dei diritti, in Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, Vol. 
15. No. 1. (2013), 52-86. 
62 Carlos Bernal Pulido (Bogotà, July 11, 1974), is an Associate Professor at Macquarie 
Law School (Sydney, Australia). He has research interests in the fields of constitutional 
comparative law, jurisprudence, and torts. He has published widely in all these fields in 7 
different languages. His qualifications include a LL.B. from the University Externado of 
Colombia (Bogota) (1996), a S.J.D. from the University of Salamanca (Spain) (2001) and 
a M.A. (2008) and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (2011) from the University of Florida (U.S.A). 
He has delivered guest lectures and presented papers in more than 20 countries.  
63 Every modern legal system is made up of two basic kinds of norms: rules and principles. 
These are applied by means of two different procedures: subsumption and balancing. While 
rules apply by means of subsumption, balancing is the means of applying principles. 
Balancing has therefore become an essential methodological criterion for adjudication, 
especially of constitutional rights. However, balancing is at the heart of many theoretical 
and practical discussions. One of the most important questions is whether balancing is a 
rational procedure for applying norms. The aim of Bernal Pulido's books is to consider 
whether this is the case. To achieve this aim, his works reflect on why the rationality of 
balancing is in doubt, and to what extent balancing can be rational, and how this can be 
possible. The weight formula proposed by Robert Alexy is analysed as a model which, in 
spite of its limits, solves the philosophical and constitutional problems about the rationality 
of balancing to the greatest extent possible. Cf. BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: The Drama of 
Law as a Collective Play, in This Century, Issue 2. (2013a), 8-15. 
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rules apply by means of subsumption, balancing is the means of applying 
principles. Balancing has therefore become an essential methodological criterion 
for adjudication, especially of constitutional rights.64 
The concept of balancing is at the heart of many theoretical and practical 
discussions. One of the most important questions is whether balancing is a rational 
procedure for applying norms or a mere rhetorical device, one that is useful for 
justifying any judicial decision whatever. This is a juridico-philosophical question. 
It has a major bearing on a second question, which is relevant from the point of 
view of constitutional law: the question of the legitimacy of the judge as balancer. 
More than one renowned author has stated that balancing is nothing more than an 
arbitrary and rash Solomonic settlement, that the judge therefore does not have 
sufficient constitutional standing to apply principles from this standpoint, and that 
when he does so, he unduly restricts and even usurps other powers enshrined in 
the constitution.65 
According to the critics, balancing is irrational for several reasons. Following 
Bernal Pulido's opinion, the most prominent of these critics refer to the lack of 
precision, the incommensurability, and the lack of predictability of balancing.  
The first objection claims that balancing is no more than a rhetorical formula 
or a technique for exercising power that lacks a clear concept and precise legal 
structure. The objection states that there are no objective legal criteria which could 
be binding on the judge for balancing and useful for controlling judicial decisions 
where balancing is brought into play. From this point of view, balancing is a formal 
and empty structure, based only on the subjective, ideological and empirical 
appraisals of the judge. The scales for balancing are subjective appraisals by the 
judge. Therefore, balancing cannot lead to a single correct answer.66 
The second objection states that balancing is irrational because it entails a 
comparison of two measures which, due to their radical differences, cannot be 
compared. Incommensurability arises in balancing, for there is no organisation into 
a hierarchy or a common measure that makes it possible for the weight of the 
relevant principles to be determined. In the field of principles, there is no “unit of 
measure”, nor it there a “common currency for making possible a comparison” 
between principles.67 
                                                 
64 BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: Is Tort Law a Practice of Corrective Justice? in Diritto e 
Questioni Pubbliche, Vol. 12. (2012), 1-23. See also SCHAUER (2012): op. cit. 
65 BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: El neoconstitucionalismo a debate (Arguing about the New 
Constitutionalism) (in Spanish), 2006, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, 1st. 
Edition, 74. 
66 BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: El derecho de los derechos (Rights’ Law), 2007, Universidad 
Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, (1st. Edition, and 1st. and 2nd. Reprints) 2005, (3th. 
Reprint) 417. 
67 BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: El Principio de Proporcionalidad y los Derechos 
Fundamentales (The Principle of Proportionality and Constitutional Rights), 2008, Centro 
de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2003 (1st. Edition), 872 pp., 2005 (2nd. 
Edition), 875 pp., 2008 (3th Edition), 883 pp., English edition in preparation. 
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The final criticism maintains that balancing is irrational because its result 
cannot be predicted. Every result of balancing is individual. It depends on the 
circumstances of the case, not on general criteria. Judicial decisions that stem from 
balancing therefore conform to an ad hoc case law, which tends to magnify the 
justice of the single case while sacrificing certainty, coherence and the generality 
of law.68 There is a link between these three objections. The result of balancing 
cannot be predicted owing to its lack of precision, and the main reason for the lack 
of precision is the fact that there is no a common measure that makes it possible to 
determine the weight of the relevant principles.  
7. MY PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS  
Balancing continues to provoke controversy among judges and legal scholars. 
Critics believe that it gives judges too much discretion and amounts to a usurpation 
of the legislative function. They contend that balancing is an ambiguous and 
arbitrary methodology for measuring unequal interests against each other, which 
results in unpredictable decision making. While proponents, such as U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argue that balancing is „the sounder approach 
– the approach more consistent with our role as judges to decide each case on its 
individual merits – is to apply a test in each case to determine whether the burden 
on the specific plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant and whether the 
particular interest asserted by the State before us is compelling.” 
How can balancing ever be dissociated from lawmaking, when it comes to 
constitutional adjudication? A basic task of constitutional judges is to resolve legal 
disputes between two parties pleading a constitutional norm or value against the 
other. Most judges are disinclined to build constitutional hierarchies of norms. 
Instead, they usually proclaim that no right is absolute, which then propels them 
into a balancing mode. In balancing situations, it is context that varies, and it is the 
judge’s evaluation of the circumstances, facts, and policy considerations that 
determines the outcome of a case. 
In Theory of Constitutional Rights, Robert Alexy contends that rules “contain 
fixed points in the field of the factually and legally possible,” therefore; a rule is a 
norm that is either “fulfilled or not.” However, principles are norms that “require 
that something be realized to the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual 
possibilities”. This distinction makes a difference in adjudication, because a 
conflict between two rules may be resolved by giving primacy to, invalidating, or 
establishing an “appropriate exception” to one rule in relation to the other. 
Whereas, a conflict between two principles can only be managed through 
balancing – where the judge finds that one principle outweighs the other, given a 
particular set of circumstances. Alexy believes that conflicts of rules are played 
                                                 
68 As for all those aspects, see also BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments in the case Study of Colombia: An analysis of the Justification 
and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, in International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 11. No. 2. (2013b), 339. 
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out at the level of validity, where “competitions between principles are played out 
in the dimension of weight.” 
Bernal Pulido explains that critics believe balancing is irrational for multiple 
reasons. However, the most widely noted are a lack of precision, 
incommensurability and lack of predictability. For those who claim constitutional 
rights and competing principles are incommensurable, Alexy maintains that the 
triadic scale (light, moderate, serious) he developed provides a solution. 
Even though Alexy provides a rationalization for balancing as a procedure, he 
does acknowledge that the question of what relative weight judges should give to 
opposed principles, in any given dispute, falls outside of his theory. However, from 
my point of view, Alexy’s procedure does, nonetheless, allow for the 
understanding that balancing does generate a particular form of argumentation and 
places the judge under an obligation to justify his/her decisions in terms of certain 
constraints. Thus, to the extent that judges actually search for solutions absent of 
harm and actually look to comply with the law of balancing, balancing is less 
susceptible to the accusation that it proceeds without rational criteria and is no 
more than a means to bundle a court’s unconstrained policy choices. 
Grègoire Webber69 notes John Finnis’ opinion70 that without an identified 
                                                 
69 WEBBER, GRÉGOIRE: The Negotiable Constitution. On the Limitation of Rights, 2010, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. In matters of rights, constitutions tend to avoid 
settling controversies. With few exceptions, rights are formulated in open-ended language, 
seeking consensus on an abstraction without purporting to resolve the many moral-political 
questions implicated by rights. The resulting view has been that rights extend everywhere 
but are everywhere infringed by legislation seeking to resolve the very moral-political 
questions the constitution seeks to avoid. The Negotiable Constitution challenges this view. 
Arguing that underspecified rights call for greater specification, Grégoire C. N. Webber 
draws on limitation clauses common to most bills of rights to develop a new understanding 
of the relationship between rights and legislation. The legislature is situated as a key 
constitutional actor tasked with completing the specification of constitutional rights. In 
turn, because the constitutional project is incomplete with regards to rights, it is open to 
being re-negotiated by legislation struggling with the very moral-political questions left 
underdetermined at the constitutional level.  
70 FINNIS, JOHN: Human Rights and Common Good: Collected Essays Volume III, 2011, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. This volume collects twenty-two published and 
unpublished chapters on a variety of topics related directly to human rights, justice, and the 
common good. The first nine date from 1970 through to 2007. They begin with a study – 
in dialectic with Dworkin's earlier lecture on the same themes – of the bearing of 
contemporary legal and political theory on the incorporation of a declaration of rights and 
freedoms in British law. There follow chapters on place of rights, and of duties to oneself, 
in Kant's moral and legal theory and some contemporary interpreters of Kant; on the 
application classical conceptions of distributive justice to modern problems; on the 
emergence of the ideal of government limited by, inter alia, respect for human rights, and 
contemporary distortions of the ideal that are proposed by Rawls, Dworkin, and followers 
of theirs (not least in relation to marriage); on the place of civic virtues and respect for 
diverse persons in constitutional order; and two chapters on the great question of migration 
rights and the legitimacy of national boundaries preventing free and equal migration. Part 
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common measure, the principle of proportionality cannot direct reason to an 
answer. It can only assist reason in choosing between two incommensurables. 
Bernal Pulido shows us how Alexy’s weight formula,71 developed as a complement 
to the rule of balancing, not only allows for the determining the concrete weight of 
                                                 
Two groups three chapters on the justice of punishment, concluding with the mature 
statement of retribution's place as punishment's formative justifying aim, in engagement 
especially with Nietzsche's ‘genealogy of morals’. Part Three surveys just way theory in 
its historic development and current shape. Parts Four, Five, and Six each group three 
chapters: on autonomy, justice, and euthanasia; on autonomy, justice, and human 
reproduction; and on marriage in its relation to justice and the common good.  
71 The “weight formula” is thus proposed as a developed complement to the rule of 
balancing, which Alexy states on the basis of a classical formulation of the third limb of 
the proportionality principle, or proportionality in the narrow sense, in German 
constitutional law. However, it seems to Bernal Pulido that the weight formula, as described 
by Alexy, calls for a new law of balancing. The aim of the weight formula is to establish 
“a conditional relation of precedence between the principles in the light of the 
circumstances of the case”. The key observation is that the relation of precedence is not 
determined by means of merely comparing the importance of the principles in the case at 
hand (“the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle” and “the 
importance of satisfying the other”), but by means of a wider operation which includes 
reference to their abstract weight and to the reliability of the empirical assumptions relating 
to the importance of the principles. That is, the weight formula is a reformulation of the 
basic insight behind the original law of balancing which is more sophisticated in analytical 
terms in that it renders explicit the need to consider two more variables, namely, abstract 
weight and reliability of the empirical assumptions.  
This formula seeks to reflect the main normative and empirical variables that are relevant 
for balancing. It is accordingly a very complex model, one that gives rise to the objection 
that application would seem not to be obviously straight forward. However, it should be 
said that the model is complex because the application of principles is a highly complex 
procedure. Moreover, the weight formula is not an algorithmic procedure that can 
guarantee the only correct answer in all cases. Quite the contrary, for it has diverse 
rationality limits that give the judge room to exercise discretion. His ideology and 
appraisals play an important role here. Nevertheless, this fact does not reduce the rationality 
and usefulness of the formula. The weight formula is a clear procedure even when its limits 
are borne in mind. It offers for balancing, a clear concept and a precise legal structure, that 
are free of all contradiction. In this structure, the triadic scale is the common measure for 
determining the weight of the relevant principles. The weigh formula is also a determinate 
structure that clarifies the different, relevant balancing variables. It therefore enables the 
result of balancing to be correctly justified in the law. Through this formula, justification 
can be stated in conceptually clear and consistent terms, with complete and saturated 
premises, and with logic and the burdens of argumentation respected. The weight formula 
gives expression to every element that the judge ought to take into account and every 
decision that should be justified. In legal practice, these judicial decisions make up a 
network of precedents that allow principles to be applied in a consistent and coherent 
manner, with the result that balancing is predictable. Finally, the weight formula is a very 
good example of how practical problems in constitutional law can be solved with the help 
of juridico-philosophical considerations. Cf. ALEXY (2002): op. cit. 122-158. 
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principles in light of the circumstances of a case, but also their abstract weight and 
empirical assumptions relating to the importance of those principles. Bernal Pulido 
also reminds us of John Rawls’ view72 when referring to the meaning of relevant 
positions of principles- the more connected with the moral capacities of the person 
of position of a principle is, the more importance should be attributed to the 
principle. 
David Beatty asserts in Ultimate Rule of Law,73 that by carefully studying the 
                                                 
72 RAWLS, JOHN: A Theory of Justice, 1971, Harvard University Press. This is a work of 
political philosophy and ethic, originally published in 1971 and revised in both 1975 (for 
the translated editions) and 1999. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to solve the 
problem of distributive justice (the socially just distribution of goods in a society) by 
utilising a variant of the familiar device of the social contract. The resultant theory is known 
as “Justice as Fairness”, from which Rawls derives his two principles of justice: the liberty 
principle and the difference principle. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues for a principled 
reconciliation of liberty and equality. Central to this effort is an account of the 
circumstances of justice, inspired by David Hume, and a fair choice situation for parties 
facing such circumstances, similar to some of Immanuel Kant's views. Principles of justice 
are sought to guide the conduct of the parties. These parties are recognized to face moderate 
scarcity, and they are neither naturally altruistic nor purely egoistic. They have ends which 
they seek to advance, but prefer to advance them through cooperation with others on 
mutually acceptable terms. Rawls offers a model of a fair choice situation (the original 
position with its veil of ignorance) within which parties would hypothetically choose 
mutually acceptable principles of justice. Under such constraints, Rawls believes that 
parties would find his favoured principles of justice to be especially attractive, winning out 
over varied alternatives, including utilitarian and right-libertarian accounts.  
73 BEATTY, DAVIS: The Ultimate Rule of Law, 2004, Oxford University Press, New York. 
„Proportionality” analysis is becoming a term of art in constitutional law. If we have not 
heard of it, that is because the concept has received far more elaboration and evaluation 
outside of the United States. One of the leading proponents of proportionality analysis in 
constitutional law is the Canadian legal scholar, David M. Beatty. For the last decade, 
Beatty has pursued a vision of comparative constitutional study as revealing „timeless” or 
„universal” ideals of proportionality and rationality in constitutional adjudication around 
the world. In his latest book, The Ultimate Rule of Law, he advances the argument that 
constitutional courts around the world are, and should be, turning away from a focus on 
„interpretation” and instead concentrate on applying the principle of proportionality to 
measure the constitutionality of challenged government actions. 
As Beatty shows, in Canada, Germany, the European Court of Human Rights, India, 
Ireland, South Africa, and on occasion even in the United States, courts or tribunals invoke 
the basic concept of proportionality not only to review the propriety of sanctions, but also 
to measure the legality of a wide range of government conduct through some form of 
means-ends analyses. In a number of countries, proportionality analysis is treated as a 
general principle of public law, applicable not only to constitutional law, but also to 
administrative and even to international law questions. Although means-end analyses are 
found in a wide swathe of constitutional doctrine in many tribunals, a distinguishing feature 
of proportionality analysis is its eschewal of doctrinal sub-categories, its commitment to 
returning to foundational questions of constitutional purpose in structuring analyses of 
challenges to government action, and its requirement that the government come forward 
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facts of the case, judges are able to determine proportionality objectively. 
Although, Beatty sees balancing as “subjective” based on a calculation of costs 
and benefits – a process of cataloging and quantifying factors and a comparison of 
incommensurable –, at times he uses balancing “vocabulary” when describing his 
principle of proportionality. He maintains that “proportionality is an essential, 
unavoidable part of every constitutional text and a universal criterion of 
constitutionality”. As Webber noted, Beatty contends that “proportionality request 
judges to assess the legitimacy of whatever law or regulation or rulings is before 
them from the perspective of those who reap its greatest benefits and those who 
stand to lose the most.” Thus a balancing perspective. 
The U.S. Supreme Court uses a balancing approach most often to decide cases 
where constitutionally protected individual rights conflict with governmental 
                                                 
with justifications for statutes that infringe on protected rights.  
Beatty is primarily concerned with versions of proportionality analysis which, like the 
Canadian or German approaches, consider not only rationality and availability of other 
alternatives, but proportionality in the „strict sense” of some degree of fit between the harm 
that some endure, or the intrusions some suffer, in order to create a legitimate benefit for 
others. Beatty is quite persuasive as to the pervasiveness of the phenomena of such 
proportionality analysis, both the Canadian version and others used by the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Indian Supreme Court, the German Federal Constitutional Court, and 
a number of other influential constitutional tribunals. He provides examples in three major 
areas of constitutional law – religious liberty, gender and racial equality, and positive 
welfare rights – to illustrate courts' concerns for the proportionality of government actions 
that impose special burdens on some and, increasingly, for the proportionality, or fairness, 
of government efforts to provide assistance or opportunities. 
But Beatty's ambitions are not merely descriptive. First, in the course of description Beatty 
develops what one might call a „best practices” approach to proportionality analysis. For 
Beatty, the best version of proportionality analysis is one that relies on pragmatic, 
empirically contextualized reasoning. It seeks to view legal issues through the perspectives 
of those most benefitted and most burdened by challenged action, while generally 
accepting a wide range of legitimate government ends. These are the tools of 
proportionality analysis, „properly enforced” (p. 166). Adherence to these practices, he 
argues, means that proportionality analysis meets criteria for neutrality and objectivity in 
constitutional adjudication. 
Second, Beatty argues that such proportionality analysis, rather than interpretation of 
constitutional texts, should be seen as the fundamental tool of normatively responsible 
judicial review in self-governing democratic polities. Much of the hard work of 
constitutional adjudication, he argues, turns on the question of government justification of 
its actions, an inquiry best guided by the norms of proportionality analysis. Moreover, 
proportionality analysis would yield a more determinate and impartial form of 
constitutionalism than a focus on interpretation of constitutional provisions under any of 
the leading schools of interpretation. Rather than focusing on interpreting a constitution 
within its historic traditions, or considering questions of institutional role or deference, 
constitutional judges should carefully scrutinize the facts to determine whether, in light of 
the governmental purposes intended to be served, the challenged act or action appropriately 
accommodates the interests of those most affected or concerned. In so arguing, Beatty 
dispenses not only with „interpretation” but (at times) with „rights” (p. 171). Justification 
of challenged government action becomes the focus of analysis.  
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interests. One landmark constitutional case decided in this manner, was ROE v. 
WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1973), which legalized 
abortion. In reaching its decision, the Court found that in the first trimester of 
pregnancy, a woman's right to privacy outweighed the State's interest in protecting 
health, but in the later stages of pregnancy, the State's interest gradually 
outweighed the woman's. 
From my perspective, a balancing court can give some measure of coherence 
to adjudication by developing stable procedures for arriving at decisions. To the 
extent that it is successful, these procedures could take on some of the 
systematizing functions of precedent more broadly. A court could declare that 
rights are absolute, or that one right must always prevail over other constitutional 
values, including other rights provisions. Creating such hierarchies would almost 
constitutionalize winners and losers. In so far as judges gave reasons for having 
conferring a higher status on one value relative to another, they have in fact 
balanced. 
Balancing makes clear that each party is pleading a constitutionally legitimate 
norm or value and that the court holds each of these interests in equally high 
esteem. Determining which value shall prevail in any given case is not a 
mechanical exercise, but is a difficult judicial task involving complex policy 
considerations. However, in my opinion, Alexy’s triadic scale and weight formula 
are proven effective tools that allow for an objective constitutional adjudication. 
When properly executed, balancing requires courts to acknowledge and 
defend – honestly and openly – the policy choices that they make when they make 
constitutional choices. Most certainly, is not a magic wand for judges to wave to 
make all of the political dilemmas of rights review disappear. Indeed, waving such 
a wand would expose rights adjudication for what it is: constitutionally-based 
lawmaking. Nonetheless, I believe balancing offers the best position currently 
available for judges seeking to rationalize and defend rights review, given certain 
strategic considerations, the structure of modern rights provisions, and the precepts 
of contemporary constitutionalism.  
It is my opinion that balancing helps judges manage disputes that take a 
particular form, but does not dictate correct answers to legal problems. It provides 
a set of relatively stable, off-the-shelf, solutions to a set of generic dilemmas faced 
by the constitutional judge. Therefore, I do see balancing as an appropriate 
criterion for constitutional argumentation.74 
 
 
                                                 
74 I wrote all these final conclusions in occasion of the course “Constitutional 
Argumentation”, to the bosom of “Master Global Rule of Law and Constitutional 
Democracy”, issued by the Faculty of Law of the University of Genoa (Italy), A.A. 
2012/2013. I had the pleasure to meet and to discuss with Carlos Bernal Pulido, teacher of 
the course mentioned, when he explained his theories in this University on April 24, 2014. 
But the present essay is chiefly dedicated to Ronald Dworkin (December 11, 1931 – 
February 14, 2013), in memoriam. 
 
135 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Books and articles 
[1] ALEXANDER, LARRY (ed.): Constitutionalism. Philosophical Foundations, 1998, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
[2] ALEXY, ROBERT: Theorie der Grundrechte, 1985, Nomos, Baden-Baden. 
[3] ALEXY, ROBERT: Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen 
Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung. English translation by Neil 
MacCormick as A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse 
as Theory of Legal Justification, Clarendon, London, 1989. 
[4] ALEXY, ROBERT: On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and 
Morality: Bulygin's Critique, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 13. Issue 2. (2000), 138-147. 
[5] ALEXY, ROBERT: A theory of constitutional rights, 2002, Oxford University Press. 
[6] ALEXY, ROBERT: Begriff und geltung des rechts (The Concept and Validity of the 
Law), 2005, Karl Alber, Freiburg und München. 
[7] ALEXY, ROBERT: On the Concept and the Nature of Law, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 21. Issue. 
3. (2008), 281-299. 
[8] ALLEGRETTI, UMBERTO: Diritti e stato nella mondializzazione, 2002, Troina (En), 
Città aperta. 
[9] ATIENZA, MANUEL: El sentido del Derecho, 2001, Ariel, Barcelona,. 
[10] ATIENZA, MANUEL: Legal Reasoning and Constitutional State, in Associations (in 
print). 
[11] BARBERIS, MAURO (2000a): Filosofia del diritto. Un'introduzione storica, 2000, il 
Mulino, Bologna. 
[12] BARBERIS, MAURO (2000b): Neocostituzionalismo, democrazia e imperialismo della 
morale, in Ragion Pratica, Vol. 14. (2000), 147-162. 
[13] BARBERIS, MAURO: Metaetica del costituzionalismo, in Diritto e questioni pubbliche, 
No. 11. (2011) 135-156. 
[14] BARBERIS, MAURO: Law and Morality Today, in Revus 16, 2012, 55-93. 
[15] BARBERIS, MAURO: Genoa's Realism: a Guide for Perplexed, in Revista Brasileira de 
Filosofia, 2013, RBF, 240-252.  
[16] BARBERIS, MAURO: Neo-constitutionalsm: Third Philosophy of Law, in Rivista di 
Filosofia del Diritto – Journal of Legal Philosophy, 1/2014, 153-164. 
[17] BEATTY, DAVIS: The Ultimate Rule of Law, 2004, Oxford University Press, New York. 
[18] BERLIN, ISAIAH: Two Concepts of Liberty, in BERLIN, ISAIAH: Four Essays on 
Liberty, 1969, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
[19] BERNAL, PULINDO CARLOS: El principio de proporcionalidad y los derechos 
fundamentales, 2003, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Bogotà. 
[20] BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: El neoconstitucionalismo a debate (Arguing about the 
New Constitutionalism) (in Spanish), 2006, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 
Bogotá, 1st. Edition. 
[21] BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: El derecho de los derechos (Rights’ Law), 2007, 
Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, (1st. Edition, and 1st. and 2nd. 
Reprints) 2005, (3th. Reprint). 
[22] BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: El Principio de Proporcionalidad y los Derechos 
Fundamentales (The Principle of Proportionality and Constitutional Rights), 2008, 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2003. (1st. Edition), 2005 
(2nd. Edition), 2008 (3th Edition), English edition in preparation. 
[23] BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: Is Tort Law a Practice of Corrective Justice? in Diritto e 
 
136 
 
Questioni Pubbliche, Vol. 12. (2012), 1-23. 
[24] BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: The Drama of Law as a Collective Play, in This Century, 
Issue 2. (2013a), 8-15. 
[25] BERNAL-PULIDO, CARLOS: Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the case 
Study of Colombia: An analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional 
Replacement Doctrine, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 11. No. 
2. (2013b), 339-357. 
[26] BISKUPIC, JOAN: American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia, 2009, Sarah Crichton Books. 
[27] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Alcuni argomenti contro il diritto naturale, in Rivista di diritto 
civile, Vol. 4, (1958) 253-263. 
[28] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Sul positivismo giuridico, in Rivista di filosofia, Vol. 52. (1961), 
14-34. 
[29] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Presente e avvenire dei diritti dell'uomo, in La comunità 
internazionale, Vol. 23. (1968) 3-18. English translation by CAMERON, A.: Human 
Rights Now and in the Future, in BOBBIO, NORBERTO: The Age of Rights, 1996, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 12-31. 
[30] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: L'età dei diritti, in BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Il terzo assente. Saggi e 
discorsi sulla pace e sulla guerra, 1987, (2nd ed.) Edizioni Sonda, Einaudi, Torino, 
112-125. 
[31] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Presentazione, in PECES-BARBA, GREGORIO: Teoria dei diritti 
fondamentali, 1993, Giuffré, Milano. 
[32] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: Il positivismo giuridico, 1996, (2nd ed.) Giappichelli, Torino, 
(1st ed. 1961). 
[33] BOBBIO, NORBERTO: El fundamento de los derechos humanos, in DÍAZ, RAMÓN 
SORIANO – CABRERA, CARLOS ALARCÓN – MOLINA, JUAN MORA (ed.): Diccionario 
crítico de los derechos humanos, 2000, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Sede 
Iberoamericana de la Rábida. 
[34] BONANATE, LUIGI: La politica interna del mondo, in Teoria politica, Vol. 17. No. 1. 
(2001), 3-25. 
[35] BULYGIN, EUGENIO: Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and 
Morality, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 13. Issue 2. (2000), 133-137. 
[36] CASSESE, ANTONIO: I diritti umani nel mondo contemporaneo, 1994, Laterza, Roma-
Bari. 
[37] CHAISSONI, PIERLUIGI (ed.): The Legal Ought, 2001, Giappichelli, Torino. 
[38] CHAISSONI, PIERLUIGI: Utopia della ragione analitica. Origini, oggetti e metodi della 
filosofia del diritto positivo, 2009, Giappichelli, Torino. 
[39] CHAISSONI, PIERLUIGI: L'indirizzo analitico nella filosofia del diritto. Da Bentham a 
Kelsen, 2008, Giappichelli, Torino. 
[40] CIANCIARDO, JUAN: The Principle of Proportionality: The Challenges of Human 
Rights, in Journal of Civil Law Studies, Vol. 3. Issue 1. (2010), 177-186 
[41] COMANDUCCI, PAOLO: Il positivismo giuridico: un tentativo di bilancio, in Sudi in 
onore di Franca De Marini, 1999, Milano, Giuffrè, 125-134. 
[42] COMANDUCCI, PAOLO: Neo-constitutionalism: an attempt at classification, in 
Associations (in print). 
[43] CORTEN, OLIVER: The Notion of “Reasonable” in International Law: Legal Discourse, 
Reason and Contradictions, in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 48. No. 3. (1999), 613-625. 
[44] DAN, PRIEL: H.L.A. Hart and the Invention of Legal Philosophy, in Problema, Vol. 7. 
No. 5. (2011), 301-323. 
 
137 
 
[45] DOGLIANI, MARIO: Introduzione al diritto costituzionale, 1994, il Mulino, Bologna. 
[46] DWORKIN, RONALD: Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
[47] DWORKIN, RONALD: The Moral Reading of the Constitution, 1996, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
[48] FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: Diritti fondamentali, in Teoria Politica, Vol. 14. No. 2. (1998), 3-
33. [English translation: Fundamental Rights, in PINTORE, ANNA – JORI, MARIO (ed.): 
Italian Debate on Fundamental Rights. Monographic issue of International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 14. No. 1. (2001), 1-33, 1-106]. 
[49] FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: I fondamenti dei diritti fondamentali, in Teoria Politica, Vol. 16. 
No. 3. (2000), 41-113. 
[50] FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: Per una sfera pubblica del mondo, in Teoria politica, Vol. 17. No. 
3. (2001) 3-21. 
[51] FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: Lo stato di diritto fra passato e futuro, in COSTA, PIETRO – ZOLO, 
DANILO (ed.): Lo stato di diritto. Storia, teoria, critica, 2002, Feltrinelli, Milano, 349-
386. 
[52] FERRAJOLI, LUIGI: La pragmatica della teoria del diritto, in COMANDUCCI, PAOLO – 
GUASTINI, RICARDO (ed.): Analisi e diritto 2014, 2014, Giappichelli, Torino (in print). 
[53] FIGUEROA, RUBIO SEBASTIÁN (ed.): Hart en la teoría del derecho contemporánea. A 
50 años de El concepto de derecho, 2014, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de 
Chile..  
[54] FINNIS, JOHN: Human Rights and Common Good: Collected Essays Volume III, 2011, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
[55] FLORIDIA, GIUSEPPE G.: La costituzione dei moderni. Profili tecnici di storia 
costituzionale. I Dal Medioevo inglese al 1791, 1991, Giappichelli, Torino. 
[56] FLORIDIA, GIUSEPPE G.: ‘Costituzione’: il nome e le cose, in COMANDUCCI, PAOLO – 
GUASTINI, RICCARDO (ed.): Analisi e diritto 1994, Giappichelli, Torino, 131-152. 
[57] GARDNER, JOHN How Law Claims, What Law Claims, in KLATT, MATTHIAS (ed.): 
Institutionalized Reason. The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, 2012, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 29-44..  
[58] GUASTINI, RICCARDO: La “costituzi-onalizzazione” dell’ordinamento italiano, in 
Ragion Pratica, Vol. 6. No. 11. (1998a), 185-206. 
[59] GUASTINI, RICCARDO: Teoria e dogmatica delle fonti, 1998b, Giuffrè, Milano. 
[60] GUASTINI, RICCARDO: Lezioni di teoria costituzionale, 2001, Giappichelli, Torino. 
[61] HART, HERBERT L. A.: The Concept of Law, 1994, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1961 
first edition; 1994 second edition). 
[62] KELSEN, HANS: Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche 
Problematik, 1934, Deuticke, Wien. [English translation by B. PAULSON, 
LITSCHEWSKI – PAULSON, STANLEY L.: Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, 
1992, Clarendon Press, Oxford.]. 
[63] KELSEN, HANS: General Theory of Law and State, 1945, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
[64] KOSKENNIEMI, MARTTI: The Effect of Rights on Political Culture, in ALSTON, PHILIP 
(ed.): The EU and Human Rights, 1999, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 99-116. 
[65] KRAMER, MATTHEW: Throwing Light on the Role that Moral Principles Play in the 
Law, in Legal Theory, Vol. 8. Issue 1. (2002), 115-143. 
[66] LEITER, BRIAN: Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: the Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence, in LEITER, BRIAN: Naturalizing Jurisprudence, 2007, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 153-181. 
[67] LOEWENSTEIN, KARL: Political Power and the Governmental Process, 1957, 
 
138 
 
University of Chicago, Chicago. 
[68] LUZZATI, CLAUDIO: Vagueness (of Legal Language), in The Encyclopedia of 
Language and Linguistics, 1993, Pergamon Press, Oxford – New York – Seul –Tokio, 
Vol. 4. 2086-2091.  
[69] LUZZATI, CLAUDIO: Principi e princìpi. La genericità nel diritto, 2012, Giappichelli, 
Torino. 
[70] LUZZATI, CLAUDIO: Il formalismo dei diritti, in Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 
Vol. 15. No. 1. (2013), 52-86. 
[71] MANIN, BERNARD: The Principles of Representative Government, 1997, Cambridge, 
University Press Cambridge. 
[72] MANIN, BERNARD – PREZEWORSKI, ADAM – STOKES, SUSAN: Elections and 
representation, in Manin, Bernard – Prezeworski, Adam – Stokes, Susan (ed.): 
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, 1999, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
[73] MANIN, BERNARD: On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, in Political Theory, 
Vol. 15. No. 3. (1987), 338-368 
[74] MANZELLA, ANDREA – MELOGRANI, PIERO – PACIOTTI, ELENA – ROGOTÁ, STEFANO: 
Riscrivere i diritti in Europa, 2001, il Mulino, Bologna. 
[75] MATTEUCCI, NICOLA: Positivismo giuridico e costituzionalismo, in Rivista 
trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, Vol. 17. (1963), 985-1100. 
[76] MAZZARESE, TECLA: (1993). Judicial Implementation of Fundamental Rights: Three 
Sorts of Problem, in KARLSSON, M. M. – JONSSON, O. P. – ERYNJARSDOTTIR, E. M. 
(ed.): Recht, Gerechtigkeit und der Staat, 1993, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 203-
214. 
[77] MAZZARESE, TELCA: Forme di razionalità delle decisioni giudiziali, 1996, 
Giappichelli, Torino. 
[78] MAZZARESE, TECLA: Is the age of rights to a turn? Paper presented at „Fundamental 
Aspects of Human Rights. A Symposium”, Helsinki, 22-23 February 2002. 
[79] MAZZARESE, TECLA: Towards a Positivist reading of Neo-constitutionalism, in Jura 
Gentium-Rivista di Filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale, 18, 
(2008) 345-364. 
[80] MCILAWAIN, CHARLES HOWARD: Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, 1947, 
Cornell University Press, New York. 
[81] MORESO, JOSÉ JUAN: In Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism, in CHIASSONI, 
PIERLUIGI (ed.): The Legal Ought, 2001, Giappichelli, Torino, 37-63. 
[82] MULLENDER, RICHARD: Nicola Lacey. A Life of H.L.A. Hart: the Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream – H.L.A. Hart in Anglo-American Context, in Web Journal of Current 
Legal Issues (review 2007), 2004, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
[83] NINO, CARLOS SANTIAGO: Introducción al análisis del derecho, 1983, Ariel, 
Barcelona. 
[84] PACE, ALESSANDRO: Metodi interpretativi e costituzionalismo, in Quaderni 
costituzionali, Vol. 21. No. 1. (2001), 35-61. 
[85] PAINTER, SUZANNE: Improving the Teaching of School Law: A Call for Dialogue, in 
Brigham Young University Education & Law Journal, Issue 2. (2001), 213-230. 
[86] PALOMBELLA, GIANLUIGI: L'autorità dei diritti, 2002, Laterza, Roma-Bari. 
[87] PECZENIK, ALEXANDER: On law and reason, 2009, Springer, London. 
[88] PETTIT, PHILIP: Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, 1999, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
[89] POZZOLO, SUSANNA. Neoconstitucionalismo y especificidad de la interpretación 
constitucional, in Doxa, Vol. 2. No. 21. (1998), 355-370. 
 
139 
 
[90] POZZOLO, SUSANNA: Neocostituzionalismo e positivismo giuridico, 2001, Torino, 
Giappichelli. 
[91] PRIETO SANCHÍS, LUIS: Constitucionalismo y positivism, 1997, Fontamara, Mèxico. 
[92] RAWLS, JOHN: A Theory of Justice, 1971, Harvard University Press. 
[93] RAZ, JOSEPH: Legal Rights, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4. No. 1. (1984), 
1-21. 
[94] REDONDO, MARIA CRISTINA: (ed.), Il “Postscript” di H. L. A. Hart, monographic 
issue, in Ragion pratica, Vol. 21 (2003), 347-360.  
[95] RING, KEVIN: Scalia Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court's Wittiest, Most 
Outspoken Justice, 2004, Regnery Publishing, Inc. 
[96] ROSS, ALF: On Law and Justice, 1958, Stevens, London. 
[97] ROSS, ALF: Directives and Norms, 1968, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
[98] ROSSUM, RALPH: Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition, 2006, 
University Press of Kansas. 
[99] SARTORI, GIOVANNI: Constitutionalism: a Preliminary Discussion, in American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 56. No. 4. (1962), 853-864. 
[100] SARTORI, GIOVANNI: Costituzione, in SARTORI, GIOVANNI: Elementi di teoria 
politica, 1987, il Mulino, Bologna, 11-24. 
[101] SCALIA, ANTONIN: A Matter of Interpretation, 1997, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
[102] SCALIA, ANTONIN – BARNER, BRIAN: Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts, 2012, West Publishing Company, College & School Division. 
[103] SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Playing by the Rules, 2002, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
[104] SCHAUER, FREDERICK: (Re)Taking Hart, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 119. Issue 3. 
(2006), 852-883. 
[105] SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of 
Legal Text, in Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 4. Issue 1. (2010), 34-45. 
[106] SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of 
Legal Text, in Klatt, Matthias (ed.): Institutional Reason: The Jurisprudence of 
Robert Alexy, 2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 307-316. 
[107] SCHAUER, FREDERICK: Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning, 2013, Harvard University Press, Harvard. 
[108] SEARLE, JOHN: The Construction of Social Reality, 1995, Free Press, New York. 
[109] SEARLE, JOHN: Mind, Language, and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World, 
1999, Basic Books, New York.  
[110] SEARLE, JOHN: Rationality in Action, 2001, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
[111] SEARLE, JOHN: Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, 
2010, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
[112] SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: Law, Morality and the Guidance of Conduct, in Legal Theory, 
Vol. 6. Issue 2. (2000), 127-170. 
[113] SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: On Hart’s Way Out, in COLEMAN, JULES (ed.): Hart’s 
Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, 2001, Oxford University 
Press Oxford. 
[114] SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, 
in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 77 (2007), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657 [cit. 2014-07-30]. 
[115] SHAPIRO, SCOTT J.: Legality, 2011, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
[116] STAAB, JAMES: The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on 
the Supreme Court, 2006, Rowman & Littlefield. 
[117] TARELLO, GIOVANNI: Storia della cultura giuridica moderna. Assolutismo e 
 
140 
 
codificazione del diritto, 1976, Bologna, Il Mulino. 
[118] TARELLO, GIOVANNI: L'interpretazione della legge, 1980, Milano, Giuffrè. 
[119] TARUFFO, MICHELE: Diritti fondamentali, tutela giurisdizionale e alternative, in 
MAZZARESE, TELCA (ed.): Neocostituzionalismo e tutela (sovra)nazione dei diritti 
fondamentali, 2002, Giappichelli, Torino. 
[120] TOOBIN, JEFFREY: The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (revised 
ed.), 2008, Anchor Books. 
[121] TROPER, MICHEL: Il concetto di costituzionalismo e la moderna teoria del diritto, in 
Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 18, (1988), 61-81. 
[122] TUSHNET, MARK: A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of 
Constitutional Law (revised ed.), 2006, W.W. Norton & Co..  
[123] WEBBER, GRÉGOIRE: The Negotiable Constitution. On the Limitation of Rights, 
2010, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
[124] ZAGREBELSKY, GUSTAVO: Il diritto mite. Legge diritti giustizia, 1992, Einaudi, 
Torino. 
Electronic sources 
[1] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 
331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969); available at: http://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch XXIII_01p.pdf. 
 
141 
 
A Possible Tax Incentive in Latvia: Introduction of 
Intellectual Property Box Regime 
DACE, Liga  
Riga Graduate School of Law 
Strelnieku iela 4k-2 
Riga, Latvia 
liga.dace@rgsl.edu.lv, 
EISMONTS, Janis 
Riga Graduate School of Law 
Strelnieku iela 4k-2 
Riga, Latvia 
janis.eismonts@rgsl.edu.lv  
 
Abstract 
Intellectual Property (IP) Box regime is a relatively new tax incentive targeted at the 
income deriving from intellectual property and provides either a reduced tax rate or a 
partial exemption of tax for the income which is generated from IP. Currently eleven EEA 
member states have introduced an IP Box, mainly in order to incentivise investment in 
research and development (R&D) and innovation. Latvia currently has one of the lowest 
rates of investment in R&D amongst all EU member states, thus Latvia should seriously 
consider the introduction of IP Box, especially since it might positively impact economic 
growth and success of the country. 
 
Keywords: Intellectual Property (IP) Box, tax incentive, R&D, Latvia. 
 
JEL classification: H25. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction to the Intellectual Property Boxes  
This paper aims at exploring the possibility of introducing Intellectual Property 
(IP) Box regime in Latvia. 
IP Box regime is a relatively new-to-the-world tax incentive – most countries 
have introduced it in the last ten years – which is aimed at incentivising investment 
in research and development (R&D) and innovation. IP Box regime is targeted at 
the income which derives from intellectual property – in most countries patents in 
particular – and it offers either a reduced tax rate for IP income or a partial 
exemption of tax for the income which is generated from IP. It has been given the 
unusual name of a ‘Box’ regime due to the fact that the pioneering countries, which 
introduced this tax incentive, had a box to tick in tax forms to be submitted to their 
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national state revenue offices.1 IP Boxes vary across countries with regard to what 
type of IP qualifies in order to receive the tax benefit, whether only existing or also 
acquired IP qualifies, what type of income qualifies and a number of other factors. 
Therefore, a common reader may have heard such names for this regime as a Patent 
Box (in countries where only patents qualify for the tax relief, for example, the 
UK), License Box (in countries where the qualifying IP has to be licensed, for 
example, the Swiss Canton of Nidwalden) and Innovation Box (in countries where 
the regime has gone as far as to include products and services that cannot be 
registered as patents or trademarks, for example, the Netherlands).2 For uniformity, 
all of these regimes will be included in the term ‘IP Box’ in this paper. 
Currently even such large players of the world’s economy as China have 
adopted IP Box regime. Eleven European Economic Area members have IP Boxes, 
of which nine are European Union (EU) member states.3 Due to the limited scope 
of this paper and special circumstances underlying tax incentives in Europe (such 
as the free movement of goods, services and workforce as a general principle of 
EU) that distinguish European countries from the rest of the world, the paper will 
focus on the EU context. 
1.2. Reasons underlying the introduction of IP Boxes 
The two main reasons underlying the introduction of IP Boxes in as many as eleven 
countries in Europe are, first, the need for the EU member states to comply with 
EU general strategic plans (currently – Europe 2020, in the past – Lisbon Strategy 
and objectives developed in Barcelona summit) and, second, the realization that 
R&D and innovation are significant factors for the overall national economic 
growth and success.  
The underlying objective of the Lisbon Strategy – a plan for the development 
of EU’s economy between years 2000 and 2010, which was adopted already 
fourteen years ago – was to make the EU the most competitive economy in the 
world by focusing on innovation and research and development (R&D) and by 
making EU’s economy increasingly more and more knowledge-based.4 In line with 
the Lisbon Strategy there were further objectives developed in the EU summit that 
took place in Barcelona in 2002, of which one of the most notable ones was to raise 
investment in the EU to 3% of EU’s GDP by 2010.5 This aim was repeatedly 
                                                 
1 ATKINSON, ROBERT D. – ANDES, SCOTT: Patent boxes: innovation in tax policy and tax 
policy for innovation, report by The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 
2011. 
2 EVERS, LISA – MILLER, HELEN – SPENGEL, CHRISTOPH: Intellectual Property Box 
Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations, in ZEW (Centre for European 
Economic Research) Discussion Paper, No. 13-070 (2013). 
3 Source for statistics: Ibid. 
4 Lisbon European Council on 23rd and 24th of March 2000. Presidency conclusions. 
Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/001 
00-r1.en0.htm [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
5 Barcelona European Council on 15th and 16th of March 2002. Presidency conclusions. 
 
143 
 
included in the current EU’s strategic plan, namely Europe 2020, due to not having 
been achieved.6 Therefore, EU member states have had to invent new strategies 
and incentivises that would help them to comply with these requirements since 
their low investment indicators proved that the situation will not change without a 
suitable government interference.  
But, of course, a mere desire to comply with EU strategic plans has not been 
the main reason for the creation of IP Boxes. European countries that have 
introduced the new tax regime have not done so simply in order to raise investment 
in R&D to some arbitrary number. Most of the economic models and theories show 
that the raise in R&D and innovation practices leads to a number of positive 
changes in national economies, such as increase in high-skilled jobs, 
manufacturing of high-value products, supply of sophisticated services and others, 
which subsequently lead to an economic growth. This view is supported by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).7 
Additionally, some economists, for example R. D. Atkinson, go as far as to claim 
that in fact every modern tax code should explicitly focus on creating opportunities 
for the increase in investment in R&D and innovation.8 
1.3. Advantages and disadvantages of IP Boxes 
The main advantage of IP Box lies in its difference with other R&D incentivises, 
such as R&D tax credits and direct R&D funding. IP Box affects the ‘output’ side 
of the research conducts – company’s income deriving from IP – while tax credits 
and direct funding affects the ‘input’ side – company’s expenditures related to 
R&D. Hence, IP Boxes incentivise firms to commercialize their IP rather than 
merely conduct research and innovation projects that do not lead to a creation of 
products or services that can be sold. The commercialization of IP positively 
impacts other processes in nation’s economy – usually registered parents are 
further manufactured which leads to an increase in production of high-value 
products, raise in high-wage jobs and other factors that helps shifting national 
economy to a knowledge-based one. Non-commercialized R&D activities do not 
necessarily lead to the same results.  
Further, IP Boxes help to reduce the financial risks that firms incur when they 
want to invest in innovation. Investing in R&D projects is risky since the outcome 
of the research cannot be predicted beforehand. Therefore, R&D and innovation 
                                                 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/barcelona_european 
_council.pdf [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
6 Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Communication from 
the Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BA 
RROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf [cit. 
2014-09-20]. 
7 ANDREWS, DAN – DE SERRES, ALAIN: Intangible Assets, Resource Allocation and 
Growth: A Framework for Analysis, in OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No. 989. 2012.  
8 ATKINSON, ROBERT D.: Effective Corporate Tax Reform in the Global Innovation 
Economy, report by The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 2009. 
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needs government-supported tax incentives more than many other business fields. 
IP Box is a successful tool which encourages firms to undertake investing. R&D 
tax credits and direct funding may have the same advantage, however they 
encourage investing in earlier stages of research while IP Boxes – in later stages 
of research. Therefore, these tax initiatives can successfully co-exist. 
Another advantage is that, being first and foremost a tax incentive, which in 
some countries attains a rather high level of complexity, IP Box impacts not only 
investment in innovation and R&D in the country, but also creates a different 
climate for the operation of R&D and innovation companies and changes country’s 
tax profits both in structure and in size. Therefore, a considerable amount of 
changes take place in country’s economy when it opts for the introduction of IP 
boxes affecting both public and private sector. Together with a favourable 
corporate income tax rates, appropriate climate for the registration of new 
companies and a number of other factors, IP Boxes helps European countries to 
attract foreign companies and their subsidiaries, compete with offshore systems 
and with such knowledge-based economies as China, the USA and Canada, overall 
proving to be noticeable players in the international tax competition. 
The aforementioned advantage, however, shows one of the disadvantages of 
the IP Box, which is that IP Box is only one factor of a series of elements which 
lead to the economic growth and success of a country. When introducing IP Box 
regime, governments must also think of other changes needed in state’s legislation, 
administrative and economic structure, etc., which would make the particular 
country convenient for R&D and other business conducts. 
Another disadvantage lies in the limited application of the IP Box. In most 
countries only income deriving from registered patents is eligible for the reduced 
tax, although including software, business know-how, secret manufacturing 
processes and other forms of IP would be far more beneficial for the overall 
economic success and interests of the society in the country. 
Further, the disadvantage of IP Box regime in EU member states is that it 
would be beneficial for the countries to require that R&D and innovation activities 
which are related to the income that enjoys the reduced tax rate are performed in 
the particular country.9 However, due to the EU principle that requires a free 
movement of goods, services and workforce, it cannot be done. This reduces the 
overall benefits of the IP Box in a single EU member state while not affecting the 
positive effects of IP Boxes on the whole EU and EEA economy. 
Lastly, there is an ongoing debate in the EU Code of Conduct group discussing 
whether IP Boxes constitute state aid, which is prohibited by Article 107 under the 
Treaty on the Function of the EU. While it is unlikely that IP Boxes will be 
regarded as a state aid in the EU, the countries considering to introduce this tax 
regime have to consider the risks this might create. 
 
                                                 
9 ATKINSON, ROBERT D. – ANDES, SCOTT: Patent boxes: innovation in tax policy and tax 
policy for innovation, report by The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 
2011. 
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1.4. Introducing IP Box in Latvia 
This paper focuses on trying to confirm the hypothesis that the introduction of IP 
Box regime in Latvia would increase the investment in R&D and innovation and 
would positively impact other components that pattern the overall economic 
success of the country. 
Latvia aims to reach 1.5% of its GDP large investment in R&D by 2020, as is 
set out in the Guidelines on National Industrial Policy of Latvia 2014-2020.10 Yet 
the indicator in 2012 has only been 0.66%11, thus not reaching even half of this 
aim. As of July 1, 2014 Latvia has introduced R&D tax credit, which is the only 
R&D related tax incentive in the country. While it will take years to observe the 
impact of this tax initiative, the experience of other European countries suggest 
that the new incentive will not be sufficient to help Latvia achieving its goals.  
Additionally, together with relatively low corporate income tax (CIT) rate of 
15%, residence permit initiative and other government supported strategies, the 
introduction of IP Box may positively impact the operation of both local and 
foreign companies in Latvia. These allegations will be analysed in the third Section 
of this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews selected 
existing IP Boxes in Europe, thus allowing to observe different aspects of the tax 
regime that shall be considered when opting for IP Box in Latvia. Section 3 consists 
of the analysis about the possible introduction of IP Box in Latvia and Section 4 is 
constituted of concluding remarks. 
2. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED IP BOXES IN EUROPE 
2.1. Selected countries and introductory remarks 
Malta, The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have been chosen as the three 
EU member states to overview in this section, each selected due to a certain distinct 
feature of each country’s IP Box regime that distinguish it from others. Malta’s IP 
Box tax rate is 0%, The United Kingdom’s IP Box can be regarded as a ‘typical 
Patent Box’, while the IP Box regime in the Netherlands includes a wide range of 
IP thus being considered an ‘Innovation Box’ and having achieved a new level of 
this tax incentive.  
2.2. Malta 
Malta’s IP Box rate of 0% comes of little surprise since the country is generally 
                                                 
10 Nacionālās industriālās politikas pamatnostādnes 2014.-2020. gadam [the Guidelines on 
National Industrial Policy of Latvia 2014-2020], Ministru kabineta 2013. gada 28. jūnija 
rīkojums Nr. 282. 
11 Provisional. Eurostat table on Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en
&pcode=t2020_20&tableSelection=1 [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
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recognized as being a tax haven.12 Malta’s CIT rate is 35%, however the country 
has an imputation system of taxation in place. This means that most of the Maltese 
companies can apply for a tax refund that makes the national CIT rate turn in an 
effective rate of only 5%, which is the lowest CIT rate in the EU.13 Thus, a tax 
exemption for IP, which was introduced in 2010, seems to be yet another Maltese 
incentive to make the country into one of the most attractive tax jurisdictions in 
the world.  
Types of IP that qualify for the tax exemption under IP Box regime include 
patents, as well as copyrights and trademarks associated with the qualifying 
patents. Therefore, software and databases are exempt from CIT in Malta which is 
rarely a case in other countries where IP Box regime has been introduced. The 
main requirement for a patent to qualify for IP Box tax rate is that it shall be a 
product of either a fundamental, industrial or experimental research. However, the 
corresponding R&D associated with the creation of a patent can take place 
anywhere in the world. In addition, the patent can be registered in countries outside 
of Malta as well, provided that it can be patentable under Maltese laws. Further, 
Malta’s IP Box applies also for those patents, copyrights and trademarks which 
were registered before the introduction of the new tax incentive and, in addition, 
companies that have acquired their IP rather than created it themselves, can apply 
for the tax exemption as well. As regards the qualifying income, the provisions of 
Maltese law states that “royalties and similar income” deriving from IP can be 
exempt from CIT, thus allowing companies to apply 0% tax rate to an income 
which is generally interpreted in a rather broad way.14 
2.3. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) opted for the IP Box regime as recently as in April 
2013. The reduced tax rate is 10% which is 11 percentage points less when 
compared to a CIT rate, which is currently set at 21%.15 However, the new tax 
incentive is being introduced gradually in five phases allowing companies to apply 
10% tax rate to only 60% of income deriving from IP in 2013 and then raising this 
percentage by 10% every year up until 2017 when firms will be able to apply the 
reduced tax rate to all income qualifying for the IP Box tax rate. 
The types of IP qualifying for the reduced tax rate are patents that are 
registered in European patent offices, supplementary protection certificates and 
veterinary, medical and plant protection certificates. The UK has chosen a 
“development” and “active ownership” conditions for the companies that tend to 
apply a reduced tax rate for their income deriving from IP, namely, firms must have 
played a certain role in the development of a patent thus acquired IP cannot qualify 
for a 10% tax rate. The UK hopes to incentivise actual R&D and innovation 
                                                 
12 While there is no universal list of tax havens to support this allegation, this claim is not 
only supported by a general belief amongst tax advisers but also by surveys and working 
papers by OECD and other international organisations. 
13 Malta: The IP and R&D jurisdiction. Deloitte Malta. August, 2012. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
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activities with these requirements rather than promote simple buying and selling 
of IP from company to company in order to reduce the tax burden. Although firms 
that can benefit from this tax incentive generally have to be either UK-based or 
UK permanent establishments, the patents can also be owned by non-UK resident 
companies in case if the firm is a member of a group, in which another firm owns 
the patent. Thus, benefits of the UK’s IP Box can be used not only by local, but 
foreign firms as well. In the same way as Malta’s IP Box, the UK’s tax incentive 
is applicable not only to patents registered after the introduction of IP Box, but also 
before 2013. Further, similarly to Malta’s IP Box, the UK’s IP Box regime also 
maintains a broad definition of qualifying income stating that all relevant income 
deriving from IP qualifies for the reduced tax rate. The calculation of the qualifying 
income differs from Maltese one, though, since in the UK IP Box tax rate applies 
to net income, which is calculated using a specific formula which is stated in the 
provisions of national law.16 
2.4. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands introduced its IP Box regime in 2007 when it in many ways 
resembled the UK’s ‘typical Patent Box’ with the reduced tax rate being set at 10% 
and patents being the main type of qualifying IP. However, in 2010 the Netherlands 
decided to further develop the new tax incentive by making it even more attractive 
to R&D and innovation firms. IP Box tax rate was reduced to 5% and new types 
of qualifying income were included thus making the Netherlands IP Box into what 
is now known worldwide as an ‘Innovation Box’. This IP Box rate is one of the 
lowest in the world, in addition being 20 percentage points less than current the 
Netherlands CIT. 
Types of IP qualifying for IP Box tax rate are patents that are registered 
anywhere in the world and IP which has resulted from R&D activities but cannot 
be patentable according to universal standards, for example, software, trade 
secrets, manufacturing processes, scientific models and others. For such 
intellectual property R&D certificate, which is granted by the authorities of the 
Netherlands, must be gained. While both resident and non-resident companies can 
use benefits of the regime, the IP Box is aimed at local firms more than foreign 
since there is a requirement that a Dutch company is responsible for most of R&D 
activities associated with the patent or non-patentable IP. In addition, in case of 
non-patentable IP, at least half of respective R&D activities must be conducted in 
the Netherlands rather than abroad. Thus, the Netherlands has aimed to incentivise 
local R&D and innovation development with the introduction of their IP Box. 
Unlike in Malta and the UK, there is a time limit set for qualifying IP in the 
Netherlands – it must have become a business asset after the end of 2006; IP 
registered before the end of 2006 cannot qualify for the reduced tax rate. Further, 
similar to the case of UK’s IP Box, the net income deriving from IP is taxed at a 
reduced rate of 5%.17  
                                                 
16 Guidance on the Patent Box Regime. Patentise. December, 2012. 
17 European Patent Box Regimes. Japan External Trade Organisation. Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers LLP. April, 2013. 
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2.5. Comparison of selected IP Boxes  
It can be deduced from the descriptions above that while each of the selected 
countries has incorporated certain special features and focus areas into their IP Box 
regimes, all three IP Boxes maintain similar fundamentals.  
First of all, IP Box tax rate is significantly lower than CIT rate in all selected 
countries. Secondly, all of selected IP Boxes focus on IP that is associated with 
R&D activities and innovation rather than IP of any kind. In this respect the UK 
and the Netherlands have additional requirements regarding the location of 
qualifying companies in order to primarily foster local R&D. Thirdly, all three 
countries have a relatively wide definition for the qualifying income and have 
chosen not to put a cap on the amount of income that can benefit from the IP Box 
tax rate thus making this tax incentive accessible for more companies than might 
seem from the first sight.  
However, selected IP Boxes reveal differences as well. Malta has opted for an 
extreme IP Box regime offering a full tax exemption for the qualifying IP, in 
addition not putting any constraints on the location where patents are registered 
and where the respective R&D activities take place. Further, the UK’s IP Box is 
being introduced in phases, has a special formula for a calculation of the qualifying 
income and requires companies to have actively taken part in the creation of 
qualifying IP. Finally, the Netherlands has chosen to include non-patentable IP in 
its tax incentive, focus its IP Box on local firms more than foreign and, unlike 
Malta and the Netherlands, does not qualify all IP regardless of the registration of 
it in the patent office. 
3. INTRODUCING IP BOX IN LATVIA 
3.1. Current taxation and protection of IP 
Currently there is no special taxation of income deriving from IP in Latvia, thus 
the respective income is taxed at a corporate income tax rate, which is 15% for 
both resident and non-resident companies except for companies that qualify for a 
micro-enterprise status. Micro-enterprises (which are firms with a turnover of less 
than 100 000 EUR a year that in addition to this rule have to comply with other 
requirements stated in national law) have to pay a micro-enterprise tax at a rate of 
9% of company’s turnover instead of a CIT. Latvia’s CIT is the third lowest in the 
EU with EU’s average corporate income tax rate being set at 22%.18 The average 
IP Box tax rate in EU countries is 8% with two countries – France and Spain – 
having IP Box rate equal to Latvia’s CIT rate.19 Thus, on EU scale Latvia’s tax 
regime can be regarded as attractive for the income deriving from IP in spite of 
having no special tax incentive for that. 
                                                 
18 Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform. EU’s average CIT was calculated without 
surcharges; in countries where several CIT rates are applied, the most widely applicable 
rate was used in calculation. 
19 EVERS – MILLER – SPENGEL: op. cit. 
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While having no tax incentive for the income deriving from IP, Latvia has an 
initiative regarding R&D expenditures, which essentially is a R&D tax credit in its 
nature. Firms can subtract three times of their investment in R&D activities from 
the income that is liable for a corporate income tax. This initiative came into force 
only as recently as in July 2014 with R&D tax credit being only half of its current 
size before this date. Amendments in the Law on Corporate Income Tax not only 
included raise in R&D tax break but also clarified definitions and scope of R&D 
activities thus showing that Latvian government is increasingly placing focus on 
how to incentivise innovation in the country. 
Patents, trademarks and designs can be registered in the Patent Office of the 
Republic of Latvia and are protected by national laws. These types of IP are 
protected by Law on Patents, Law on Trademarks and Indications of Geographical 
Origin, Law on Designs and several regulations issued by the Cabinet of Ministers. 
In addition to this, IP in Latvia is protected by provisions of international 
conventions that Latvia is a party to. Thus, applicants may file international 
application for the protection of their invention by using the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) system, by filing an application to the European Patent Office (EPO) 
or the Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM), or using other 
international means. Additionally, as an EU member state, Latvia has to conform 
to the general principles of the Union, such as free movement of goods and 
services, and thus has to protect IP registered in other EU member states in the 
same way as nationally registered IP. 
3.2. Current development of R&D and innovation 
According to the Guidelines on National Industrial Policy of Latvia 2014-2020, 
which have been set out by the Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia, 
Latvia’s plan is to support and complement the general objectives of EU, which 
were described in Section 1 of this paper. Latvia intends to increasingly shift its 
economy to knowledge-based one by modernizing its industry and producing 
sophisticated goods and services.20 As was described in Section 1, reaching an 
overall 1.5% large investment of national GDP in R&D and innovation fields by 
2020 would be a positive indicator which would show that Latvia’s economy is 
successfully growing and developing in the planned way.  
However, current indicators of the development of R&D and innovation in 
Latvia are one of the worst in EU. Only three EU member states currently have a 
lower rate of gross domestic expenditure on R&D than Latvia with Latvia’s 
investment in R&D being only 32% of the overall EU indicator.21 Latvia has the 
lowest share of government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D in the EU 
with Latvia’s rate set at only 0.4% while overall EU’s rate having been 1.42% in 
                                                 
20 Nacionālās industriālās politikas pamatnostādnes 2014.-2020. gadam. 
21 Indicator for year 2012. Eurostat table on Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D. 
Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0&languag 
e=en&pcode=t2020_20 [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
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2012.22 Latvia has the second lowest indicator of R&D personnel in the EU not 
reaching even half of the overall EU rate.23 Total researchers in business enterprise 
sector in Latvia constitute only 14% of all researchers in the country thus showing 
that R&D activities take place mainly in government and higher education sectors 
rather than corporate sector. In comparison, the respective indicator in the EU is 
much higher – 37%.24 Thus Latvia is generally unable to compete in R&D and 
innovation fields with not only those EU countries that have introduced IP Box 
regime, R&D tax credits or other R&D related initiatives but also with other EU 
member states regardless of their R&D tax incentives.  
As regards the products of R&D, that is, essentially the creation of intellectual 
property, Latvia ranks 34 out of 143 in the Global Innovation Ranking 2014.25 
Latvia ranked 49 in relation to patent grants, 55 with regard to trademark 
registration and 43 in industrial design registration in 201226, lagging behind 8 out 
of 9 EU countries that have introduced IP Box regime and, in addition to that, also 
most of other EU member states. 
Additionally, there are few other indicators which show negative aspects of 
the development of R&D and innovation in Latvia, for example, only 15 out of 
150 Latvian scientific institutes were acknowledged to be competitive on a 
worldwide basis in a recent assessment conducted by the Ministry of Education 
and Science.27 
However, several indicators show that Latvia has the necessary resources to 
be able to develop its R&D and successfully compete with other EU member 
states. The share of the population aged 30-34 years who have successfully 
completed university or university-like education is higher in Latvia than in the 
EU on average and even exceeds Europe 2020 target28, which means that the 
population of Latvia is highly-educated and thus can offer a suitable workforce for 
innovation related fields. Slowly but steadily Latvia presents itself on the 
                                                 
22 Eurostat table on Share of government budget appropriations or outlays on research and 
development. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plug 
in=1&language=en&pcode=tsc00007 [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
23 Indicator for 2012. Eurostat table on Research and development personnel, by sectors of 
performance. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&pl 
ugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsc00002 [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
24 Indicator for 2011. Eurostat table on Total researchers, by sectors of performance. 
Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plug 
in=1&pcode=tsc00003&language=en [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
25 The Global Innovation Index 2014. Available at: http://www.globalinnovationindex 
.org/content.aspx?page=data-analysis [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
26 WIPO statistical country profiles: Latvia. Available at: http://www.wipo.int/ipstats 
/en/statistics/country_profile/countries/lv.html [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
27 Zinātnisko institūciju novērtējums [Assessment of scientific institutes in Latvia]. 
Available at: http://izm.izm.gov.lv/ZI-novertejums.html [cit. 2014-09-20]. 
28 Indicator for 2013. Eurostat table on Tertiary educational attainment by sex, age group 
30-34. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0& 
language=en&pcode=t2020_41 [cit. 2014-09-20].  
 
151 
 
international scene as a country with rapidly growing business area of information 
technologies (IT) – Latvia has the sixth fastest average Internet connection speed 
in the world29 and its potential in IT has been recognized by global technology 
services, banks and consultant companies which set up their outsourcing centres 
in the country. 
3.3. Advantages arising from introduction of IP Box regime and other 
considerations 
It can be deduced from descriptions in the two subsections above that Latvia has a 
pressing need regarding the introduction of new government-supported strategies 
that would increase R&D activities, investment in R&D and innovation, raise the 
number of registered IP and provide solution to other aforementioned issues. While 
the introduction of IP Box regime is not the only possible strategy to undertake in 
order to solve these problems, the described ratios and indicators show that it is 
unlikely that a simpler and narrower incentive would be sufficient in Latvia’s case. 
Although the advantages of IP Boxes were already discussed in Section 1, it is 
important to emphasize in the case of Latvia that this special tax incentive not only 
has direct but also indirect effects which can positively impact economic and social 
components of the country. The key feature of IP Box incentive is that it is focused 
on commercialization of IP and increase in income deriving from it. Thus, the 
introduction of IP Box can, as an example, make Latvia’s country image more 
attractive, increase regulatory quality, incentivise formation of subsidiaries and 
branches of foreign companies in Latvia, spur manufacturing of products which 
have been registered as patents through regime, etc.  
Thus, even though Latvia’s CIT rate is one of the most competitive ones in 
the EU, Latvia remains to be amongst the countries with high shadow economies. 
In the World Bank’s report Latvia was listed as 53rd smallest shadow economy 
amongst 120 economies in the world between 1999 and 2007, thus indicating that 
it has one of the highest shadow economies amongst EU member states.30 
Therefore, one can create such a model: even if Latvia chose to introduce an IP 
Box with a relatively high tax rate when compared to its CIT rate, for example, 
half of the current CIT rate, that is, 7.5%, then Latvia’s IP Box rate would be the 
sixth lowest amongst EU IP Box rates (see Figure 1 below). Hence, one can predict 
that such tax regime would incentivise compliance with tax regulations on a local 
level and would attract foreign investment from other EU member states. 
                                                 
29 Akamai’s State of the Internet. Q1 2014 Report. Volume 7, number 1. Available at: 
http://www.akamai.com/dl/akamai/akamai-soti-q114.pdf?WT.mc_id=soti_Q114 [cit. 
2014-09-20]. 
30 SCHNEIDER, FRIEDRICH – BUEHN, ANDREAS – MONTENEGRO, CLAUDIO E.: Shadow 
Economies All over the World. New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007, in 
Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5356. (2010). 
 
152 
 
 
Figure 1: IP Box rates in EU countries. Latvia does not have an IP Box regime 
and is included in the graph for comparative purposes.31  
Further, the introduction of IP Boxes would require changes in legislation. 
While at first this might seem like a burden to businesses since they would have to 
comply with new provisions of law, it could be a great possibility for Latvia to 
increase its regulatory quality and enforcement of the rule of law. It would be an 
opportunity to clarify the regulatory framework regarding R&D and innovation 
and, in addition to this, also related fields, for example, ones regulated by the 
Commercial Law, Law on the Micro-enterprise Tax, Law on the Corporate Income 
Tax and others since the tax system would change. Regulatory quality and 
enforcement of the rule of law have long been known as important factors which 
companies consider when choosing a certain business action or overall strategy. 
Figure 2 (see below) shows that all EU member states that have IP Box regime, 
except for Hungary, have higher Worldwide Governance Scores in both of these 
areas than Latvia. Thus, if Latvia opted for an IP Box and, in addition, managed to 
raise firms’ beliefs in Latvia as a country with a clear and trustable system of legal 
enactments, companies would be incentivised to undertake investment in R&D 
that they would not have had undertaken without the new regulations.  
                                                 
31 Source: EVERS – MILLER – SPENGEL: op. cit. 
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Figure 2: Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law Governance Score in EU 
countries with IP Boxes (in the range -2.5 to 2.5; data for year 2012). Latvia does 
not have an IP Box regime and is included in the graph for comparative purposes. 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators.32  
However, it must be noted that the scope of this paper and available statistical 
data does not allow to unambiguously state that the introduction of IP Box in Latvia 
would be advantageous and lead to positive effects described in this paper. IP 
Boxes are too new of an incentive to give enough statistical data which would 
either prove or reject the hypothesis that it raises investment in R&D and is a more 
effective incentive than R&D tax credits, direct funding or others. Additionally, 
the quantitative considerations regarding possible correlation with other positive 
effects on Latvia’s economy arising from the introduction of IP Box regime 
maintain certain ambiguities as well. Nevertheless, none of the EU countries that 
have introduced the IP Box regime in the recent years has opted for a termination 
of it or publicly called it an unsuccessful tax incentive, therefore it remains to be a 
tax initiative to consider also for Latvia.  
4. CONCLUSION 
IP Box is a relatively new tax incentive which offers a reduced tax rate for IP 
income or a partial exemption of tax for the income which is generated from IP 
and is aimed at incentivising investment in R&D and innovation. Currently eleven 
countries in Europe have introduced this special tax regime with the reduced tax 
rates ranging from 0 to 15%, thus in most of the countries being set at significantly 
                                                 
32 Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports [cit. 2014-
09-20]. 
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lower rates than national CITs. Unlike other R&D and innovation related 
incentives, IP Boxes are targeted at the income rather than expenses thus 
incentivising commercialization of IP, which is the driver for economic growth and 
success since it positively impacts employment and manufacturing of high-value 
products. 
In most of EU member states, the application of IP Box tax rate is limited to 
patents, however some countries offer this tax incentive to trademarks, designs and 
non-patentable IP as well. Some countries, such as the Netherlands and the UK, 
have put constraints on the location of companies that can apply for the reduced 
tax rate in order to incentivise local R&D. However, this can only been done to the 
extent that does not violate the principles of free movement of goods, services and 
competition in the EU.  
The introduction of IP Box in Latvia would be beneficial since all R&D 
related indicators in Latvia are on average much lower than in the EU. Latvia aims 
to reach investment in R&D in the amount of 1.5% of national GDP by 2020, 
however the only nation-wide initiative related to innovation has been R&D tax 
credit, which was introduced only this year. Thus Latvian government has to take 
a rapid action in order to achieve its own plans. It is very likely that the introduction 
of IP Box in Latvia would positively impact national economy by attracting foreign 
investment, raising belief in a fair tax system and regulatory quality, creating new 
R&D related workplaces and developing knowledge-based manufacturing. 
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Abstract 
This paper shows the historical envrionment, the results and the problems of the defense 
aspect of the european integration. The author points out, that the defense integration is 
difficult not only on the field of capabilites, but on the area of armament and researches 
too. The study aims to draw attention to the fact, that the further strengthening of the 
european integration and the future of European Union are significantly based on the 
question of defense integration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The fact that the weakest and most critical point, defense- and security politics of 
the European integration is essencial for world power cues, furthermore the 
development of joint defense- and security is a long known matter. However it is 
worth to reflect on this matter from an unusual aspect, namely how do the issues 
of the more advanced economical integration appear on the horizon of defense- 
and security politics.1 If this sector means a serious challenge in the foregoer 
                                                 
*2nd Lieutenat, Ministry of Defence Legal Department Codification Section.  
The study exclusively presents the writer’s point of view; those cannot be regarded as 
standpoints of the institution where the writer is employed. 
The writer’s research was conducted among the frames of the National Program of 
Excellence – a convergence program, an important project for developing and operating a 
system that ensures personal support for national students and researchers; identification 
nr. TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/2-11/1-2012-0001. The project is being realized with the support of 
the European Union, with the European Social Fund’s co-financing. 
1 Next to the political references it would be reasonable to analyze the aquisitional, 
armaments industrial and logistical reality in another study. About the changes of this and 
it 21st century questions see: VARGA, LÁSZLÓ – TURCSÁNYI, KÁROLY: A brit védelmi 
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economical integraiton, then consequences can be drawn about the political 
integration, broader in point of the EU's defense matters and it's whole future. 
This domain induces actual and critical questions for years, that is amplified 
by every characteristic of the postjaltan internation environment, together with the 
economical world-wide crisis and the effects and processes generated by it, which 
is their own duality point at the invigoration of the state's role once again, as much 
as they create an opportunity to the political integration's recruitment. 
2. THE PANORAMA OF TWO AND A HALF DECADES: POSTJALTAN 
ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD CRISIS 
„Nowadays to say that we live in a transition between an old, dying and a new, 
unborn world order counts as a cliche”2 still this is the reality. The previous world 
order, in other words the so called jaltan world order ended, as most of its essential 
criteras disappeard. This of course has different effect in regerd to geopolitical and 
world power matters and has different effects on economical and research 
segments. However the differences are important between these diverse effects and 
domains, sithence after the end of the jaltan order the world economy, as a world 
order without the barrier of bipolar superpowers – but with still present partially 
nation-state limits – could become whole and create a very complex global 
network. To revise the events of the last period from the viewpoint of the study's 
subject, it is imperative to look at the changes on the world order's level which 
acted significantly in point of the economical order too.  
„The jaltan setting was unparalled in history. This world order wasn't created 
by a single empire's hegemony or generated by states of broadly equal in power 
size multi-actor balance sport, instead it was established by the agreement of two 
nations that were militarily far more powerful than the others. Their direct impact, 
or rather influence expanded to the whole world not only figuratively but 
literally.”3 Therefore what ended is a global order that was based on the military, 
troubled on the surface but based on an unspoken agreement, built on an arms race 
                                                 
beszerzések reformja [The reform of british defense procurement], 2003, Zrínyi Miklós 
Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem Egyetemi Kiadó, Budapest. VARGA, LÁSZLÓ – TURCSÁNYI, 
KÁROLY: Az amerikai védelmi beszerzések reformja [The reform of american defense 
procurement], 2003, Zrínyi Miklós Egyetem Egyetemi Kiadó, Budapest. TURCSÁNYI, 
KÁROLY – HEGEDŰS, ERNŐ: A nagy távolságú (stratégiai) légi szállítás perspektivikus 
kérdései I. rész [The perspectival questions of long-range (strategic) airlifting, Part I], in 
Katonai Logisztika, Vol. 20. No. 4. (2012), 65-97.; TURCSÁNYI, KÁROLY – HEGEDŰS, 
ERNŐ: A nagy távolságú (stratégiai) légi szállítás perspektivikus kérdései II. rész [The 
perspectival questions of long-range (strategic) airlifting, Part II], in Katonai Logisztika, 
Vol. 20. No. 1. (2013), 62-87. 
2 MEZŐ, FERENC: A geopolitika formaváltozásai [The formchanging of geopolitics], in 
Politikatudományi Szemle, Vol. 15. No. 4. (2006), 75. 
3 GALLÓ, BÉLA: A túlélés tudománya [The science of surviving], 2000, Helikon kiadó, 
Budapest, 7. 
  
158 
 
and antagonistical opposition, which expanded to the whole world, notedly to 
given spheres of interest that gave mandate to act on their border. In my opinion 
this international power structure, in other word this world order was the first truly 
global world order in the history of humanity, which could own the real 
completeness of globality.4 Consequently this world order was historically unique, 
and it is a fact that it ended, it is not clarified until this day that what kind of order 
comes after the transition or interregnum it left behind. It is questionable too that 
the forming new system will be able to own the characteristics essential to the 
wholeness of global world order similar to the jaltan. 
The issue of the jaltan heritage may work out any way soever, it is sure that 
„a new, world order is forming that is very different from the jaltan. And if we 
don't close our eyes before the North Atlantic events […] we have to discover that 
on global levels the North-South […] conflict becomes more and more 
determinative. […] But it is at least this evident the fact that with the disappearance 
of the great enemy […] the weak point of the victors became increasingly 
obvious.”5 
It is a sad historical fact that the world haven't become more peaceful, 
predictable and more conflict-free with the break-up of the eastern block. The 
similarly important realization follows from it, that fundamental transformations 
take place in the circumstances that supporting the approaches until now, 
accordingly it is partially really true, „that it is typical to this new era that the power 
spreads over from the states to new actors”6 In point of the changes it has proven 
true that there is not reason to exaggerations and euphoria. It is true the same way 
to the democracy's and liberal-capitalism's triumph as in point of the non-statal 
actors. The topic of this study levels to that domain in which the state's importance 
is still exclusive, and the so called revolutionary or at least historical postjaltan 
changes appear to be relative and partial. 
It is proven true until today that several states' cooperative action is needed to 
hold the global peace and security on a relative level, as the fact too that the 
rivalism between the world powers is still exists, in which the United States of 
America is hegemon but not peak hegemon, since the thesis according to which 
the „USA transformed only in a century (…) into a power that can enforce its will 
anywhere on the world and its influence reaches anywhere in the world, first in the 
history.”7 
                                                 
4 The previous „world orders” were only orders of continents, or world orders without the 
technical, economical and militry completeness, which existed only in the foregorund of 
the decisive hegemon sample in longer-shorther historical periods. I consider like this the 
age of Roman Empire, the perios of German-Roman Empire's strneght, and the Dutch- and 
then the English navaly hegemony. 
5 GALLÓ (2000): op. cit. 8. 
6 ZAKARIA, FAREED: A posztamerikai világ [The postameican world], 2009, Gondolat 
kiadó, Budapest, 33. 
7 BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW: A nagy sakktábla [The great chesstable], 1999, Európa kiadó, 
Budapest, 9. 
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With Zakaria Fareed's ideas placed in a somewhat different environment, we 
could say that the world called postamerican by him is „not about the fall of 
America, but about the rise of the others”,8 as Russia looks to be rising again, China 
may have began an unstoppable upswing, and next to all these, because of the EU's 
economical invigoration, the first steps were on the way to the power-political 
independence. If next to these peak actors we draw up the South American 
integration efforts or India's rising weight, then it is distinct that we live in a 
difficultly forecastable, and diffuse relation rich transient period. This multi-
stakeholder aspect was made more complex and fearsome by the events of 11 
september and the terrorist attacks followed by it, furthermore by the different 
modern security threats. As primarily we can say because of the international 
terrorism's attacks and their aftermath in Afghanistan and Iraq that „...the United 
States of America is in difficult situation, its myth of invulnerability shattered and 
its government undertook impractical tasks alone”9 
The undertakeing of impractical taks brought a wide range of crises with 
itself. On the one part „Washington's intervention in Iraq caused a crisis in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Germany and France disapproved of the one-sided american 
move..”10 On the other part the war against terrorism and its security action made 
a serious chip on the constitutionality's requirements of predominancy. Thirdly this 
challenge pointed out again the importance of states' defense nature and the weight 
of the defense sector. Furthermore this kind of „crusade” somewhat divided the 
attention and on the level of common frame of mind the realisation of the 
economical world crisis became much more sudden too, which opened the way to 
the strenghtening of another field of statal intervention. 
Accordingly the last ten years brough serious and remarkable changes on the 
field of the world politics and then to the world economy too, what together means 
a great challenge and numerous oppurtunities in the same time11 for the european 
integration. The sum of oppurtunities reside in that, the legal and political 
integration shows a resolution for the tasks that burden – in some cases exceed – 
the nationstates in themselves. Several effective precedents appear for this in 
                                                 
8 ZAKARIA: op. cit. 31. 
9 DEÁK, PÉTER: Biztonságpolitika a hétköznapokban [Securitypolicies in the weekdays], 
2009, Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest, 38. 
10 NAGY, LÁSZLÓ – RÁCZ, LAJOS: Nemzetközi erőközpontok a 21. század elején 
[International power centers in the beginning of the 21st century], in Hadtudomány, Vol. 
18. No. 1. (2008), 75. 
11 Several analist of the European Union explained this:, see: „…the financial crysis is a 
risk and an opportunity in the same time for the European defense sector. On the one hand 
it looks reasonable the the decreasing budgets increase the cooprationg pressure for the 
member-states, and this way they solve the EU's problems regarding the defense industry 
and the trade development and structural conversion. On the other hand in spite of decade 
long speeches and initiations for more cooperation and less national interest, to the 
European Union's defense issues the national privilege is characteristical.” – Direcorate 
General for External Policies, Policy Department: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on 
Eurpean Defence, 2011, SEDE, 14. 
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respect to research and economy. In the research field great steps were made 
towards the unifiacation of the intellectual property's law. „The law of intellectual 
property is one of the most widely, even internationally harmonized law area, this 
harmonization looks back to more than a hundred years history „,12 and the 
experience it generated was used to ensure the harmonization on the Union's level 
for the research and developement. More intensive and dynamic changes can be 
revealed among the political integration's economically determined changes in 
regard to the money-markets' union control, as the world economical crisis 
generated by the credit crunch acted with such force on this filed, that opened the 
way for efficient changes for the union level.13 
However next to the opportunities numerous challenges line up, these reside 
in that, it has to form actual abilities, next to the existing or the planned ones in 
numerous areas for the political aims and institutional frames to deepen the 
political integration. This is especially true in point of defense, it follows from this, 
that to the armaments industry and defense research and development too. The 
defense sector appears to be quite difficult area in this aspect, what on one hand 
can be justified by it's special political relations, on the other hand by it's special 
status in economy's order. 
In its essence the extant – and the altering – power structure appears to be 
difficultly understandable, or at least hardly analysable and forecastable, as it were: 
„The international world of the early XXI. century, the increasing number of 
actors, the world disarrangement and world disorder offers even complex 
orientation alternatives than ever before.”14 
Compared to this the economical environment is prima facie more easily 
understandable insomuch that the world ecomony as world order with the 
decomposition of the bipolar could expand and become global without changing 
the political field and without political barriers.15 As Wallerstein said: „The modern 
world order is world economical order – as much today as always in its history. 
                                                 
12 KESERŰ, BARNA ARNOLD: Adalékok a védjegyátruházás jogi megítéléséhez, I. rész, 
[Contributions to the legal judgement of trade mark assignment, Part I.], in Iparjogvédelmi 
és Szerzői Jogi Szemle, Vol. 7. No. 5. (2012), 17. 
13 See KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS: Toward the European Federation?: Reform processes in financial 
stability system of the European Union, especially to the early concept of European 
Bankunion, in US-China Law Review, Vol. 10. No. 1. (2013), 46-67; KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS: In 
the Name of the Integration – The Reform of the Financial Supervisory System of the 
European Union, in International Relations Quarterly, Vol. 5. No. 2. (Summer 2014). 
Available at: http://www.southeast-europe.org/pdf/18 /dke_18_a_eu_Kalman-Janos_The-
Reform%20of-Financial-Supervisory-System-of-the-European-Union.pdf [cit. 2012-10-
04]. 
14 GALLÓ, BÉLA: Az újkapitalizmus régi világa [The old world of newcapitalism], 2010, 
Napvilág kiadó, Budapest, 14. 
15 „In the last part of the 20th century the unity of worldcapitalism was restored and the 
capitalis became a whole systeam again.” SIMAI, MIHÁLY: A világgazdaság a XXI. század 
forgatagában [The worldeconomy in the vortex of 21st century], 2008, Akadémiai kiadó, 
Budapest, 26. 
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[…] One of the determinative attribute of the world economical orders is that, they 
are not bracketed by some kind of unified political structure. Instead of this, 
numerous political orders exist next to each other in the world economical order, 
which are connected by the net of loose interstate connections in our modern world 
structure.”16 
The global economical relations are moved by the clear economical interests 
in the centrum-halfperiphery-periphery relations system, and like this the 
economical connections and the research and development can cover the whole 
world like a network. This image is absolutely true only on the first approach, as 
the armaments industry and the defense research and development is that is 
attached to the states primarily and decisively builds on given states' order and 
claim, or at least well capturable national sphere of interest.17  
Naturally the economical crisis affected the defense sector daintly too, as it 
amplified the states' existing tendencies, which bring forth the reduction of defense 
budget at any time. From Europe's point of view this is a double-edged 
phenomenon, as few of the EU states can be viewed as militarly weighty and the 
extant situation has additional negative effects on the not certainly satisfactory 
abilities, meanwhile the EU couldn't relieve the states even on a short term, even 
if they devoted themselves to this level of political integration to the pressure of 
the crisis. The most notable effect of the crisis' pressure would be the actual 
decision and the beginning of slow contruction. Th national fixity of the armaments 
industry appears much harder in respect to the EU, as the more developed states 
concerned by this market have a strong interest in keeping and strengthening their 
own armaments industry. Considering this market the EU has to do some basic 
unionisation steps, except the investment politics needed for occurrent unification. 
I could word the latter after all, that in pont of the armaments indunstry and this 
market's research and developent the EU should act qu. as astate. In respect ot the 
armaments industry it looks like the usual integration routine with instituion-
building, and waiting for the right political moment. It is needed on this field to 
enchance the political integration, to build up the truly effective institutional 
background and to gently form the economical backgrount and the investment 
palette to reach slow but real successes, which could establish the developement 
of real union defence capabilities on the field of armaments industry. 
3. EU EFFORTS IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR 
„On 17 May 2004 the European Union's Council approved the 2010 Headline 
                                                 
16 WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL: Bevezetés a világrendszer-elméletbe [Introduction to World-
system analysis], 2010, L’Harmattan, Budapest, 57. 
17 To clarify, the main orderer of the american defense industrial companies is the United 
States of America, so they set their action and development profile for the insterests of the 
USA, because next to the orders of the States they count on the most immmediate allies 
and significant national dotation. 
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Goal, which reflects the objectives of the European Security Strategy and 
higlitedly emphasizes the qualitative improvement of capabilitiesand the quick 
reaction ability.”18 On 12 of July in the same year „the Council decided next to a 
joint action to create the European Defence Agency”19, then at the end of 
November they decided about the creation of EU combat teams and finally as the 
ending of the year 2004 „the EU's military mission stared in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) as the continuation of SFOR activity”20 
Sadly we have to say that after 2004 the Union had to face serious dilemmas 
– on this field too –, and the idea of division between the more and less developed 
areas emerged along with the thesis of the defence integration's core principled 
fortification. To the latter the European Security and Denfece Union's Belgian, 
French, Luxembourgish and German conception was the example, wich prevised 
an increased defence integration, in wich not all EU states would be necessarily 
partner. On the one hand this clustering would have redefined the Petersberg tasks21 
and the requirements and roles connected with its assumption, on the other hand it 
would have acutely increase the defence chatacter as if it were a „hard core” inside 
the EU. This two-speed plan, that can be related to the European conception, was 
only one of the clouded ideas after 2004. 
Hovewer after 2004 the European Security and Defence instituion extended 
almost constantly both in agency and in qualification (see the European Security 
and Defence Academy ), in some measure by the fulfilment of the constitutional 
procedure's partial results, and underkaen missons were ongoing too, the Joint 
Security and Defence Poilicy (henceforth: JSDP) got in the shadows of the 
hardnesses of mass enlargement, but even more in the shadows of the international 
events. It is true that the Italian presidentship accepted the European Security 
Strategy, which can be interpreted as additional big landmark, as well as serious 
decisions were made against organized crime and terrorism, and the protection of 
the borders, still the Iraqi war and with it the depraved transatlantic were what 
became decisive. 
Certainly this overshadowed state, that was replaced by the economical crisis 
                                                 
18 European Security and Defence Policy 1999-2009, ESDP Newsletter Special Issue 
2009., available: http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/esdp-newsletter-
special-issue-esdp10/ [cit. 2011-08-24]. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 These arrangement were expanded by the Petersberg declaration in 1992, which stated 
by law the frames of the european defense and security organisation, and it adverted these 
functions to the WEU's sphere of action: (1) peacekeeping, (2) humanitarian actions, (3) 
rescue actions, (4) crysis-mangement, (5) security roles regarding conflict prevention. 
The Petersberg head stated that the WEU is authorized to partially requisite the NATO 
forces disposed by the member-states, and the development of required military abilities 
has to be started immediately, the creatio nand realization of „’the forces offered to 
cooperation with’ program', in which the member-states can command forces to particular 
tasks, and missons. See BABOS, TIBOR: Az európai biztonság öt központi pillére [The five 
central pillar of european security], 2007, Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest, 116-117. 
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in 2008 and lately by the answers given to it, does not mean the break of 
developement. It can be valued as a positive sign that „the European Defence 
Agency was created by the joint action of the Council of Ministers with the purpose 
to (1) improve the defence capabilities, especially the crisis management of the 
EU; (2) move fordward the armament collaboration of the Union; (3) establish the 
EU's defence industrial and technological foundations and to create a competitive 
European defence equipment market; (4) support the research to establish Europe's 
defence industrial and technological potential.”22 
Moreover it is important to state, that the JSDP wich gives the independent 
pillar, the body of common foreign and internal politics, operated and bloomed on 
a missional level, as „in 2005 the EU took over the command of the stabilisation 
forces stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These were followed later by short term 
missions in Africa, Asia and in the Middle East. In the May of 2007 the EU started 
a police mission for 3 years in Afghanistan, and it stationed a militry force with 
more than three thousand men in borderland of Chad and Middle-Africa at the 
beginning of 2008 to provide protection for the refugees who had to abandon their 
homeland because of the battles in the neighbouring Darfur region. The Union 
carried out a naval misson for the first time in 2008. The goal of the misson was to 
provide protection from the pirates for the ships delivering food aid to the 
country.”23 These and especially the naval missions were followed by others.24 and 
are followed by until today, for which the most essential organisational 
developmenents slowly come to fruition expanded by the effort to harmoize the 
european armaments industry products and the market. 
Besides the always returning criticism is well known in point of the JSDP, that 
the – political – organizational structure was given and readied before Lisboa, 
partial results pre-existed, but in military manner first the 2003 offering and then 
the setting of offering for 2010, was that did not live up to the expectations from 
the point of view of function and operability. The critics lay it down again and 
again, that the EU repeats its own failures again and again when it creates the 
institutional and organiztaional settings, but forgets to assign the tasks and 
executive capacity, or creates it faultly.25 
                                                 
22 Európai Védelmi Ügynökség, available: http://europa.eu/agencies/security_agencies 
/eda/index_hu.htm [cit. 2011-05-10]. 
23 Közös Kül- és Biztonságpolitika, available: http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_hu.htm [cit. 
2011-05-10]. 
24 See TARDY, THIERRY: EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping: a promising relationship in 
a constrained environment, in ORTEGA, MARTIN (ed.): The European Union and the United 
Nations, 2005, Partners in Effective Multilateralism, Chaillot Paper No. 78.; GAZDAG, 
FERENC: Az Európai Unió közös kül- és biztonságpolitikája [The Common Foreign- and 
Security Policies of the European Union], 2000, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest; VAN HEGELSOM, 
GERT-JAN: External action of the European Union, in Collegium, No. 34, (2006); BABOS, 
TIBOR: Az európai biztonság öt központi pillére [The five central pillar of european 
security], 2007, Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest. 
25 See GÁLIK, ZOLTÁN: A közös európai kül- és biztonságpolitika történelmi tapasztalatai 
és a Lisszaboni Szerződés [The historical experience of the european common foreing- and 
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In accordance with some observations in point of the suggested and real flaws 
– accordint to my standpoint it is relevant – the Lisbon Treaty could not make a 
beaktrough on the field of JSDP, although it is uquestionable, that it brought 
revolutionary changes in point of the Common Domestic and Foreign Policy 
(henceforth: CDFP) with the new organizational, agency and importance rating, 
and with the termination of the pillar system and CDFP’S integration into politics. 
On the whole I think that despite the succesful reforms26 on the field of foreign 
policy, Lisbon made only technical changes in point of JSDP and made only 
declarative messages to the future. 
After all we have to highlight the European Defense Agency as an 
accomplishment in the negative characterization, which is the most important 
among the agencies falling under the head of the JSDP. The main taks of the agency 
created by the joint countenance on 12 july 2014 and which is seated in brussels is 
to „support the endeveaors of the states and the council made to improve the 
european defense capabilities and the decisions made on the field of crisis 
management, and the maintenance of the european security and defense policy's 
current form and it's developement in the future.”27 The joint decision was changed 
to a regulation on 12 july 2011, thus indicated by the leaders of the EU the intention 
to support and consolidate the Agency. It was decisive in the creation of the agency 
that the members of the Union „conventionally spend less on defense expenses and 
research and developement on the field of armaments industry. The high level of 
fragmentation makes the efficiency improvemets of the European armaments 
industry much more difficult. The aim of the agency’s creation was to improve and 
synchronize the development of states’ defense capabilities, the promotion of 
military preparations, to keep an eye on the industrial and technological defense 
                                                 
secutiry policies and the Treaty of Lisbon], in Grotius, available at: 
http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/MVVYUP/73%20galik%20zoltan.pdf [cit. 2010-05-08]. 
26 See GÖMBÖS, CSILLA: Két év távlatából: Az Európai Külügyi Szolgálat [After two years: 
The European Foreing Service], in KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS (ed.): Quot capita, tot sententiae, a 
Batthyány Lajos Szakkollégium Tanulmánykötete II. [Quot capita tot sententiae, Studies of 
Batthyány Lajos College II.], 2013, Batthyány Lajos Szakkollégium, Győr; GÖMBÖS, 
CSILLA: Egység az átláthatatlanságban? [Unity in opacity?], in FARKAS, ÁDÁM – NÉMETH, 
IMRE – KONCZOSNÉ SZOMBATHELYI, MÁRTA – SZABADOS, ESZTER (ed.): Optimi Nostri, 
Díjnyertes Állam- és Jogtudományi Diákköri Dolgozatok 2013 [Optimi Nostri, Award-
winning student circle papers from Law and Political Sciences 2013.], 2013, Universitas-
Győr Nonprofit Kft., Győr; KISS, J. LÁSZLÓ: Európai Külügyi Szolgálat, avagy lehet-e 
global payerből global player? [European Foreign Service, could become a global payer 
to a global player], in Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Tanulmányok, No. 1. (2011); BROK, ELMAR: 
Prejudices, Challenges and Potential: an Impartial Analysis of the European External 
Action Service, available at: http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/questions_europe/qe-199-
en.pdf [cit. 2012-10-04]; GRAHAM, AVERY: The EU’s External Action Service: new actor 
on the scene, available at: http://www.epc.eu/docu ments/uploads/pub_1223_the_euro 
pean_external_action_service__new_actor_on_the_scene.pdf [cit. 2012-10-04]. 
27 Missions and functions, available at: http://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/whatwedo/ 
missionandfunctions [cit. 2011-09-02]. 
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market of Europe, as well as on the support of research and developement of the 
armaments industry.”28 The angency becomes decisive with this, as it coordinates 
between armaments indusrty’s companies, as well as it does among the member-
states who appear on the market as customers, and completes this with providing 
information for the memeber-states and performing advisory and expert tasks. This 
intgrated approach contributes to the unified improvement of capabilities, where 
supply and demand will connect optimmally to save time and expense. Hovewer 
beyond the cooperation the agency’s operation and approach gives a change to 
reshape the industrial sturcture and to form a continental armaments industrial 
market.29 
Since the establishment of the agency – thanks to the agency itself too – 
different regulational and declarative steps were made, which pointed toward the 
unfication, although with the „overpondered advance” peculiar to political 
integration. From these we could firstly emphasize the Green Book of Public 
Purchase of National Defense30 fo 2004 based on „Towards a European Union 
Defence Equipment Policy”31 titled Communication from the Commission of 
2003, which points out that it wishes to contribute to the the gradual development 
of „European Defence Equipment Market” (EDEM), which is the creation of a 
more transparent and relatively more open market between the member-states, 
which – with respecting the characteristics of the economical sector – would 
improve it’s economical effectiveness. The progress towards the Europe sized 
market has key role in the improvement of European economical sectors’ 
competitiveness, in providing better distribution of national defense connected 
funds and in the cause of supporting the Unions military capacity developement, 
in the scope of the Joint Security and Defense Policy (JSDP)”32 
The Green Book pointed out in the same time the characteristics that lie in the 
armaments industry, and to the fact that the unification is essential to this market 
too, so much to the whole economical integration as in regard to the strenghtening 
of the political integration’s real capability development. This effort – which was 
indicated by the GreenBook’s statements – was followed by actual decisions. from 
these „A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence 
industry”,33 that was accepted by the member-states, and the „The Code of Best 
                                                 
28 KENDE, TAMÁS – SZŰCS, TAMÁS (ed.): Bevezetés az Európai Unió Politikáiba 
[Introduction to policies of European Union], 2009., Osiris kiadó , Budapest, 764. 
29 Missions and functions, available at: http://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/whatwedo/ 
missionandfunctions [cit. 2011-09-02]. 
30 COM(2004) 608, Zöld Könyv – A honvédelem közbeszerzése [Green Paper – Defence 
procurement], Brüsszel. 
31 COM(2003) 113, Communication from the Commission of 11 March 2003: Towards a 
European Union Defence Equipment Policy. 
32 COM(2004) 608, 3. 
33 The Code of Conduct on defence procurement of the EU Member States participating in 
the European Defence Agency. Brussels, 21 November 2005.  
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Practice in the Supply Chain”34 of 2006 has to be highlited. These policies, that 
were accepted by the member-states, were pointing toward the union of the 
purchase side, of course these can’t be called breakthroughs because of the political 
bargain processes, particularly not if we take into account that these were followed 
by the specification of the „Treaty in the field of defence procurement”35 in 2006, 
which again pointed out the characetristics of the defense industry and reinforced 
the political obstacles that hindered the creation of the Europen defense market. 
The exception specification was reasonlike, yet from the integration’s point 
of view it was still valued as step back, and its weight was felt by the Union’s 
decision makers too. Because of this in 2007 they released a strategical 
communication with the tilte of „A strategy for a stronger and more competitive 
European defence industry”,36 in which they schedule the conditions and tasks of 
the unification of the european defense industry. This strategy – which was created 
only in the form of a communication – did not complete – not even partially – until 
today. After this the defense market’s relations were mainly affected by the 
decisions in connection with the security strategy, like the decision concerning 
weapon commerce, which neither can be called particular successes.  
So the passed time shows, as if the forming of unified European defence 
market stopped, and this establishes assumptions in connection with the creation 
of the unified European defense capabilities, namely with the political integration’s 
further strengthening. From the point of view of the integration these negative 
assumptions can not be neutralized by the mission activities, nor the institutional 
changes experienced on the field of foreign service, especially not because the 
numers concerning the defense market show fragmentation rather than integration. 
On the one hand we can tell, that the Union’s armaments industry is almost 
90% concentrated in the six most powerful industrial memeber-states, namely in 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. On the other hand 
however we can see that in the region there are more than 2000 companies and 
more than 80 000 suppliers are registered. Next to the more significant industrial 
states, it is typical to the smaller states that they give home for numerous 
armaments industrial companies. The fragmentation is well shown by that, from 
the worlds 20 leading armaments indurtial companies there is only 5 european, 
while from the 100 biggest firms approximately 33. This question's highlighted 
economical significance is well pointed out by the fact that there are more than 
700 000 people in Europe who work for purely armamtents industrial companies, 
                                                 
34 The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, Approved by the Aerospace and Defence 
Industries Association of Europe (ASD) on 27 April 2006 and agreed by the EU Member 
States participating in the European Defence Agency. 
35 COM(2006) 779, Commission interpretative communication of 7 December 2006 on the 
application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement. 
36 COM(2007) 764, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
of 5 December 2007 – A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence 
industry. 
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while there are more than one and a half million people working for suppliers. Next 
to these numbers, it is worth to think about the income of the industry, which 
immediately shows why are some states so attached to maintaining national control 
and try to slow the unification.37  
Probably by recognizing this too the Union’s leaders decided that after their 
last successful expressly security and defense politics themed conferecnce in 
200838 they sit down to the conference table for the sake of the JSDP’s 
improvement on 19-20 December 2013. According to expert analisyses this 
discussion did not bring a breakthrough again. As Tamas Csiki writes: „In the light 
of all this we can tell, that the significance of the 19-20 December summit meeting 
was mainly procedural and communicational, because it draw the European 
decision makers’ and somewhat the public opinion’s attention to joint security and 
defense policy again. In the particulat problematic areas partial successes were 
born, which could help the continuation of already started processes and the 
fulfilment of programs, but it wasn’t a breakthrough – and it can’t be expected, 
until the necessary political will does not appear from the member-state’s part.”39 
4. SUMMARY AND PROPOSITION 
The future of the political integration and with it the European Union depends 
mainly on the unification of the defense sector, and then on the Union’s joint 
defense capabilites created by the support of common defense industry. The 
harmonization of this field in fact belongs to the classical question of suverenity, 
since in one respect the states should have to – at least partially – give up the 
national control over the defense market, and after that they should support such a 
unified European defense investment policy, that could carry out an integrated 
market- and capability development. For this firstly it is necessary to create the 
appropriate regulation environment, secondly the budget frame for the 
developement should be at their disposal, thirdly it is necessary to further develop 
the institutional stucture to effectively supply the new aims. With all these, a 
harmonized capability upgrade could start in relation with the Union. 
However next to the permanent and resounding successes the biggest question 
would still be open, namely that the memeber-states are willing to hand the key 
questions of defense to Union level, or insted of this they would create an effective 
                                                 
37 See SIMAI, MIHÁLY: A korszerű haderőfejlesztés nemzetközi tendenciái (2. rész) 
[International trends of modern army developement (Part II.)], in Hadtudomány, Vol. 22. 
No. 1-2. (2012), 4-18. 
38 Although in 2012 a meeting was held to strengthen the prvious decisions, but the experts 
stated about this that it didn't mean any meaningful advance. See CSIKI, TAMÁS: Az Európai 
Tanács közös biztonság- és védelempolitikai csúcstalálkozójának háttere és eredményének 
értékelése [The background and the rating of the defense- and security political summit of 
European Council], available at: http://nit.uni-nke.hu/downloads/Elemzesek/2014/SVKK_ 
Elemzesek_2014_1.pdf [cit. 2014-04-16]. 
39 Ibid. 
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offer based system and with this reject the idea of „Europe-state” once and for all. 
In my opinion we have to realize, that there are unconcealable differences 
bettween the European military forces since the enlargement of 2004, which makes 
the operation of the literal European army impossible, and this can not be helped 
by the expectations towards the member-states, since the army development is 
rather costly activity, and in the current economical situation it is an 
uncompleteable task for the member-states in point. This problem could be solved 
on one part by the strenghtening of th European Defense Agency and the real 
unification of the European defense market, in which the Agency would not only 
coordinate the connection between the companies and the customer member-
states, but it would appear on the market as the Union’s sales executive, or it would 
operate as supervising institute of the a possibly establishable – partly member –
state sponsored – European company group. By my conception the Union does not 
only need an unifying armaments industrial market, but it should accelerate the 
process by the joint action of its member-states with an Union armaments industrial 
company group. On the one hand I think the extension of the ATHENA sponsor 
program would by justified, or the creation of an independent European military 
capability improvement fund, which would sponsor the military improvement of 
member-states that assumes an obligaton – for example increased ready time 
battlegoup or EUFOR participation –, on the other hand to provide the funding of 
missing capabilitesfor member-states, for example by acquisition of new transport 
vehicles, but on Union level. 
To sum it up I have to say, that a serious change in approach has to be made 
to strengthen the defense – and with it the political – integration and its succesful 
future. This could be an unfamiliar expectation in the current – newer – historical 
happy and peaceful days, but it can not be forgotten, that all the successes and 
results which realized in the integration, after all are viewed from the aspect of 
survival are standing on the foundation of defense capabilites, just as the state’s 
functioning, and at present these capabilities are on nation-state level and very 
many-sided, as viewed from Union level they are rather fragmented. 
So firstly the defense sector and capabilities has to be treated on their place, 
secondly solutions has to be produced which keep the advantages that are typical 
to the integration and the support of the undeveloped, thirdly on the defense line 
priority has to be given to the market and research and developement integration. 
Moreover I think on middle-distance the member-state offering system and their 
suverenity has to be respected, but on the long run a position has to be taken in the 
the suverenity vs. „Europe-state” question. 
To simplify, in the territory of defense decision has to be made: Europe want 
to do or only to pretend? 
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Abstract 
Due to the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union (EU) could be more unified and more 
determined actor in the international area. The present paper examines the procedure for 
concluding of the EU, mainly based on provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. The EU, as the 
legal person of international law, possesses rights and obligations, which is also 
manifested in the conclusion of international agreements. So it is important to put emphasis 
on the examination of those provisions which provide legal basis for concluding various 
international treaties by the EU, and in given circumstances establish the EU's competence. 
In this respect it would be analysed what kind of external competences belong to the EU. 
Furthermore, this paper gives some significant phase of the constructing procedure of the 
EU. 
 
Keywords: EU's procedure for concluding agreements, EU's external competences, EU's 
legal personality 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty of Lisbon serves as a significant milestone regarding the European 
integration, especially in connection with the European Union's more determined 
performance and representation on international area. The Treaty of Lisbon vests 
legal personality to the European Union1 so thus the EU is undoubtedly the legal 
person of international law. Due to the explicit granting of legal personality of the 
EU, it possesses rights and obligations, which is also manifested in the conclusion 
of international agreements. 
Concerning the Communities, the founding Treaties have previously 
contained provisions on the procedure for concluding agreements of the European 
Communities (EC) as well, and during the progress of integration, almost all 
modifying treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice) amended provisions connected 
                                                 
* This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co- 
financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/2-11/1-2012-
0001 ’National Excellence Program’. 
1 Article 47. The Treaty on European Union (Lisbon, 2007), hereafter “TEU”. 
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to this topic, just like the currently operative Treaty of Lisbon.2 However, as 
regards the gradually stronger international appearance of the EU, it is worth 
analyzing what kind of changes the Treaty of Lisbon has brought about in the EU's 
previous procedure for concluding agreements. It is especially important examine 
how the new position– the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy – established by the Treaty of Lisbon joins and what role it 
plays in the EU's process to conclude international agreements. Furthermore, the 
reinforcing role of the European Parliament (hereafter “EP”) in this procedural 
order should be emphasized. 
An important fact must be mentioned that modifications of the EU's procedure 
for concluding agreements have inseparable connection with the gradual widening 
of the EC/EU's competences. One of the EU's competences is a sensitive, 
problematic area itself, not even mentioning the conclusion of international 
treaties. Hence, it is an unavoidable question that in which cases the European 
Communities, and then with the deepening of the integration of the European 
Union, has had the sphere of competence to enter into international agreements. In 
aware of the fact, the EU does not have competences covering the wide-scale area, 
it can only proceed according to authorizing provisions of treaties (that is the 
conferral of powers). So it is important to put emphasis on the examination of those 
provisions which provide legal basis for concluding various international treaties 
by the EU, and in given circumstances establish the EU's competence. Based on 
all these, the EU's external competences (explicit and implied) are also worth 
analyzing. 
2. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE EU AND POWER TO CONCLUDE 
AGREEMENTS 
Due to the Treaty of Lisbon the EU has more determined competences to act on 
the international area. First of all, Article 47 of the Treaty on European Union 
explicitly recognizes that “the Union shall have legal personality”. Thus, as its 
Member States, the EU has ability to exercise rights in international legal affairs 
and enter into obligations of its objectives.3 According to that the EU can enter into 
agreements with third countries and international organizations, and it can be held 
accountable under international law if it contravenes its obligations and take action 
where its rights are infringed. “If a Union institution concludes an agreement, it 
will be binding on the Union and it will be liable for its performance. So 
international capacities of the EU are governed by the rules of international law, 
however, the division of powers between the EU and its Member States is a matter 
                                                 
2 Articles 216 and 218. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon, 
2007), hereafter “TFEU”. 
3 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 31 March 1971. The Commission vs. The Council. 
Case C-22/70. Furthermore Judgement of the Court of Justice of 14 July 1976. Kramer en 
Bais. Case C-3/76, Joined Cases C-4/76, C-6/76. 
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of Union law.”4 
After the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, Article 1 of TEU provides that 
the EU replaces and succeeds the European Community. Whereas before the 
founding Treaties did not expressly endow the EU as whole with legal personality, 
only expressly conferred legal personality on the European Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community.5 6 In 1992, the European Union was set up 
by the Maastricht Treaty; however, this Treaty was silent on its legal personality, 
no provision on the legal personality of the Union was inserted. Aside from Article 
281 of TEC (consolidated version amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam), which 
declared the legal capacity of the Community, there were no such provisions in 
TEU in connection with the Union. Nor were any provisions regarding the 
conclusion of international agreements by the Union, whereas capacity to conclude 
treaties is clearly one of the defining features of international legal personality. It 
seemed to be directed towards establishing whether there is some type of 
constitutional/international law barrier to EU action under international law in 
second and third pillar matters. All these shortcomings of the Maastricht Treaty 
created opportunity for great legal debates on this topic.7 However, defining the 
EU’s legal capacity became more and more important, its international sphere of 
action continuously widened and increased, its international performance became 
more significant. (For example it opened its delegations in third countries, sent 
deputies and observant to areas of various conflicts.) 
The question of the EU’s legal personality was not obviously solved by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, although, Article 24 of TEU was inserted by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which is itself one development in a long debate about the 
EU' international legal personality. As time goes by, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the debate seems ever more irrelevant, in the light of its Article 24: „When it is 
necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international 
organizations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may 
authorize the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open 
negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council 
acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall 
be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it 
has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other 
members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to 
them.” Thanks to this above mentioned provision of the Treaty of Amsterdam the 
Council has the competence to conclude agreements with third countries and 
international organizations. So, before the Treaty of Lisbon the Council has already 
                                                 
4 LENAERT, KOEN – NUFFEL, PIET VAN (ed.): European Union Law, 2011, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 952. 
5 Article 281. Treaty on the European Community; Article 184. Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 
6 MCGOLDRICK, DOMINIC. The International Legal Personality of the EC and the EU, in 
DOUGAN, MICHAEL – CURRIE, SAMANTHA (ed.): 50 Years of the European Treaties. 
Looking Back and Thinking Forward, 2009, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 187-188. 
7 Ibid. 195-203. 
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concluded agreements on behalf of the Union, which means the EU had already 
been displayed as a participating party bound by the agreements. 
After entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the question about the legal 
personality of the EU was definitely answered. On the one hand, Article 1 of TFEU 
rules that the Union replaces and succeeds the European Community. “Therefore, 
the EU will exercise all rights and assume all the obligations of the European 
Community, including its status in international organisations, whilst continuing 
to exercise existing rights and assume obligations of the EU. In particular, the EU 
will succeed to all agreements concluded and all commitments made by the 
European Community with other organisations and to all agreements and 
commitments adopted within organisations and that are binding upon the 
European Community.”8 
3. THE EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE UNION – IN THE NET OF COMPETENCES 
The above written overview was necessary to see that the ability to conclude 
agreements is the one of the indispensable and recognized manifestations of the 
international legal personality. However, the EU’s ability to act, just like entering 
into international treaties, does not directly come from having a legal personality. 
Exactly norms of competences are needed in order to act on international area, 
which on the one hand, determine competencies, on the other hand, mark their 
limits. The area of the EU’s spheres of competences is a sensitive, problematic area 
in itself, not to mention cases of entering into international treaties. Regarding the 
subject of present study it is really important to analyze in what cases the EU has 
competences to enter into international treaties. 
In respect that the EU does not have competence covering every area, it can 
only proceed according to treaties’ certain authorizing provisions (the principle of 
conferral). Hence, the Treaty of Lisbon has further elaborated the principle of 
conferral, as stated in Article 4 (1) and Article 5 (1) and (2) of TEU. Based on 
these, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon 
it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.” Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon details taxatively the 
competences which can be found in Articles 2-6 of TFEU and due to these 
provisions, it can be read/determined whether the EU’s given external competence 
belongs to the exclusive or to the shared group. 
There are two possible aspects to assortment the EU’s external competences. 
On the one hand, we can differentiate these competences according to that they 
either belong to the exclusive or to the shared/complementary competence of the 
given external competence of the EU. On the other hand, the other grouping of 
external competences is done according to whether Treaties expressly provides on 
                                                 
8 EMERSON, MICHAEL – BALFOUR, ROSA – CORTHAUT, TIM (et al.): Upgrading the EU’s 
Role as Global Actor. Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, 
2011, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 21. 
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concluding international treaties, or not. In the first case we can refer to express 
external competences/external competence. In the second case there is lacking of 
the explicit provision to the entering into international treaties, however the 
concluding agreements is still necessary for reaching the aims set in the Treaties. 
So in such cases we can talk about so called „implied” external competences.9 
Concerning the Communities, founding treaties have previously contained 
provisions on the procedure for concluding agreements by the European 
Communities, as well and in connection with the progress of integration, almost 
all modifying treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice) modified provisions 
connected to this topic, just like the currently operative Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 
216 and 218of TFEU). However, as regards the gradually stronger international 
appearance of the EU, it is worth investigating what kind of changes the Treaty of 
Lisbon has brought about in the EU's previous procedure for concluding 
international agreements.  
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 300 of the Treaty of the European 
Community at the same time contained the declaration of public competence 
referring to entering into international agreements and its inner rules referring to 
the process of public law.10 With the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
this ‘old’ provision became separated and now, Article 216 of TFEU especially 
determines the cases when the EU can enter into international agreements, while 
Article 218 of TFEU regulates the process of entering into agreements. 
3.1. Typing of explicit Union competences (express external competences) 
The EU possesses explicit external competence when the Treaties expressly 
empower the Union to conclude international agreements. They give the legal basis 
for this kind of action. This is reflected in Article 216 of TFEU, which states that 
the „Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide”.11 In a limited number 
of cases, the Treaty of Lisbon provides an explicit competence to the EU to act 
externally. In the light of this, the EU has special competence set in the founding 
treaty among others, in the following areas:  
 a common commercial policy (Articles 206-207 of TFEU); 
 association agreements (Article 217 of TFEU); 
                                                 
9 KAJTÁR, GÁBOR: 216. cikk, in OSZTOVITS, ANDRÁS (ed.). Az Európai Unióról és az 
Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződések Magyarázata 3. [Explanation of the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 3.], 2011, 
Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 2671-2674. Furthermore Judgement of the Court of Justice of 
31 March 1971. The Commission vs. the Council (ERTA). Case C-22/70. 
10 See KOUTRAKOS, PANOS. EU International Relations Law, 2006, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 138-181. 
11 WOUTERS, JAN – COPPENS, DOMINIC – DE MEESTER, BART: The European Union’s 
External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty, in GRILLER, STEFAN – ZILLER, JACQUES (ed.): 
The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? 2008, Springer 
– Wien – New York, 169. 
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 an exchange-rate system for the euro in relation to non-Union currencies 
{Article 219 para. (1) of TFEU}. 
For example, the common commercial policy belongs to the exclusive 
competence of the EU. This means that member states cannot enter into 
international agreements on these areas anymore, only the EU is eligible to do so. 
However the conclusion of the association agreements belongs to the share 
competence of the EU.12 
In addition, the Union is empowered to conclude agreements by the explicit 
provisions of the Treaties: 
 the research and technological development {Article 186 of TFEU}; 
 the economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries 
{Article 212 para. (3) of TFEU}; 
 the environment {Article of 191 para. (4) of TFEU}; 
 the development cooperation {Article 209 para. (2) of TFEU}; and 
 the humanitarian aid {Article 214 para. (4) of TFEU}. 
The EU can exercise these external competences even in respect of matters 
which are not yet subject of rules at Union level. In these areas, both the Union 
and Member States may cooperate with third countries or international 
organisations. Article 4 para. (4) of TFEU clarifies that the nature of these Union 
competences is ‘shared’ but the specialty is that their exercise by the Union does 
not prevent Member States from exercising their own competences in these 
fields.13 “The Union's competence in this regard does not detract from Member 
States' own powers to negotiate in international fora and conclude international 
agreements, although, Union action will reduce the scope for action on behalf of 
Member States, in view of the principle of primacy.”14 
At this point, it is worth to mention that there are such mixed- agreements 
where a field falls within the competence of both the Union and Member States, 
so the Union’s external action is categorised as mixed. These kinds of agreements 
cause various problems regarding international law, Union law and practice.15  
                                                 
12 It is important to mention within the framework of common commercial policy, that the 
analysis of competency questions between the EU and its Member States would require a 
separate research, with relation to WTO/GATT agreements. Hence, regarding the 
complexity of this theme, the current research does not deal with it. 
13 WOUTERS – COPPENS – MEESTER: op. cit. 168-170. 
14 LENAERT – VAN NUFFEL: op. cit. 1015. 
15 The interpretation and analyse of such agreements would go beyond the limits of this 
study. Connecting to the framework of explicit treaty-making power, we have to mention 
that the Union is allowed to conclude international agreements with one or more States or 
international organisations in the Common Foreign and Security Policy area (Article 37 of 
TEU). The nature of the Union’s competence in the field of CFSP is not well defined and 
might be best categorised as a kind of ‘sui generis’ competence or shared competence 
without pre-emption. See WOUTERS – COPPENS – MEESTER: op. cit. 169. 
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3.2. Implied external competence 
In determining the grouping of the EU’s external competences, the case law of the 
Court of the EU has a decisive role. The external competences of the Union have 
mainly been clarified in the European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ) case law.16 
The previous case law of ECJ highlighted that the Union may conclude 
international agreements not only in those cases where the Treaties or a legally 
binding Union act provides so but instead, it can rule without explicit procedure 
for concluding conclusion authorisation, with so called implied external 
competences.17  
So, Article 216 of TFEU ensures 3 further possibilities to conclude entering 
into international agreements: 
 „where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, 
within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties; 
 or is provided for in a legally binding Union act; 
 or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
This Treaty provision codifies the external powers which – according to long-
standing case law of the European Court of Justice – flow implicitly from the 
Treaties and secondary Union law. It is known as the „implied treaty-making 
power” of the EU.18 
Based on the case law of ECJ, regarding to the judgment of AETR-case,19 
generally, it can be said that this kind of implied external competence is parallel 
with every existing inner competence. So, there is a parallelism of internal and 
external competences: if the internal competence has been exercised, an external 
competence follows.20 This creating law interpretation of ECJ on implied express 
competence is also included in the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, according to Article 3 
para. (2) of TFEU: „The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its 
internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or 
alter their scope.” 
The significant element of the above-mentioned provision could be found in 
Article 216 of TFEU referring to that the EU can enter into agreements if it “is 
likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.” In connection with the AETR 
judgment, member states cannot assume international obligations on those areas 
                                                 
16 However, there is no possibility in current study to present numerous legal cases. 
17 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 31 March 1971. The Commission vs. the Council 
(ERTA). Case C-22/70. 
18 LENAERT – VAN NUFFEL: op. cit. 1016. 
19 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 31 March 1971. The Commission vs. The Council 
(ERTA). Case C-22/70. 
20 VÁRNAY, ERNŐ – PAPP, MÓNIKA (ed.). Az Európai Unió joga [The European Union Law], 
2010, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 223-228. 
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where the EU has already practiced its competences as it would have effect on 
public policy and would lead to their modification. Hence, states’ such behavior 
would endanger the realization of public policy. (This also comes from the Article 
4 para. (3) of TEU.)21 
Article 216 of TFEU refers to the other case also from the legal practice of 
competent courts, when the Union has external competence because its internal 
competence may only be effectively exercised together with an external 
competence. This corresponds to the situation where an international agreement of 
the Union is „necessary to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, 
one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties”. 
Furthermore the Article 216 of TFEU determines it as the third issue that the 
EU can even enter into international treaties without special external competence, 
ifit is provided for in a legally binding Union act/normative instrument. It is 
important that its pre-condition the EU has competence to accept such a secondary 
legal source which serves as the legal base for the concluding of the international 
agreement. In that case, if the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, 
then the Article 352of TFEU ensures supplementary competence for the EU, where 
the action by the Union proves necessary, “within the framework of the Union’s 
policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties.”22 However, this article 
by no means can be applied in order to accept such provisions which effect would 
result in the modification of Agreements.23 
3.3. Who is obliged by obligations? 
It is an important and complex question that who is obliged by the obligations, 
which are assumed by the EU through the different kind of international 
agreements. Article 216 para. (2) of TFEU declares that „Agreements concluded 
by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member 
States.” According to this text, if a Member State would breach the given 
agreement with legal or other factors (action), then it is considered as the violation 
of Union law, for which the Member State can be held responsible. In judgment of 
ECJ of 26 October 1982, in connection with Kupferberg case24 the ECJ declared 
that Member States have responsibility regarding their obligations with third 
parties by the EU (formerly: the Communities). 
Based on the above mentioned reasons the determination of the areas where 
the EU has competences to enter into international treaties is complex and 
complicated. Having special regard to that the question of legal personality and 
                                                 
21 KAJTÁR: op. cit. 2673. 
22 Article 352 TFEU. 
23 See KAJTÁR, GÁBOR. 352. cikk [Article 352], in OSZTOVICS, ANDRÁS (ed.): Az Európai 
Unióról és az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződések Magyarázata 3 [Explanation 
of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
3], 2011, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 3337-3344. 
24 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 26 October 1982. Hauptzollamt Mainz vs. C.A. 
Kupferberg. Case 104/81. 
  
180 
 
competency problems strongly connected to entering into make this issue even 
more complicated. It is not by chance that the numerous case law of ECJ are 
normative and decisive, which analysis would be as a separate whole paper.25 
4. PROCESS OF THE CONCLUDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS26 
Now, that I have broadly presented the EU’s spheres of competences regarding to 
conclude international treaties, let me examine how the EU’s contractual 
procedures operate. As I have already mentioned, Article 216 and 218 of TEU can 
be regarded as successors of Article 300 of TEC, which previous ones contain rules 
regarding to conclude into international treaties referring to Union institutions and 
member states. Its scope covers all such bilateral and multilateral international 
agreements which are concluded by the EU with other Member States and 
international organizations, and also agreements between the EU and member 
states.  
Article 218 of TFEU regulates the process of entering into agreements, during 
11 paragraphs, however, not in full detail.27 In this procedure, the European 
Commission, the Council of the European Union and the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy have significant part; also, the 
European Parliament has increasing part in it. 
The first phase of the procedure for concluding is the authorization to start 
negotiations. In the framework of this phase, the Commission or the High 
Representative makes suggestions to the Council having been convinced on the 
necessity of the planned agreement. Based on the suggestion, the Council 
authorizes the Committee and exclusively or mostly the High Representative in a 
resolution for initiating negotiations in cases of common foreign and security 
policy. The appointed main negotiator has the main role during the negotiations; 
however, one has to continually consult with special committees appointed by the 
Council, and has to negotiate along directives set by the Council. Therefore it can 
be stated that the Council has a main role to start the procedure of concluding 
agreements. 
After the negotiations, Council decision is needed to sign the agreement.28 
Following this, there are two options to recognize the agreement as obligatory: i) 
                                                 
25 In this study the author does not intend to mention debates, problems connected to the 
obligatory nature of these agreements, on the place of international agreements in the EU’s 
hierarchy, and besides, the scale of mixed agreements is unlimited. 
26 See KAJTÁR, GÁBOR: 218. cikk [Article 218], in OSZTOVICS, ANDRÁS (ed.): Az Európai 
Unióról és az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződések Magyarázata 3 [Explanation 
of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
3], 2011, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 2677-2685. 
27 It would be quite long to analyse the elements of this provision, hence, in the framework 
of this paper the author would only like to focus on the most significant points in connection 
with the narrow field of interpretation. 
28 Art. 218 para. (5) TFEU.  
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the first is when the signature of agreement happens at the same time of the 
signature of agreement); while ii) the other option is that a Council decision is 
required to recognize agreements as obligatory. Until agreements enter into effect, 
the EU has to stay away from those actions which would stymie the agreement’s 
subject and aim. 
In those cases when the Council accepts agreements as obligatory with a 
regulation, its regulation is created upon the suggestion of the Commission and the 
High Representative. It is important that before accepting the regulation, it has to 
adequately cooperate with the European Parliament. There are detailed rules 
referring to this, as well. It is important to highlight the voting of the Council 
during this procedure, that the rules are always the same as rules to be applied in 
cases or authorizing the Commission or the High Representative. According to 
main rule, the Council decides with qualified majority but in certain determined 
cases consensual decision is needed.29 
Who signs the agreement? Mostly, the Council authorizes the actual EU 
Presidency to decide who shall sign the agreement on the part of the EU. Hence, 
in most cases the 1-1 representative of the EU Presidencies and/or the Commission 
signs the agreement. 
The entries into force of the agreements concluded by the EU are regulated 
by the general rules of international law. That is, an agreement does not 
automatically enter into force when it is recognized as obligatory by the EU or by 
a third state regarding them. Usually, they take regulations of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties into consideration, especially its Article 24.30 
In respect of the role of the European Parliament, it could be said the definite 
increasing role of the EP. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP had no formal role 
during the negotiations on an international agreement. However, a Framework 
Agreement had been concluded between the Commission and the Parliament that 
provided for exchange of information between both institutions.31 Due to the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Council at least always consults with the European 
Parliament before agreements. However, it is not obliged to take the EP’s opinion 
into account, in some cases; EP’s agreement is needed to make Council decisions.32 
The significance of EP’s role is important in agreements connected to the budget. 
The above mentioned process means a smooth process regarding the Union 
entering into agreements, however, this process is not always so easy. Temporary 
applications are used many times, the modification of these agreements is also 
regular and there are cases when these agreements are suspended or ceased.33 
 
                                                 
29 Art. 218 para. (8) TFEU.  
30 Art. 24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 1969). 
31 WOUTERS – COPPENS – MEESTER: op. cit. 183-184. 
32 See Art. 218 para. (6) TFEU. 
33 Regarding this case, Art. 218 of TFEU also contains detailed rules. 
  
182 
 
5. SUMMARY 
This paper analyzed the European Union’s procedure for concluding international 
agreements after the Treaty of Lisbon. Thanks to the Lisbon Treaty the EU is 
undoubtedly the legal person of international law. Regarding that, the one of the 
indispensable and recognized manifestations of the legal personality is the ability 
to enter into treaties which contain rights and obligations that can be justified 
according to rules of international public law. The EU has ability to conclude 
agreements according to reach of the aims set out in Treaties. This EU’s ability 
manifests in its external powers. In this respect the present study examines the 
EU’s express and implied external competences to conclude agreements.  
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 300 of TEC contained in the same 
provision the competences referring to entering into international agreements and 
its inner rules referring to the process of the concluding agreements. With the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this old provision became separated and now, 
Article 216 of TFEU especially determines the cases when the EU has 
competences to conclude international agreements, while Article 218 of TFEU 
regulates the process of entering into agreements. Regarding this separation of the 
former provision, the paper does not place only great emphasis on the external 
competences of the EU, but also analyses the procedure of the conclusion 
according to the role of the new post, namely the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in this process. Furthermore this study 
emphasizes the increasing role of the European Parliament, which is also a new 
element in this EU’s procedure for concluding agreements Regarding these 
reforms and other significant reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon, it would be possible 
the realisation of the EU’s more unified and more efficient appearance on 
international area and the realisation of the European Union's values and interests. 
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Abstract 
With this study I would like to present two anti-corruption acts. This documents has a big 
influence to the European and non-European countries also. In this study I will try to focus 
to the points of the documents, so we will see the similarities and the differences between 
these anti-corruption documents. Both of the documents create difficult questions, for 
instance: how if two countries has jurisdiction to investigate a case at the same time, which 
sanctions need to use etc. The documents not just influence the countries, but each other’s 
to.  
 
Keywords: anti-bribery convention, anti-corruption, FCPA, OECD 
 
JEL Classification: K33  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a global problem since the beginning. We have to fight against it, not 
just because it is bad shape but because it proves the ruin of the society. But how 
can we do this? Do an independent administrative member which can use sanctions 
or hope that it will stop of oneself? Maybe the first one, but hoping will not work. 
We do not have answers to the questions. However, this is our target to find answers 
to the questions somewhere. However, on the other hand, we also need an act. 
Some countries have a very strong anti-corruption act. To give you an example, 
here are U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and U.K. Bribery act. I think without 
an act and a strong organisational background the fight against bribery is more 
difficult because there is nothing in the government’s power.  
However, some people do not know that Hungary is part of an anti-corruption 
convention. Yes, this is a convention and not an own Hungarian legislation. The 
main aim of this study is to provide insight in this not commonly known 
convention, by introducing the regulations main aspects through questioning its 
everyday usability and general usefulness. Firstly, I am going to write about 
corruption. After that I would like to present the Convention, not the whole, only 
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its most important parts. Also I would like to present the role and activities of 
Transparency International in this matter, particularly regarding the fight against 
the international corruption. Why? Because it is a good initiation that both young 
and both old people fight together against the corruption all over the world, 
because they want something impossible: a world without bribery and fraud. In 
Hungary, the object of the corruption (the U.S. FCPA, OECD, U.K. Bribery Act) 
is not processed or not known; the literature on it is deficient. I would like to put 
forward that Hungarian literature and books are few in number and it is especially 
the internet that helps us to find information. This is the reason that sources were 
almost without exception retrieved from the internet. This study is a summary to 
give few ideas to do the system better.  
2. WHAT IS CORRUPTION? 
The nature of corruption is more or less known for every one of us, someone knows 
when experiences it, but to give an exact definition of the phenomena turns out to 
be quite a challenge. On the one hand, there are many useful and interesting 
definitions which can explain the meaning of corruption. On the other hand, there 
are so many inaccurate and misleading definitions. Because of this I only want to 
describe a few of them. Firstly, we can read about corruption on the site of 
Transparency International U.K.: “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. It hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on the 
integrity of people in a position of authority. Corruption holds back economic 
development, prevents a free market operating for businesses and consumers, and 
further exploits already marginalised groups.”1  
The next one is also a definition of Transparency International, which can be 
found on the global site of T.I.: „Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. Corruption is when a family has to choose between paying a bribe so 
that a doctor will see its sick child, and putting food on the table. Corruption is 
when thousands of people die in an earthquake beneath collapsed buildings 
because safety inspectors were bought off. Corruption is when bureaucrats steal 
public money to buy mansions and cars instead of investing it in low-cost housing 
and public transport. Corruption has many forms. It causes sleepless nights for 
millions of people – but too often not for the corrupt. Transparency International 
is working to change that.”2 Both of them try to help imagining (with examples) 
what „corruption” means. I believe that this few instances shows us that the forma 
of the corruption appear in different way but the essence is the same. We can use 
examples, we can make a definition with 4-5 sentences but this will be deficient. 
The area of corruption is too big to be defined and mainly to be controlled. This is 
not impossible but without the society, the government is helpless.  
                                                 
1 Transparency International U.K. – Corruption, available at: http://www.transparency. 
org.uk/corruption [cit. 2014-01-31]. 
2 Transparency International – Global coalition against corruption, available at: http:// 
www.timetowakeup.org/main/home [cit. 2014-01-31]. 
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However, there is a more serious problem: politicians, the government, 
doctors and so on. In the beginning my opinion was the main problem in Hungary 
is that we do not have an anti-corruption act which can help us to fight against 
corruption. But after I compared the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with the 
Hungarian criminal code I realized that the Hungarian legislation is right and what 
is more. There were a number of definitions and technical terms which were the 
same in both act. This means that we have to search the problem not in the 
legislation but in the lack of the organisation of the Hungarian system. But this 
object is not this study’s topic. Nevertheless, that Hungary is the member of the 
OECD, so the convention is also in force in Hungary, the practice is not the best, 
because of the lack of the sufficient organisations. 
 
Table 1: Average perceived level of bribery risk in selected government 
activities in OECD countries (2006).3 
 
In this study I will collect those provisions which in some way still contribute 
to the fight against corruption. Let us continue the thinking about the meaning of 
corruption. Therewith, that somewhere the corruption is rise in line with this the 
public resources from important priorities like as health and education be weaker 
and do not get enough money to develop. Corruption is bad not just for the society 
but also bad for businesses. Corruption is anti-competitive, there are so many 
disadvantages which are caused for the honest businesses whose do not pay bribes. 
The main problem that if somebody live with the chance and bribe, these shapes 
will be an unended circle. He will offer money again, and the other party will do 
his assignments just if he gets money. In the long run, it will not work. If the bribed 
                                                 
3 Source: Integrity in Public Procurement, available at: http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/ 
integrityin publicprocurement.htm [cit. 2014-10-25]. 
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people doing his assignments just for more money the honest and poorer people 
could not race with this. 
 
Table 2: General government and state-owned utilities procurement in 
selected OECD countries as a percentage of GDP (2008).4 
First of all, I am going to present OECD’s anti-bribery convention and I would 
also like to present Transparency International. 
3. THE OECD 
The OECD is very important in the process of fighting against corruption. In this 
organization there are lots of members who accepted the Convention, so in these 
countries the Convention has a very strong power. Otherwise, in the majority of 
the countries the Convention is the only legislation connected to bribery. Now, let 
us see how the organization was created. The OECD’s forbear was the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was established 
                                                 
4 Source: fighting corruption in the public sector, http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/integrity 
inpublicprocurement.htm [cit. 2014-10-25]. 
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in 1948. During the years the cases showed the organisation is work. A few years 
later Canada and the US joined OEEC members in signing the new OECD 
Convention on 14 December 1960. On 30 September 1961, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was born when the Convention 
came into force. At the beginning of the study I mentioned U.S. FCPA. Not by 
accident. The Convention created it because of the American Congress. This was 
a very important moment, because both of these documents impress each other 
during the years, so we can see many similar, or same ideas, definitions and 
technical terms in these documents.  
In 1988, the American Congress suggested that the President negotiate an 
international treaty with members of the Organisations for Economic Co-operation 
and Development to make an anti-bribery convention to stop the bribe in the 
international business transactions by many of the United States’ partners. The 
negotiations was successful so the Convention on Combating Bribery for Foreign 
Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) was 
born, which put a very important require for the parties: to make it a crime to bribe 
foreign officials.  
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions was signed in December 1997 and came into 
force in February 1999. It has since been ratified by all 30 OECD member 
countries and by seven non-member States (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Estonia, Slovenia and South Africa). Both the Convention and FCPA were 
modified many times. They influenced each other’s development. This is why it is 
important to know about the „acts”. However, the relationship between the 
Convention and FCPA will be elaborated on in another study. 
4. THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
The Anti-Bribery Convention consists of 18 parts: 
 Preamble; 
 Article 1 The Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials; 
 Article 2 Responsibility of Legal Persons; 
 Article 3 Sanctions; 
 Article 4 Jurisdiction; 
 Article 5 Enforcement; 
 Article 6 Statute of Limitations; 
 Article 7 Money Laundering; 
 Article 8 Accounting; 
 Article 9 Mutual Legal Assistance; 
 Article 10 Extradition; 
 Article 11 Responsible Authorities; 
 Article 12 Monitoring and Follow-up; 
 Article 13 Signature and Accession; 
 Article 14 Ratification and Depositary; 
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 Article 15 Entry into Force; 
 Article 16 Amendment; 
 Article 17 Withdrawal. 
Before we discuss the main articles in detail, let us see some information on the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery. This Group has an outstanding role. This Group 
monitors the members and also tries to enforce the Convention. The 34 OECD 
member countries (including the United States) and five non-OECD member 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Russian Federation, and South Africa) 
are members of the OECD Working Group on Bribery (Working Group). Its 
members meet quarterly to review and monitor implementation of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention by member states around the world. Periodically each party undergoes 
a monitoring system. This monitoring system is consist of three phases. “The 
Phase 1 review includes an in-depth assessment of each country’s domestic laws 
implementing the Convention. The Phase 2 review examines the effectiveness of 
each country’s laws and anti-bribery efforts. The final phase is a permanent cycle 
of peer review (the first cycle of which is referred to as the Phase 3 review) that 
evaluates a country’s enforcement actions and results, as well as the country’s 
efforts to address weaknesses identified during the Phase 2 review.”5  
5. SEVERAL ARTICLES IN GENERAL FROM THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
5.1. Article 1 The Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
In the first article, the Convention declares as we talked about it, that each party 
have to make it a crime to bribe foreign officials. Furthermore, the Convention 
defines a few terms for us. Firstly, „foreign public official” means any person 
holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office in a foreign country, whether 
appointed or elected.”6 The next term is „foreign country” which „includes all 
levels and subdivisions of government, from national to local.”7 This article is 
traditional because it clarifies the basic concepts. 
5.2. Article 3 Sanctions 
When there is a crime, we also need sanctions to react to it. The Convention 
declares the requirements for the penalties: effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties. The penalties have to be comparable to that applicable to the 
bribery of the Party's own public officials The Convention gives guidelines and 
leaves it to the members how they want to punish. This is not necessarily good. 
The legal systems in Europe and in the other countries of the world is very 
                                                 
5 A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – By the Criminal Division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf 
[cit. 2014-02-14]. 
6 Ibid. 7. 
7 Ibid. 7. 
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different. Some are stricter and some are simply weak. For example in the United 
States, the FCPA working good, but it can because the Act declares the penalties 
and the definitions concretely. On the other way, for instance, in an African 
country, where is a totalitarian system, this never going to work. 
5.3. Article 4 Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is always an interesting part of the acts. Maybe, this is the most 
important part of the Convention because this article helps members to know who 
has the right to conduct proceedings. The territorial basis of jurisdiction should be 
interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection with bribery act is not 
required. The conflict of jurisdiction used to be a problem but the Convention helps 
members to decide on jurisdiction. 
5.4. Article 9 Mutual Legal Assistance 
The Convention very nicely and specifically describes mutual legal assistance. 
“Each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties 
and arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party 
for the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings brought by a Party 
concerning offences within the scope of this Convention and for non-criminal 
proceedings within the scope of this Convention brought by a Party against a legal 
person.”8  
5.5. Article 10 Extradition 
Regarding extradition, the Convention mentions it simply. It does not declare the 
exact process but leaves it to the parties, especially to the extradition treaties 
between them. 
5.6. Article 12 Monitoring and Follow-up 
As I have already said, the OECD Working Group on Bribery’s work is very 
important. This Group has an outstanding role. This Group monitors members and 
also tries to enforce the Convention. Monitoring is one of the most significant parts 
in the fight against corruption. None of the laws can prevail if organizations or 
people do not monitor the compliance of the law. This helps us to understand that 
Transparency International is good for the society and also for the government and 
in any case should be supported. In the next part of the study, I am going to present 
Transparency International. 
6. THE GOALS OF THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION WITH 
THE OECD 
The dream is a world without corruption. A world, where governments, businesses, 
                                                 
8 Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions and Related Documents, available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ 
ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf 7 [cit. 2014-02-15]. 
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civil societies and the daily life of people are free from corruption. Transparency 
International was created in 1993. There are 100 countries in the coalition. Much 
remains to be done to stop corruption, but much has also been achieved, including 
for instance the creation of international anti-corruption conventions. 
Transparency International is a politically non-partisan organisation. T.I. have 
more than 60 national organisations around the world, which have formed TI 
National Chapters. The National Chapters are a clustering of leading citizens in 
private and public life. TI has campaigned for international action to put off foreign 
bribery – and not just the criminalisation of bribery. “The drama unfolding in the 
OECD framework is an important element, but only one element, on the broad 
global anti-corruption stage.”9 
7. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, there is a very complex system against corruption. We have a 
Convention, which is a contract between the parties. We also have a Group, which 
continuously monitors the countries in order that they shall enforce the 
Convention. In my opinion, the most successful initiative is Transparency 
International. They make regular reports, investigations. Let us not forget that we 
also have a criminal law book which harshly punishes corruption, but the main 
problem is that this is not detailed enough. I will continue to urge the creation of 
an anti-corruption law. But maybe we are not prepared for this. We have to search 
the solution in people and in the society. There are many possibilities to make a 
country without corruption. But this is a different case. The corruption, the bad is 
root in the society, in every people. There is not enough the legislation. This is why 
I presented the T.I., this organisation working for a better world more than 20 years, 
and he can reached very important results. The cases of the corruption is all-
important the publicity. Perhaps, the T.I. has not got the scope to judge, but it has 
got the society’s attention, and those whose want a world without bribe and fraud. 
Until people do not say that corruption „is bad”, anti-corruption acts will not work.  
With this study I wanted to make a short summary the two, maybe the most 
important documents about the anti-corruption. These have a big influence to the 
European and to the non-European countries legal systems also. As we saw, both 
the OECD’s Convent, both the U.S. FCPA were influenced to the Hungarian 
legislation, which caused that Hungary have a strong anti-corruption part in the 
Hungarian criminal code (2011. C.), but it will never work, if the organisational 
background inadequate. 
 
                                                 
9 OECD Anti-Corruption Convention leaves critical questions still open, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/oecd_anti_corruption_convention_leaves
_critical_questions_still_open [cit. 2014-02-10]. 
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“These men ask for just the same thing: fairness, and 
fairness only. This is, so far as in my power, they, and 
all others, shall have.” 
(Abraham Lincoln) 
Abstract 
During my research I would like to draw attention to one of the society’s major problems, 
homelessness, which is closely connected to the freedom of movement. As the profile of 
homeless people went through a change in both Europe and Hungary, I believe solutions 
have to be found to tackle the situation. 
Whereas previously the majority of the homeless was middle-aged men, who were 
struggling with alcohol and drug problems and left closed institutions (psychiatry, jail, 
etc.) without permanent residence or job, nowadays several families with children, women 
and young adults can be found among the homeless. The increase in the costs of living, 
utility costs and the interests of foreign currency loans made it more difficult to maintain 
a home for people with low income. Families may fall apart and the number of homeless 
people will increase.  
The situation of the homeless and the related legislation pose a huge challenge for all the 
countries in Europe. The number of people living on the streets is increasing in Hungary 
and in the neighbouring countries as well. Unfortunately, almost no attention is paid to 
prevention. The government intervenes only when people have already lost their homes 
and have to live on the streets and thus their safety or health are endangered. However, 
the problems never begin on the streets, they only end there. This situation must be legally 
solved through responsible actions, adequate supply systems and redeeming mechanisms. 
In this paper I introduce the current situation of the homeless in Hungary, the previous 
measures taken and the Decisions of the Constitutional Court. My aim is to draw attention 
to the seriousness and the possible consequences of the issue.  
The administrative proposals which consider the stay of the homeless in public areas as 
an issue of city image hold the risk to contradict the right to human dignity. The legislation 
explicitly lists what activities can be carried out in public areas and leaves the decision 
whether to sanction habitual residence in public areas to the local government. 
 
Keywords: homelessness, homeless situation, legislation. 
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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1. Introduction 
One of the hottest social issues these days is the problem of homelessness. It is a 
problem need to be solved not only in Hungary but also nearly in all European 
countries. 
The main question of the issue I deal with is whether the prosecution or the 
punishment of the homeless solves any of the related problems (or even one them). 
In other words, would it eliminate homelessness if the authorities persecuted the 
homeless people?  
The problem of homelessness is not only the problem of the individual. In 
reality, it is a social problem affecting the whole population. It would be necessary 
to find solutions to address and eliminate this situation. When dealing with the 
problem of homelessness, the legal regulation of associated issues poses a major 
challenge. The number of people living on the street continues to increase. Solving 
the situation by the rule of law is possible and necessary by providing appropriate 
supply systems and exit mechanisms. 
In the first part of my work, the legal decisions of the Constitutional Court 
concerning situation of the homeless are expounded. Any administrative proposal 
or sanction dedicated to address the problem of homeless people, especially those 
which refer to the issue in a way that the homeless living in public spaces ruin the 
image of the city, has the risk of an anomaly associated with the right to human 
dignity.  
The Act of Offence provides an itemized lists of what behaviours can be 
continued in public areas. Municipalities are free to decide whether to impose 
sanctions e.g. for residing in public places habitually or not. 
1.2. The definition of the homeless 
The first question is the legal concept of the homeless. The Social Act gives the 
definition of the homeless in two different ways: 
According to the first definition, which is the administrative type: “Homeless 
is a person who does not have a registered place of residence, except for those 
whose registered place of residence is a homeless shelter.” As it follows from the 
above definition „in the social case management procedures of the homeless, the 
body has social competence the area of which is declared as a place of residence 
by the statement of the (concerned) homeless at the time of the use of the supply.” 
In case of providing financial and natural service, local governments should 
act according to this definition. 
The second definition of the Act – the supply type definition defines the term 
in the following way: „The person should be considered homeless who spends their 
nights in public places or in premises not for the purpose of housing.” 
Under this definition „Local authorities, irrespective of their competence, 
required to provide temporary support/assistance/aid, meal/food and 
accommodation if the lack of these needs would threat the lives or the physical 
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integrity of those in need.”  
The Social Act links this definition to the provision of personal care for 
homeless people. In other words, the government is required to apply this 
definition if it provides personal care by providing shelters, night shelters or 
temporary accommodation. This also means that territorial jurisdiction of 
residence or last residence cannot be a condition when using these benefits.1  
1.3. Public land 
According to the Act LXIII of 1999: “Any state-or local government-owned land 
which can be used according to its intended purpose... furthermore, those private 
areas which can be used under the same condition are considered public land.”2 As 
for the Regulation of the Municipal Assembly,3 the public areas of Budapest 
„basically serve for the goals of the community and under the same terms and 
conditions these are available for anyone to achieve these goals.” 
According to this: 
(1) Public land can be used freely according to its intended purpose; 
(2) The use of public land should not impair the rights of others with similar 
objectives; 
(3) The use of the public land differs from its intended purpose if the use of 
the public area or just the use of a specified part of it prevents others from its 
proper use in the manner mentioned in this regulation. 
In other words, public land can be used in an improper way as well, but this 
requires special permission from local governments so you have to pay for it. 
2. LEGAL REGULATION  
2.1. Does law take us forward? 
Unfortunately, experience shows that legal approach is quite insensitive to the 
depth of the problem, in many cases, it even prevents the effective work. Although, 
the former situation has not changed much by improving the situation of the 
homeless and by introducing new regulations designed to help them. The Social 
Act and regulations of the local authorities contain conflicting provisions often, 
which leads to a total disfunctionality. 
As Hungary is a state party of most human rights conventions (more than a 
hundred...), the current government is committed to guarantee the right to adequate 
housing equally, including homeless people as well, without discrimination even 
if it is not included in the Constitution explicitely/expressis verbis. 
No. 4 statement of the Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) containes the details of the obligations of the states regarding the right 
to proper housing.  
                                                 
1 Act III of 1993 on social administration and social benefits. 
2 Act LXIII of 1999 on the public space surveillance, Art. 27. 
3 Degree of the Municipal Assembly 59/1995. (X. 20.). 
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In the 12th paragraph of the resolution, the committee points to the fact that 
“although the proper way of the practical implementation of the right to adequate 
housing differs in each signatory country inevitably, the Covenant requires clearly 
that each State should take the necessary steps in order to achieve this goal.” It 
requires the establishment of a national housing strategy in all cases. 
2.2. The homeless in the Fundamental Law 
Article XXVII para. (1) of the Hungarian Fundamental Law says that everyone 
staying lawfully in the territory of Hungary shall have the right to move freely and 
to freely choose his or her place of stay.  
Under the Article 8 of the Fourth Amendment to Hungary’s Fundamental Law, 
the following provision shall replace Article XXII of the Fundamental Law:  
(1) Hungary shall strive to provide the conditions for housing with human 
dignity and to guarantee access to public services for everyone.  
(2) The State and local governments shall contribute to creating the 
conditions for housing with human dignity by striving to guarantee housing 
for every homeless person.  
(3) An Act of Parliament or local government decree may outlaw the use of 
certain public space for habitation in order to preserve the public order, 
public safety, public health and cultural values.  
2.3. Legitimate illegality? 
When the fourth amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary came into force, 
the Constitution of Hungary came into conflict with itself. 
The Amendment of the Constitution (Article 8) also states that any regulation 
made by the local government can declare the habitual use of public place (as an) 
unlawful (action). Simply, the local government may restrict some basic 
constitutional rights of certain citizens, namely the right to freedom of movement 
and the choice of residence.  
One of the most controversial points of the Fourth amendment of the 
Hungarian Fundamental Law concerning the homeless. A serious consequence of 
the amendment is that more judicial decision or interpretation of the law can be 
even contradictory at the same time. Some provisions can be legally challanged. 
According to Amnesty International, it is particularly worrying that the 
proposal of the Amendment of the Constitution (Article 8) makes it possible to 
criminalize the habitual use of public place by law or by local regulations because 
it contradicts to the international obligations of Hungary. The state should 
guarantee the right to adequate housing equally for everyone. 
The problem is not the restriction itself but the fact that the Fundamental Law 
declares that fundamental rights and duties may be regulated only by law, but even 
that should not restrict the essential content of fundamental rights. This is a 
cornerstone of the rule of law as in this way governance with decrees can be 
prevented. 
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held the view that in relation to a 
fundamental right the regulation by decrees is constitutional only in case of an 
indirect and remote correlation. Municipal regulations concerning homelessness 
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issues are most likely to affect the constitutional and fundamental rights closer and 
in a more direct way, they would not stand the test of constitutionality. The 
Fundamental Law is not aimed to have a constitutional level of solution to all fields 
and problems of life and society. It is enough to set out only basic rights and duties 
in the Fundamental Law, since the establishment of detailed rules and laws has to 
be carried out on the level of parliamentary legislation. Before the Fourth 
Amendment, rules concerning the problem has been set in the Constitution.  
According to the text of the Constitution: “Hungary shall strive to provide the 
conditions for housing with human dignity and to guarantee access to public 
services for everyone.” 
2.4. The Constitution is not a game 
The constitution of a country records in writing the fundamental values of the 
people living there. We cannot allow that cruelty to and prosecution of the poor 
and the vulnerable become a fundamental value in Hungary.  
Hungary formally ensures equal rights. However, homeless people are not 
able to exercise their rights similar to people in better positions. 
However, by declaring living in public areas a petty offence by the Municipal 
Assembly and by the National Assembly as well in the spring of 2011, it is 
homelessness that became unlawful.  
Banning homeless people from public places violates their fundamental 
human rights and human dignity, as well as the right to freedom of movement and 
free choice of residence. 
It can be considered unconstitutional. It would restrict their right to free 
decision-making and their freedom of action without meeting the requirements of 
the Constitutional-test. According to the current practice of the Constitutional 
Court, the State should limit fundamental rights only if the protection or the 
enforcement of other fundamental rights or other constitutional values cannot be 
achieved by any other ways. 
In order to be constitutional, a constitutional restriction must fulfill the 
requirements of the so-called „necessity-appropriateness” test. The legislature is 
required to apply the weakest means appropriate for achieving the objective of the 
limitation. 
According to the practice of the Constitutional Court, a reference to an 
abstract public interest or to an increase of the efficiency of public safety is not 
adequate grounds for limiting the fundamental constitutional rights.  
The Constitutional Court has already explained at the time of the 
constitutional foundation of rule of law that dignity is associated with human life 
inherently and it is indivisible and unrestrictable, and therefore it is equal for all 
people. [...] Human dignity and life is untouchable, undisputable for everyone 
equally regardless of their physical and spiritual level of development or condition. 
 
 
  
198 
 
3. THE SITUATION OF THE HOMELESS IN VIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
3.1. Constitutional Court Decision 176/2011. (XII. 29.)  
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly dealt with the limitation of the rights of 
the homeless. In the first case, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights 
initiated the examination of the constitutionality of the (Art. 14 para. (2)) of the 
regulation of Kaposvár Municipality because this regulation declares rummaging 
through garbage as an offence. 
Although, according to the commissioner, the regulation is unconstitutional. 
The commissioner argues that the regulation restricts rummaging through 
garbage without any reasonable grounds, however it does not target a group 
expressis verbis, and it stigmatizes and discriminates people living below the 
poverty line because it relates to them, so the regulation violates the freedoms and 
equality of opportunity of these groups. 
The Commissioner turned to Kaposvár county town in order to repeal the 
objected decree but that did not happen, so he turned to the Constitutional Court, 
which examined what kind of attitude can be declared as an offence by a local 
governmental decree. An activity declared as a petty offence by the local 
government must be in accordance with major goals and principles of different 
regulations. 
According to the challenged ordinance: those who effuse rubbish or rummage 
through garbage at the littery placed in public areas commit an offence and can be 
punished by a maximum of thirty thousand (30,000) HUF fine.  
According to the Kaposvár notary, the decree was necessary because of the 
maintenance of the public peace and public health. 
Contrary to this, according to a higher level regulation, if someone effuses 
rubbish or rummages through garbage in containers, commits an offence in a 
public health point of view, which is punishable by up to 50,000 HUF fine. Thus, 
the regulation of the local government is needless, since the qualification of 
littering is regulated by a higher regulation. 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the local government must not impose 
sanctions because rubbish is considered ownerless as the contents of the waste 
container can be picked up by anyone. The fact that someone puts garbage into the 
container expresses that they dispose it, because they do not need it. Therefore, 
rummaging through garbage must not be sanctioned because it is not an illegal 
conduct. So the local government exceeded its legislative competence by 
sanctioning “getting out garbage of the container”.  
Finally, the Constitutional Court examined whether rummaging through 
garbage can be declared as a petty offence or not.  
According to the Ombudsman, sanctioning rummaging through garbage is 
also unconstitutional because there is no constitutional limitation of such activities. 
Since the „valuable” things removed from containers as a result of rummaging 
through garbage are taken away and not littered, the action does not cause any 
pollution. Although, if the concerned person litters, (s)he is responsible for this 
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action. 
The Constitutional Court thought that rummaging through garbage is an 
involuntary action that arises from existential reasons as those doing so are poor, 
needy people, who can ensure conditions to survive, only in this way, that is why 
that action should not be sanctioned and the State must ensure respect for human 
dignity. 
The state has a compulsory obligation to provide assistance for the socially 
disadvantaged by creating or founding institutions, etc. but those who do not take 
advantage of this help, for example, they need to have access to the vital things by 
means of rummaging through garbage. The local government, therefore, exceeded 
its legislative powers again. 
Finally, the Constitutional Court examined whether the regulation violates the 
conditions of equality or not.  
According to the Commissioner, it violates that because the decree 
stigmatizes an excluded group, which is considered an indirect discrimination.  
The Constitutional court ruled that the impugned section of the local 
government decree was unconstitutional and therefore annulled it.4 
3.2. Constitutional Court decision 38/2012. (XI. 14.)  
There is another decision of the Constitutional Court also dealing with the 
homeless.  
It was also Máté Szabó, the ombudsman, who initiated an action for 
constitutional review of laws declaring living on public areas habitually a petty 
offence and those who commit this offence can be fined or detentioned. 
Some of the main points of the regulation on the use of public places and 
public areas of the capital city are contrary to the requirement of the principle of 
the rule of law and violate the right to human dignity. The usage of public land for 
the purpose of living there habitually is declared a petty offence. 
For those homeless people who live in the public place, this is a very serious 
crisis situation, which is due to various constraints, and it is rarely a consequence 
of a conscious or thoughtful free choice. Homeless people have lost their homes 
and have no opportunity to resolve their housing, so the absence of a real 
alternative forces them to live in public places – as that is the only open public 
area. 
According to the Ombudsman, a priori there is no place for them to go to, so 
they are forced to reside habitually in public areas that is why sanctioning this 
situation is in conflict with their human dignity. Homelessness does not infringe 
the rights of third parties/others, so it should not be threatened by such a 
disadvantage. He considers fine unsuitable because it is not deterrent.5 
 
                                                 
4 Decision 176/2011. (XII. 29.) Constitutional Court. 
5 Decision 38/2012. (XI. 14.) Constitutional Court. 
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4. NO ROOF = NO RIGHTS? 
4.1. Legislation leading to illegality 
Parliament, local governments and particularly concerned metropolitan and district 
municipalities (most of the homeless people live in the capital) considered the 
introduction of strict rules and regulations as a successful way to handle the issues 
of homelessness. 
Examining former and current legislation and regulations, it is clear that 
harassing begging or begging with children was prohibited before 2010, as well.  
Intervention by the state had a turn again concerning the homeless when 
legislators interfered with the issue in statutory level. 
This provided an opportunity for local governments to declare the improper 
use of public areas a petty offence. According to the concerned amendment of the 
Act of Offence, fine and imprisonment can be imposed for offences. 
The Ministry of Home Affairs attempted to set up some „surviving spots” for 
the homeless by larger municipalities in February in 2011 but these attempts were 
unsuccessful. However, in spring, 2011, the Metropolitan Municipality took 
advantage of the amendments of 2010 and made a local regulation in which 
homelessness (in public areas) was declared as an offence. In November 2011, the 
National Assembly adopted a new bill in which declared „habitual residence in 
public places” a punishable offence for which imprisonment or a fine of up to 150 
thousand HUF can be imposed if someone violated the prohibitive municipal 
regulations repeatedly.  
On the 23th of December in 2011, the Parliament accepted the new Act of 
Offence, which was to punish homelessness throughout the country. 
On 12th of November 2012, the Constitutional Court declared the provision 
of the Act of Offence – which sanction living in public areas habitually – 
unconstitutional and annulled it due to the actions of the ombudsman. The 
committee also annulled those statutory provisions, which have authorized local 
governments to impose a fine or apply confiscation as a punishment of antisocial 
behaviour by regulations.  
Finally, on March 11, 2013, the Parliament adopted the Fourth Amendment 
to Hungary's Fundamental Law and with this action it is included in the 
constitution that „An Act of Parliament or local government decree may outlaw 
the use of certain public space for habitation in order to preserve the public order, 
public safety, public health and cultural values.“6 Since according to the majority 
of the Constitutional Court, the contents of the Amendment to Hungary's 
Fundamental Law cannot be reviewed by them, this situation had a serious and 
lasting effect on the constitutional condition of the homeless. 
4.2. International judgement of the Hungarian situation 
Despite international pressure and protests at home, the Hungarian Parliament has 
voted in a constitutional reform which not only inscribed the criminalisation of 
                                                 
6 Fourth amendment to Hungary's Fundamental Law. 
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homelessness in the country’s Constitution but also made it possible to ban people 
from habitually residing in public places and to fine them.  
The constitutional amendment, which criminalizes homelessness, has been 
abolished by the Constitutional Court stating that criminalising homelessness is 
unconstitutional, as it violates fundamental human rights and human dignity. 
Including prosecution of homeless people for living in public spaces into the law 
is unconstitutional. Neither the removal of homeless persons from public premises, 
nor urging them to take up social assistance may be considered a legitimate 
constitutional aim. 
“Homelessness is a social problem that should be dealt with by the state by 
means of social intervention and social assistance rather than punishment. It is 
incompatible with the protection of human dignity as enshrined in Article II of the 
Fundamental Law to declare homeless persons dangerous to the society and punish 
them.”7  
Hungary has been called on to veto the amendment criminalising 
homelessness which makes it possible to imprison or fine those who sleep on 
streets. This proposed constitutional amendment clearly violates the spirit of the 
many international human rights treaties to which Hungary is signatory. 
Members of FEANTSA (European Federation of National Organisations 
Working with the Homeless), which is an umbrella of not-for-profit organisations 
which participate in or contribute to the fight against homelessness in Europe, are 
alarmed by the regulations of the Hungarian authorities. This organization is the 
only major European network focusing exclusively on homelessness at European 
level. They are alarmed by the Hungarian government’s campaign to punish and 
imprison homeless people who are unable to find or afford accommodation. It is 
quite shocking that over the past two years, the Hungarian government has used 
the legal system to systematically target vulnerable people living in extreme 
poverty. There is a lack of affordable housing in Hungary and people who are 
homeless have nowhere to go. 
“Criminalising homeless people is not the answer. Punitive measures, which 
stigmatise and criminalise homeless people, are cruel, since they punish the most 
vulnerable. These measures, whether they be fines that are absolutely unaffordable 
for people who have no means, or convictions for misdemeanors and other 
administrative offences, make it even more difficult for people to emerge from 
situations of extreme poverty. People face additional stigma, huge bureaucratic 
burdens and debts when attempting to re-integrate into society and the labour 
market. Criminalisation measures are also ineffective, since they aim to move the 
visible problem of homelessness out of view rather than offering any real solution.” 
The solution should be an integrated homelessness strategy, which offers real 
housing options for homeless people, either in social rental properties or in 
supported housing on the private rental market can be successful and affordable, 
even in times of economic crisis. The main argument for this opinion is: „These 
                                                 
7 European Federation of National Organisations Working With the Homeless Press 
Release – 13th March 2013 For Immediate Release FEANTSA Deeply Concerned by 
Constitutional Amendment Criminalising Homelessness. 
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strategies are not more expensive than using police and the justice system to fine, 
arrest and imprison homeless people and they work.” 
FEANTSA, and its members urge the Hungarian government to withdraw its 
proposed amendment which will open the door to human rights violations in the 
Hungarian constitution. Instead, Hungary was called on to work towards 
developing an integrated homelessness strategy as a positive and effective way of 
putting an end to this unacceptable situation.8 
4.3. Ruthless power – destructive consequences 
Over the past two years, there was a change of attitude in the management of 
homelessness by the state and local governments in Hungary; instead of a social 
or an administrative problem the issues of homelessness have become a criminal-
legal question. 
The government provides power for municipalities to criminalize homeless 
people in many ways. There is an Act according to which living in public places 
habitually as well as the construction of a cottage in a public land without a 
permission is punishable. It was done despite the fact that in Hungary there is no 
adequate social housing policy and people cannot exercise their rights to 
possessing proper housing. The state responsibility is realised in the effort that the 
homeless are forced to live in shelters – act enforced even by law enforcement 
tools. The current Hungarian politics misses the ambition to find a socio- political 
solution to the problem of homelessness. 
Huts and tents of those homeless who try to create own, independent „homey” 
conditions are dismantled. The authorities try „to solve” the problem by moving 
the visible problem of homelessness out of view. There is something particularly 
cruel in the way how the government has been working on the prosecution of 
homeless people over the past two years; and this cruelty appears not only in the 
legislative level but also in practice. 
4.4. Punishment or fair judgement? 
Contrary to this situation, the Constitutional Court stated in its decision that 
homelessness is a social problem so instead of punishing them, the state should 
deal with social intervention and provide social aid and support. 
Thus, – the Constitutional Court says – it violates the right to human dignity 
if the homeless are considered to be dangerous to the society or considered as 
criminals. To penalise those who have lost their houses is not humane. Homeless 
people live on public places but doing so they do not infringe the rights of others, 
do not cause any harm and they do not commit other unlawful actions. 
According to the committee, the human dignity of the individual and the 
freedom of action cannot be reconciled with the fact that the state enforces anybody 
to the use of services by punishment.  
Last but not least, homelessness is a social problem so solving the problem by 
                                                 
8 European Federation of National Organisations Working With the Homeless Press 
Release – 4 March 2013 For Immediate Release – Statement Against the Continued 
Persecution and Criminalisation of Homeless People in Hungary 
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penalising it is not only inappropriate, but also pointless. These homeless people 
got to this position because they cannot resolve their housing due to lack of income, 
thus, they are not able to pay the fine. If we accepted that a person in an unworthy 
position does not have a human dignity to be protected, we would question human 
dignity and equality itself.  
Anyone at any time can get involved in an indignity. We do not need an 
economic crisis for this to happen, an unexpected life tragedy might be sufficient 
to make somebody homeless. Homelessness and living on the streets is not a matter 
of the choice of the individual, but also it is a kind of deviance. – Besides, there 
are the ranges of differences in individual cases – so dealing with it might cause a 
dilemma and a lot of conflicting views and interests. Obviously, neither sleeping 
on the streets nor rummaging through garbage may not be 'rights', anyway, they 
have never been and nobody wants to achieve that.9 
5. A POSSIBLE WAY TO SOLUTION  
As the problem of homelessness is a multi-dimensional problem, solutions and 
efforts to reintegrate homeless people into the society also need to be enforced in 
several areas simultaneously. Different ideas, opinions and ways can be and should 
be considered and supported to achieve success. 
The public opinion should be revealed also. Policy makers consider it 
inevitable to find solutions to the prevention of homelessness, to release the 
difficulties of the homeless and to help them in the housing while respecting and 
guaranteeing the requirement of an equal dignity. 
Provision of adequate housing is a key component/element of reintegration.  
Access to a number of good quality and affordable housing for the 
marginalized population would be necessarily important. Furthermore, politics on 
employment, housing and expenditure on health should be revised and 
reconsidered as well. It is important that other areas associated with homelessness 
should be consistent with current policies and measures with the effort to eliminate 
homelessness, and should not generate a regular supply of the homeless 
population. 
It is important to act against the social perception that homelessness is only 
the problem of the individual, as it is a social problem affecting the whole 
population.  
Instead of punishing and placing the homeless in mass accommodation 
shelters, the solution would be the prevention of rooflessness and facilitating the 
access to housing for those who have been unhoused.  
Issues of homelessness should be dealt together with social and housing 
policies instead of using law enforcement exclusively. Furthermore, ensuring the 
                                                 
9 BORZA, BEÁTA – CSIKÓS, TÍMEA – KISS, BERNADETT (et. al.): A hajléktalan lét, in HAJAS, 
BARNABÁS – SZABÓ, MÁTÉ (ed.): Pajzsuk a törvény. Rászoruló csoportok az ombudsmani 
jogvédelemben [Their shield is the law. The Ombudsman's protection for vulnerable 
groups], 2013, Alapvető Jogok Biztosának Hivatala, Budapest, 337-338. 
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cooperation of local authorities and efficient governmental programs are needed. 
This cooperation would facilitate their social integration and settle their situation 
instead of criminalization of homeless and displacement them from the street.  
Comprehensive housing and social policy reform is needed to manage the 
issue of homelessness; e.g. Acts should contain an enforceable right to housing. 
Measures taken in the following areas are also necessary; an extended social 
housing network, significantly increased housing subsidies, widespread, effective 
debt management, moreover a social service system that works on helping its 
customers to be re-housed soon, and finally, putting a greater emphasis on 
prevention rather than post-compensation. 
Nobody should have the purpose to – especially not the Parliament that helps 
so much for those who are in danger of losing their home due to foreign currency 
loans – more people live on the street or in a cottage, but we should have the 
purpose to have real solutions to the housing crisis. Either the development of the 
local governmental rental property and the use of empty houses or the renovation 
of the houses in bad condition and making them habitable would be the solution to 
this problem.  
All upcoming governments should seek to alleviate homelessness, reduce the 
number of homeless people, to ease the housing crisis situations. The method of 
allocation housing and the access to housing opportunities should be improved. 
These efforts, however, limited by the course of the current budgetary constraints, 
which can be grouped into two categories: achievable steps with or without out 
increasing the reverse current resources. 
Although, it is true that it is not the government that is responsible for the 
elimination of homelessness in whole or for every aspect of the situation.  
Wide social cooperation and social professional initiative is necessary for the 
gradual elimination of homelessness. Housing and housing retention, furthermore, 
conversion of the regulation concerning the homeless is that requires governmental 
actions. Such integrated systems in which the government, local governments, 
social service providers and operators are working together are required in each 
area of intervention.10 
6. CONCLUSION  
The most important is that homeless people should not be treated as criminals. I 
am convinced that direct assistance can only be successful and efficient by the 
collaboration of various organisations and people. It is strongly important to 
emphasize the respect of the human dignity, the equitable recognition of the 
autonomous and responsible decision-making capabilities, furthermore, the 
                                                 
10 GYŐRI, PÉTER – MARÓTHY, MÁRTA: Merre tovább? Egy nemzeti hajléktalanügyi 
stratégia lehetséges keretei. Szakértői javaslat a Magyar Köztársaság Kormánya részére 
[Where to go? A possible framework of a national homelessness strategy. An expert 
proposal for the Government of the Republic of Hungary], in Pro Domo Füzetek, No. 1. 
(2008), 10. 
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expression and the protection of the rights of the homeless or the people threatened 
with such a situation. It is also indispensable to prevent the development of such 
situations, in other words, to prevent people becoming homeless.  
The state always had, and now it also has a constitutional way to – not really 
constitutional law, but rather implemented a kind of paradigm shift in approach – 
become an active ally of the citizen instead of being a passive assistant. The role 
of the ombudsman can be defined as an incentive to act as a professional and as a 
consistent critic who shows the arguments in favour of participation and 
coordinates the process. 
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Abstract 
After the crisis, the European Union's legislative activity in connection with the regulation 
and supervision of the financial market was characterized with strong task- and 
competence centralization endeavours and is still characterized with it in secondary (but 
not primary) law. That is exactly why the most complicated and most significant question 
is that among what limitations these endeavours can prevail from legal point of view. The 
article analyses the notion of the measures for approximation in the European law, the 
applicability of Article 290 and 291 TFEU and the reinterpretation of the Meroni doctrine 
in the context of the current case law of the European Court of Justice.  
 
Keywords: ESMA, European agencies, legal basis, Meroni, Article 290 and 291 TFEU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After the crisis, the European Union's legislative activity in connection with the 
regulation and supervision of the financial market was characterized with strong 
task- and competence centralization endeavours and is still characterized with it in 
secondary (but not primary) law. That is exactly why the most complicated and 
most significant question is that among what limitations these endeavours can 
prevail from legal point of view. What heights can centralization, or nicely 
expressed, integration can achieve among legal frames? What is that point after 
which the integration surpasses the framework of current foundation treaties? 
Centralization's (integration's) margin, borders are set by the rules of primary 
law on delegation of competences and by the case law of the European Court of 
Justice (hereinafter: ECJ). Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: 
TEU) says that – as one of the most significant rules of the European Union 
common law – the limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. According to the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within 
the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Every such competence which 
Treaties have not conferred to the Union, remain at member states. Hence, the 
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principle expresses that Member States further remain the lords of the Treaties; 
they continue to be holders of national sovereignty.1 It comes from the principle of 
conferral that every secondary legal act must have a legal basis in specific Treaty 
articles, or primary European law. The ECJ review the legality of legislative acts 
and if the legislator chose the act’s legal basis wrong (ultra vires) the Court declare 
the act concerned to be void, based on Article 263 and 264 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU). It is another significant 
question in connection with the delegation of competences that who do Member 
States transfer part of their competences to, hence, according to Article 17 TEU, 
the Commission ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by 
the institutions pursuant to them. (…) It shall exercise coordinating, executive and 
management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. That is – as a quasi-separation 
of powers rule – Article 17 TEU appoints the Commission for the implementation 
of (primary and secondary) Union law, along determined conditions. 
Simultaneously with the widening of the European Union's tasks, the level of 
bodies under the European institutions was formed, from which I have to highlight 
the diffuse system of the so called European agencies. As a reaction to 
organizational expansion, the second level of delegation of competences has been 
formed – among the principle of conferral –, which can also be understood as 
delegation of competences inside the organizational system of the Union. We can 
distinguish two cases on this level. On the one hand, we can distinguish 
competences delegated to the Commission by Union legislators, on the other hand, 
the delegation of those competences which were originally delegated to the 
Commission by the Treaties.2 The first case is handled by Article 290 and 291 
TFEU. Primary law does not rule on the conditions of the second case, its rules 
were formed by case laws of the ECJ (the so called Meroni-doctrine). 
The limits of centralization (integration) endeavours are partly determined by 
the principle of conferral – according to which the Union can only practice such 
competences which were transferred to it by member states through the foundation 
treaties, via limiting their own sovereignty – and as its outcome, the existence of 
an adequate legal basis necessary for secondary legislation. On the other hand, 
centralization's (integration's) limits are the frames of delegation of competences 
among the European Union bodies written in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, 
connecting to which the primary question is whether it can be regarded as a closed 
delegation system or not. On the third part, the court case law referring to the 
delegation of Commission competences also limits the deepening of integration 
among legal frameworks. The extent of the European financial supervisory 
architecture formed as the effect of the crisis was affected by all three limitations 
and the court's interpretation – as I am going to elaborate on it – strongly widened 
the legal limits of competences' centralization in the name of integration. 
                                                 
1 VÁRNAY, ERNŐ – PAPP, MÓNIKA: Az Európai Unió joga, 2010, Complex, Budapest, 183. 
2 LAFARGE, FRANCOIS: The legal basis and the legal constraints of EU agencies (and the 
transformation of the executive function in the EU), in ONGARNO, E. (ed.): EU Agencies, 
2013, Palgrave MacMillan. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra 
ct_id=2249873 [cit. 2014-07-21]. 
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The permissibility of the European financial supervisory system's reformation 
via Union law became questionable by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in front of the ECJ, in its action aiming at the annulation of ESMA 
competence connecting to short selling. Despite that in the action of Great Britain 
questioned the legal limits of centralization endeavours in connection with only 
one competence rule – and not in connection with the whole new supervisory 
system –, the ECJ's decision is a milestone regarding the above mentioned limits.  
2. THE ESMA CASE’S BACKGROUND IN SHORT 
Investigating short selling’s legal background, we can realize that prior to the 
economic crisis there was no Union legislation and Member State legislations 
showed considerably various pictures.3 In September 2008, in the height of the 
financial crisis – in a so called reaction panic –, more Union Member States and 
the USA's competent authorities accepted measures for restricting or banning short 
selling.4 
The current fragmented approach to short selling and credit default swaps 
limits the effectiveness of supervision and the measures imposed and results in 
regulatory arbitrage. It may also create confusion in markets and costs and 
difficulties for market participants.5  
Recognizing the further systemic risks hidden in the different regulations, 
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps 
(hereinafter: Short selling Reg.) was born on the recommendation of the 
Commission. The Short selling Reg. tries to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market and to improve the conditions of its functioning, in particular with 
regard to the financial markets, and to ensure a high level of consumer and investor 
protection, it is therefore appropriate to lay down a common regulatory framework 
with regard to the requirements and powers relating to short selling and credit 
default swaps and to ensure greater coordination and consistency between Member 
States where measures have to be taken in exceptional circumstances.6 
According to Article 28 of Short selling Reg., in case of exceptional 
circumstances, ESMA can order increased information obligation for natural or 
legal persons having net short positions in relation to specific financial instrument 
                                                 
3 See PAYNE, JENNIFER: The Regulation of Short Selling and Its Reforms in Europe, in 
European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 13. Issue 3. (2012), 429. 
4 BEBER, ALESSANDRO – PAGANO, MARCO: Short-Selling Bans Around the World: 
Evidence from the 2007–09 Crisis, in The Journal of Finance, Vol. 68. Issue 1. (2013), 
343. 
5 See COM (2010) 482 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps, 2. 
6 See Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps (hereinafter: Short 
selling Reg.) preamble point 2. 
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or class of financial instruments, and in case of exceptional circumstances, it can 
prohibit or impose conditions on, the entry by natural or legal persons into a short 
sale or a transaction. 
The ESMA can exclusively make these measures if a) the measures address a 
threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the stability 
of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union and there are cross-border 
implications; and b) no competent authority has taken measures to address the 
threat or one or more of the competent authorities have taken measures that do not 
adequately address the threat. The competence set in Article 28 of Short selling 
Reg. is hierarchically superior to Member State authorities' decisions as measures 
accepted by ESMA according to this article are prevail over any previous measure 
taken by a competent authorities.  
The United Kingdom (in this part furthermore referred to as Applicant) 
handed in an action to the ECJ on 1st June 2012, in which it requested the 
annulation of Article 28 of Short selling Reg. based on Article 263 TFEU. In the 
action, the Applicant named four pleas in law, which – according to it – give basis 
to annulations of ESMA’s intervention powers in exceptional circumstances. 
In the action the Applicant referred to that firstly, Article 28 of Short selling 
Reg. is contrary to the second principle established by the Court of Justice in the 
Meroni case,7 because when ESMA is required to take action under Article 28 
entail a large measure of discretion. Secondly, Article 28 purports to empower 
ESMA to impose measures of general application which have the force of law, 
contrary to the Court's decision in Case Romano.8 Thirdly, Article 28 purports to 
confer on ESMA a power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application, 
whereas in the light of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the Council has no authority 
under the Treaties to delegate such a power to a mere agency outside of these 
provisions.. Finally, fourthly, if and to the extent that Article 28 were interpreted 
as empowering ESMA to take individual measures directed at natural or legal 
persons, it would be ultra vires Article 114 TFEU. 
As Balázs Fekete also highlights, „the following conviction in the focus point 
of the Applicants was that Article 28 provides such a wide discretional competence 
to ESMA, which delegation is against the law because of certain foundation treaty 
rules and because of the existing ECJ case law.”9 Besides the validity of the 
concrete competence, the ECJ has to form an opinion in all above mentioned 
theoretically significant interpretation of law that mark the limits of centralization, 
                                                 
7 Judgment of the Court of 13 June 1958. Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v 
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. Case 9/56. 
8 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 May 1981. Giuseppe Romano v Institut 
national d'assurance maladie-invalidité. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal du 
travail de Bruxelles – Belgium. Social security – Applicable exchange rate. Case 98/80. 
9 FEKETE, BALÁZS: Az Európai Értékpapír-piaci Hatóság rendkívüli válsághelyzetben 
alkalmazható beavatkozási hatásköre nem ellentétes az uniós jogrend követelményeivel, 
Lendület HPOPs Kutatócsoport, 2014. Available at: http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/blog/2014/ 
02/europai-ertekpapir-piaci-hatosag [cit. 2014-07-21]. 
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the ESMA case’s systemic importance originates from this.10 These theoretically 
significant questions are going to be investigated via following the study's logical 
order, not according to the order of the Judgement.11  
3. IN THE NAME OF THE INTEGRATION  
3.1. The question of legal basis and the notion of the measures for 
approximation 
Hence, the first theoretically significant question referred to the interpretation of 
the notion of the measures for approximation and Article 114 TFEU determined as 
the legal basis of the competence included in Article 28 of Short selling Reg. Based 
on Article 114 TFEU – which Article is also the legal basis of the formation of the 
ESFS and the SRM –, save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following 
provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. 
The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.  
According to the Applicant, Article 28 of Short selling Reg. is not intended to 
authorise ESMA to take individual measures directed at natural or legal persons. 
On the contrary, measures that may be adopted under that provision are of general 
application. Furthermore, he Applicant considers that, if, however, Article 28 of 
Short selling Reg. is to be regarded as authorising ESMA to direct decisions at 
natural or legal persons, that provision is ultra vires Article 114 TFEU. That 
provision does not empower the EU legislature to take individual decisions that 
are not of general application or to delegate to the Commission or a Union agency 
the power to adopt such decisions. Hence, the theoretically significant question can 
be asked in a way that whether those decisions addressed to financial institutions 
which have prevail over any previous measure taken by a competent authorities 
can be regarded as measures for approximation according to Article 114 TFEU or 
not. The theoretical significance of the question is showed by that the advocate 
general (Niilo Jääskinen) acting in the case and the court has different theoretical 
standpoints. 
In the Advocate General's opinion,12 referring to judgement made in the 
                                                 
10 MARJOSOLA, HEIKKI: Case C-270/12 (UK v Parliament and Council) – Stress Testing 
Constitutional resilience of the Powers of EU Financial Supervisory Authorities – A 
Critical Assessment of the Advocate General’s Opinion, in EUI Working Paper Law 
2014/02, 4. 
11 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014. United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. 
C-270/12. (hereinafter: Judgement) 
12 Opinion of Advocate General, 12 September 2013. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
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ENISA case,13 he ascertained upon the court case law that the EU legislature may 
deem it necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body 
responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation 
‘in situations where, in order to facilitate the uniform implementation and 
application of acts based on that provision, the adoption of non-binding supporting 
and framework measures seems appropriate’. Furthermore, it is important that in 
the ENISA case the ECJ ruled that nothing in the wording of Article 114 TFEU 
implies that the addressees of the measures adopted by the EU legislature on the 
basis of that provision can only be Member States. Hence, Article 114 TFEU 
provides legal basis for that addressees of acts accepted upon this can even be 
natural or legal persons. The Advocate General determined that the decision 
making powers of ESMA under Article 28 of Short selling Reg. bear little 
resemblance to the measures described by the Court in these important passages 
of the ENISA ruling. First of all, measures based on Article 28 of Short selling Reg. 
are legally binding, while the Court investigated non-legally binding measures in 
the ENISA case. While this is not objectionable in and of itself, it is difficult to 
envisage how the exercise of a power under Article 28 of Short selling Reg. could 
contribute to harmonisation of the kind described by the Court in ENISA. Rather 
its function is to lift implementation powers contained in Article 18, 20 and 22 of 
Short selling Reg. from the national level to the EU level when there is 
disagreement between ESMA and the competent national authority or between 
national authorities.14 Hence, the Advocate laid down that the outcome of the 
activation of ESMA’s powers under Article 28 of Short selling Reg. is not 
harmonisation, or the adoption of uniform practice at the level of the Member 
States, but the replacement of national decision making with EU level decision 
making.15  
The ECJ, deviating from the Advocate General's opinion investigated whether 
the two conditions in Article 114 TFEU prevail with relation to Article 28 of Short 
selling Reg. So the ECJ analysed that, on the one hand, whether the measures 
according to Article 28 of Short selling Reg. comprise measures for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in the Member States and, on the other hand, have as its object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.  
                                                 
Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. C-270/12. 
(hereinafter: Opinion). 
13 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 May 2006. United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. 
Case C-217/04. 
14 Opinion point 50. 
15 The Advocate General marked that the Article 352 TFEU could be an adequate legal 
basis for the competences delegated to the ESMA with the Article 28 of Short selling Reg. 
With this legal basis the problem is that the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament to adopt 
the appropriate measures. 
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The ECJ first determined that by the expression ‘measures for the 
approximation’, the authors of the TFEU intended to confer on the Union 
legislature, depending on the general context and the specific circumstances of the 
matter to be harmonised, discretion as regards the most appropriate method of 
harmonisation for achieving the desired result, especially in fields with complex 
technical features.16 Regarding this, the ECJ has held in that regard that such 
discretion may be used in particular to choose the most appropriate method of 
harmonisation where the proposed approximation requires highly technical and 
specialist analyses to be made and developments in a specific field to be taken into 
account.17 Continuing the Court's argumentation, accordingly, the EU legislature, 
in its choice of method of harmonisation and, taking account of the discretion it 
enjoys with regard to the measures provided for under Article 114 TFEU, may 
delegate to a Union body, office or agency powers for the implementation of the 
harmonisation sought. That is the case in particular where the measures to be 
adopted are dependent on specific professional and technical expertise and the 
ability of such a body to respond swiftly and appropriately.18  
The ECJ makes clear that the aim of the orderly functioning and integrity of 
the financial markets or the stability of the financial system in the EU includes the 
establishment of an appropriate mechanism which would enable measures to be 
adopted throughout the EU which may take the form, where necessary, of decisions 
directed at certain participants in those markets.19 The EU legislature therefore 
considered it appropriate to lay down a common regulatory framework with regard 
to the requirements and powers relating to short selling and credit default swaps 
and to ensure greater coordination and consistency between Member States where 
measures have to be taken in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the 
harmonisation of the rules governing such transactions is intended to prevent the 
creation of obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market and the 
continuing application of divergent measures by Member States.20 Taking all these 
into account, in the ECJ interpretation, competence set in Article 28 of Short 
selling Reg. corresponds to criterion written in Article 114 TFEU. 
The significance of the decision in connection with the centralization's 
borders can be traced in that according to the ECJ’s interpretation Union bodies’ 
practice of their competences is based on such general, Union interests which in 
nature and in quality differ from the individual Member State interests and cannot 
                                                 
16 Judgement point 102. 
17 Judgement point 103. 
18 Judgement point 105. 
19 RAPASSI, RENÉ: Assessment of the Judgement of the European Court of Justice in Case 
270/12, United Kingdom v Council and European Parliament. Impact of this judgement on 
the proposal of the SRM regulation. Available at: http://www.sven-giegold.de/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Assessment-ECJ-Case-C-270-12-and-relevance-for-the-SRM1. 
pdf [cit. 2014-07-21]. 
20 Judgement point 114. 
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be realized exclusively with the cooperation of Member State authorities.21 
Therefore, competences ensuring direct Union intervention (supervision) are 
compatible with Article 114 TFEU in connection with the significantly integrated 
European financial markets, and – in opposition with the Advocate General's 
opinion which tried to set up limits for the application of the notion of „measures 
for approximation” –, unanimous decision making set in Article 352 TFEU is not 
necessary for them. Such interpretation of Article 114 TFEU gives way (not only) 
to the further integration of financial market's European supervisory system. 
Besides, such wide interpretation creates the risk that the scope of „measures for 
approximation” could be expanded almost indefinitely, depriving of Article 114 
TFEU inherent limits and thus the principle of legality can be violated.22 
3.2. The interpretation of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
According to the argumentation of the United Kingdom, because of that Articles 
290 TFEU and 291 TFEU circumscribe the circumstances in which certain powers 
may be given to the Commission, the Council has no authority under the Treaties 
to delegate powers such as those provided for in Article 28 of Short selling Reg. to 
an EU agency. Therefore, the ECJ had to take a side in that whether legal 
framework entering into the place of so called comitology with the Treaty of 
Lisbon mean a closed system or not. Whether creators of TFEU wished to create 
such an only legal framework in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU which only makes 
the delegation of certain competences exclusively – in special cases for the Council 
– for the Commission possible, or the Union legislator have other systems of 
delegation such competences to Union organizations or authorities. 
“The practice of delegated competences and the taking of adequate executive 
measures are indispensable tools of the enforcement of Union law, which suppose 
the unified interpretation of the TFEU’s new regulations”.23 Based on Article 290 
TFEU a legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of the legislative act. Article 291 para. 1 TFEU lies down that Member 
States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally 
binding Union acts. Para. 2 says that where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing 
powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases 
provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
Council. By Article 290 the Commission can only be authorized to accept acts with 
general application, while according to Article 291 the Commission (in certain 
cases the Council) can also apply individual measures and acts with general 
application for the sake of unified implementation of the legally binding Union 
                                                 
21 FEKETE: op. cit. 
22 BABIS, VALIA: The Power to Ban Short-Selling: The Beginning of a New Era for EU 
Agencies? in Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 27/2014. 2. 
23 OSZTOVITS, ANDRÁS (ed.): Az Európai Unióról és az Európai Unió Működéséről szóló 
Szerződések magyarázata 3. 2011, Complex, Budapest, 3099. 
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acts.24 The main constitutional concern relating to Article 290 TFEU delegated acts 
appertains to democratic accountability. In contrast, the main constitutional focus 
in relation to Article 291 TFEU implementing acts relates to respect for the primary 
competence of the Member States with respect to implementation of EU law, and 
the institutional balance between the Council and the Commission when they 
assume implementing roles.25  
Continuing the train of thoughts, it is important to highlight that regarding 
Article 291 a European authority cannot be the addressee of an executive 
competence expressis verbis. The opinion of the Advocate General also took it into 
consideration, as is says that Article 291 TFEU, like Article 290 TFEU, does not 
refer to agencies as subjects on whom implementing powers can be conferred at 
the EU level. However, given that implementing powers do not extend to amending 
or supplementing legislative acts with new elements, fundamental constitutional 
principles do not in my opinion prevent the legislator from conferring such powers 
on agencies as a midway solution between vesting implementing authority in either 
the Commission or the Council, on the one hand, or leaving it to the Member 
States, on the other.26 This argumentation was taken over by the ECJ as well. In 
the Judgement the ECJ noted in that regard that, while the treaties do not contain 
any provision – hence, neither do Articles 290 and 291 TFEU – to the effect that 
powers may be conferred on a Union body, office or agency, a number of 
provisions in the TFEU none the less presuppose that such a possibility exists.27 
Under Article 263 TFEU, the Union bodies whose acts may be subject to judicial 
review by the Court include the ‘bodies, offices’ and ‘agencies’ of the Union. The 
rules governing actions for failure to act are applicable to those bodies pursuant to 
Article 265 TFEU. Article 267 TFEU provides that the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States may refer questions concerning the validity and interpretation of 
the acts of such bodies to the Court. Such acts may also be the subject of a plea of 
illegality pursuant to Article 277 TFEU.28 
The ECJ noted that Article 28 Short selling Reg. vests ESMA with certain 
decision-making powers in an area which requires the deployment of specific 
technical and professional expertise. However, that conferral of powers does not 
correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU, 
but cannot be considered in isolation. On the contrary, that provision must be 
perceived as forming part of a series of rules designed to endow the competent 
national authorities and ESMA with powers of intervention to cope with adverse 
developments which threaten financial stability within the Union and market 
confidence. The ECJ deducted that from this rough argumentation that Article 28 
of Short selling Reg. read in conjunction with the other regulatory instruments 
adopted in that field identified above, cannot be regarded as undermining the rules 
                                                 
24 OSZTOVITS: op. cit. 3105-3106. 
25 Opinion point 83. 
26 Opinion point 86. 
27 Judgement point 79. 
28 Judgement point 80. 
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governing the delegation of powers laid down in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 
TFEU.29  
Defects of the ECJ’s argumentation probably come from that in spite that it 
agreed with the Advocate General’s argumentation, it did not wish to make it as 
part of the Judgement. According to the Advocate General’s argumentation, 
Article 28 of Short selling Reg. does not violate Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
because it delegated the intervention competence to ESMA directly with the 
legislative act of the Union’s legislator – choosing the solution outside Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU. The EU legislature is not acting as a ‘delegating authority’ when 
it confers implementing powers on institutions, agents, or other bodies of the 
Union, but a constitutional actor exercising its own legislative competence, as 
conferred on it by the higher constitutional charter, i.e. the Lisbon Treaty.30 
According to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU the addressee of transfer may only 
be the Commission – in some cases based on Article 291 the Council –, however, 
we can deduct it from the argumentation of the judgement that according to the 
ECJ’s interpretation, the legal framework formed in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
cannot be regarded as the only system with which competences can be delegate to 
any European body. With this argumentation, the ECJ stated not less than that 
European agencies actually mean the alternative of the implementation of Union 
law besides Member States and implementation by the European institutions, even 
if expressis verbis does not come from the text of founding treaties. Among the 
framework of the Meroni-doctrine, which I am going to elaborate on in the next 
point, in areas requiring special competencies, the Union legislator can delegate 
regulative and executive competencies to European agencies having special 
competency. Based on these, the ECJ distinguish the delegation of powers to EU 
agencies that is only indirectly recognised in the Treaties, from the explicit 
delegation of powers to the European Commission under Article 290 and 291 
TFEU.31 
3.3. The reinterpretation of the Meroni-doctrine 
The essence of the Meroni judgement32 is that the Court differentiated between 
clearly defined executive powers and discretionary powers having wide margin of 
discretion. The previous ones can be conferred, while the latter ones were qualified 
as non-conferrable. 
In the Meroni-case the Court set those criteria with which fulfilment 
delegation of competences is allowed. Based on these, the delegator can only 
delegate competences to administrative agencies if: (1) a delegating authority 
cannot confer upon the authority receiving the delegation powers different from 
                                                 
29 Judgement point 80. 
30 Opinion point 91. 
31 PELKMANS, JACQUES – SIMONCINI, MARTA: Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA can help 
build the single market, in CEPS Commentary, 3. Available at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/ 
mellowing-meroni-how-esma-can-help-build-single-market [cit. 2014-07-21]. 
32 See KOEN, LENAERTS: Regulating the regulatory process: Delegation of powers in the 
European Community, in European Law Review, Vol. 18. No. 1. (1993), 30. 
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those which it has itself received under the treaty (general principle); (2) such a 
delegation of powers can only involve clearly defined executive powers, the use of 
which must be entirely subject to the supervision of the delegator; (3) a delegation 
of powers cannot be presumed, even when empowered to delegate its powers the 
delegating authority must take an express decision transferring them; (4) the 
transfer must not disturb the institutional balance between European institutions. 
The judgment of the Meroni-case was further supplemented by several later 
judgements, which together form the so called Meroni-doctrine.33 The framework 
of the delegation of competences became complete with the Romano case, as the 
ECJ, within the framework of the EEC Treaty in connection with a Union 
organization set the general prohibition of legislative competences’ further 
delegation, the prohibition of the delegation of powers having wide margin of 
discretion, and it determined the necessary system of criterion regarding every 
other cases of delegation of powers. 
The strict system of conditions set up in the Meroni-case and the prohibition 
of the delegation of powers having wide margin of discretion has stood for fifty 
years as constitutional limits to delegation,34 which prohibition continuously 
became flexible in the court’ case law35 since the formation of the new type of 
European authorities. The ESMA case allowed the ECJ to summarize and 
reinterpret the Meroni-doctrine’s strict rules in the context of the introduced Treaty 
of Lisbon.36 
As the first step, the ECJ noticed that the bodies in question in Meroni case 
were entities governed by private law, whereas ESMA is a European Union entity, 
created by the EU legislature.37 As the second step the court stated that unlike the 
case of the powers delegated to the bodies concerned in Meroni case, the exercise 
of the powers under Article 28 of Short selling Reg. is circumscribed by various 
conditions and criteria which limit ESMA’s discretion.38 Finally the ESJ noted that 
contrary to the applicant’s claims, those powers do not, therefore, imply that ESMA 
is vested with a ‘very large measure of discretion’ that is incompatible with the 
                                                 
33 See for more details KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS: A tilalomtól a rugalmas értelmezésig, avagy a 
hatáskör-átruházás az Európai Unió Bíróságának joggyakorlatában, in KECSKÉS, GÁBOR 
(ed.): Doktori műhelytanulmányok 2014, Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola, Győr, 2014 (forthcoming). 
34 CRAIG, PAUL: EU Administrative Law, 2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 155. 
35 About the process see for more details KÁLMÁN (2014): op. cit. 
36 Under Article 263 TFEU, the Union bodies whose acts may be subject to judicial review 
by the Court include the ‘bodies, offices’ and ‘agencies’ of the Union. The rules governing 
actions for failure to act are applicable to those bodies pursuant to Article 265 TFEU. 
Article 267 TFEU provides that the courts and tribunals of the Member States may refer 
questions concerning the validity and interpretation of the acts of such bodies to the Court. 
Such acts may also be the subject of a plea of illegality pursuant to Article 277 TFEU. So 
the judicial control over the European agencies become full, which was completely lacking 
at the time of the Meroni judgement. 
37 Judgement point 43. 
38 Judgement point 45. 
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TFEU for the purpose of that judgment.39 
The new Meroni-doctrine referring to the delegation of competences can be 
built up from the judgement’s reasoning – with regards to what has been included 
in the Advocate General’s opinion. Based on this, competences having wide 
margin of discretion can be delegated to other Union organization than the 
Commission if (1) this organization is a European Union entity, created by the EU 
legislature (point 43), (2) the exercise of the powers are circumscribed by various 
conditions and criteria which limit the discretion (point 45), and (3) the exercise 
of the delegated powers are precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review 
in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority (point 53.). It 
is important to highlight that competences delegated via this way include 
individual decisions and measures with general application, too. 
Hence, it can be seen that the ECJ strongly reinterpreted the framework of 
delegation of competences, taking the wide formation of the ECJ review into 
account, which – together with literature opinions40 – makes the maintenance of 
strict conditions laid down by the Meroni-doctrine useless. At the same time, the 
Court discarded the difference between clearly defined executive powers and 
discretionary powers having wide margin of discretion, with that it resolved the 
prohibition of the delegation of powers having wide margin of discretion. Several 
representative of the literature welcomed the reinterpretation of the Meroni-
doctrine, as the new framework suits the Union’s current improvement more.41 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The ESFS was formed as the first step of the European Union’s reform process, 
“compelled” by the economic crisis. However, the banking system’s bailout 
packages raised government debt to such levels which led to sovereign credit crisis 
and the deflection of the Euro. Hence, reform processes continued to move towards 
the more and deeper integration, putting the question: what kind of Europe do we 
want? Do we want the United States of Europe with federal organization or the 
Europe of Nations with strengthened Member State position, without political 
integration? We can list several reasons pro and contra all future plans, however, 
with the analysis of institutional changes it becomes clear that the formation of the 
Banking Union is not followed by the weakening of Union competencies but by 
its drastic strengthening. The introduction of the Banking Union, and primarily the 
SRM, its second pillar cannot reach its aim without adequate financial background, 
hence, the further deepening of integration is needed with the approach of fiscal 
policy, which is direct consequence and wish is the remedy of the lack of 
democratic legitimacy, which shows into the direction of political union. We can 
quarrel on the European Union’s future, but decision makers have already voted 
                                                 
39 Judgement point 54. 
40 VOS, ELLEN: Reforming the European Commission: What role to play for EU agencies? 
in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37. No. 5. (2000), 1123-1124. 
41 See BABIS: op. cit. 2.; PELKMANS – SIMONCINI: op. cit. 6. 
  
218 
 
for one way with the introduction of reform processes. In the deepening of 
integration the ECJ does a good job, and as it elaborated on it in its study, they 
widened the founding treaties’ regulations to the widest in order to maintain the 
reform processes. We cannot solve every question with the integration-friendly 
interpretation but the principle of legality has to be blocked against the unlimited 
widening of founding treaties’ regulations mainly Article 114 of TFEU which is 
the seed of reforms. The European Union is further based on the principle of 
conferral, as it cannot be regarded as a sovereign state, hence, for the sake of 
ensuring the new institutional reforms’ stability – before further reforms – their 
treaty base must be laid down. 
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Abstract 
In my study I present a significant part of the Hungarian public administration’s 
reorganization, the process of the formation of district public administrational level and 
district offices. In its frame, I draw a picture on the main characteristics of council district 
system which can be regarded as current district offices’ historical predecessor, and I also 
provide information on the circumstances of the termination of district offices operating in 
the council system. Following this, via stepping to the present through the past, I review 
the theoretical bases of the formation of the modern district public administrational level, 
the main stages of the formation of district offices, including basic rules referring to 
“district agreements” to be entered into by municipal and county government offices and 
settlement local self-governments. After this, I provide information on district offices as 
sub-offices of municipal and county government offices; analyse district office’s 
organization, task- and competence sphere and their management and leadership 
characteristics. As the closure of the study, I review experiences conducted from the 
operation of the district offices so far and present recommendations on the development of 
district offices 
 
Keywords: district offices, metropolitan and county government offices, regional public 
administration, reorganization 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the new Government was formed in 2010, the regional level of public 
administration's state administration subsystem was characterized by a great deal 
of fragmentation and organizational variety. If we made a snapshot of regional state 
administration at the time of the 2010 change of government, we would see that 
among regional state administration organs there were organs of general 
competence (regional state administration authorities) and of special competence 
(such as county land registries), if we investigated competency and operational 
area, we would see regional organs (regional administration of national pension), 
county organs (such as county office of justice) and organs operating with special 
competency (such as national park directorate). This diversity was increased by 
that some state administration organs with special competence operated 
organizational units of regional competence under county level (such as regional 
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land registry).1 Besides the above mentioned diversity of regional state 
administration organs, a further specialty of the regional level was that certain 
organs acting independently from one another with the budget insured to them and 
used human resources 'freely' among legal frames, operated next to the weak 
coordination competence of regional state administration offices.  
These disintegration processes could not be stopped by the always 
strengthening integration endeavours2 either, up until 2010, when the new 
Government started to reorganize the Hungarian public administration. 
As the first step of the public administration reform, metropolitan and county 
public administration offices3 were formed – again – with the effect of 1st 
September 2010, terminating regional state administration offices and as their legal 
successors. Simultaneously, the unconstitutional situation4 born with the formation 
of regional state administration offices – or rather their legal precursor, regional 
public administration offices – also terminated. The second step of the reform was 
the formation of metropolitan and county government offices as the Government's 
regional state administration organs of general competence, which legal base is 
given by Act CXXXVI of 2010 (furthermore referred to as Khtv.) on law 
amendments connected to the formation of metropolitan and county government 
offices and regional integration, and Government Decree nr. 288/2010. (XII. 23.) 
on metropolitan and county government offices. Metropolitan and county 
government offices were formed on the base of metropolitan and county public 
administration offices, as their general successor. Furthermore, a significant part 
of the until then mainly individually operating regional state administration organs 
became organizational units – special administration units – of metropolitan and 
county government offices through integration. As regards regional state 
administration organs falling outside of the integration – except National Tax and 
                                                 
1 GYURITA, ERZSÉBET RITA: Reformok a területi államigazgatás szervezetében 2010-2013 
között [Reforms in the regional state administration organization between 2010 and 2013], 
in PATYI, ANDRÁS – LAPSÁNSZKY, ANDRÁS (ed.): Rendszerváltás, demokrácia és 
államreform az elmúlt 25 évben. Ünnepi kötet Verebélyi Imre 70. születésnapja tiszteletére 
[Transition, democracy and state reform in the past 25 years. Festive volume for the 70th 
Birthday of Imre Verebélyi], 2014, Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 175. See also: GYURITA, 
RITA – HULKÓ, GÁBOR – KÁLMÁN, JÁNOS – TÓTH, TAMARA: The Organisation of the 
Hungarian Public Administration, in SMUK, PÉTER (ed.): Transformation of the Hungarian 
Legal System 2010-2013, 2013, Complex, Budapest, 155-184. 
2 The detailed analysis of government decrees referring to the integration attempts see:  
ZÖLD-NAGY, VIKTÓRIA – VIRÁG, RUDOLF: A területi államigazgatás integrációja 
[Regional state administration's integration], 2013, Nemzeti Közszolgálati és 
Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 35-48, 52-57. 
3 Metropolitan and county public administration authorities were formed by Government 
decree 214/2010. (VII. 9.) on metropolitan and county public administration authorities. 
4 See the presentation of the unconstitutional situation born upon the formation of regional 
public administration authorities in details: VEREBÉLYI, IMRE: Válságban a magyar 
középszintű közigazgatás, quo vadis? [In crisis the hungarian middle level public 
administration, quo vadis?], in Új Magyar Közigazgatás, Vol. 1. No. 2. (2008), 1-5. 
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Customs Administration Directorate and law enforcement organs5 –, the 
metropolitan and county government office practices coordination and 
investigative rights. Metropolitan and county government offices started their 
operation on 1st January, 2011. It is important to highlight that government 
windows6 that is, integrated governmental customer services were formed at that 
time as inner organizational units – with tighter task- and competence sphere – of 
metropolitan and county government offices' general office. 
The Government set the formation of a good state as its objective, for which 
completion it launched two further significant administration programs in 2011, 
besides the public administration reform: juridical reform and reform of local self-
governments.  
The Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development Programme 
(furthermore referred to as Magyary Programme) was elaborated in 2011, which 
on the one hand set down the legitimacy and results of the reform started in 2010, 
on the other hand, appointed the public administration reform's further main tasks. 
The Magyary Programme also elaborates on the characteristics of the good state, 
according to which „the State creates a lawful and equitable balance between a 
number of interests and needs, allowing the enforcement of claims in this way and 
provides protection. On the other hand, the State proceeds with due responsibility 
in the interest of the protection and preservation of the nation’s natural and cultural 
heritage. On the third part, the only self-interest of the State is that it should, under 
any circumstances and effectively, be able to enforce the above two elements of 
the common good; in other words, the State should create an effective rule of law, 
therefore should provide the functioning of its institutions, and should provide the 
honouring and accountability of individual and collective rights.”  
The Magyary Programme defines the complete renovation of regional public 
administration as the most significant part of the public administration's 
innovation. The Government arrived to the next significant step of the renovation 
of regional public administration in 2013, as district offices started their operation 
as sub-offices of metropolitan and county government offices on 1st January. As it 
was worded in the 2012 publication of the Magyary Programme, „the purpose of 
the Government is to create contemporary, modern-age administrative districts 
which contribute to the coming into being of a system that operates at lower social 
costs than today’s public administration”. 
In my study I would like to present the circumstances of the formation of 
district offices as well as significant characteristics of their organization and 
operation. 
                                                 
5 Metropolitan and county government offices only practice coordination tethers over law 
enforcement organs. 
6 See the formation, organization and operation of metropolitan and county government 
offices in GYURITA, ERZSÉBET RITA: A fővárosi és megyei kormányhivatal [The 
metropolitan and county government office], in Új Magyar Közigazgatás, Vol. 7. No. 2. 
(2014), 8-19. 
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2. HISTORY – DISTRICTS IN THE SYSTEM OF COUNCIL 
Via investigating the history of Hungary's state structure, we can see that districts 
as regional organizational units7 placed between the level of county and settlement, 
as a basic regional unit of Hungarian public administration has continuously been 
present in the Hungarian state's history from the 15th century – except twenty-
eight years – and has had a decisive role during the completion of public 
administration tasks.8 Unfortunately, the study's extent limitations do not allow me 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the history of the institution of districts9 but 
I have to mention the district organization operating in the system of council prior 
to the transition, which can also be regarded as the „ancestor” of the current 
structure of districts. 
Article 29 of the Constitution10 accepted in 1949 (furthermore referred to as 
Constitution) stated that the People's Republic of Hungary consists of counties, 
districts, towns and villages from state administration point of view. According to 
paragraph 30 of the Constitution, the state power's local organs are county council, 
district council, village council and town district council.11 Hence, district was 
determined as a constitutional regional level. 
Detailed rules on the organization and operation of local councils – as elected 
organs – can be found in Act I. of 1950 (furthermore referred to as: the first council 
law) on local councils. At that time, district council's operation sphere expanded 
to all towns and villages, however, with the individual decision of the council of 
ministers, certain bigger towns were subtracted from the authority of county and 
district council.12 
Act X of 1954 on councils (furthermore referred to as: the second council law) 
altered the regional fragmentation, based on which all towns were subtracted from 
the authority of the district council and towns with county and district rights were 
formed.13  
Act I of 1971 on councils (furthermore referred to as: the third council law) 
brought about a significant change with regards to the district level of public 
administration as it terminated district council organs and institutionalized district 
offices. District councils, as unified, individual organs of the county council's 
executive committee, carried out state administration tasks belonging to the 
competence of the council with relation to those villages which were not qualified 
                                                 
7 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 19. 
8 IVANCSICS, IMRE – TÓTH, JÓZSEF: A járások múltjáról és lehetséges jövőjéről [On the 
history of district and on their possible future], in: Területi Statisztika, Vol. 15. Issue 1. 
(2012), 6. 
9 Ibid. 6-33, makes a complete review of the institution’s history in this theme. 
10 Act XX. of 1949 on the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic.  
11 IVANCSICS – TÓTH: op. cit. 9, Act XX. of 1949 on the Constitution of the Hungarian 
Republic, Art. 29 and Art. 30. 
12 IVANCSICS – TÓTH: op. cit. 10. 
13 Ibid. 11. 
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as suburban villages. As for suburban villages, competences of the district office 
or its head were practiced by special administration organs and the secretary of the 
town council's executive committee.14  
The application of the suburban model continuously spread in the 1980s.15 
Finally, the system of district offices was terminated with the effect of 1st January 
1984 and was replaced by the new administration system, the suburban 
administration. Though, it is interesting that 83 districts and 61 suburban 
administrational units existed before the reorganization, while 179 new suburbans 
were formed after the reorganization.16 
3. THEORETICAL BASES OF THE FORMATION OF DISTRICT OFFICES 
The basic objectives determining the directions of the public administration's 
reorganization and the formation of the Good State are written in the Magyary 
Programme (furthermore referred to as Magyary Programme 11.0), drafted by the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Justice in 2011. The formation of district 
state administration and simultaneously with it, local self-government reforms 
were already marked as tasks to accomplish in Magyary Programme 11.0, as a 
result of which the partition of local public affairs and state administration affairs 
between district offices and village local governments is being realized.17  
After the formation of district as state administration level, upon the wish of 
the Government, the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice took the 
necessary steps for creating scientific basis18 for districts and the formation of 
district offices.19  
As the result of the theoretical preparation work, the Government, as a formal 
decision, published Government decree 1299/2011. (IX. 1.) (furthermore referred 
to as Government decree) on the formation of districts, determining the formation 
of districts. Point 1 of the Government decree sets the more effective, more 
inexpensive and client centred regional state administration as the objective of the 
district system. Furthermore, the Government decree also recorded the conceptual 
principles regarding the formation of districts. The Government decree obviously 
stated that districts must be formed with 1st January 2013. Besides setting the date, 
we can put the organizational principles and expectations of the Government 
decree into four main groups:  
                                                 
14 Art. 66 of the Act of 1971 on councils. 
15 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 19. 
16 IVANCSICS – TÓTH: op. cit. 12. 
17 Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development Programme (MP 11.0) 25. 
available at: http://magyaryprogram.kormany.hu/admin/download/d/2c/40000/Magyary 
%20kozig%20fejlesztesi%20program%202012%20A4.pdf [cit. 2014-06-01]. 
18 The Ministry of Public Administration entrusted the HÉFTA Research Institute with the 
carrying out of preparatory tasks. The study can be retrieved from: http://hetfa 
.hu/terhasznalatvizsgalat/ [cit. 2014-06-01]. 
19 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 170. 
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a) principles to follow during determining districts' regional extension and 
competence area; 
b) principles referring to selecting districts' seat; 
c) principle of the distribution of local self-government and state 
administration tasks; 
d) principles referring to districts offices' organizational system and their 
physical realization. 
4. FORMATION OF DISTRICT OFFICES 
On 25th June 2012, the Parliament created Act XCIII of 2012 (furthermore referred 
to as District law) on the formation of districts and the modification of laws 
connected to it, which Act determined the legal frames of the formation of districts 
and transferred the law amendments20 necessary for the reorganization of tasks. 
During the formation of districts, the District law justified it as a primary 
standpoint that the newly formed district offices shall be formed on the base of 
local self-governments ‘assets and human resources ensuring the completion of 
tasks taken over from the local government, and on the base of metropolitan and 
county government offices’ sub-offices, hence, the central budget shall be less 
burdened by the introduction of the new lower-middle public administration level, 
therefore, not only the operation but the formation shall also be done in an 
inexpensive way. As for human resources, it is significant to note that only those 
public officials could be transferred from village local self-governments who met 
the conditions necessary for fulfilling the tasks.21 I must note that with regards to 
certain village local self-governments the first thing to determine was the number 
of positions of the staff complement of the mayor's office to be taken over by the 
given metropolitan and county government office in the ratio of the transferred 
task- and competence circles. Hence, the staff complement of district offices was 
not influenced by the circumstance that certain public officials did not meet the 
qualification conditions, or the village self-government decided not to give any 
public officials, as in these cases metropolitan and county government offices took 
over empty positions which could be freely filled among legal frames. It can be 
seen that therefore person and position was separated from each other. The self-
government assets serving the completion of tasks was taken to the metropolitan 
and county government offices' free utilization,22 the legal relation of the public 
officials who were taken over became governmental service relation by the power 
of law.23 Details of the transfer of positions and self-government assets serving the 
completion of tasks transferred from local self-governments was completed by the 
                                                 
20 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 182.  
21 The applicable qualification conditions are determined in Government decree 29/2012. 
(III. 7.) on the qualification conditions of public officials. 
22 District law, Art. 2. para. (1). 
23 District law, Art. 7. para. (3). 
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agreement between metropolitan and county government offices and village self-
governments. The agreements had to be conducted until 31st October 2012.24 In 
cases if it did not happen at all or not adequately happened, the agreement was 
done between the given metropolitan and county government office with a decree, 
and it decided on unsettled questions of the agreement with a decree.25 There was 
no place for further legal remedy against this metropolitan and county government 
office decree in the public administration organization, the affected village self-
government could hand in judicial supervision request against it. 
Government decree 218/2012 (VIII. 13.) (furthermore referred to as District 
government decree) formed as an executive decree of the District law had the 
sample26 of agreement between metropolitan and county government offices and 
village self-governments, and the detailed rules of concluding agreements and the 
handover of self-governments' assets. 
The District government decree appointed27 the competence area of district 
offices and determined their organizational structure. Based on the regulation, 23 
district offices in Budapest and 175 district offices in the counties could start their 
operation on 1st January 2013. 
5. LEGAL BASE OF DISTRICT OFFICES 
The District law – among others – modified the Khtv., which hence determined 
district offices’ place in the system of metropolitan and county government offices, 
set the rules of competence practicing and finalized the practice of employers’ 
rights.28 
According to Khtv., district offices operate as sub-offices of county 
government offices, and district offices operate as sub-offices of the metropolitan 
government office.29 Based on the regulation by law, district offices – similarly to 
special administration organs – became metropolitan and county government 
offices’ organizational units with individual task- and competence sphere with that 
functional tasks30 ensuring district offices’ operation are carried out by the general 
office of metropolitan and county government office. This solution ensured the 
operation-financial advantages coming from the unified organization with regards 
to district offices, too.31  
District offices’ organizational structure follows the organizational structure 
of metropolitan and county government offices, according to which the district 
                                                 
24 District law, Art. 5. para. (2). 
25 District law, Art. 5. para. (5). 
26 District government decree’s appendix 2 contains the text of the agreement. 
27 The District government decree’s appendix 2 contains district office’s competence area. 
28 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 186. 
29 Khtv. Art. 20/A. para. (1)-(2). 
30 The determination of functional tasks is written in Art. 1 of the District Law. 
31 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 186. 
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office consists of the district general office led by the head of the district office 
(furthermore referred to as district general office) and specialised district organs.32 
As regards the organizational structure of the district general office, KIM 
order nr. 3/2013. (I. 18.) (furthermore referred to as KIM order) on organizational 
and operational structure of metropolitan and county government offices has 
resolutions. Based on the KIM order’s investigation, it can be concluded that the 
district general office characteristically consists of an authority department and the 
department of the office of government issued documents. In case of district offices 
with greater number, a department supporting operation has also been formed in 
frames of the district general office for carrying out certain functional tasks.33 
Government windows with extended competences34 were formed in 2014 as the 
newer stage of the public administration reform (furthermore referred to as district 
government windows), which windows started their operation as the district 
general office’s organizational units. In connection with district government 
windows we must notice that they were formed from the merging of departments 
of the office of government issued documents and those government offices which 
previously operated as organizational units of metropolitan and county government 
offices’ general office. In the new type of government offices one can arrange cases 
belonging to the sphere of the office of government issued documents and cases 
belonging to previous government offices’ task and competence sphere, as well as 
cases of special administration organs’ task- and competence sphere (such as true 
copy of title deed). Not all district offices have such new-type of government 
windows yet, their formation is continuous. Currently, office of government issued 
documents and department of government windows can simultaneously operate 
next to each other.  
The following specialised district organs operate as organizational units of 
district offices: 
a) district public trust office for carrying out child protection and guardian 
tasks; 
b) district construction office to carry out construction supervision authority 
and certain legally determined construction authority tasks; 
c) district building control and heritage protection authority for carrying 
out construction supervision, certain legally determined construction 
authority tasks and cultural heritage protection authority tasks; 
d) the district office’s special administration organ of Animal Health and 
Food Control for carrying out food safety, food quality-supervisory, 
fodder-supervisory, food chain-supervisory and animal health tasks; 
e) district land registry for carrying out property and ground formation 
tasks; 
                                                 
32 Khtv. Art. 20/A. para. (3). 
33 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 212. 
34 Government decree 515/2013. (XII. 30.) on government windows introduces the “second 
generation” government windows. 
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f) district land registry’s labour sub-office for carrying out employment, 
work force tasks; 
g) district public health institution for carrying out public health tasks.35 
According to para. (2) of the District government decree’s Art. 2, the 
government decree can name other state administration organizations as the district 
authority’s special administration organ. However, this has not happened since the 
setting up of district offices. It is important to highlight that not all district special 
administration organs have been formed in all district offices. It is only the district 
public trust office that operates in every district. Characteristically, all district 
organs can be found in bigger district offices and they practice their tasks and 
competence sphere expanded over more districts. 
The fact that administration shall not fall further from citizens was a highly 
justifiable principle at the formation of district offices. To that end, the institution 
of sub-offices and case assistant has been formed. The District government decree 
states that the district office can carry out its tasks through sub-offices and case 
assistants with regards to villages belonging to its competence.36 Sub-offices are 
district offices’ individual inner organizational units, where the district office holds 
permanent administration. In those settlements where the district office does not 
operate sub-offices but still wishes to ensure the possibility of local administration, 
district office’s case assistants may act. Details of the settlement case assistant 
service are set in the agreement conducted between metropolitan and county 
government offices and settlement local self-governments.37  
6. DISTRICT OFFICE’S DIRECTION AND LEADERSHIP 
6.1. District office’s direction 
The district office’s direction is greatly similar to the leadership structure of 
metropolitan and county government offices, as the head of the district office can 
be regarded as a political leader to the extent that his/her appointment’s condition 
is higher education and at least five-year public administration experience, 
however, in his/her case Khtv. accepts parliamentarian activity, chair of county 
assembly and fulfilling the role of a mayor as public administration experience.38 
It is a difference though that district office heads’ charge is not connected to any 
governmental cycle.39 The head of the district office is appointed and exempted by 
the minister upon the recommendation of the Government Commissioner. 
Employer rights over the head of the district office – expect appointment and 
exemption – are practiced by the Government Commissioner.40  
                                                 
35 District government decree, Art. 2. para. (1). 
36 District government decree, Art. 1. para. (1). 
37 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 223-224.  
38 Khtv. Art. 20/D. para. (2). 
39 FAZEKAS, MARIANNA: Közigazgatási jog, Általános rész I. [Public administration law – 
General part I.], 2014, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 202-203. 
40 Khtv. Art. 20/D., para. (1). 
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The head of the district office is substituted by the assistant-head of district 
office. Theoretically, the assistant-head of district office is the district office’s 
administrative professional leader, as one can be appointed as assistant-head of 
district office if s/he has basic degree and public administration management 
qualification, basic degree and international public administration management 
qualification, master degree and graduate public administration manager 
qualification, master degree and graduate European and international public 
administration management qualification, graduate jurist qualification achieved at 
master degree and at least basic degree and economist qualification.41 The 
assistant-head of district office is appointed and his/her legal relation is terminated 
by the Government Commissioner upon the recommendation of the head of the 
district office. Employer rights over the assistant-head of district office – expect 
appointment, termination of legal relation, initiation of disciplinary proceeding and 
cutting disciplinary penalty – is practiced by the head of the district office.42 
Having regard to that district offices are organizational units of the 
metropolitan and county government offices which operate as a unified budgetary 
organization, and to that they are only individual regarding their task- and 
competence sphere, the organizational leader entitlements of the head of the 
district office are quite limited. Most of the organizational tasks are practiced by 
the Government Commissioner.43 In this sphere, the head of district office has the 
widest room for manoeuvre regarding employer rights, which is only limited in a 
way that regarding the appointment and termination of the district office’s 
government official, the Government Commissioner has the right to object. On the 
person to be appointed or terminated as the district office’s government official, 
the head of the district office – in case of specialised district organ after having 
consulted with the head of the specialised district organ – informs the Government 
Commissioner who can object against the person to be appointed or against his/her 
termination within fifteen days after having received the information. The objected 
person cannot be appointed as government official, or cannot be terminated.44 
The employer right over the head of the specialised district organ means an 
exception from the main rule, as the head of the specialised district organ is 
appointed by the head of the county special administration organ upon the 
recommendation of the head of district office – if the government decree does not 
make an exception – and s/he practices the employer rights connected to his/her 
appointment. On the person to be appointed or terminated as the head of the 
specialised district organ, the head of the county special administration organ 
informs the Government Commissioner who can object against the person to be 
appointed or against the termination within fifteen days after having received the 
information. The objected person cannot be appointed as head of the specialised 
district organ, or cannot be terminated.45 
                                                 
41 Khtv. Art. 20/E, para. (2). 
42 Khtv. Art. 20/D. para. (1). 
43 FAZEKAS: op. cit. 204. 
44 Khtv. Art.20/B. 
45 Khtv. Art. 20/F. 
  
230 
 
The head of district office, the assistant-head of district office and the head of 
the specialised district organ are government officials appointed for an unlimited 
period. 
6.2. The district office’s leadership 
A similar structure is present in district offices like the one in metropolitan and 
county government offices’ double (parted) leadership. The difference is that – 
according to the previous point – the Government Commissioner has 
organizational management tether over district offices. In practice it means the 
functional carrying out of tasks that ensure the operation of district offices (such 
as appointments, practising the right to object in case of exemption, practising 
covenant for the charge of the government office in case of procurement ensuring 
the district office's carrying out of tasks, approving the district general office's 
order of business; etc.). 
Besides organizational leadership entitlements, the professional leadership 
tether over district offices has also been institutionalized. The professional 
leadership’s essence is that the given branch's responsibility for the carrying out of 
professional task and the determining of professional requirements remains.46 
Professional leadership’s legal tools are especially a) annulation of decision, order 
for carrying out of a new procedure, if needed, b) decision's precursory or follow-
up approval in legally determined cases, c) issue individual order for the carrying 
out of tasks or complementing a default, d) obliging for a report or statement.47 
Professional leadership over district offices parts with relation to organizations 
having the given task sphere according to the followings: 
a) with regards to state administration cases belonging to the sphere of the 
district general office, the professional leadership tethers are practiced by 
the Government Commissioner; 
b) with regards to tasks carried out by the office of government issued 
documents operating in the district general office for reporting and 
accounting, the tether is practiced by the Public Administration and 
Electronic Public Services Central Authority's chair; 
c) the professional leadership of social tasks belonging to the sphere of the 
district general office is carried out by the metropolitan and county 
government office's social and public trust office; 
d) with regards to specialised district organs, the chair of the county special 
administration organ carrying out the professional leadership is entitled 
to practice the professional leadership tethers.48 
7. DISTRICT OFFICE'S TASK- AND COMPETENCE SPHERE 
Having regard to that according to basic principles determined by the Government, 
                                                 
46 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 243. 
47 District government decree, Art. 3. para. (1). 
48 District government decree, Art. 3. 
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district offices’ most important task is to carry out state administration tasks below 
county level, district offices’ – also meaning specialised district organs – task- and 
competence sphere consisted of the following elements: 
a) authority cases belonging to the sphere of the notary – exceptionally the 
mayor, or the administrator of the mayor's office; 
b) affairs belonging to the task- and competence sphere of metropolitan and 
county government office's special administration organs' subregional 
and district sub-offices.49 
Significant differences prevail during the actual realization of the original idea 
of competence-division, as the complete transfer of state administration authority 
tethers being in the competence of notary has not happened yet, hence, a very 
mixed and complicated system has been formed in the area of practicing lower 
level state administration authority tethers.50 
Besides some insignificant tethers (such as approval of circus menagerie), 
legislators put significant areas into the task- and competence sphere of district 
offices, especially from the point of view of metropolitan notaries. There has also 
been a tether-distribution in certain field of social administration. Furthermore, the 
district office became the general misdemeanour authority.51 Listing it one by one, 
the following cases were transferred from the notary to the task- and competence 
sphere of the district office based on legislations made until the end of 2012: 
a) tasks of the office of government issued documents; 
b) certain public trust and child protection tasks; 
c) certain social administration tasks; 
d) family support cases; 
e) public education tasks; 
f) right of asylum cases; 
g) authorization of sole proprietorship activity; 
h) certain communal-type cases (such as cemetery authorization); 
i) certain animal health tasks (such as authorization of animal shelter); 
j) misdemeanour tasks; 
k) management of local protection committees; 
l) certain water, environmental protection tasks; 
                                                 
49 ZÖLD-NAGY – VIRÁG: op. cit. 205. 
50 The transfer of the notary’s state administration task- and competence sphere to district 
offices in connection with the formation of district (metropolitan district) offices was 
regulated in Government decree 174/2012. (VII. 26.) on the modification of certain 
government decrees. Further tether-installation in connection with the formation of district 
(metropolitan district) offices was carried out by Government decree 296/2012. (X. 17.) on 
the modification of certain government decrees. 
51 FÁBIÁN, ADRIÁN – BENCSIK, ANDRÁS: Régi és új szereplők a területi államigazgatásban: 
járási hivatalok és kormányablakok [Old and new actors in the regional state 
administration: district offices and government windows], in Új Magyar Közigazgatás, 
Vol. 7. No. 2. (2014), 22. 
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m) construction supervision, certain construction authority tasks.52 
The keeping of the mixed system of the lower level state administration 
authority’s task- and competence spheres was explained by the Government with 
that those task- and competence spheres could not be transferred to the district 
office with regards to which the adequate practice of competence requires a more 
detailed local knowledge of local characteristics and local regulations.53 
As I have already mentioned it in point 6., from 1st January 2014, with 
Government decree 515/2013. (XII. 30.) on government windows (furthermore 
referred to as GW Government decree) entering into effect, the possibility for the 
formation of government windows with extended task sphere became possible, 
which government windows now operate as the district general office's inner 
organizational units.54 Hence, the district office's task- and competence sphere was 
expanded with the task- and competence sphere of government windows, which 
can be grouped according to the followings: 
a) cases carried out in their own competence sphere; 
b) cases to be carried out as a contributory authority; 
c) providing guiding information; and 
d) general provision of information without having regard to competence 
sphere and authority. 
8. SUMMARY 
As I have already elaborated on it, some differences prevail between the original 
ideas on the formation of district offices and their actual realization – especially 
with regards to the formation of task- and competence sphere –, however, we 
cannot question the achieved successes of the formation and operation of district 
offices. The formation of district offices was a huge task in the life of metropolitan 
and county government offices, still, district offices started their operation without 
any trouble on 1st January 2013. It is important to highlight that there has been 
smaller fixes in district offices but there has been no need for significant changes, 
which perfectly signals their stabile construction. 
It can also be valued as a great success that citizens basically welcomed the 
formation of the new district office and the client-centred, service provider type of 
public administration, which is a significant objective of the public 
administration's reorganization and is being more and more realized.  
Regarding district office's future, the direction of its improvement arose as a 
question. Numerous governmental ideas have born in connection with it. 
According to one proposal, in case of a possible, further governmental integration, 
                                                 
52 Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development Programme (MP 11.0) 26. 
available at: http://magyaryprogram.kormany.hu/admin/download/d/2c/40000/Magyary 
%20kozig%20fejlesztesi%20program%202012%20A4.pdf [cit. 2014-06-01]. 
53 White Book for the review of the regional state administration system and regional state 
administration competences. 31st August 2013. 16. 
54 GW Government decree Art. 1. para. (1). 
  
233 
 
the integration of the newly integrated regional state administration organs' district 
authority organizational units, the district office's individual organizational unit 
shall be accomplished. There was also a proposal regarding that based on the 
experiences so far, districts' area shall be investigated, and if needed, their border 
shall be modified – even through possible contraction – in order to reach a more 
effective public administration operation. 
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Abstract 
This article is a brief summary of the fundamental principles of Hungarian public media 
services. The reader can get an overall picture about the main moral and ethical rules on 
public media services in Hungary. These principles are mainly determined in Act CLXXXV 
of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media, and the Code of Public Media Services. In 
this article I try to take a closer look at how Hungarian public media services work, based 
especially on these principles, and what these principles mean actually. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, a new Media Act was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament: Act 
CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media.1 This Act describes and 
defines the main features and fundamental principles of Hungarian public media 
services. These features and principles are not new in the Hungarian legislative 
system, however, they are very important not only in Hungary but in every 
democratic state.2 In this article I try to take a closer look at how Hungarian public 
media services work, based especially on these principles. 
Why are these principles so important? Are they useful actually, or are they 
just of a bunch of guidelines which don’t work in real life? It is not a simple 
question but I think time will give the answer to this, too. Let’s be optimistic about 
this because, in my opinion, these principles shouldn’t be ignored and they have a 
message both to the citizens and the Hungarian Parliament. 
                                                 
1 Along with the Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules 
on Media Content. 
2 To get a more detailed picture about the history of fundamental rights in the Hungarian 
legislative system see KUKORELLI, ISTVÁN: Tradíció és modernizáció a magyar 
alkotmányjogban [Tradition and modernization in the Hungarian Constitutional Law], 
2006, Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 11-19. 
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2. THE PRINCIPLES  
The fundamental principles of the Hungarian public media services are not only 
determined in Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media 
(hereinafter: Media Act). Another source is the Code of Public Media Services 
(hereinafter: Code). This document is not a source of law, it is a fundamental guide 
to refine and explain the features and objectives defined in the Media Act. As the 
Media Act, also the Code determines and describes the fundamental principles and 
explains them in details. So, let’s take a closer look at the actual principles and 
what they mean actually:3 
2.1. The fundamental principles of independence from political parties and 
political organisations 
The independence of public media services is one of the most important tasks to 
fulfil. Public media services generally serve the citizens and not political parties or 
organisations. Separating public media services from them ensures that the public 
media should not be just a marketing or propaganda tool for the current governing 
party. It goes without saying that the citizens should be informed enough about 
political events and that they can build their own opinion about politics-related 
topics. Therefore, it is mandatory, that the information provided by public media 
services should be balanced and manifold. Public media services must not accept 
grants or any kind of money from political parties or organisations. Even in the 
period before elections, they publish the advertisements of political parties for free 
and in an equal timeframe for all participants. 
2.2. The principles regarding diversity, objectivity and balanced nature of news 
and timely political programmes, the presentation of disputed issues and the 
diversity of opinions and views 
Presenting truthful, objective and timely information to the audience about 
significant events is one of the main goals of public media services.4 As said 
before, Hungarian citizens have the right to build their own opinion and they can 
do it only if they have the opportunity to get the relevant information on topics 
they are interested in. Diversity in the information flow is also very important 
because people are not the same and choosing among various opinions is not only 
a right but it is also a responsibility for each citizen.  
2.3. The criteria for supporting and sustaining the mother-tongue culture  
Globalisation has also taken its toll on national languages. Life gets always faster 
and faster and the linguistic culture of each country is affected by globalisation in 
some ways. The original languages of traditional nations are declining; more and 
more foreign expressions show up in languages, foreign terms are used much more 
                                                 
3 Based on the listing in the Code of Public Media Service Art. 15-27. 
4 More detailed information about this very important criteria: Decision 1/2007. (I. 8) 
Constitutional Court about the criteria of balance. 
  
238 
 
than it is necessary and grammar errors plague everyday conversations. Slang and 
one-dimensional communication only make it worse. Public media service 
providers have a chance to slow down this process because their services affect a 
large part of society and they can reach and influence people like none else, 
besides, of course, other media providers. It’s sad to say but commercial media 
providers are more interested in making profit and being „hip and trendy” than 
sustaining the mother tongue culture. Therefore, public media’s responsibility is 
enormous: they should communicate the right usage of words and correct 
grammar, present the many dimensions of the beautiful Hungarian language. 
2.4. The principles of presenting the culture and life of national and ethnic 
minorities in Hungary  
Every democratic state must protect and support their national and ethnic 
minorities within the borders of their territory. These minorities are considered as 
state-constituent factors, so strengthening and presenting their culture and 
identities form a highly ranked principle in the regulation of the media.5 To support 
these goals, public media service providers dedicate scheduled time to minorities 
at national and local levels and make programmes that present the life and the most 
important events related to each group. This is also an important tool to sustain the 
unique culture and native language of minorities in Hungary.  
2.5. The principles of presenting cultural, scientific, ideological and religious 
diversity 
An independent public media service provider cannot afford to present one-sided 
programmes to their audience. The diversity and balanced coverage of positions is 
also required when presenting religious, ideological, scientific and cultural events. 
As it is said before, public media encourage all their viewers to build their own 
opinions and that can only come true if public media service providers fulfil their 
missions to bring correct and balanced information to their audiences.6 
2.6. The principles of performing tasks with regard to the protection of minors 
The protection of minors is a very interesting topic and often a subject of debate 
because this is a special group of the audience. The children’s lack of experience, 
their credulity and the fact that media have an alleged influence on them create a 
need for multi-level protection. The protection of minors is governed by legislation 
and media self-regulation. The most common thing you can see on audiovisual 
programmes is a little circle on the screen where this sign tells you which age-
group of children the programme in question is appropriate to. 
2.7. Tasks in the field of education 
Public media constitute a powerful tool in the education of citizens. Therefore, it 
is very important to provide content for educational purposes and to provide 
                                                 
5 Also a high priority in the Fundamental Law of Hungary (Art. XXIX.). 
6 This is not just a goal of public media services, it is also a right of the citizens, see SÁRI, 
JÁNOS: Alapjogok II. [Fundamental rights II], 2000, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 228-232. 
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programmes in foreign languages in order to provide the audience with foreign 
language education. The life of Hungarian universities and colleges should be 
presented both in- and outside the borders of Hungary. 
2.8. Tasks in the field of the coverage of sports 
Supporting the Olympic ideal and healthy lifestyle is a highly ranked task for 
Hungarian public media services. Major sport events and not only the competitive, 
but student and leisure sports should be presented as well. Owing to the 
presentation of para-sports events, this goal can be reached better, and in this case, 
public media service providers have even more responsibility because commercial 
media service providers don’t often show para-sports events because of their low 
popularity. 
2.9. The respect for personal and human rights 
Respecting personal and human rights pursuant to the Constitutional Law of 
Hungary, the ECHR and the EU Audiovisual Services Directive7 is one of the main 
features of Hungarian public media services. Which are the most important fields, 
which these provisions try to protect? Fundamental personal rights; the freedom of 
thoughts, opinions, religions; privacy of private and family life; the right to good 
reputation; the rights of the ethnics and minorities.8 Public media services can’t 
reach their goals if any of these rights are violated; should it happen, a press 
correction can be required. 
2.10. Programming principles related to people with disabilities 
Disabled people have their rights, too, and they deserve a bit more attention than 
other people. The social integration of these people is also an important mission. 
To fulfil that, Hungarian public media services provide special programmes to 
people with disabilities and also to other groups of the audience like minors, 
elderly people, less educated people and other members of disadvantaged groups. 
2.11. The promotion of environmental and health consciousness 
The rights related to the environment and health belong to the 3rd generation of 
human rights.9 To support these rights, Hungarian public media services provide 
timely and correct information on the latest developments in these fields. An 
important goal is to encourage people to live in a healthy way and protect their 
environment so as to maintain sustainable development. 
                                                 
7 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
8 For intresting examples and regulation on national and international level see HALMAI, 
GÁBOR: Kommunikációs jogok [Communication rights], 2002, Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 114-201. 
9 For various case-law decisions related to human rights and media law see HALMAI, 
GÁBOR (ed.): Alkotmánybírósági esetjog [Case Law of the Constitutional Court], 2007, 
Complex Kiadó, Budapest. 
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2.12. Provision of regional and local content 
The public media services in Hungary provide information not only on national, 
but regional and local levels, too. This is important to keep citizens informed about 
the nationwide and the neighbouring events. To be informed enough about the 
events in the closer society helps building integrity and relationships as well. 
Therefore, public media service providers in Hungary have regional studios where 
local and regional programmes are produced about the main events of the region 
in question. 
2.13. The principles of keeping members of the Hungarian nation living 
outside its borders appropriately informed and also of providing appropriate 
information about them 
As it is known, Hungary has a special history and millions of Hungarians live 
outside the borders of the state in the neighbouring countries. Hungarian public 
media services take responsibility for them and function as a bridge to keep the 
integrity of the whole Hungarian nation intact. This task has two sides; to provide 
information to the Hungarian minorities in other countries about the main events 
and also to show Hungarian citizens living in Hungary what is happening to 
Hungarian communities abroad. 
2.14. The principles relating to the extent and guarantees of the autonomy and 
responsibility of producers and programmers employed by the public media 
service system and to the guarantees of their participation in defining the 
principles of programme production, ordering and editing 
The strict rules and principles in the world of public media services are not always 
easy to comply with. Sometimes the work and programmes produce conflicts of 
interests because the media always affect also the political sphere. To be able to 
work independently, in compliance with the relevant law and the ethical codes and 
people working in this field must have some kind of autonomy, just to guarantee 
their independence and objectivity.10 
2.15. The principles of formulating basic rules of conflicts of interest, other 
than those provided for by law, applying to staff members, with special regard 
to those employed in relation to news and political programmes 
As mentioned before, the independence and the objectivity are highly ranked 
requirements for the staff that work in public media services. This criterion is even 
higher in the field of news and political programmes because it may be the most 
closely watched part of public media services. Therefore, those participating in this 
area have even higher ethical norms to follow than other staff members. We can 
find a special regulation here, the most immanent and important feature is that 
these employees can’t take any grants, or take part in politics-related events or 
organisations. 
                                                 
10 To understand the core of this matter see HALMAI: op. cit. (2002), 54-68. 
  
241 
 
2.16. The principles relating to ethical norms governing the broadcasting of 
commercial communications and advertising activities 
Commercial speech and communication is a profit-oriented form of 
communication, speaking directly to the audience. Advertising has more levels of 
regulation:11 International directives, general acts, special acts and ethical codes. 
The Media Act serves as a general act alongside them.12 It is very important to 
follow the regulation of these multi-level legislations because in commercial 
media, these rules are sometimes set aside for the sake of profit. 
2.17. The principles of publishing public service announcements and political 
advertisements 
They are tricky principles. Being independent and provide politically correct, 
timely, and balanced information about political events and opinions is even hard 
in „peace time”, not to mention the period before elections. The public media 
service providers aren’t allowed to publish any kinds of political announcement or 
advertisement only in periods preceding the elections. To stay independent and 
balanced, participants of a given election get the same amount of advertising time, 
the same time-frames between the given days (mixed), and the providers can’t take 
money or any compensation time for the publishing. 
2.18. Communications with viewers and listeners 
The public media services are not institutes for themselves; they are created to 
serve the audience, the citizens of Hungary, and the members of the Hungarian 
Nation living outside of the borders. Therefore, it is very important to keep in touch 
with them, to get feedback about the work done by public media services. The 
needs and opinion of the viewers and listeners provide useful information so as to 
make public media services even better. Beside this, the permanent control of the 
civil society is also a guaranty to reach the goals which are set for Hungarian public 
media services. 
3. SUMMARY 
Finally, this is a brief summary of the fundamental principles of Hungarian public 
media services. Of course, this article could (hopefully) only bring a little insight 
into these topics; maybe a whole book would be needed to cover this field 
comprehensively.13 There were some questions at the beginning of this article, so 
                                                 
11 Multi-level regulation is common for the Hungarian legislative system, see PATYI, 
ANDRÁS – VARGA, ZS. ANDRÁS: Általános közigazgatási jog [General Administrative 
Law], 2009, 2010, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 99-108. 
12 For specific legislation and detailed ethical rules see Act XLVIII of 2008 on the Basic 
Requirements and Certain Restrictions of Commercial Advertising Activities; Hungarian 
Code of Advertising Ethics. 
13 And there are right away two of them: KOLTAY, ANDRÁS – NYAKAS, LEVENTE (ed.): A 
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I try to answer them: I think these rules and restrictions are important, they need 
to be followed because they are unavoidable in any democratic state and I also 
think that most of them will be complied to. As I have said, time will tell us 
everything. I hope that the reader could get an overall picture about the main moral 
and ethical rules on public media services in Hungary. 
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Abstract 
Stability is one of the basic juridical properties of constitution. The main way to ensure 
stability of a constitution is a special complicated procedure for changing it. The Russian 
constitution was approved on December 12, 1993 at a referendum. So, like most of the 
constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe it is just over twenty years old. The Russian 
constitution can be called especially rigid and mixed with regard to the methods of its 
changes. To this date there have been thirty three drafts of amendments to the Constitution. 
Only three bills have been approved by the Parliament and have passed the ratification in 
the regions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Last year, in 2013 we celebrated the 20th anniversary of our Constitution.1 That 
was a chance to assess quality of this document. Scientific and political circles had 
a very hot discussion whether to change the Constitution or not. Supporters of 
renewal of the Constitution claim that the Constitution must be dynamical and 
meet the changing public relations. Besides, they pay attention to drawbacks of the 
1993 Constitution content (especially, to a strong role of the Russian President). 
Opponents to the changes say about a necessity of stability and respect to the 
Constitution, setting an example of the USA, because twenty years is a small 
period for a constitution.2 And potential of the 1993 Constitution is yet to be fully 
achieved! 
If we look at the experience of the largest countries of the continental Europe, 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted at national voting on December 12, 1993) 
(considering the amendments introduced by the Laws of the Russian Federation on 
amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 30, 2008 no. 6-
FKZ, December 30, 2008 no. 7-FKZ, February 5, 2014 no. 2-FKZ), available at: 
http://constitution.garant.ru/ [cit. 2014-06-25]. 
2 Torkunov, Anatoly: 20 лет для Конституции не срок [20 years for the Constitution are 
not a term], 2013, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/18/konstituciya.html [cit. 2014-
06-25]. 
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which anyway are close to our country, recently they have been changing their 
constitutions rather actively. In 2008 at the time of Nicolas Sarkozy there were 
amendments and additions made to 64 articles of the French Constitution. In 2006 
Federal Republic of Germany considerably updated the articles on distribution of 
powers between the federation and its members. The best example is Hungary that 
passed a new Constitution three years ago. 
2. PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
The 1993 Russian constitution can be called especially rigid and mixed with regard 
to the methods of its changes. It means that different chapters are changed by two 
different and rather complicated procedures. The Chapter 9 regulates them. 
Proposals on amendments to the Constitution may be submitted by the President 
of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the 
Government, the legislative (representative) bodies of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation, and also by groups of the deputies of the State Duma. 
To change the three protected Chapters (Chapter 1 on the main principles, 
Chapter 2 on human rights and Chapter 9 itself on constitutional amendments) it 
requires not only to get a consent of the majority of deputies of the both chambers 
of the Parliament, but also to convene a Constitutional Assembly, which drafts a 
new constitution and can pass it by itself or submit it to the popular vote. So far 
there is no law about such a Constitutional Assembly, all know why: this trick 
allows to ensure stability of the protected chapters of the Constitution (though there 
are a few drafts in academic circles). 
To change the rest of the Constitution chapters (from the 3rd to the 8th which 
are devoted to the federative structure, the President, the Parliament, the 
government, courts, local self-government) there is another procedure, also rather 
complicated. Amendments are approved again by the both chambers of the 
Parliament, but after that they must be ratified by two thirds of the Russian 
Federation subjects. Thus, to make a change or an addition to any chapter of the 
Constitution it is required to get consent of a wide circle of people, this also 
facilitates stability of the Constitution.  
3. PRACTICE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION  
3.1. Initiators of the amendments 
If we have a look at the practice of amendments to the Russian constitution we can 
see the following specific features. To this date there have been thirty three drafts 
of amendments to the Constitution. 
If we look at initiators of the constitutional amendments we will see that most 
of the drafts (15 – almost a half) were submitted by the legislative bodies of the 
Russian subjects (we will refer to them as legislative assemblies, though they also 
have other names; a federative structure of Russia is very complex; the largest 
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territory in the world, multinational composition; this is a separate subject for 
research and an important factor of influence on the entire life of the country). One 
third of these suggestions (5 out of 15) were made by Sakhalin region, 2 – by 
Ivanov region, 1 – by Tatarstan Republic, Moscow region, Altai region, Tyumen 
region, Volgograd region, Smolensk region, Tambov region, Astrakhan region 
each (in total, 10 subjects out of 85 took part in this process). 
A bit fewer amendment drafts to the Constitution were proposed by the 
deputies of the State Duma (12, which is rather logical, because they have to deal 
with legislation on a day-to-day basis). And 3 suggestions were received from the 
Federation Council and the President of Russia each. One can take a guess whose 
suggestions after all were accepted. 
3.2. Content of the amendments 
As for the content of the drafts it can be said that almost all of them (with a rare 
exception) concern state authorities and do not affect basics of the social order or 
human rights. It can be explained by an extremely complicated procedure for 
changing and adding to these chapters of the Constitution. Moreover, rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution to the full extent comply with international 
standards. But on the other hand, it can be explained by inattentiveness of federal 
and regional deputies to the society and human rights, unlike struggle for power 
(pulling-over of power between the Parliament, the President and their supporting 
parties). 
In total 28 articles of the Constitution were suggested to be changed (out of 
137). One can distinguish three characteristic groups of suggestions about changes. 
3.2.1. Form of state rule 
The form of state rule itself is not indicated in the Russian Constitution (except 
that it is a republic, of course). Review of constitutional provisions shows that the 
Russian Federation is a mixed republic with a dominating President (some 
scientists call it the presidential or even super-presidential, but this is not correct). 
The President is elected by the people. The government is formed by the President 
together with the Parliament and is accountable to them both. The Parliament can 
be dissolved. 
Initiators of the amendments suggest to weaken the role of the President and 
consequently to strengthen the role of the Parliament primarily with regard to the 
government and control over its activity. For example, authors of three drafts 
suggested to provide to the State Duma the right to give consent not only to a 
candidacy of the prime-minister (as it does now), but also of a number of the main 
ministers (internal affairs, foreign affairs, defense, etc.), as well as to introduce an 
individual non-confidence vote to a certain minister (now it is impossible; today 
we have only a joint non-confidence vote when the President fully decides upon 
its outcome). Besides that it was suggested to include into the Constitution a 
provision about a right of the chambers to carry out parliamentary investigations 
(not so long ago there was a federal law passed on this issue, but the Constitution 
does not give such a right to the chambers). In general, the idea was to strengthen 
control of the Parliament over the government. 
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3.2.2. Public Prosecutor’s Office position 
Traditionally since the Soviet time the Russian Prosecutor’s Office has been a very 
strong supervising authority with wide powers. Besides the functions of supporting 
the prosecution in courts and supervising prisons, it has kept a function which is 
absent in the western countries and which was abandoned by most of the Eastern 
European countries when they moved to democracy. This is a function of general 
supervision over statutory compliance of all public bodies. It was inherent to the 
Soviet totalitarian system. 
In the Russian constitution only one article about the Prosecutor’s Office can 
be found in Chapter 7 «Judicial power». One can agree that this is not a very 
fortunate statutory resolution. It is suggested to have the Prosecutor’s Office in the 
title of this chapter, and also to provide to the Prosecutor General the right of 
legislative initiative and the right to apply to the Constitutional Court. 
3.2.3. Territorial issue 
As we said before it is very critical for Russia (as for any other state). It has 
significance not only due to the recent Ukrainian events and joining of Crimea and 
Sevastopol’ to Russia, but first of all due to the Chechen wars and existing tension 
in the Northern Caucasian region. It was suggested (three times! in 1995, 1998) to 
provide to the upper chamber of the Parliament (the Federation Council) the right 
to give consent to the President to use of armed forces not only outside the country 
(as stated by the Constitution), but also on the territory of the Russian Federation 
to ensure sovereignty and national integrity of the Russian Federation, protection 
of rights and freedoms of humans and citizens. Hence the inviolability of the 
territory of Russia was underlined.  
As for human rights, twice (!) it was suggested to change only Article 43 of 
the Constitution about the right for education. 
3.3. Consideration of the amendments 
As for the time of the suggested drafts of the Constitution amendments, we can 
note that the most number of the initiatives had been submitted until 2000 (when 
V. Putin was elected the President). The most number of initiatives (17) were 
finally declined in 2013, this was done obviously to the 10th anniversary of the 
Constitution. The most common way to complete the constitutional process is to 
decline the draft bill in the State Duma or to return it to its author due to non-
compliance with requirements of the Constitution and the State Duma Regulations. 
The longest time of consideration (15 years) was devoted to an amendment 
about strengthening of parliamentary control over the government. The shortest 
and the most successful consideration was two months. And the happy author of 
these amendments was the President of the Russian Federation. 
4. ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION  
In November 2008 the President D. Medvedev unexpectedly for many people 
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submitted two draft bills about amendments to the Constitution, and the Parliament 
approved them already on December 30 the same year. The first amendment 
increased the terms of office of the Parliament and the President: the State Duma 
from 4 to 5 years; the President from 4 to 6 years. Thus, if previously two 
presidential terms in a row totaled 8 years, now it is 12 years (this is a lot; there 
were suggestions to make it 7 years!).3 
The second amendment insignificantly strengthened controlling powers of the 
State Duma: annual reports of the government to the State Duma about the 
performance results were introduced, including on issues raised by the Duma itself. 
We should note that it is not enough. For example, after hearing of the report the 
State Duma could hold debates and raise a question about approval or disapproval 
of the government policy (in fact, about confidence or non-confidence to the 
government).4 
The last, third amendment to the Russian constitution was also passed very 
quickly and unexpectedly upon an initiative of the President (V. Putin) in February 
of this year. It caused turbulent debates in a legal community, especially among 
the civilists. It abolished the Supreme Arbitration Court and subordinated a system 
of the arbitration courts to the Supreme Court.5 
To make the picture complete, it must be said that there is one more category 
of making amendments to the Constitution – resulting from emergence of a new 
subject of Russia or a change of a name of the subject. Upon 1995 Ruling of the 
Constitutional court new names into the Constitution text (into Article 65, which 
lists all the subjects of the Russian Federation) are introduced by the President by 
his decree (it is also a rather arguable decision).6 So, strictly speaking the latest 
amendment to the Russian constitution was inclusion of words about Crimea and 
Sevastopol’ as new constituent entities in the composition of the Russian 
Federation into Article 65.7 
                                                 
3 Law of the Russian Federation on amendment to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation no. 6-FKZ of December 30, 2008 «On changes of the terms of office of the 
President of the Russian Federation and the State Duma». Collection of Laws of the Russian 
Federation, nо. 1, art. 1 (2009). 
4 Law of the Russian Federation on amendment to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation no. 7-FKZ of December 30, 2008 «On controlling powers of the State Duma in 
regard to the Government of the Russian Federation». Collection of Laws of the Russian 
Federation, nо. 1, art. 2 (2009). 
5 Law of the Russian Federation on amendment to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation no. 2-FKZ of February 5, 2014 «On the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation and the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation». Collection of 
Laws of the Russian Federation, nо. 6, art. 548 (2014). 
6 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation no. 15-P of November 28, 
1995 «On interpretation of part 2 of Article 137 of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation». Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation, nо. 49, art. 4868 (1995). 
7 Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ of March 21, 2014 «On admission of the Republic 
of Crimea into the Russian Federation and creation of new constituent entities in the 
composition of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the city of federal 
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5. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
Speaking about the Constitutional court of the Russian Federation and stability and 
dynamism of constitution (looking back on the beginning of this article), it must 
be mentioned that in a sense the Court promotes both thanks to its rulings, 
especially in respect of the Constitution interpretation. In total, the Court 
interpreted the Constitution eleven times (from 1995 to 2000 – look at that year 
again!). Interpretation mostly touched upon the articles on the highest state 
authorities, federative structure, changes to the Constitution and not basics of the 
state rule, human rights and freedoms. 
6. CONCLUSION 
What conclusion can we draw with regard to this essay? Twenty years are a very 
short period to change a constitution. As a first step it is necessary that all 
wonderful ideas embodied in the Russian Constitution on numerous human rights, 
democratic principles, etc. shall be translated into life and become a part of a daily 
life of every person or a state authority8. 
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Abstract 
In Hungary, around 75% of the whole road traffic take place on the more than 31,000 km-
long national network of public roads.1 In my thesis, I am attempting to present this huge 
mass of property as real estate from three various aspects. After placing, categorising 
transportation management in the legal system, I wish to present these special real estates 
– constituting part of the national assets – from the aspects of ownership rights, asset 
management and fulfilling public tasks. I am giving an overview of the organisations 
representing three aspects but which operate based on the same principles and which wish 
to achieve the same objectives. In the end, by taking a practical example, I would like to 
show that – unfortunately – reality is sometimes different from the condition provided for 
by legal statutes. 
 
Keywords: asset management, fulfilling public tasks, ownership rights, transportation 
management 
1. TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT 
Transportation management is a special field from the aspect of the theory of 
public administration law. However, the legal institutions relating to transportation 
can be found indirectly in almost all areas of law. Examples could be especially 
but not limited to civil law which regulates delivery services, transportation and 
insurance in independent contracts, or labour law with special legal regulations 
relating to the employees working in transportation, financial law regulating state 
expenses that can be spent on transportation, taxes generated by transportation and 
other revenues for the State. The Penal Code has a whole chapter on transportation 
crimes; and in the 21st century the laws on environmental protection are intended 
to provide the environment with protection from pollution caused by 
transportation. 
Within transportation public administration two areas can be distinguished 
from each other clearly. When providing transportation as a public service, it is the 
                                                 
1 VÁCZI, VINCENT: The Public Road Network Management is Uniform, in The Safety of 
Transportation, special issue (December 2013.) 41. 
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State that provides certain transportation activities that is to say it fulfils a public 
task. At the same time, transportation politics has to shape and operate 
transportation order and harmonise the activities, proportion of citizens, 
organisations and institutions that participate in transportation. Within 
transportation politics, activities serving transportation constitute a separate 
category which includes the construction, maintenance, development of the 
transportation infrastructure and the economic, organisational structure and 
operation of organisations providing transportation services. The other sub-
category includes the legal and public administration and authority tools serving 
transportation activities such as the institutions of the state budget serving 
transportation, establishing the legal order of transportation, specifying the tasks 
of authority direction, its operation and in the end, the activities of international 
organisations connected to transportation.2 
Road transportation – in addition to water, railway, air, line and local 
transportation – plays an outstanding role within transportation management based 
on the categories adapted to the basic tool system of transportation engineering. In 
Hungary, the road network is composed of public roads and private roads that are 
not closed from public transportation pursuant to the currently effective legal 
regulations. Public roads can be either national or local public roads based on the 
nature of transportation taking place on them, the quality of the roads, 
transportation load and composition of the transportation. As the notion is defined 
in the law on national assets, the national public road is a public road serving 
mainly motor vehicle transportation, having solid cover, that makes part of an 
hierarchical system (high-speed road, public road, subsidiary road), that is 
managed based on uniform public road management principles that creates 
transportation links between the local road network of localities and with the 
logistical connection points of railway, water and air transportation that cannot be 
reached via the local road networks.3 
2. ASPECT MODES 
2.1. Ownership right 
If the page of title deeds of the real estate named national public road is considered, 
then its second part that specifies the beneficiaries, includes almost the same 
records. National public roads constitute the property of the Hungarian State and 
they constitute parts of national assets. National assets – except for some of them 
as per the legal regulations – shall not be sold, shall not be encumbered, shall not 
be provided as security and no shared property can be established on them. Its basic 
purpose is to ensure fulfilling the public task. The legal regulation referred to above 
                                                 
2 LÖVÉTEI, ISTVÁN: A közlekedési igazgatás. [Transportation Administration], in FICZERE, 
LAJOS – FORGÁCS, IMRE (ed.): Magyar közigazgatási jog [Hungarian Public 
Administration Law], 2004, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 162. 
3 Act CXCVI of 2011 on the law on national assets Art. 3. para. (1) point 13. 
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states that the national assets must be treated in a liable way and suitably to their 
purpose. National asset management is liable to operate, preserve the value of, 
utilise, increase the national assets suitably to their intended purpose as it is in 
harmony with the current load-bearing ability of the state, local government, 
primarily necessary for fulfilling public tasks and current social needs, based on 
uniform principles, in transparent, efficient and cost-saving ways and furthermore, 
to sell assets that become unnecessary from the aspect of fulfilling the state's or the 
local government's tasks. 
The public tasks fulfilled by the State that is to say the maintenance, operation 
and development of national roads are realised on the infrastructure network 
constituting part of the public assets. The State enjoys a monopolistic position in 
this area which is justified by the huge volume of investments and the irrationality 
of factors expected by market competition conditions (e.g. parallel railway lines or 
just motorways). It is the clear consequence of monopolistic services that the 
transportation infrastructure is subject to stricter regulation and control of such 
services. The essential of the control is that no one can be excluded of the service 
that is to say of circulating on the road just for economic reasons.  
The State, as the owner, exercises its partial rights arising from the ownership 
right via its organs established for that purpose. The first organ is the Hungarian 
National Asset Management Co. Ltd. by shares (hereinafter: MNV Zrt.), which 
plays a primary role in the coordinate system of the national assets (real estates, 
chattels, land, companies, special asset elements) and asset managers (MNV Zrt., 
Hungarian Development Bank, National Land Fund, the organs of the central 
budget, local governments). From the aspect of my subject matter, the most 
important task of MNV Zrt. is to exploit the national assets subject to its exercising 
the ownership right via direct or civil-law contracts. MNV Zrt. started its operation 
on the 1st January 2008 owing to the amalgamation of – the State Privatisation and 
Asset Management Co. Ltd. by shares, the Budget Asset Directorate and the 
National Land Fund Management Organisation – as their legal successor. Its 
establishment created the organisational conditions necessary for making the 
ownership aspect uniform regarding the national assets.4 At the time of its 
establishment, the owner's statements could be issued as a result of a complicated 
and mainly lengthy procedure. Later on, however, the bureaucratic system became 
more flexible, exercising the rights of the owner became smoother via concluding 
asset management contracts with other asset management organisations or by 
empowering them regarding specified groups of matters. 
2.2. Asset management 
By reading further the page of title deeds of the national public road as real estate, 
there the asset manager is Transportation Development Co-ordination Centre 
(hereinafter: KKK). Its history goes back to 1989 when the Country-wide Public 
Road Chief Directorate was established, which was named Road Management and 
Co-ordination Directorate until its termination of the 1st June 1996. The budget 
                                                 
4 Available at: http://www.mnvzrt.hu/bemutatkozas/mnv_zrt.html [cit. 2014-08-27]. 
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organ established under the same denomination has been named Transportation 
Development Co-ordination Centre since the 1st January 2007. KKK is central 
economic budget organ operating independently with country-wide competence, 
which is the background institution of the National Ministry of Development) 
(hereinafter: NFM). Its primary tasks are managing the financing of the road 
network and coordinating the transportation profession. It provides professional 
preparation and information background for work going in the Ministry and other 
background institutions. The institution is the centre of the coordination activities 
of transportation development: it coordinates the activities of scientific and non-
government organisation working on the development of transportation 
infrastructure and transfers the results of their work to NFM, orientates the work 
of organisations participating and realising infrastructure development projects, 
guarantees the success, legality and efficiency of transportation infrastructure 
development projects. Upon request, KKK issues real estate manager's approvals 
and owner's approvals as well in connection with MNV Zrt as a result of the 
process described before in the subject matter of interventions affecting the assets 
managed by itself by providing green light to network development. 
2.3. Fulfilling Public Tasks 
In our country, the trustee of managing country-wide public roads is Hungarian 
Public Road Not for Profit Co. Ltd. by shares (hereinafter: MK). Though, the page 
of title deeds does not include the public road manager because it fulfils its tasks 
pursuant to legal regulations and a contract concluded with KKK. The legal 
predecessor of the public road managing company, Hungarian Public Road Public 
Utility Company was established by the Ministry of Transportation, 
Communication and Energy by amalgamating 19 department public road 
managing public utility companies into the State Public Road and Information 
Public Utility Company. Hungarian Public Road Public Utility Company 2009. 
was transformed into a company limited by shares by the turning date of 31st 
March 2009 which started its operation from the 1st April 2009. 
The Hungarian State is the founder and shareholder of Hungarian Public 
Roads Not for Profit Co. Ltd. by shares. The Hungarian Development Bank Co. 
Ltd. by Shares exercises the shareholder's and owner's rights due to it as the 
primary legal entity. In the sense of company law, MK is a one-person not for profit 
public utility company limited by shares. When deploying its public utility 
activities, the company fulfils public tasks, which must be ensured by the ministry 
managed by the minister liable for transportation as a state organ regarding the 
country-wide public roads owned by the Hungarian State. By acting in its public 
road managing quality, MK deploys the activities relating to road, bridge, tunnel 
development, maintenance and operation of country-wide public roads that is to 
say activities connected to the public task. The Hungarian Public Roads Not for 
Profit Co. Ltd. by shares records its revenues and costs, expenses separately arising 
from each of its activities belonging to its basic purpose, and within them, its public 
utility activities and economic-enterprising activities. In addition to its public 
tasks, Hungarian Public Roads Not for Profit Co. Ltd. by shares deploys also 
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economic-enterprising activities, however, strictly in order to complete public 
utility tasks or tasks harmonising its basic objectives specified in its Establishment 
Instrument and by not endangering them. The organisation shall not distribute its 
profits of its economic activities but it shall spend the profit to its public utility 
activities. 
Hungarian Public Roads Not for Profit Co. Ltd. by shares has a special place 
in the organisation system of Hungarian state administration. MK does not qualify 
as an authority. The headquarters of the organisation that has vertical and 
horizontal sections are located in Budapest and its divisions fulfil the daily tasks 
in all counties. The actual road management activity is deployed by the more than 
160 operation engineering centres belonging to the operation and maintenance 
departments of the county divisions.  
On the 1st November 2013 an important organisational transformation took 
place in the company's history: the State Motorway Management Co. Ltd. by 
shares merged with Hungarian Public Roads Not for Profit Co. Ltd. by shares. This 
meant that the public road management company took over assets worth around 
twenty billion forints and more than seven hundred employees. Therefore, 
Hungarian Public Roads Not for Profit Co. Ltd. by shares fulfils all the road 
management tasks in addition to the franchised motorway sections, private road 
networks and municipality roads. Owing to the above, the Company has become 
one of the top ten state enterprises of Hungary.  
3. A PRACTICAL PROBLEM 
Regarding, however, the condition of country-wide public roads in the register of 
title deeds, reality does not show the theoretical image described here in each case. 
Let us examine through a practical example what the problem can be? The law on 
public road transportation defines clearly what the territory of the road covers: the 
area between the road borders and the part of land belonging to the road. At the 
same time, the border of the road is its external edge – including the elevated curb, 
the road embankment, the back-slope, the drainage ditch, channel or other draining 
facilities.5 But in the register of title deeds the area of the national public road is 
„from wall to wall” that is to say the pavement or the cycle track by the road 
constitutes its part whereas these latter ones must be the ownership of the local 
government and therefore, must be managed by an operating organ of the local 
government. All the above can lead to several misunderstandings and unreasonable 
lengthy procedures. When, for example, a citizen using the pavement dislocates 
his/her ankle because of the uneven asphalt surface and as a consequence, the 
citizen must go on sick-leave, then the Country-wide Health Insurance Fund often 
wishes to collect the amount paid to the charge of the health insurance auxiliary 
system from the public road managing organ. This problem is much more 
complicated where it is not only the status shown in the register of title deeds which 
is not identical with the actual management relations but in addition, the area 
                                                 
5 Act I of 1988 on the law on public road transportation Art. 47. 
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constituting part of the real estate but falling outside the area of the public road 
remains without a „master”, that is to say, no one manages it. Fortunately, this 
situation occurs only very seldom. 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
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Abstract 
The main principles of data protection and private policy are changed particularly in 
Hungary March 15, 2014, because the new Hungarian Civil Code entered into force at this 
point. A number of principles of data protection and private policy transformed by the rules 
of new Civil Code of Hungary. Both of the theoretical and practical lawyers (who dealing 
with data protection and privacy rights) faced with these changes occurred in all of 
substantive law, procedure law and law-consequence also. The new practice evolving is 
the proposition of courts, which are able to do it through theirs’ judgment. The 
consummation of this paper is the showing of possible solutions.  
 
Keywords: new principle of private policy in Hungary 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At first, it is worth asking the question, what is the reason of the new principles of 
data protection and private policy in Hungary. According to me, the reasons of 
these are searchable the changing of source of rules of civil law and in conjunction 
with the new Civil Code1 the new data protection act.2 New rules and principles 
introduced in Hungarian law system by changing of both of these acts. 
Secondary, necessary to exam the real contains of the old and new acts and 
differences between them especially. We can try to find the answers following 
questions on these bases; what is the reason of new principles of private policy and 
data protection actually? The new acts or new practice of the courts, or both of 
them? 
The answers of these questions searchable in all of these legal conditions and 
interaction with each others. Firstly, the new acts – which had private policy 
                                                 
1 Act V of 2013 on Civil Code. 
2 Act CXII of 2011 on right to informational self-determination and freedom of 
information. 
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contents – started the new (law) attitude of mind of data protection and private 
policy, than the theoretical and practical lawyers went on form the new practice 
adjusting both of new acts and law tradition of this area of law. The area of data 
protection and private policy has approximately twenty-four-year old (law) 
tradition3 and the legislator and the lawyers want to follow – better to say – to 
develop this tradition, but changing fundamentally not. This is indicated by the fact 
that the new act on right to informational self-determination and freedom of 
information inured January 1 2012 and the old Civil Code enforced and new 
entered into force March 15, 2013. This fact shows that, the overlapping between 
the enforcing of Civil Codes and informational act has not caused problems of 
system of area of data protection and private policy. All of acts were able to operate 
parallel with each others. 
I would like to analyse develop of data protection and private policy, so at 
first I show the rules of private policy of old Civil Code, secondary the new. Then 
the describing of new right to informational self-determination and freedom of 
information follows. Finally, I review the principles of European Union shortly. 
2. THE DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVATE POLICY PRINCIPLES OF THE OLD 
CIVIL CODE 4 
This act had not contained the detailed rules of private policy and data protection. 
The general rules enabled the vindication of compensation in the case of injury of 
data protection and private policy.  
There was on mode of this vindication of compensation by the old Civil Code 
of Hungary. This was the non-pecuniary damages. If the privacy of person was 
violated, he could require non-pecuniary damages from the contravener. The 
problem of this system was following; the insulted had to argue the damage and 
the extent of it. The fact of injury of private policy was not enough to validation of 
non-pecuniary damages. It meant, that the data protection and private policy were 
not affirmed as a value per se. Furthermore, the injury of private policy and 
personal data had not meant damage and eventuated compensation per se. 
3. THE DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVATE POLICY PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW 
CODE CIVIL 
At first, we have to say about the main basic of private policy, the rules of 
Fundamental law of Hungary.5 By this act, the right of personal data protection 
                                                 
3 The time of regime change of Hungary is 1990, when the democratic system created and 
the private policy had been recognized by state.  
4 Act IV of 1959 on Civil Code. 
5 It is the new Constitution of Hungary, entered into force January, 1 2012. 
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and right of cognition of data of public interest are authenticated6 and the 
emergence of law of personal data protection and cognition of data of public are 
saved by Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information.7 Secondary, other rules about the private policy had entered into 
force, so the system of data protection of new Civil Code had built step by step on 
the basis of main acts of this area. The new Civil Code contains the principles 
about private policy partly, the sources of this rules are in these acts cumulatively.  
The new Civil Code regulates the protection of individual right two levels. 
One of them is the enumeration of the individual rights, but it is not complete, only 
illustrative.8 One form of injury of individual right is a violation of right to privacy 
and protection of personal data. Other of them is the exact rules of consequence of 
injury of these.  
The consequences of the injury of individual rights in Civil Code show the 
importance of this area by the legislator. On the other hand new legal instrument 
is instituted by the Civil Code. This is the injury paid.9 Instead of the rules of old 
Civil Code of Hungary, According to the injury paid, the damnification of personal 
rights means damage per se, and the contravener have to pay only because the 
action. “The injury paid an indirect consideration of damnification of personal 
rights by property in satisfaction and private legal punishment at the same time.10 
The new system of data protection and private policy is very interesting, 
because it builds on the basic of old system partly. The legal continuity guaranteed, 
because in the case of damnification of private policy, the harmed can require 
injury paid, and then if he has damage to property by the damnification of private 
policy, the harmed can demand non-pecuniary damages. 
The possibilities of harmed are contained by the new Civil Code of Hungary 
and the Act CXII of 2011 on right to informational self-determination and freedom 
of information. The main elements of system of data protection and private policy 
are determined by these acts. 
The possibilities of harmed by the act on right to informational self-
determination and freedom of information;11 protest to personal data management, 
turn right to court to ask stopping infringement, to restore the original, turn right 
to Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
to ask the data protection authority procedures. Anybody can initiate the procedure 
of the Authority for free, by reason of the injuria (or imminent danger of injuria) 
of personal data, or right to knowledge of public interest items. The Authority has 
right to inspect documents, enter room, anyone to request information orally and 
in writing, and conduct assay invite in the procedure.12 The Authority depends on 
                                                 
6 Fundamental law of Hungary Art. VI. para. (2). 
7 Fundamental law of Hungary Art. VI. para. (3). 
8 New Civil Code of Hungary Art. 2:42. para. (2).  
9 New Civil Code Art. 2:52. 
10 Commentary of new Civil Code. 
11 Art. 22. and Art. 52-60. 
12 Act CXII of 2011 on right to informational self-determination and freedom of 
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the result of procedure can do the follows: calls to remedy grievance or eliminate, 
make recommendations to the supervisor of offending organ, to action official data 
protection procedure.13 At the end, the Authority is able to bring an action to follow 
the procedure of writ of Authority.14  
The main possibilities of harmed by the new Civil Code of Hungary are the 
injury paid and non-pecuniary damages. As for me, a special rule of procedure of 
prosecutor is very important new element of private policy. In the case of injury of 
individual laws, which contrary to public interest, the prosecutor is able to enter an 
action with victim’s consent.15 
Parallel with rules of Civil Code, the Criminal Code of Hungary16 contains 
many elements of personal data protection. For example, specifies the misuse of 
personal and public data.17 
Summary, we can talk about a related well-structured system of data 
protection and private policy of Hungary, in which the different acts are able to 
complete each others. 
4. THE PRACTICE OF THE HUNGARY AND EUROPAIN UNION  
I would like to write about the legal practice of Curia of Hungary and 
Constitutional Court of Hungary and European Court of Human Rights in this 
chapter. At first, we can conclude that the development of legal practice these 
courts are equivalent in the recent times. There is not significance differences 
judgement of these courts.  
Both of decision of European Court of Human Rights18 and Constitution 
Court of Hungary19 declare the liability of the operator of the website for 
comments.  
The decision20 of Constitutional Court of Hungary destroyed the rules of 
legitimate public interest of new Civil Code, because basic lawlessness. By this 
decision the legitimate public interest is an indefinable concept, so it must not use 
in the area of data protection and private policy. 
 
                                                 
information Art. 54. para (1). 
13 Act CXII of 2011 on right to informational self-determination and freedom of 
information Art. 55. 
14 Act CXII of 2011 on right to informational self-determination and freedom of 
information Art. 64. 
15 New Civil Code Art. 2:54. para. (4). 
16 Act C of 2012 on Criminal Code. 
17 Act C of 2012 on Criminal Code Art. 219-220. 
18 Case of Delfi v. Estonia. 
19 Decision 19/2014. (V. 30.) on the procedure of the Constitutional Court. 
20 Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) on the procedure of the Constitutional Court. 
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5. SUMMARY 
We can say that the system of data protection and private policy of Hungary has 
developed along with practice of European Union. Many new acts have come into 
effect recently, and these are able to control properly the area of data protection in 
Hungary. This is evidenced that the Hungarian and EU courts make the same 
decisions. 
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Abstract 
The 1st May 2014 it has been 10 years of Polish participation in the European Union. This 
past decade has brought significant development in Poland. It is because of grants from 
EU. Poland has gained in European integration both globally and regionally at the local 
government level. A good example of this is the region – Małopolska – literally called Little 
Poland with its main city – Krakow.  
During these 10 years there had been circa 200 projects worth about 550 million €. 
European funds affect the development of almost every aspect of life. For instance in terms 
of road investment, public transport, municipal management as well as non-investment 
projects, so-called soft investments in the form of education, social assistance and social 
integration, culture and tourism. 
 
Keywords: infrastructure development, Krakow in European Union, public 
infrastructure. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Ten years ago, 1st May 2004 Poland with other nine countries: Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta became 
members of European Union. The past decade has brought significant 
development in Poland. This changes occur in the form of infrastructure and non-
investment projects, so called soft investments. This improvement has been seen 
on the example on the second largest city in Poland – Krakow. Last ten years was 
a very good period for Krakow city. Krakow has never developed so quickly in its 
history before. This effect would not be so spectacular without financial support 
from European Union grants. One of the report1 says that the most visible effects 
of Polish membership in the European Union are investments financed from EU 
                                                 
1 10 years of Polish presence in the EU – the benefits and costs. For whom EU money? 
About the use of EU subsidies by the Malopolska entrepreneurs and local governments see 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:LDy5mE3sJLg J:jakaunia.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Prezentacja-04.10.2013-Krak%25C3%25B3w-.pptx+&cd=10& 
hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=pl&client=firefox-a [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
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funds. Virtually every municipality has modernized some way, built a sewage 
system and sewage treatment plant, renovated community center or school because 
of EU subsidies. 
There are many aspects of life we can be proud of because of participation in 
European Union. Of course there are disadvantages, as everywhere, but we cannot 
deny the visible effects, which have positive impact on life in Krakow. It is better 
for life to live in well-organized three-dimensional and social sphere.  
The most visible result is that Krakow is considered as the city with the best 
municipal management in Poland. This is owed of EU funds too. These grants were 
parts of projects in the form of financial support according to wastewater treatment 
plant or network plumbing. Moreover these effects are seen now in new modern 
rolling stock, modernization, new tram and road infrastructure. Other examples 
equal important are social integration and social assistance for unemployed, people 
with disabilities or families that need social support. 
All projects are described on special website2, where everybody who are 
interested in EU funds in Krakow or Lesser Poland can acquire needed 
information. Moreover there are further plans for next planned years, so it proves 
and provides continuously development. 
2. 10TH ANNIVERSARY IN KRAKOW 
From the beginning of 2014 were held a lot of meetings, debates and exhibitions 
devoted to Polish association in the European Union. Many information appeared 
in the local press, radio, television and the Internet. Krakow’s authority and 
residents had a lot to say in this topic. Everything was done to increase the 
awareness about the benefits derived from Polish membership and the nearest 
region. 
Round, 10th anniversary of Polish accession to the European Union was a 
good opportunity to reflect on. Especially when it comes to what Lesser Poland 
District gained from European founds3. Moreover this topic is very up to date and 
provokes many discussions, particularly in the political sphere and those taking 
place at Krakow’s universities. The themes are the Polish integration and 
achievements in the past decade, as well as a future plans for the 2014-20244 years. 
Beside casual discussions there was picnic on the Main Square in Krakow. The 
Krakow City organized it in May, 1st under the title ‘10 Polish years in the 
                                                 
2 European Funds for Malopolska (Lesser Poland), available at: http://www.fundusze.m 
alopolska.pl/Strony/default.aspx [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
3 10 years in the European Union: what has changed in the Lesser Poland? Avalibale at: 
http://www.ra diokrakow.pl/www/index.nsf/ID/JGAA-9JPBB4 [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
4 About ten years of Polish membership in the European Union at the Jagiellonian 
University. Available at: http://rodm-krakow.pl/o-dziesiecioleciu-latach-czlonkostwa-
polski-w-unii-eur opejskiej-na-uniwersytecie-jagiellonskim/ [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
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European Union’.5 Very popular was special exhibition6 that showed all the biggest 
and the most important achivements supported by funds from EU. 
3. KRAKOW’S PLACE IN POLAND AND THE CLOSEST REGION 
Poland is situated on the central Europe and borders with Russian Federation, 
Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Germany. Total area of 
land is 312 685 km2 and this making Poland the 9th largest country in Europe. 
Poland has a population of 35,8 million people. The majority of them live in urban 
areas (61% people). The official language is Polish. Because of tourist industry the 
knowledge of English is common. The official currency is the Polish zloty (PLN). 
Poland is not in Euro Zone which actually makes this country relatively not 
expensive compared to the West countries of Europe.7 
3.1. Krakow – general characteristics 
To understand the Krakow’s role in Poland and closest region, there is a need to 
depict main characteristics of the most important levels of life in this city. Because 
as it was mentioned at the beginning, almost every aspect of life in Krakow was 
supported by European Union funds. 
Krakow is the second biggest city in Poland with 750 000 inhabitants 
nowadays. Just after the capital –Warsaw – which is the biggest Polish city with 
1,7 million people now. Krakow as one of the oldest Polish city situated just on the 
Vistula River has been one of the leading centers of Polish academic, cultural and 
artistic place. What is more, it is one of Poland’s most important economic hubs. 
These elements create that city is a very important center in Poland.  
Krakow is located on the Southern part of Poland. The city is situated in a 
valley at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, about 219 m above sea level. 
Krakow has good location, because of the Jurassic Rock Upland to the North and 
the Tatra Mountains to the South. Rich nature reserves due to ecological value 
places make this area full of plant and animal wildlife in the middle of diversified 
landscape. Also many endemic species can be found here.  
From the tourist side, Krakow is the major tourist spot of Poland. This one 
thousand year old city is Poland former capital, former seat of Polish kings. The 
entire medieval land of whole Krakow Old Town which is a UNESCO treasure has 
been preserved. The city is famous because of the Wawel Royal Hill with the castle 
                                                 
5 Picnic ‘10 Polish years in the European Union’ in Krakow, available at: http://www.10 
latwue.pl/atrakcje/piknik-10-lat-polski-w-unii-europejskiej-w-krakowie/ [cit. 2014-07-
28]. 
6 Krakow 10 years in the European Union (see the exhibition), available at: http://krakow.pl 
/aktualnosci/103481,26,komunikat,10_lat_krakowa_w_unii_europejskiej__zobacz_wysta
we_.html [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
7 Poland and its tourist attractions, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xXH 
TjwhDlQ&feature=youtu.be [cit. 2014-07-25]. 
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and Cathedral. Both excellent examples of renaissance architecture. Other key 
sights are located in the Market Square. The largest medieval square in Europe. It 
is surrounded by historic town houses.8 
There is no doubt that Krakow is a major educational place. Twelve 
institutions of higher education offer multiple courses in the city.9 For a special 
attention deserve two universities. Humanities and technical one. Jagiellonian 
University – the humanities university and AGH University of Science and 
Technology – the technical university are the biggest and one of the leading 
researches centers in Poland.  
Krakow is unofficial cultural capital of Poland and was named the official 
European Capital of Culture for the year 200010 by the European Union. Kraków's 
28 museums are separated into the national and municipal museums. The city also 
has a number of art collections and public art galleries. It is worth to mention about 
the Rynek Underground Museum,11 situated under the Main Square. It is very 
modern museum where visitors can see more than one thousand years of history 
through its real streets and artefacts. Just next to museums there are many cultural 
indoor and outdoor events. It is obvious that these are film festivals, theaters and 
music one. 
3.2. Małopolska – ‘Little Poland’ 
‘Little Poland’ is literally name of Polish world ‘Małoplska’. ‘Małoplska’ means 
the historic region with the biggest city on this area – capital – Krakow (picture 1). 
Other proper names are Lesser Poland District in English or Polonia Minor in 
Latin. According to a Polish custom, whenever a new village was formed next to 
an older one, the name of the new entity was presented with an adjective little (or 
lesser). While the old village was described as grater. It means, that this new name 
was born to distinguish old province, the cradle of the Polish state, the older 
Greater Poland, from the younger sister situated on the South.  
Lesser Poland with Krakow as its capital acquired new possibilities to 
improve infrastructure, create new ways for investments and new investors, 
encourage tourists to visit interesting and unique venues from UNESCO list for 
instance. On the area of Lesser Poland there are five UNESCO objects:12 Historic 
Centre of Krakow; Wieliczka and Bochnia Royal Salt Mine; Auschwitz Birkenau 
German Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camp; Kalwaria Zebrzydowska 
the Mannerist Architecture and Park Landscape Complex and Pilgrimage Park; 
Wooden Churches of Southern Lesser Poland. Possession of these pearls of World 
                                                 
8 Poland and its tourist attractions, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=4xXHTjwhDl Q&feature=youtu.be [cit. 2014-07-25]. 
9 Information about Krakow, available at: http://www.meta-online.com/pl/informacje/ 
informacje-o-krakowie/ [cit. 2014-08-23]. 
10 European cities of culture for the year 2000. A wealth of urban cultures for celebrating 
the turn of the century see http://www.krakow2000.pl/acceraport.pdf [cit. 2014-08-23]. 
11 Rynek Underground Museum, available at: http://www.mhk.pl/branches/rynek-
underground [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
12 World Heritage List, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ [cit. 2014-07-27]. 
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Heritage undertakes to care for it, promoting these objects and maintenance of 
appropriate level of this heritage. 
 
Picture 1. Lesser Poland District – Małopolska – Little Poland – Polonia Minor 
Source: www.visitmalopolska.pl 
Małopolska region has a very important and wide extended transportation 
network. It contains roads, airports and railroads with local, national and 
international statuses. According the roads, through Lesser Poland cross several 
European roads with numbers:13 E40 (from West to East across whole Europe), 
E77 (from North to South to border with Slovakia in Chyżne), and others e.g. E30, 
E371, E372, E462, E75. With respect to airports, Lesser Poland has it two. One of 
it is situated next to Krakow i.e. John Paul II International Airport Kraków – 
Balice. This is the second biggest airport in Poland after this situated in Polish 
capital. The second one in Małopolska region is Katowice International Airport 
next to Katowice city. Except mentioned possibilities of travelling, there are 
                                                 
13 Lesser Poland. Transport Roads see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesser_Poland [cit. 
2014-07-26]. 
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railways with European connections too. These transportation also has gained 
opportunity from diversified grants and visible forms and more comfortable 
conditions are seen now or can be seen soon.  
Krakow with its both historic and administrative regions called ‘Małopolska’ 
had gained the new opportunities due to the dynamic development with respect to 
EU funds. It is natural order of life that adjacent region with main city attract more 
opportunities and new paths of development. And the next success is, that this 
development can be named as sustainable.  
4. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
There are many examples of development in aspect of public infrastructure in 
Krakow. The best known, the most important and visible facilities can be divided 
into two groups. First one is municipal management and the second one is public 
transport. Inhabitants of Krakow city can be proud of improvement specifically 
seen in the form of municipal management. 
During last ten years Krakow has received 2,311 billion PLN (about 550 
million €). Simultaneously it has to be maintained, that there is one basic condition 
to receive any grant from EU. It is own contribution. That is why the local 
government in Krakow had to pay more than 2 billion PLN (c.476 million €). 
According to statement of Krakow’s president Jacek Majchrowski, he claims that 
taking into account financial possibilities of own contribution, local authorities 
have used EU assistance in one hundred percents.14 
4.1. Municipal management 
Environmental protection is a serious problem nowadays. That is why this issue is 
considered to be proper treated by authorities in urban management. 
Sphere that is referred to municipal management in Krakow is the best 
functioning in this field in Poland. It has been achieved because of European Union 
grants. Under this assistance it was possible construction of wastewater treatment 
plant in Płaszów. From these founds benefits also heating network for its 
modernization. Other very important examples are network plumbing 
modernization or municipal landfill Barycz.  
 
                                                 
14 KLEJBUK-GOŹDZIALSKA, BEATA: 10 years in EU, in Dwutygodnik Miejski Kraków, No. 
8. (2014), 11. 
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Picture 2. Lamusownia – modern waste facility.15 
For a special attention deserves Lamusownia (picture 2). This is the name of 
modern waste facility. It is special place in Krakow, where its residents can for 
free, and small business can for low fee get rid of almost all of segregated waste. 
This waste usage stores bulky waste such as furniture, computers or televisions, 
unusual wastes such as paints, glues, batteries, etc. It is that place, in which for 
each type of waste are separate containers. Important thing is, that the waste is 
collected until the container is full. People can bring here the waste from Monday 
to Saturday during all year. Generally it can be concluded that this is investment 
in a better life in a clean Krakow. Just a little bit of awareness and good willingness 
are enough to drive waste to proper place – Lamusownia, rather than through the 
soil and water to our stomachs, or by stoves and chimneys into our lungs. This 
steps enhance the chance that going on a trip or picnic, we avoid the countryside 
of illegal dumps.16 
Another great project that European Union money has improved in municipal 
management in Krakow is eco incineration plant (picture 3). This object is under 
construction now from 2008 and will be opened in 2015. That investment will 
complement the system of public utilities in the city and at the same time will be a 
source of energy for the city. The Programme of Municipal Waste Management in 
Krakow is implemented under the Operational Programme Infrastructure and 
Environment. Priority is waste management and protection of the earth's surface. 
This is measure 2.1.: Complex projects related to municipal waste management 
with particular emphasis on hazardous waste.17 
                                                 
15 Source: http://www.lamusownia.krakow.pl/ [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
16 Lamusowania – main page, available at: http://lamusownia.krakow.pl/ [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
17 Eco incineration plant – main page available at: http://www.spalarnia.krakow.pl/ [cit. 
2014-07-28]. 
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Picture 3. Eco incineration plant18 
The project aims are to build the missing installation system for processing 
municipal waste, i.e. the Department of Waste Thermal Treatment. This plant will 
constitute one of the most important elements of the waste management system 
and will be an integral part of it. 
4.2. Public transport 
Krakow with students living here during academic year is almost one million city. 
It can be seen during those studying months. Public transport with diverse shifting 
possibilities from one place to another is a very important task. People choose their 
place for living there, where are provided good proximity of communication 
facilities and velocity of mobility for their destination.  
Support from EU grants can be seen in modern rolling stock and new tram 
roads and other roads investments. With respect to modern rolling stock, these are 
for example low-floor, ecological trams and new busses. That vehicles are 
designed specifically for disabled people. What is more and very convenient, these 
objects have air conditioning system and monitoring one. Providing safety for 
travelers is very up to date task for local authorities.  
In Krakow there are two new tram routes: one line leads to Small Plaszow 
and the second one to Ruczaj. These areas was poorly connected with the rest of 
the city. Now not only there are new tram lines, but also all surrounded 
infrastructure, that involving new pavements on road, for passers and routs for 
cyclists. Everything is designed in a modern and fashionable way.  
Such big city needs also vast road network and diverse ways of possibilities 
to avoid traffic jams or unnecessarily driving up in busy location such as big 
jounctions or roundabouts. As a alternate road in Krakow, it Southern part is 
bypass. It is part of highway number A4 that passing from East to West of Poland. 
Moreover this construction allows for removal of heavy transport from the centre. 
Another important road and bridge construction is roundabout called Victims of 
Katyn. It is three-storeys roundabout which improve communications in the 
Northern part of Krakow. Next good example of improving traffic problem is 
flyover above the Nowohucka street. Those who drive just straight ahead do not 
have to cross through big crossroad, they just can go above it during a few seconds.  
                                                 
18 Source: http://www.spalarnia.krakow.pl/ [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
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For those people, who prefer going by foot or riding their bicycle there is also 
modern and interesting new way. This footbridge is destined only for pedestrians 
and cyclists and connects two Krakow’s districts above the Vistula River. During 
night, this bridge is easy to see owing to colorful lights between Kazimierz District 
and Podgórze one.  
People, who travel by plane from John Paul II International Airport, have 
some inconveniences now. The second busiest airport in Poland is located near 
Krakow, in the village named Balice, has its extension now. The airport was opened 
for civil aviation in 1964 and was renamed in honour of Pope John Paul II in 1995. 
The airport has two passenger terminals, for international and domestic flights, as 
well as a cargo terminal. Now there are construction works and this investment 
will be finished in 2015. The investment is estimated at 600 million PLN (c. 142 
million €) with 200 million PLN (c. 47,6 million €) coming from EU fund.19 
To sum up the public transport issue, it has to be noticed that there were also 
other investments. It were fast agglomeration rail or railway and bus station 
modernization, etc. All those examples of infrastructure facilities are strongly 
needed. It is important that second biggest city in Poland has an extensive 
communication network. All mentioned projects were supported by EU funds. 
5. SOFT INVESTMENTS 
Soft skills are personality traits. These skills consist of communication, 
assertiveness, creativity, resistance to stress, leadership competencies, the ability 
to cooperate with others and work independently and time management skills. Soft 
skills we learn at home, we acquire it also in the process of learning and future 
professional career.20 
One can think of soft skills, whether are crucial for employers. It is now 
desirable the same as university degree or professional experience in the labour 
market nowadays. Soft skills are also the point of view of today's style of living 
and working with people. It seems to be very important these days. It allows to 
conclude whether the candidate is suitable for the proposed position, not only as 
to its substance, but also whether employee will fit into the image of a company, 
or find a group of other employees, or whether employee will be able to attract 
new customers. 
Soft skills are useful not only at work but also in every other of life. It helps 
us to function in society, due to development of our image, make new friends, 
pursue its objectives or even organizing time, which we have less and less 
nowadays. Without no doubt it is worth to pay attention to develop and improve 
these skills. 
In this article the concept of soft investment refers to social programs, which 
                                                 
19 John Paul II International Airport, Krakow, Poland. See http://www.airport-technology 
.com/projects/john-paul-international-airport-krakow-poland/ [cit. 2014-07-28]. 
20 Miękkie i twarde kompetencje – o co w tym chodzi? See http://gadzetomania.pl/2010/ 
11/09/miekkie-i-twarde-kompetencje-o-co-w-tym-chodzi [cit. 2014-08-10]. 
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are funded by the European Union. These programs can be considered as an 
investments. It is connected with improving people qualifications and promoting 
social initiatives for the future. And that future will provide positive results for 
sure. 
5.1. Culture 
Krakow has a lot to say in the sphere of cultural events. It is here, where films 
festival, theater and music one take place every year. Krakow is one of the most 
important city in Poland in cultural sphere. That is why the EU funds reached many 
important occurrence here.  
Film Music Festival is an annual event, which two editions in 2009 and 2011 
were financed from European funds. The Opera Rara is a year-round cycle opera 
based on ambitious productions from the stages of the most famous opera houses 
in Italy, France, Britain and Germany. Next example are series of Krakow Nights: 
Museum Krakow Night, Sacral Krakow Night or Poetic Krakow Night and many 
others. These nights were supported by the EU from 2009 to 2012 editions. 
For those who want to spend their time close to culture in museum, can visit 
modern just established new museums i.e. Museum of Modern Art or Rynek 
Underground Museum of medieval Krakow. A few museums were modernized. 
These are e.g. Museum of the Home Army, multimedia and interactive place with 
the knowledge full of Polish history of World War II. Other objects are theaters 
with one of the most important one is People's Theatre in Nowa Huta.21 
These mentioned objects are prominent, because they represent Polish culture 
that is intertwined with the Polish history and regional folklore. 
5.2. Social assistance 
EU funds supported projects in the field of social integration, improving 
employability and increasing professional activity unemployed people. 
For example, the project ‘Different paths, one goal’ is directed to unemployed 
and offers them the opportunity to participate in various training courses, 
internships, assistance guidance counselors or one-time grants for establishing 
their own business. 
Within the framework of social integration have been implemented standards 
in the field of social work specialist counseling for people with disabilities and 
their families. That help was offered for families experiencing violence. 
Interesting project was the ‘StreetWork’ which aim was to improve the social 
integration of young people aged 15-25, by improving their functioning in school 
and family. Within the project there were workshops on addiction prevention, 
healthy lifestyle and the ability to function in a group. Street workers were 
organized leisure activities such as ‘Days of work’, ‘Graffiti workshop’, football 
tournaments and film screenings such as ‘Summer Cinema’. 
Because of these social assistance projects many people in Krakow had 
                                                 
21 DŁUGOSZ, ANNA: 10 years in EU for Krakow, in Dwutygodnik Miejski Kraków, No. 9. 
(2014), 4-6. 
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opportunity to stand face to face with national and international culture in 
museums, theaters, operas and films festivals. For many of them founds gave them 
chance for better life because of work assistance. For poor families or families with 
proper functioning disorders it was very important, hope of better tomorrow.  
5.3. Education 
Krakow as a part of projects from European funds tries to provide children and 
youngsters needs at every stage of education.  
The ‘I'll be back’ project is a program that helps return to work after a break 
related to childbirth. It is dedicated to young mothers (or fathers), that have 
problem with re-employment after maternity or paternity leave. This support is 
very important now, because first of all it helps young parents to provide them 
work and then material support for young families. 
In primary and secondary schools have been implemented projects based on 
innovative syllabuses, especially of mathematics and natural sciences. This step 
should conduct to equal educational opportunities. Moreover appeared learning 
individualization of extra lessons in English or research groups in mathematics and 
natural sciences. All to meet different children’s needs in schools. The projects also 
supported talented students in the form of scholarships.  
From EU funds have also been renovated school buildings and classrooms. It 
included new educational equipment and new facilities.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
During Polish participation in European Union from 2004 till this 2014 year it 
should be seen positive development in infrastructure and soft investments 
described in this article. Krakow’s authorities acquired actively money for local 
investments. Well known and seen are mostly transportation and road investment 
projects. But there are many social projects in form of soft investments that focus 
on individual needs Krakow’s inhabitants.  
Krakow’s president Jacek Majchrowski said22 that the passing decade of 
Polish membership in European Union opened up an opportunity for development, 
and Krakow’s authorities full exploited that opportunity. In Krakow, we are 
witnessed the changes which would have never occurred in such rapid pace. 
Without EU funds there would not be numerous of project created at that time in 
Krakow.  
 
 
                                                 
22 10 Polish years in the European Union – an open letter of Krakow’s President, available 
at: http://krk.fm/10-lat-polski-w-unii-europejskiej-list-prezydenta-krakowa [cit. 2014-07-
28]. 
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